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Discovery: The process whereby a requesting party asks for
information and the producing party provides only data, thereby
increasing the cost of litigation by an order of magnitude.
Introduction
Computer-based evidence is not new to the Law, but its ubiquity and quantity are
forcing the Law to contemplate some new challenges. Just about every legal dispute involves
data that was created on a computer-even if the final documents appear on dead treest . The
sheer volume of data produced by litigants is forcing many an attor ney to request an extensi9n
just to allow it to be reviewed before production and analyzed after receipt.
There are many issues that the Courts still have not resolved when it comes to
computer-based evidence - not the least of which being jus t what is a requesting party entitled
to, in what form, and what additional explanatory information must be provided?
Documents And Databases
What Is Data?
A computer knows nothing of documents and databases. A computer makes no
distinction between the two. It is merely a machine doing precisely what it was told to do by
computer programmers who have written a computer program2 to process information.
A computer can only store data in the form of 0's and l's. Everything else, be it a letter, a
FAX, an audio recording, a photograph, a video, or a giant corporate database, is an illusion.
The illusion requires a conspiracy between the computer hardware (the electronics) and the
software (the computer programs). When working properly, the illusion is complete - you think
the computer is storing this information in an appropriate form and can redisplay or replay it
on demand. However, the savvy counsel never lets go of the idea that it really is an illusion.
1 The intentionally derogatory terms used by computer geeks for documents created by melting
carbon powder onto a matrix of wood chips.
2 Thus giving rise to the computer science definition of a computer program as uinformation
about how to process information."
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Those who do let go of that idea run the risk of not req uesting information to which they might
be entitled, or to produce irrelevant or privileged information.
To many people data and informat ion are essentially synonymous. This is flat wrong.
Failure to make this distinction is responsible for many of the discovery and production woes of
litigants and their counsel.
Data and information have close-but-no-cigar definitions:
1/data (1) A re-interpretable representation of information in a formalized manner suitable for
communication, interpretation, or processing."
lIinformation (1) In information processing, knowledge concerning such things as facts, concepts,
object, events,i deas and processes,t hat with a certain context has a particular meaning."
IBM Dictionary of Computing, Tenth Edition (1993) (emphasis added).
The subtlety of these definitions bears some consideration: Data is are-interpretable
representation of information. Information is data that has meaning in context. To rephrase this
in a more approachable form: Data is what is stored on the computer - information is what you
make of it.
The Difference Between Data and Information
Consider this piece of data: 1,000,223,101.
It has no apparent meaning to us yet it represents a number that milli ons of people will
remember until their deaths. To understand the meaning (more properly called the semantics)
of this data, one needs only to know what this data is, how it is encoded, and how to interpret it
appropriately.
It is the number of seconds that have elapsed since midnight on January 1st, 1970. Using
a calculator (or a calendric idiot savant if you have one) this number can be converted into a
date: September II, 2001, 8:46 am3.
3 Technically this time is in UTC (sic), Universal Coordinat~dTime, not Eastern Standard Time,
but the point is made, nevertheless. For those whose cognitive skills have only come on-line since this
date, this is the time when the first hijacked aircraft, American Airlines flight 11 from Boston, impacted
with the north tower of the World Trade Center. Computers using the UNIX operating system calculate
dates as the number of seconds since January 1st , 1970.
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Every man, woman and child in North America who is sane and of suitable age, will
remember this date, yet were they to be presented with this"raw" data, they would have found
it to be completely incomprehensible and devoid of meaning.
That is the difference between data and information. The problem in liti gation can be
expressed succinctly: What is requested is information. What is produced in response is data.
Unless the data produced is accompanied with sufficient additional information to allow
humans to direct computers to convert the data produced back into information, the data
produced and received remains only data and is worth the paper that it is not printed on.
The difference between data and information may seem academic, but it is this
difference that, if overlooked, will likely increase the cost of discovery significantly. It is not
unusual for the costs of converting data into information during discovery to be one of the most
significant costs.
It is not just semantics that we as humans need to fully unders tand data. For example,
the date 9/11/2001 has little meaning to those who live to the East of the U.S.A. Over "there"
dates are written differently and September 11, 2001 would be written numerically as
11/9/2001 (notice how North American eyes deal with this date - the meaning fades).
The difference here is that we need to know the format of the data in order to interpret it
with appropriate semantics.
But, as they say in the Ginsu knife commercials: Wait! There's more! Consider the
following date (in U.S. format): 9/32/2001. Our brains quickly decode that there is a
fundamental problem with this date as there is no such thing as the 32nd day of September.
What we are now doing is applying rules to the data - technically known as syntax - that
control the"grammar" of writing dates. Such syntax determines that it is acceptable to write the
month first, followed by a "/", then the day in the month, a"/" again, and the year. (Notice
how before 2000, we rarely wrote the year out as a four digit number? The syntax of date
writing has changed.)
Date syntax also determines such things as the validity of writing a date such as
2/29/200x because there can only be a Febr~ary 29th when there is a leap year. Date syntax also
says that it is acceptable to write the date in many other forIilS: 9-11-01, 11 September, 2001, Sep.
11,2001, and so on.
A-3
COMPUTER-BASED EVIDENCE: CUTTING THE COST OF DISCOVERY
Andy Johnson-Laird and Barbara A. Frederiksen
The only reason we can all read these dates and know what the y mean to us as humans
is that we have been "programmed" with an understanding of what it takes to take the data and
tum it into informat ion. Specifically we have been taught three things: the format, syntax and
semantics of North American date representation.
It is these three things that one must have to convert data into useful information. If any
of these three things are absent, one has just a pile of binary digits of 0's and l's.
Encoded Information
Textual Characters
Representing the real world in a computer is a real challenge. Whatever we do must be
based on the fact that computers can only represent data using the 0 and 1 of the binary
numbering system.
How then can we represent the letters of the alphabet and decimal numbers? The
answer is by encoding that data in a binary representation. Of course, it would be distinctly
sub-optimal if everyone used their own private way of encoding letters and numbers because it
would mean tha t we could not exchange information4.
In North America, most people (apart from IBM) use a system of encoding called quite
descriptively, the American Standard Code for Informa tion Interchange ("ASCII"). IBM, for
historical and imperial reasons uses a different encoding system on some of its computer
systems called the Extended Binary-Coded Decimal Interchange Code ('J'EBCDIC.")5
Without descending into the com plete technical depths, suffice it to say that the letters of
the alphabet in ASCII are represented by groups of eight binary digits - such a group is known
4 This is not just an academic issue. Even today there are many different alphabets that
computers need to represent when one considers all of the different written human languages. In the
early days of computing, circa 1960, there were several contending different representations for the
current Latin fonts we use in North America.
5 Though ASCII and EBCDIC operate in the same fashion, they use different values to represent
data. Most PCs require special software to read data encoded in EBCDIC. Special care is therefore
required to ensure EBCDIC files are produced in a useable format during discovery
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as a "byte" of information6. In ASCII, the letter"A" is 01000001, "B" is 01000010 and so on,
through all of the upper case letters, the lower case letters, Arabic numeral characters (as
opposed to numeric values), and the special punctuation marks such as --!@#$%I\&*O etc.
When the"A" key is pressed on a compute r's keyboard it is translated by the electronics
of the keyboard and the computer into 01000001 when it is placed into the computer's memory.
When it is displayed on the computer's screen, the binary value of 01000001 is translates into a
pattern of dots that has the appropriate letterform and color for the typeface being used. When
it is printed on paper (such as you are reading right now), the hardware and software of the
computer and the printer conspire to print small dots of toner or ink on paper for the
appropriate letterform. Thus, the illusion is complete. Whenever it matters, the letter"A" can be
typed, displayed, and printed, even though internally it is 01000001.
Textual documents can be searched only because they are textual and the computer can
scan the underlying binary patterns that represent each character for an exact match with a
keyword (also represented in ASCII). The computer can do this precisely only because the letter
"A" is represented as 01000001 regardless of what typeface it might be displayed or printed in.
ASCII text such as this is the most basic form of textual information on a computer.
Numbers
The illusion of numbers is effected in a similar way, but using a different encoding. A
byte of information contains numeric values using the binary numberi ng system where each
binary digit is ascribed a decimal value. In the conventional decimal system, the "columns" of a
number are ascribed powers of ten. A number with four digits would have column headings of:
1000 100 101, so that we can write 1,234 and know it is one 1000, two laO's, three 10's and four
l's that are then added together to form the final number.
Binary works with the same rules except that, by definition the "columns" are powers of
two (hence the name binary). For example:
6 "Byte" is a term coined by IBM to denote a group of adjacent binary digits. These days,
convention has it that the byte, unless otherwise specified is eight binary digits.
A-S
COMPUTER-BASED EVIDENCE: CDITING THE COST OF DISCOVERY
Andy Johnson-Laird and Barbara A. Frederiksen
The binary number 10110011 shown in the example above really means a value of: one
128, one 32, one 16, one 2 and one 1. Add ing these together (as one does for decimal arithmetic),
means that 10110011 is equivalent to 179 in decimal.
Computers use binary because it is simpler and easier. There is no measuring of
magnitude of numbers in each digit position - either it is a 0 or a 1, and the computer will use
the presence or absence of voltage, or the polarity of a magnetic field to represent a 0 or a 1
internally7.
Is It A Textual Character Or Is It A Number?
This is the first hint of the quagmire that lies ahead and it is the source of much
confusion for non-computer people.
Given that the letter H A" is 01000001, and that this also represents the decimal value of
65 (there is a one in the 64 column and a one in the 1 column, added together these are 65), then
how does the computer "know" whether or not 01000001 should be a textual character or a
decimal number represented in binary?
The answer is that the computer does not need to know. It is entirely up to the computer
programmer to ensure all instances of bytes containing textual characters are treated like text,
and those instances that represent decimal numbers are p~operlyhandled as numeric
information. If a computer programmer ever makes a mistake and inadvertently treats numeric
information as text then all +FpPyvpjDeAii! breaks loose (this being an example of some non-
textual information that was misinterpreted as text by forcing Microsoft Word to open an
executable program called ghost.exe).
7 Paradoxically, all digital computers work by using analog electronic circuitry. This causes
considerable confusion when patents speak of digital signals versus analog signals. Internally a computer
might, for example, use voltages between 0 volts and +5 volts and adopt the convention that a voltage
greater than 3.4 volts is a 1, an lower than 2.0 volts is a zero. With this convention, the signals are
"binary," but they are so, only because an analog voltage is subjected to threshold measurements.
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This "context-sensitive" interpretation of binary digits, while it may seem confusing or
arbitrary to start with, is not uncommon in everyday life. We are all used to dealing with the
problem of context-sensitive encoding; a red light on the instrument panel of your car does not
have the same meaning as the red light on the rear-end of a bus, or a red light hanging above an
intersection, or outside a building on certain streets in Amsterdam. The semantics are different;
but all typically mean some variant of stop or "you have, or will have, a problem" (including
the reference to Amsterdam).
Life would become quite confusing if the semantics of the color red were to mean, "it's
OK to proceed." Indeed, more than one person has been confused by Microsoft's decision to
require us to click on the I••button when we wish to stop the computer.
Graphical Images
That small graphical image of the start button is not text even though it looks like text
when it is displayed on the screen. Instead it is a small graphical image of an icon and letters.
One only need look at the screen close up to see the individual graphic elements and the dots
that make up the letters.
1111111'
Each dot on the screen is represented as a combination of the three primary colors; red,
green, and blue. The specific color obtained depends upon the intensity of these values much
like mixing light of these primary colors, with black being represented as: Red: 00000000, Green:
00000000, Blue: 00000000 (no light would therefore be black). A dim yellow might be
represented as: Red: 00000000, Green: 01011111, Blue: 0101000 (this would have a greenish tinge
as there is more green than blue). At the other end of the spectrum (so to speak), white is
represented as: Red: 11111111, Green: 11111111, Blue: 11111111.
In this graphic representation above, note that the computer is not storing text as text,
but as groups of colored dots that, when displayed (or printed), happen to look like text to a
human reader.
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This difference between text and a graphical representation of text is fundamental and
further serves to confuse many a lawyer when dealing with document production.
Scanned Documents
Printed documents can be scanned in and converted to graphic images by document
scanners - a FAX machine is an example of this. Horizontal slices (called raster scan lines) of
the document are sensed as the document moves past the scan head in a FAX machine.
Equipped with hundreds of light sensors, the FAX machine senses those places on the paper
that have been darkened with ink or toner, and converts each raster scan into D's and l's for
transmission to the remote FAX machine. A document scanner works the same way. Color
scanners have three sensors for each /I dot" position in the scan head, and can sense the amount
of red, green, and blue light being reflected back from the documen t.
Inside the computer (or the rece iving FAX machine) these raster scan lines are re-
assembled to form an image of the original document.
However, the"digitization" of the document, as this process is more properly called, is
imperfect. The sensors in the FAX machine or the document scanner will not line up precisely
the same way as each page passes by it - more correctly, the paper will not be aligned precisely
the same way, but the effect is the same.
For example, the two images below show two words from the s arne document, printed
on different printers but scanned in on the same document scanner and the difference between
the two is quite marked in terms of the convexities and concavities on the letter forms:
IBefore me,llBefore me,l
For a computer to be able to search graphical images, a computer program would need
to be written that was"smart" enough to be able to recognize each of the letters in the
document, even though some letterforms are badly mutilated (for example, compare the "r" in
both samples).
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Such optical character recognition ("OCR") programs do exist, but they rarely attain
more than a 98% accuracy and evan that level of accvracy is sufficienl to obluscate the original
text so badly that it is impossible to search accurately and reliably.
File Formats
Whether particular binary data is textual or graphical in nature is a choice made, in part,
by the individual controlling the creation of the computer file. The specific internal file format is
something controlled by the choice of software used to create and maintain the file. There are
therefore two hurdles by the recipient of produced data: Knowledge of what format in which
the data is stored, and knowledge of which applic ation program was used to create and
maintain the information.
In some specific cases, one application program can read and interpret the computer
files created by another application program. For example, Microsoft Word can read the files
created by WordPerfect (although not always with the exact same results as WordPerfect).
The vendor of a given application program often takes the position that the file format
used by the program is proprietary (or least does not publish the information). This creates a
situation where the only way that a file in a particular format can be accessed and processed is
by obtaining a copy of the specific software used to create it. This becomes costly and time
consuming - because of the actual cost of the software (some specialized document programs
less widely used than those from Microsoft can cost around $1,000, with specialized computer-
aided design software costing two or three times more than that) and the time required to
switch between applications when reviewing the evidence.
The problem is further compounded because different versions of the same application
software may process slightly (or substantially) different file formats. This then demands that
the same specific version of the application software be used to process the file.
A further problem occurs with such files as spreadsheets and databases (the latter being
discussed more fully later in this document). Spreadsheets have a schizoid existence: they
contain both the results of calculations, and, "behind the screens" the formulae that make those
calculations. Spreadsheets also have user-defined format insofar as the columns and rows can
contain any particular data that a user wishes to enter - and each field or value of a formula
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can be encoded in a way most suitable for a user's purpose. There is no such thing as a
/I standard" format spreadsheet, nor can there ever be.
The Need For Common File Formats
Adobe Acrobat Portable Document Files
The problem of proprietary file formats needing proprietary software to read them
spurred companies such as Adobe Systems to create what they called "Portable Document
Files," ("PDF") using a program calle d Adobe Acrobat.
While PDF files need to be read and printed using Adobe Acrobat, Adobe distributes the
Adobe Acrobat reader/printer software at no cost. One must only pay to license a copy of the
Adobe Acrobat PDF creation software.
Over the past few years more and more organizations have realized that PDF files
represent a common denominator in file formats. Once a PDF file has been created it can be
read and printed on any compute r on which the free Acrobat Reader software has been
installed and, perhaps more to the point for commerce, when viewed and printed the document
will always look the same - thus bypassing the other bane of the computing world where a
document created using WordPerfect on an Apple Macintosh did not have the same fonts or
layout when it was printed using Microsoft Word on a PC.
There really are two different variants of PDF files: one are those files that are created by
"printing" the original document to the virtual printer created by the Adobe Acrobat software
(the application program "thinks" that it is printing to a real printer, but it is an illusion created
by the Adobe Acrobat software). This kind of document can, provided the correct options are
selected at creation time, contain a document index and can be searched either when using the
Adobe Acrobat Reader or by an associated program, Adobe Catalog, that can search groups of
PDF files.
The second type of PDF file is a "PDF image" file and is usually created using a
document scanner (such as the Hewlett Packard Digital Sender). These PDF files have very
different traits - they are merely a scanned image of the document and do not therefore have
any means for being searched. There is no text embedded within the document - just images of
text.
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TIFF Files
Tagged Image File Format ("TIFF", sometimes "TIF") files are another common
denominator file format that is gaining in popularity, in part because this is the format used by
FAX machines and in part, because Microsoft Windows (in all its flavors) contains software that
allows these files to be opened and printed. In functional terms, TIFF files are most closely
related to PDF image files insofar as they do not contain any searchable text, but are just images
of text.
Discovery Issues
The use of common denominator file formats such as PDP and TIFF, while appearing to
solve the problem of proprietary file formats and software, raises several important discovery
issues:
a) The costs of converting the original evidence can be significant.
b) The act of converting the original evidence alters and/or obliterates potentially relevant
data in the form of file names, the hierarchical structure of the original evidence and the
dates and times associated with the original files. This conversion will also redact the
documents in undesirable ways (such as losing the formulae associated with a
spreadsheet).
c) If PDF image files and TIFF files are created, then it will no longer be poss ible to search
through the textual material embedded in the original files using computerized search
techniques. This may significantly hamper the analysis of the data.
d) Converting the original evidence to PDF or TIFF makes it more difficult to relate the
converted file to associated data such as e-mail attachments and headers, document
properties, and operating system information such as the date the original file was
created or accessed.
Databases
The term IIdatabase" is an ambiguous term that has been used to cover everything from
simple text files, where each text line contains a separate "record" of information, to giant data
structures such as those used by credit card companies and banks to track customer contact
information, spending history, and transaction records. From the point of view'of discovery, the
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definition does not matter as much as the problems raised for the producing and the rec eiving
party.
What raises databases as an issue for the Law is that more and more litigants are
keeping more and more data in the form of databases. Dealing with databases and discovery is
a non-trivial problem because (in common with much of computing) all is not as simple as it
would seem.
The Anatomy Of Databases
Databases have a very simple, perhaps deceptively simple, anatomy. Attorneys who
understand this anatomy will be able to address discovery-related issues with far more facility
than those who do not. We have seen counsel for large American companies involved in multi-
district litigation, who felt that it was appropriate to produce printed-on-p aper copies of
database records (selected by them) rather than provide the underlying databas e information.
Such a production is about as rational as having Domino's Pizza deliver color photographs of
pizza rather than the real thi~g. It is the production of redacted, reformatted, and spoliated
information in the wrong format for any useful ana lysis.
Fields
Individual data elements in a database are stored in "fields." For example, a customer
name might consist of three fields: a first name, middle initial, and a last name. A purchase date
might be a single field, consisting (if relevant to the processing) of three other fields: the month,
the day, and the year.
Records
Data elements associated with a particular customer, transaction, or event are grouped
together in records (the word "record" being used pretty much in its pre-eomputer, paper
system sense). An individual record (describing a vehicle owner who is filing a complain t, say)
might be:
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customer name, customer ide number, address, telephone number8
Tables, Columns, And Rows
Conceptually, the easiest way of thinking about data in databases is to visualize it as
tables, with data fields arranged in columns and rows. Each horizontal row is an individual
record, and each column contains the same data field for each respective row. Continuing with
the example of customer information for those customers of a car company that have filed
complaints, the database table that holds information describing customers, called
Customerlnfo, might appear as:
Each row represents a different customer. Each column (as the column headings
suggest) represents a specific data value for that entity.
Of particular note is that the Customerld is apparently an arbitrary number assigned
(one presumes) by the car manufacturer (or the dealer) to whom the complaint was reported.
There is no specific link to any complaint or comp laints (it being entirely feasible that a single
customer could have lodged one or more complaints).
What is not apparent is how this table could be searched? Would the CustomerName
field or the CustomerId field be considered the "key" value? For proper searching, the /J'primary
key" field (as it is known) must be unique for all of the rows in a table, and therefore the
CustomerName could not be used as it would potentially be ambiguous. Therefore, one could
predict that the CustomerId is likely to be the primary key (but, absent any information that
explicitly states this, this is conjecture).
8 This is hypothetical data. A real customer record would probably contain far more information
and far more detaiL
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In this hypothetical example (of customers complaining to a car company), there would
need to be other tables that record the specific complaints, and details of the vehicles. Here, for
example, is a hypothetical table for complaints:
This table reveals a sneak preview of the challenges that lie ahead in that, even with this
ultra-simple hypothetical, one must start inferring information about the contents of the tables in
order to be able to tum the data in the tables into useful information. Specifically, one must infer:
a) The only link between a complaint record and a customer record is the CustomerId
code. In technical terms, the CustomerId is acting both as a Primary Key for the
CustomerInfo table, and also as a "Foreign Key" in the CustomerInfo table for each
entry in the Complaints table (in that it occurs in the CustomerInfo table and is used to
access data in the Complaints table). However the CustomerId cannot be the Primary
Key for the Complaints table as one customer may have filed more than one Complaint
and database rules demand that the Primary Key be unique within the table.
b) The ComplaintCode is encoded is some arbitrary way that is opaque. Without the
specific semantics for this ComplaintCode field, one could never determine what the
meaning was. What is a J9 complaint? Could it mean that the incident about which the
customer complained involved ~ fatality?
c) In the ComplaintNotes, which appears to be a free form text field, there is no guarantee
that a tire might not be a tyre (if any of the dealers were in the U.K.).
d) The ComplaintDate format has not been identified, so 1/12/1998 could be either
January 12th, or December 1st.
The final table for the hypothe tical is the Vehiclelnfo table:
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We can reasonably infer that the VIN (Vehicle Identification Number) is unique, and
that this will be used as the Primary Key. All other fields appear to be self-evident (which is
unusual and unrealistic were this to be a real-world database).
Relationships
What is l~ss than obvious is that these hypothetical tables have relationships between
them. A customer may have more than one vehicle. A customer may have filed more than one
complaint about each vehicle. A vehicle might have more than one owner, each of whom might
have filed more than one complaint.
These relationships, none of which are explicitly stated in the tables, can be represented
diagrammatically - but even then, they are not all immediately obvious:
Views
The hypothe tical thus far has focused on the poss ible physical organization of the data in
the database. Life is rarely kind enough to allow us to use the data only in the way it has been
stored. Often we need to get a different view of the data in order to make better sense of it. For
example, we might wis h to view this hypothetical data in a way that would show either (a)
which customers have which vehicle models, or (b) which vehicles have which complaints
against them.
An example report for Customers and Vehicles is-shown below:
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Which Customers Have Which Vehicle Models
CJlJtbmerName CJlSkJmerJ4ICJLftomerA~ PhoN! IYeoQr
.lice 0 ag3body 115211115, The Peebles, Smppoo3e. OR 2CE1113232 119$
VeIUde MtJke VehicleModel IVlN VeJdcle Equipment,
Ford E)J)lorer I503Al2740784 ATXtires
CusJDmuNQI1t6 CJlSldmerkl fl;'WIiOMfrA~ Plum6 IYear
Fluffy Serpentes 153901101 AP. 12, Lolia Gardens. Mississaaga. Ont. 4162015481 11gg]
VelJide Make Vdtide Model IVlN Vdicle Equipmen.t
Ford Expeditial I709QJ11 07211 Bri dgestone tires
And here is the report showing which vehicles have which compla ints:
Which Vehicles Have Which Complaints
Cuslomerld COmplaint # NoJies
Tire separa1ion. Roll over.
2 Tire pro blem. Canadia n.
11521
1~1999 15390110
1/1211998J9
X7
YIN
5O~2740784
709QJ1107211
The most salient aspect about Database Views is that the views that are available depend
entirely on the availability of the underlying data - if portions of the database have been
omitted from production, then certain views of the data will either be impossible, or costly and
time-eonsuming to produce.
Turning Databases Into Useful Information
Databases are merely organized versions of individual data fields. As a result, they too
are subject to the same traits as the simple date values discussed earlier in this paper: unless you
have knowledge of the encoding, format, syntax, and semantics you will not be able to
transform the data that you received from the opposing party into the useful information that
you requested and need to build your cas~. For databases, unlike individual data fields, you
also need to know the relationships that exist between the various tables. While some of this
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information could be inferred, in a medium to large corpora tion there can be hundreds or
thousands of database tables, and making tho se inferences by inspecting the data can be
burdensome in the extreme.
Discovery
Evidence Preservation
The main focus of this paper is discovery, but if evidence is not preserved it cannot be
produced. In the authors' experience, aggressive early preservation should be discussed, and if
need be, ruled on, very early in the litigation. This is especially true because computer-based
evidence can easily be destroyed by improper handling, hardware or software failures, virus
activity, or even norma I use of the computer system.
Many computers use automated housekeeping tasks, often invisible to the casual user,
which can result in the wholesale destruction of relevant evidence. Preservation discussions or
orders should explicitly identify whether routine automated tasks such as tape recycling,
deletion of unused files, and purges of e-mail older than thirty days should be allowed to
continue. To avoid allegations of spoliation, producing parties should communicate
preservation requirements to their computer system administrators and ask for their help to
identify all manual or automated processes that might result in data destruction.
Orders to preserve or copy the cont ents of hard disks should explicitly state whether or
not deleted files and file fragments are to be copied. If a "mirror image" (an exact copy of the
entire contents of a hard disk, including dele ted files and file fragments) is desired, special
software must be used to prepare the disk copy. The routine backups that most individuals and
companies use for their computers do not normally accomplish such preservation.
To avoid any possible confusion, the court order should use the term /I a mirror image
backup, including active files, deleted files, and file fragments" if this is the intended
preservation requirement. On more than one occasion the authors have observed lengthy
arguments about whether an order "to preserve the entire contents of the hard disk" included
preservation of deleted- files.
In litigation involving large businesses, care should also be given to identifying proper
handling for computers used by departing contractors or employees, as these computers are
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often Urecycled" and assigned to a new user. The Urecycling" process generally includes
removing all old files and re-installing fresh copies of the computer's software. Left in place,
these processes typically result in the destruction of all files left behind by the previous user.
If databases are to be produced, ~are should be taken to preserve a record of the
database structure and relationships, along with the information required to decode data stored
as encoded numeric codes or abbreviations. Preserving this information along with the data
itself is important because the database structure, relationships, and encoding information may
all be changed in the normal course of business and may be difficult (or impossible) to recreate
at some future point in time.
The Challenge Of Discovery
Business records, correspondence, e-mail, databases, spreadsheets, presentations,
documents, electronic calendars, contact lists, digital images/photographs, recordings, and
faxes all originate on computers. Only a small fraction of this information is ever printed,
mandating the need for production of computer-based evidence.
Not only is data enco ded, but it is also formatted according to rules used by the specific
computer hardware and software that created the data. Different kinds of documents,
databases, pictures, and recordings each have their own format. This means you cannot use just
any program to rea d a file - it has to be a program that recognizes the file's specific data format
and encoding, and is capable of turning the raw data back into use ful information. In order to
effect this transformation the program often requires additional supporting information
What Do You Ask For?
When discovering electronic evidence, you must therefore ask for both the electronic
data itself and also for sufficient information about the data you receive to allow you to use it.
It is important to determine what kind of software and hardware was used to create and
maintain the data received or produced. Three important questions are: "What type of
computer was the data created and maintained on?", "What operating system was the
computer using?", and "What specific programs and settings were used to create or copy the
data?" .
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You may need this information early in the discovery process, even before any electronic
information is produced. For example, consider the case where both parties agree to limit
production of e-mail and documents to files that contain specific keywords. It is possible for the
producing party to use computer programs to search for documents containing the keywords,
but the programs used for the search mus t be able to read the file format for each type of file to
be searched. Failure to choose an appropriate search program will yield unreliable results.
Even after the initial three questions are answered, additional information will be
required to extract information from the data in databases, spreadsheets, computer generated
reports, and certain other computer files. Such files all contain data with user-defined syntax
and formatting - the nature of the data, number of fields, and arrangement of the data was
initially defined by the data's user.
For business records and databases it is also common for information to be represented
using abbreviations or codes composed of alphabetic or numeric characters. For example,
numeric codes might be assigned to represent a specific customer number, product number,
medical procedure, or type of consumer complaint. In order to locate relevant evidence you
must know the semantics of what specific codes mean, which data files are used to record the
information you seek, and how the data is arranged.
If discovery involves databases, computer generated files, or computer reports, your
discovery request should seek information about the format, syntax, semantics, organization, and
schema of any data you receive.
Computer-based evidence can often be context-sensitive - that is, its relevance to the
case may change depending upon where it was found and when it was created, accessed or last
modified, and by whom. All of these are traits that may be found in meta-evidence (which is
discussed in the following section on meta-data). Electronic discovery often involves data from
more than one source. The production may involve multiple individuals, files, computers,
backup copies, or business entities. In such cases it is important ~omake sure that the provenance
and business context is preserved for any electronic evidence produced. At minimum, this
information should contain the facility, business unit, computer, user, and relevant date
information.
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The Discovery Of Meta-Data
Meta-data is a term used to include a hierarchy of information that is automatically
generated and recorded during the course of a computer's normal use. Most meta-data is
invisible to the casual user.
At the lowest level of abstraction, file specific meta-data is recorded automatically by the
computer when a file is created or used. At this level, the meta-data is specific to a single data
file, document, or e-mail. Meta-data may include information such as the file's author, when it
was created, when it was changed, and when it was used. E-mail meta-data includes
information about where the e-mail originated, how it was routed during delivery, whether it
was ever opened, what (if any) files were attached, and who else may have received a copy.
Other types of ,meta-data provide information about the configuration or use of entire
computer systems or networks. This information includes records of system activity such as
sign-on logs that identify when and who was using a computer, backup logs that identify what
backups may exist, when they were created, and what each backup might contain. Other forms
of system meta-data include records of whether the computer was attached to a network, what
files a computer hard disk contains, and event logs that show network traffic, file transfers,
faxes sent, or system configuration changes.
Many forms of meta-data are fragile, and can be easily destroyed by improper handling.
Meta-data is valuable for both analysis and authentication and therefore its preservation must
be explicitly requested.
Careful consideration should be given to which forms of meta-data should be produced
during the discovery of electronic evidence. Because courts vary their interpretation (and
understanding) of meta-data you may find it necessary to explain the need for e-mail specific,
file specific, and system specific meta-data separately. It is important to note that steps must be
taken to preserve meta-data as early as possible, since acts such as restarting the computer or
opening files for inspection result in the destruction of certain types of meta-data.
Rule 26(b)1 of F.R.C.P. states:
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For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter
involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Of particular note is the fact that the court will admit discovery of information
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." This is perhaps the
closest that the F.R.C.P. comes to describing the very nature of the system level meta-data,
which may not be direct evidence, but almost inevitably leads to direct evidence.
We Requested Information, The Other Party Produced Datal
Once discovery commences, expect the technology to present you a new set of
challenges. You know what you asked for, but what did you get? With paper-based
productions, you can simply look in the b ox and review its contents. With computer-based
productions all you can tell by looking in the box is whether you got square things or round
things - even if the media is labeled there is no way you can rea d the contents of the media
without resorting to a computer, and no way to even tell if it is readable until you try.
Even attempting to read the me d.ia may be a challenge. Hardware and data formats will
present a series of barriers, nested like Russian dolls, between the evidence and understanding.
Once one has determined what hardware and software was used to produce a tape or disk one
will need to use a compatible hardware and software configuration to read the media, which, in
the case of a computer backup tape, will probably be thousands of discrete files. To determine
what each file contains one must now open and inspect each file, again using a program that is
compatible with the format imposed by the software that created the file. If the file is a
spreadsheet, database, table, or chart, one must then decipher what the rows and columns
mean, what context they are specific to, and what encoded data values and abbreviations
represent, before the data becomes information.
It is not uncommon during this phase to discover that one must ask for production of
additional evidence, documentation, or meta-data in order to determine what exactly one has
received.
Inventory Issues
One of the problems that emerge immediate.Iy as you attempt to invento ry electronic
evidence is the not-so-simple matter of tracking electronic documents. With paper documents it
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is common for each page to be individually Bates stamped. Each physical item you can hold in
your hand bears a separate Bates number. In contrast to this, a single disk may contain tens of
thousands of documents, each with multiple pages. All of this material is likely to share a single
Bates number and without modifying the evidence, there is no way to electronically affix a
Bates stamp to individual files.
Unlike paper documents, which are often filed (and occasionally produced) in an
orderly fashion, there is often little or no organization to the contents of a computer disk. A
single disk or tape may contain documents created and maintained by many different
individuals, with responsive and irrelevant information intermixed, and no apparent order with
respect to chronology, context, or subject.
To complicate matters further, there is no requirement that files on a disk or tape have
unique names - many different files on a disk may all have the same name9, even if they have
different contents. File names are independent from content - there may be many different files,
each with a unique name but identical contents.
Several techniques exist to help manage tracking for electronic documents and files. One
of the simplest is to create a directory containing a list of the contents for each individual piece
of computer me dia. The listing should show each file name, along with the full path of sub-
directories needed to access it. Since file names are unique within a directory, this listing can
then be imported into a simple spreadsheet or database to allow tracking of individual files.
Programs such as MD5SUMIO can be used to generate message digest"signatures"
based on the contents of electronic files. These signatures can be used like fingerprints to help
identify files that contain identical information, as well as to identify instances where files with
the same name have different contents. By making these signatures a part of your tracking
9 The computer requires only that files with the same name not be present in the same sub-
directory. It is common to see many files on a hard disk with the same name. In some cases the contents
of the files is also the same (they are all copies of the same original). In other cases even though the files
have the same name, their contents (and context) may differ.
10 MD5SUM.exe is a program that uses a one-way mathematical hash function to generate a
single string of digits (called a message digest) that can be used to aid in file identification and
authentication. A copy of this program is available free on the Internet. See the following specific site
reference:
http://www.openoffice.org/dev docs/using md5sums.html (Visited June 1, 2002).
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document you can use them to identify duplicate documents during review and also to identi fy
multiple revisions of the same document. As an added benefit, these same signatures can also
be used to identify any tampering. If even a single character in a file is changed the electronic
signature will also change.
Search and concordance software can be used to help identify documen ts relating to
specific subjects. Once identified, subject keywords can also be added to the tracking
spreadsheet.
Ancient (And Modern) Geek Archeology
Another problem you may encounter during discovery or inventory is that of unknown
or unreadable media or file types. In cases involving electronic evidence that is more than a
couple of years old, you may have difficulty finding either hardware or software that can read
your files. In the case of databases and computer files with proprietary file formats you will also
need information about the specific file's organization, contents, and data relationships. In the
authors' experience it is a sad truth that such documentation seldom lives as long as the data
itself.
Assuming that the producing party st ill possesses the requisite technology and
documentation, the discovery process should include negotiations for access to the appropriate
hardware and software. If neither party possesses the required technology, some media types
may need to be sent to third party conversion companies. Be warned that you may encounter
unexpected problems with the conversion process, so scheduling should be generous enough to
allow for some delays.
At the opposite end of the hardware life cycle is media that represents state-of-the-art
technologies. Drives capable of reading suc h media may be back ordered or difficult to find.
Emerging technologies may be plagued with unstable software or subtle (and not-so-subtle)
incompatibilities between releases of hardware or software. If the case involves multinational
entities, be prepared for the possibility that some devices may be unavailable or inoperable in
your home countr y.
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Printed Evidence Is Often The Most Maximally Inconvenient Form
Once you begin your inventory, you will discover another characteristic of computer
based evidence - its volume. A 110 gigabyte hard disk you can hold in the palm of your hand
may contain documents that when printed yield a stack of paper several miles high (36.7
million pages). A single CD-ROM can yield a stack of paper 66 feet high.
From time to time the authors have been asked to print and produce the contents of an
entire hard disk, but we recommend this approach be avoided. Aside from the obvious danger
of avalanche, printing redacts the meta-data from electronic evidence, and renders impossible
most forms of computer-aided analys is.
Unless special steps are taken to preserve it, most meta-data is lost when a document is
printed. This includes document properties such as author, creation date, revision date, revision
history, date of last accessed, and location on the hard disk where the document was found.
When printing spreadsheets (and many databases) the choice must be made to print either a
cell's value or the numeric formulae used to derive it - either way something valuable is lost.
The printed version of electronic evidence cannot be searched electronically. It cannot be
used to derive earlier revisions, or readily sorted into chronological sequence. Automated
techniques cannot be used to compare the contents of multiple printed documents, or to
identify printed duplicates.
Production Completeness, Quality, And Scope
As discovery progresses, expect to identify issues relating to the scope and completeness
of production. In the early phases of discovery it is common to uncove r new databases,
applications, computers and even facilities that must be added to the scope of the production
effort. At the outset the parties will probably not know how many computers must be searched
or what backups may exis t.
If the discovery involves corporate computers you are likely to disc over that there is no
central person or department knowledgeable about all of the computer systems that exist. In the
business world it is quite common for computers to be administered according to the type of
operating system they run rather than the business purpose they serve. Mainframe computers,
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servers, and desktop computers will normally be backed up separately, and the resultant
backups managed by separate groups, following separate policies.
A further distinction exists between the system level backups (typically made by system
administrators who are responsible for recovery from catastrophic failures) and application level
backups (typically made by programmers working for or with the specific business unit who
owns the l?usiness application). If database systems are involved there is often a separate set of
backups performed by the database administrators.
In large scale litigation, testimony of 30(b) 6 witnesses can be extremely helpful in
identifying information relating to the scope of production. Key areas of inquiry include
corporate electronic document retention policies, system level backup processes and retention,
application level backup processes and retention, number and topology of networke d computers,
operating systems used, database architectures and applications, and what techniques were
used to locate and preserve data relating to the litigation.
Another valuable source of information relating to both scope and completeness of
production is system level meta-data. System level meta-data such as control files and logs can
be used to help identify which computers run which software, which computers, programs, and
users have access to which hard disks or databases, where e-mail is stored, and what backup
tapes or disk files exist. File specific meta-data can be used to limit the scope of production to
only those files from a specific period of interest or (in some cases) user.
As discovery proceeds it is also important to evaluate the quality.of the electronic
evidence. Any oral testimony about what computers, backups, or databases exist should be
compared to the actual production. If samples of reports have been produced on paper it is
important to compare them to their electronic counterparts, to make sure all related data files
have actually been produced, and that the files contain all of the relevant information elements
needed to compose the corresponding report.
Media should be checked to determine if it can be read, and if the data it contains is
consistent with any description provided for the media's contents. Despite careful handling
some media may be mislabeled or damaged during shipping, requiring replacement copies or
supplemental information to remedy the production.
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If multiple computer files exist for the same domain of data they can often be used to
cross check each other, allowing one to identify missing records, missing date ranges, or records
that appear to have missing elements.
Computer files sho~ld also be checked to ensure that the data they contain is consistent
with their file specific meta-data. An examination of file modification and creation dates can
help determine if the data has been tampered with or contaminated during prod uction. When
using meta-data to evaluate the quality of production, it is important to first evaluate the
quality of the meta-data itself. Care should be taken to ensure that the system dates and times,
which are based on the computer's internal clock are accurate, and that the meta-data itself has
not been damaged or altered.
Beyond Bates - Identification, Validation, And Authentication
During discovery it is important to obtain the information that will hel p you identify
and authenticate any electronic evidence you rely on in the courtroom. Since electronic files are
not individually Bates numbered special care must be taken to record where and how they were
located. Sufficient chain of custody information should be preserved to document who has
handled or copied computer media and what has been done to it. Information required to
validate origin, establish authorship, and authenticate contents must be preserved if available.
In the authors' experience it is valuable to both parties to identify and follow a protocol
for the production of computer-based evidence. Such a protocol specifies the logistic details of
production, identifies mutually acceptable media formats, media labeling, Bates numbering,
and specifies the records that will be created to track origin or custody of the evidence.
Records that permit identification of the producing agent and business unit responsible
for production should accompany electronic media. Information should include the name of the
entity producing the information along with country, city, site, and department sufficient to
uniquely identify the producing agent.
These records should also identify the specific computer system from which the backup
was produced or information copied. If known, the records should also preserve the identi ty of
the specific computer system upon which the information was originally created along with the
name of the individual who created or maintained the data.
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For copies of hard disks, tapes, or CD-ROMs, records should be maintained and
produced along with eac h piece of media to document how, when, and by whom the copy was
prepared.
For individual computer files, records should be maintained to document both the file's
origin and how it was copied. In the case of databases or other files which are not produced in
the same format as they are stored, the record should identify the original format (e.g. JlOracle
database") and the format used for the production C'Oracle database unload" or "tab delimited
text file"). Any process used to redact or reformat the data should also be identified.
For e-mail, it is important to pres erve the origin of the e-mail (p roducing party,
computer, e-mail id, and mailbox or folder). The original e-mail headers and routing
information must be produced along with the body of the e-mail and identification of all
attachments. The e-mail header and routing information is important because it offers valuable
information that can aid in determining the true origin and authenticity of the e-mail.
Bates Number Files At Your Peril
Occasionally, parties will insist upon imposing the paper docume nt paradigm on the
computer-based evidence and will want to Bates number each document by prefixing or
suffixing a Bates number on a file name. The presumed thinking being that it will make it easier
to identify a particular document unambiguously.
Unfortunately, this a false economy, because changing the name of the file has the effect
of a controlled spoliation of the evidence.
For example, imagine a file called "Business Plan.doc". There are essentially two choices
for associating a Bates number with this name: prefixing it, or suffixing it, thus giving rise to
either "JLI004721-Business Plan.doc" or "Business Plan.doc-JLI004721".
Both strategies create problems. Prefixing the name with a Bates number means that
directory listings with file names cannot (without significant machinations) be used to identify
documents that are likely to be different versions of the same document - the Bates number
serves to make the file names sort differently. Suffixing the name with the Bates number
completely bamboozles Microsoft Window's ability to open the docume nt with the appropriate
software - a feature that uses the characters after the last period in the name to associate the file
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with appropriate applicati on software. Double-clicking on a file named "Business Plan.doc-
JLI004721" produces the equivalent of a computational "huh?"
The far less invasive method is, as suggested in this paper, identify the media produced,
and then rely on the normal naming of computers, directories and subdirectories and files that
serve to uniquely identify files as normal (outside the context of litigation). For example, if a
magnetic tape is identified as JLIOOOI09 and it is a backup of a computer called fire, then within
the file system on fire, each file is uniquely identified by its directory "path" and file name. For
example: "d:/My Documents/Business Plans/Business Plan.doc".
A complete listing of all media, showing all directories and files can then be created and
Bates numbers can be assigned to each line item in that - or you can accept that a reference
such as "JLIOOOI09 fire d:/My Documents/Business Plans/Business Plan.doc" is unique and
therefore serves the identical purpose that a Bates number would do. Indeed, it can be argued
that it is far more efficient than a Bates number because it directly identifies what the material is
likely to be, as well as the provenance of that material.
Production Pitfalls
The Trouble With TIFFs
As a general rule, computer-based evidence is most useful when produced in the form
in which it is created and maintained on the computer. However, we have seen an increasing
trend (especially in large scale litigation) where counsel stipulate that all documents be
produced in an altered, but mutually-acceptable form, such as Adobe Acrobat Portable
Document Format (PDF) or as a Tagged Image File Format file (TIFF).
Production in a form other than the original is not without risk. Inevitably there will be
some sacrifice in both the quality of the data and the ability to process it either using the
original software used to create and manage it, or the ability to deploy forensic tools to perform
computer- based analysis for litigation.
That said, forms such as PDF may offer some convenience by virtue of the ease with
which they can be viewed without the need for special software. If special care is taken early
enough in the ne gotiations between the parties, then much of the meta-evidence can be
preserved. The challenge is to preserve it so that it can be used as though it was still associated
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with the original document before conversion to, say, PDF. For example, if the dates/times
when documents were created, modified or last accessed are properly preserved, and they are
linked to the associated PDF, then one can sort the PDF files in chronological order just as one
could do with the original documents.
Conversion of documents to scanned images carries a further downside - as a scanned
document, one cannot perform any textual searches. With appropriate homage to Rene
Magritte11, the document is no longer a document, but is an image of a document. This also
applies to PDFs, which have the further confusing characteristic that they can either contain just
a scanned image (which cannot be searched), or a scanned image with appropriate textual
content for searching, indexing etc. (albeit only with Adob e software).
This means that the available options for searching and indexing depend entirely on the
process used to convert a document into a PDF or TIFF form. This conversion must be
negotiated before thousands of documents are converted as the process is irreversible if one
creates files that are purely scanned images.
Database Production Issues
A database is a specialized type of computer file in which the organization of the data is
optimized to support flexib Ie reporting and data retrieval. In discovery, databases require
additional intellectual life-support and special handling to render the information they contain
useable.
A formal definition of the data in a database and the relationships that exist between
various data elements is called a schema.
These data relationships allow for very flexible data retrieval and reporting, using
different logical views of the data. A logical view determines which data elements, from which
table(s) will be processed. Logical views can be used to produce extracts of the data for use by
programs, or to produce printed reports that serve some particular business need.
11 Who painted an image of a tobacco pipe with the caption (albeit in French) "This is not a
pipe." The point being that it is an image of a pipe, not the pipe itself. As such it has very different
characteristics than those of a real pipe.
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Data is retrieved from databases using queries that are written in a specialized language
such as Structured Query Language (SQL). Queries may include data from several different
tables, or even several different databases into a single logical view. Queries may also exclude
specific data elements, records (rows), or tables from a logical view.
Logical views reveal only specific portions of the data in the database, arranged ina
specific order. Looking at the contents of a database through a particular view is like looking
into a room through a keyhole in a door. Unless the actual queries used to extract data from a
database are known, one cannot know what data has been included (or excluded) from the
results.
There are many different database management systems (DBMS) such as Oracle, DB2,
Informix, IMS, SAS, and Microsoft Access. Each of these has potentially different implications
with respect to discovery.
From the purely technical standpoint, the least burdensome and most cost effective form
in which to produce or receive a database, is the so called"unload" created by the actual
database software used to create and maintain the database. To be useful, though, the "unload"
must be accompanied with sufficient format, syntax, semantics, and schema information to
permit rebuilding the database. This approach normally only works if the data is to be reloaded
by the same software used to create the unload (and it may prove expensive in time and cost to
obtain the software or configure the environment).
An alternative approach is to get the entirety of the database in some "neutral" format
not tied to a specific database program. With this format the data can readily be reloaded using
any DBMS for analysis, presuming that appropriate format, syntax, semantic, and schema
information are also available.
In addition to format, syntax, semantics, provenance, and context, electronic discovery
requests for databases should also ask for the information required to restore the database and
understand its relationships. The data itself must be accompanied by appropriate information
about the underlying DBMS, the exact unload or extract process, the selection criteria and view
imposed on data extracts, an explanation of any redaction process, and sufficient information
about the schema or data relationships to allow the database to be rebuilt for analysis.
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Computer Programs
Computer programs can exist in two forms - as human readable source code (the form
used by a programmer to create and maintain the program) and machine readable object code.
Source code is used to understand what a program does and how it operates. Object code is
needed to actually run the program.
If discovery is to include computer programs, the discovery language must be explicit as
to which of these forms are to be produced12 and what accompanying docume ntation is
required.
E-mail or E-mangle?
In discovery, e-mail may require special handling. If individual e-mails are to be
produced the parties should agree in advance about what format should be used, and how
header information, meta-data, and attachments are to be handled.
As a general rule, e-mail is most useful when produced in the form which it is created
and maintained on the computer. The authors have noted a growing trend where counsel
stipulates that all e-mail will be produced as TIFF or PDF images. Special care must be tC:lken to
ensure that the resultant production is still electronically searchable and that the textual body of
each e-mail can still be linked to its associated headers, meta-data, and attachments. Without
these links the receiving party will be unable to authenticate the origin of the e-mail, open
associated attachments, identify other recipients, or readily sort the e-mails into chronological
sequence.
The Damned
Modern computer-based evidence adds new meaning to the phrase U damned if you do,
damned if you don't."
12 For more information about source code and object code see Andy Johnson-Laird's article,
"Discovery in Computer Software Patent Litigation," 1998 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. at
http://www.fclr.org/1998fedctslrevl.htm
A-31
COMPUTER-BASED EVIDENCE: CUTTING THE COST OF DISCOVERY
Andy Johnson-Laird and Barbara A. Frederiksen
So Much Evidence, So Little Time
The over-arching challenge with computer-based evidence, as has been described above,
is the sheer massive volume of it. It is not unusual in large cases to have to deal with 450
gigabytes of evidence.
Such volumes, unthinkable just a few years ago, are becoming routine. This mass of
evidence creates major problems for the producing party who has to actually manage its
production, the receiving party, who has to find a place to put it, and for both parties with the
courts, who are still generally marching to the drummer of document production on paper.
A prudent approach may be to stipulate to a document production schedule that takes
into account the volume of evidence to be produced rather than permit a court-imposed (and
thereby inappropriately short) amount of time.
This is not a new problem. The volume of computer-based evidence in productions has
been growing exponentially - all that has happened in the last few years is that we are now on
the steep part of the exponential growth curve, but the courts (and many attorneys) have not yet
fully grasped just how technologically serious this problem is.
Saving The Best Until Last
Murphy's Law For Forensics clearly states: uFor any given case, you will find the best
evidence last." It will be, more likely than not, the last magnetic tape, or the last hard disk, or the
last set of computer files, that contain the heart of the case. Or so it seems.
However, the Court and opposing counsel are not likely to be sympathetic to this -
because it has the appearance of deliberately trying to sneak relevant evidence in at the last
minute.
The fundamental problem is that, with a vast amount of evidence, you cannot find
everything all at once even with dozens of supercomputers searching and sifting the evidence.
Forensic analysis of evidence is not a a drunkard's walk through that evidence, nor is it a
massive combine harvester consuming entire bodies of evidence at a single pass. The analysis
must be systematic and follow rational threads of research and chains of inference.
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It is a no-win situation. If one finds the evidence consistent with Murphy's Law, then
you will be damned for finding it "late" - and, of course, if you do not find it all, you will
implicitly be damned for one's inadequacy.
The fallacy in the notion of being "late" is caused by the notion that we know how long
it should take. to analyze a terabyte of evidence. Not only do we not know, but we cannot know
- because the answer depends upon what is contained therein and what one finds first.
Shot In The Foot By Your Own Smoking Gun
For the producing party the ch allenge of marshalling and inspecting the evidence prior
to production is a significant one. It does not serve a client's interest well to merely hand over
gigabytes of information if, hidden in the mass of data, are privileged documents.
Assuming that there are indeed smoking gun documents in the production, it is prudent
in the extreme to at least know that they are there before producing them to opposing counsel.
But to do this may demand a small army of paralegals reviewing documents, uncompressing
compressed files (and the compressed files that may be contained therein), searching
documents for key words and phrases before documents are produced.
Again, this is a no-win situation. One is damned if one takes too "long" to produce or
analyze the evidence, or damned if you meet the artificially set deadline and overlook the
smoking gun document.
De-duping Or Duping?
De-duplicating (that is the removal of duplicate documents) demands that considerable
care be taken to document which documents are thereby removed.
De-duplication can distort the truths that the evidence contains unless a complete,
detailed log file is kept of all files removed from a production.
Indeed, as a general rule, it would be better for a producing party not to perform the de-
duplication. While the absence of de-duplication by the producing party increases the burden
f<?r the receiving party (by increasing the overall volume of evidence), it gives the receiving
party far better opportunities to determine the factual truths contained in the evidence, rather
than have to analyze an evidentiary jig-saw puzzle with unknown pattern and missing pieces.
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Conclusion
Electronic evidence poses its own special set of challenges for the discovery process.
Without the intellectual life-support of information about data's format, syntax, semantics,
organization, schema, and context it is extremely difficult to transform computer data into
useable information. This information should be requested as part of the normal discovery
process.
Attorneys who understand the pros and cons of the production and analysis of
computer-based evidence can better manage (and potentially reduce) the costs of the litigation
and better inform the courts of the realities of scheduling.
In the authors' experience it is advantageous if the parties can agree in advance to a
protocol for the production of electronic evidence. Many of the pitfalls and problems of
electronic discovery can be avoided by careful planning and record keeping. If the parties can
agree on how media should be labeled and tracked problems due to defective media or
accidental omissions can be quickly identified and remedied.
The time and cost of the production of computer-based evidence can be managed
rationally but to do so requires some technical knowledge of the pitfalls.
***END***
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Appendix A : Sample Production Protocol And Discovery Language
DEFINITION
1. "DOCUMENT" has the broadest meaning accorded to that term by Rule 34 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and includes, but
is not limited to, any kind of written or graphic material, however produced or reproduced, of
any kind or description, whether sent or received or neither, including originals, copies, drafts
and both sides thereof, and including, but not limited to: papers, writings, objects, letters, bills,
memoranda, electronic mail, notes, notations, work papers, reports, books, book accounts,
photographs, tangible things, correspondence, reports and recordings of telephone
conversations, telephone logs, statements, summaries, opinions, agreements, ledgers, journals,
records of accounts, checks, summary of accounts, spreadsheets, databases, receipts, balance
sheets, income statements, confirmation slips, questionnaires, desk calendars, appointment
books, diaries, graphs, test results, charts, data files, log files of computer access and activity,
and all of the records kept by electronic, photographic or mechanical means and things similar
to any of the foregoing, including computer media, regardless of their author.
PRODucnONPROTOCOL
2. Each individual piece of computer media produced must be clearly labeled with
a unique media control or Bates number which is indelibly written on, or affixed to, both the
media itself and any enclosure or case produced with the media. This label or marking will be
affixed in a place and manner which does not obliterate any labeling on the original media, and
which does not interfere with the ability to examine or use the media.
3. Electronic records and computerized information must be produced with
sufficient information to permit identification of the producing agen t and business unit
responsible for the production. This information shall include, but not be limited to:
a) The name of the corporation or other entity that is producing the information,'
along with information such as country, city, site, and department sufficient to
uniquely identify the producing agent.
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b) The name or identity of the specific server or computer system from which the
backup was produced or information copied.
c) The name or identity of the specific server or computer system upon which the
information was originally created, and the name of the individual who created
and/or maintained the information.
d) The name or identity of the specific server or computer system upon which the
information was maintained during the course of normal business, if different
from the system where it was created.
4. Electronic ~ecords and computerized information must be produced in an
intelligible format or together with a technical description of the system from which they were
derived sufficient to permit rendering the records and information intelligible. This description
shall include, but not be limited to:
a) The manufacturer's name and model number for electronic hardware used to
create and maintain the electronic records.
b) The name and version of the operating system used onthe computer where the
electronic records were created and maintained.
c) The manufacturer's name, product ID, and version number for any software
used to create and maintain the electronic records, along with any proprietary
software, written documentation, special parameters, and instructions sufficient
to permit those records to be read from the media produced.
d) The date, if known, when the information was first created, along with the date
of its most recent modification.
e) All decryption or access passwords necessary to unlock any computerized
information produced, including without limitation, electronic mail passwords
and file decryption passwords.
5. Except where redaction is required by law or privilege, any record/document, or
data item which was created on a computer or computer system must be produced on
computer media in the original unredacted form in which it was created and/or maintained.
For all such media produced, ~xternallabelson the media shall contain a unique tracking
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number which can be used to associate the media with appropriate identification for the
computer(s) from which the copies of computer files were made, and the full names of the
individuals or business units who used the computer so identified.- A record shall also be
maintained and produced which shows how the information on the media was copied, and
whether or not it is a comple te and forensically accurate copy of the originaL
6. For any electronic records, documents or data items produced, the producing
party shall verify that it has modified its document retention policies in a manner that will
ensure retention of the original records, documents and data items. These document retention
policies shall include, without limita tion, policies which automatically delete electronic mail or
remove unused files, policies which permit overwriting of computer media for system backup
functions, and similar policies.
7. Should the producing party seek to withhold any document based on some
limitation of discovery (including but not limited to a claim of privilege), the producing party
shall supply a list of the documen ts for which such limitation of discovery is claimed,
indicating:
a) The identity of each document's author, writer, sender.
b) The identity of each document's recipient, addressee, or person for whom it was
intended.
c) The date of creation or transmittal indicated on each document, or an estimate of
that date, indicated as such, if no date appears on the document.
d) The general subject matter as described on each document, or, if no such
description appears, then some other description sufficient to identify the
document.
e) The claimed grounds for the limitation of discovery (e.g., "attorney-client
privilege").
8. Should the producing party seek to redact any document based on some
limitation of discovery (including but not limited to a claim of privilege), the producing party
shall supply a list of the documen ts for which such limitation of discovery is claimed,
indicating:
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a) The claimed grounds for the redaction.
b) The nature of the redacted material (e.g., "patient name", IItrade secret", etc.).
c) A description of the exact process used for redaction.
9. All computer media mus t be properly packaged to ensure safe shipping and
handling. If any piece of media produced is known to have any physic al defect, electronic
defect, damaged data, or is infected with any virus or other harmful software of any kind, it
should be clearly labeled so that appropriate care can be taken during its examination.
10. All computer media, which can be write protected should be write protected
before production.
11. All copies of computer files for production will be created in such a way as to
preserve the original directory structure and any information about the files that is created and
maintained by the operating system and the software used to create and maintain the
information. This will include, but is not limi ted to, dates, times, authorship, and transmittal
information.
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS REQUEST
12. We request that you produce the following materials in your possession, custody
or control:
REQUEST NO.1: (E-mail relevant to this litigation)
13. All electronic mail, electronic correspondence, or electronic peer-to-peer
messages (lie-mail") shall be produced in electronic form, in an accessible standard format, and
on industry-standard computer media along with all files included as attachments to such e-
mail. Back-Up and archival copies of e-mail and e-mail attachments shall be restored as
necessary to create a comprehensive collection of e-mail. No modifications, alterations, or
additions to e-mails (or to the meta-data and attachments associated with such e-mails) from
their original state shall be performed.
REQUEST NO.2: (Data existing in electronic form)
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14. All data relating to «the matter in dispute» that exists or is stored in electronic
form including but not limited to: computerized applications used to collect, process, store,
display, or report on relevant data, computer presentations (e.g. PowerPoint slides), Internet
web pages, marketing information, prescription information, sales information, databases,
detail or product education, sales call information, spreadsheets, statistical analysis, computer
generated graphs and charts, graphics, animations, videotapes, slides, photographic images,
audio tapes, voice annotation, and backup tapes or similar media relating to any of the
foregoing) shall be produced in electronic form, in a mutually acceptable format on mutually
acceptable computer media. Databases (and the software and manuals associated with such
databases) shall be produced as used and maintained in the normal ordinary course of business
(including any forms and variations thereof) and shall include without limitation the computer
readable code associated with any reports, file formats, forms, queries, or structure for any
databases. If proprietary software is necessary to access and view the data, a reasonable number
of copies of the proprietary software and operating manuals shall be made available for use by
the parties receiving the discovery during the pendency of the litigation. Where specialized
syntax and/or semantics are present and encoded in the infor mation contained in any database
or file, then appropriate compute r files and documentation sufficient to permit the processing
and understanding of the information shall be provided.
REQUEST NO.3: (Proprietary software used to perform redaction)
15. For any redaction software or custom application software relating to any of the
DOCUMENTS, the producing party will provide a copy of the software, a description of how
the software functions and how it was used, the entire source code for the software, along with
any existing documentation and the exact control parameters used to control the redaction
function, including but not limited to all source files, control files, library files, header files,
project and make files, and source files for the routines that are called out in the header files,
and which are sufficient to allow the compilation of a functioning copy of each version of each
redaction product used. Where any such source code or any other computer files are
maintained under a document control or revision control system, including but not limited to
the Source Code Control Sys tern (SCCS), Revision Control Sys tern (RCS), Microsoft SourceSafe,
or Polytron Version Control Sys tern (PVCS), then the entire source code or other com puter files
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are to be produced in the form manage d by the document or revision control system, rather
than specific versions of of the files, along with DOCUMENTS sufficient to identify the
individuals' initials appearing in the revision control system's historical records. Any third
party source code libraries or header files are to be identified by name, purpose, vendor and
version number, as is the manufacturer and version number of any and all compilers and
assemblers used to translate the source code into object code.
REQUEST NO.4: (Commercial software used to perform redaction)
16. For any commercially available redaction software relating to any of the
DOCUMENTS, the producing party shall provide a description of the program and its use,
which includes at least the program name, version number, vendor, and the exact parameters or
settings used to control the redaction process.
REQUEST NO.5: (Meta-data used to describe backup and archival media)
17. Computer system logs and control files used to manage and record the existence
of backup and archival copies of computer files relevant to this litigation. This information may
include, but is not limited to: logs and control files relating to backup software, tape
management systems, vault inventories, backup policies, logs and control files relating to data
archival systems, control files or policies relating to off-site storage control, system catalogs
containing entries for backup files, policies and procedures relating to disaster recovery, job run
schedules, operator run books, standard operating procedures (SOP) manuals, and any other
records relating to data backup, restore, archival, or storage which are maintained by computer
operations, data base administration, or specific business application groups.
REQUEST NO.6: (Meta-data used to identify computer systems relevant to this
litigation)
18. Files containing information about computer systems and the applications that
run on them, including but not limited to files that are used to document network topology,
files that identify the association of applications or database to servers or computer systems,
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operator run books, SOP manuals, and guidelines to users that describe data file management
policies.
REQUEST NO.7: (Meta-data used to identify computer access relevant to this
litigation)
19. Files containing information about which business groups or individuals were
able to access or modify information relating to « the matter in dispute» . This information
includes but is not limited to files and documentation used to contro 1or describe access to
applications or files that contain information relating to« the matter in dispute», files used to
control or describe access to specific computer systems, and files used to control or describe
access and administration rights for data bases, computer files, and backup media.
* * * END * * *
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SOFTWARE LICENSES: FROM MASS MARKET END USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS
TO MISSION CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND INSTALLATION AGREEMENTS
By Will Montague and Richard Warne
Intellectual Property & Technology Department
STOLL, KEENaN & PARK, LLP
I. INTRODUCTION.
In the current economic climate, there has been some question about whether computer
information technologies will continue to play the same prominent role in business economic
development as they have in the past. While capital expenditures in computer hardware and
software have slowed in recent quarters, there seems to be little question in the business
community as to the value that such technologies can bring to an enterprise in terms of
enhanced productivity and efficiency. Of course, the cost to acquire such enabling
technology remains high for many business ventures, and thus the need remains for
contractual arrangements that carefully and completely implement the business goals of the
software developer and purchaser alike.
The goal of these materials is to assist the legal practitioner in meeting that need by helping
to identify the key issues in such agreements in a variety of contexts, and to provide some
insight into different ways to approach those issues. The materials are divided into three
parts: an explanation of background principles of copyright law and their effect on software
licensing; a discussion of current approaches to licensing, from a simple end-user license
agreement to a complex development and implementation agreement; and an analysis of
UCITA and its effect on software licensing.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW.
Much of modem day transactions in information takes place in the form of copyright
licenses. In the now seemingly ubiquitous software license, state law governs the license
transaction from a contractual standpoint, but federal copyright law generally governs the
bulk of the rights actually being licensed. A cursory understanding of copyright law
therefore should be helpful in understanding software licensing.
u.S. copyright law is founded on Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which
grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." Title 17, sections 101 through 1332 of the United States Code, now controls
federal copyright law.
Prior to passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, state common law of copyright protected
unpublished works of authorship, while federal law protected published works. After
January 1, 1978, the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976, federal copyright law has
preempted any state common law copyright protection, and established a uniform federal
system for the protection of works of authorship fixated in a tangible fonn. Protection now
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exists from the moment an original work on authorship is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression (such as paper, digital media, phonorecords, etc.) and exists for the duration of the
author's life plus a term of70 years. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 302(a).1 Significantly, use of
copyright notice (such as the copyright symbol ©) is no longer required for copyright
protection, although it does afford certain advantages to the copyright holder.
A. Subject Matter of Copyrights.
Section 102 of the Copyright Act sets forth the general subject matter of copyrights:
a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
As section 102 suggests, to be protected by copyright law, a work must be the product of
some original thought process by the author and cannot be a mere copy of a preexisting
work. Furthermore, it must be fixed in a manner that is sufficiently permanent. Even if an
original work is fixed and falls clearly within one of the above categories, it may not be
copyrightable if it is an idea, procedure, system, process, or other similar work that
constitutes the only conceivable method of using or expressing an idea. Similarly, mere
collections of factual information are not protected by copyright absent some element of
originality in the selection, arrangement, or coordination of the facts. See, e.g., Feist
Publications v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
Section 103 of the Copyright Act provides protection for compilations (collections of
preexisting works or uncopyrightable data) and derivative works (works derived from
preexisting works) but extends that protection only to the new contributions of the author,
such as the selection, coordination, and arrangement ofmaterials in compilations.
1 Copyright for works made for hire and anonymous or pseudonymous works endure for 95 years· from
publication or 120 years from creation, whichever expires first. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c).
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B. Authorship and Ownership.
Although the Copyright Act grants rights to the author of a work, it is common for multiple
authors to collaborate on a project. Issues can also arise when a creative work is done at the
request of a third party or when the owner of a copyright transfers some or all of his rights to
a third party.
1. Joint authorship. Joint authorship exists if each author intended to contribute a
copyrightable expression to the unitary whole that comprises the copyrightable
subject matter. See 17 U.S.C. §101 (defining 'joint work").
2. Work for hire doctrine. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) of the Copyright Act provides that
the employer or person for whom a work is created is considered the author of a work
made for hire. To constitute a work for hire, however, the work must either be
prepared by an employee within the scope of employment or fall within one of the
enumerated work for hire categories .and be the subject of a work for hire agreement
signed by both parties. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work made for hire"). The
Supreme Court has held that the determination of whether the author is an
"employee" for purposes of the work for hire doctrine is determined by traditional
principles of agency law. See Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 742-43 (1989).
3. Transfer of rights in copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) of the Copyright Act provides
that the owner of a copyright may transfer any and all rights associated with the
copyright. Other than transfers by operation of law, however, any transfer of
ownership of a copyright must be in a writing signed by the owner. 17 U.S.C. §
204(a).
C. Notice and Registration of Copyright
Chapter 4 of the Copyright Act governs copyright notice and registration. Under current
copyright law, neither notice of copyright nor registration of the copyright with the United
States Copyright Office is required for protection.2 However, both confer certain advantages
to the copyright holder, especially in litigation.
Copyright notice typically contains either the word "Copyright," the abbreviation "Copr.," or
the copyright symbol ©, followed by the year of first publication and the name of the author.
(Example: © 2002 John Smith.) The advantages of providing copyright notice on works are
that notice informs the public that the work is protected by copyright, identifies the author
2 For works published prior to March 1, 1989, copyright notice is required and is governed by the complex
interplay of the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Copyright Act of 1976. Works published prior to January 1,
1978, entered the public domain if no notice was attached, and works published between January 1, 1978, and
MarchI, 1989, were subject to a notice requirement that could be cured if initially omitted. For any work
published prior to March 1, 1989, therefore, a strong understanding of the copyright law in effect at the time of
publication is necessary to determine both the existence and continuing duration of any copyright protection.
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and year of first publication, and weakens the ability of a defendant in an infringement action
to interpose an innocent infringer defense.
Registration is accomplished by submission of the proper form and filing fee, along with a
deposit of the copyrighted work, to the Copyright Office. More detailed information is
available from the Copyright Office's website, http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/. There are
several advantages to registering a copyright. First, registration prior to or within five years
of first publication constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of a copyright.
Furthermore, registration is required in order to bring suit for infringement in federal court
(which has exclusive jurisdiction over copyright cases), and a copyright plaintiff may recover
statutory damages and attorney fees only if registration is accomplished within three months
of first publication or prior to the defendant's first act of infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 412.
Finally, it should be noted that regardless of registration, copyright owners are required to
deposit copies of their work upon publication pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 407.
D. Rights Afforded by Copyright Law.
The scope of rights granted to a copyright holder is substantial. Subject to certain
enumerated limitations, a copyright holder has exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute,
perform, and display the protected work. 17 U.S.C. § 106. Additionally, copyright holders
have exclusive rights to prepare and distribute derivative works based upon the copyrighted
material. Id.
Included among the statutory limitations on the copyright holder's exclusive rights are the
following important sections:
§ 107 - Fair Use. Section 107 provides that the "fair use" of a copyrighted work for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, and research is not an
infringing act. However, the statute does not explicitly define fair use, leaving the issue to
the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis. The statute states that the factors in determining
fair use include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985), the
Supreme Court stated that the fourth enumerated factor, the effect of the defendant's use of
the infringing work on the potential market for the copyrighted work, is the most important
factor. However, the four factors are, by the plain wording of the statute, non-exclusive, and
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the Court has also said that none of the factors should be viewed in isolation. See Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
Parodies of serious works of art, music, and literature often fall within the fair use exception
as a useful form of social commentary. A parody will not usually be considered infringing
when the effect is clearly recognized as a commentary and not a substitute for an original.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
Another significant form of fair use is the reverse engineering of computer software. The
influential Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, as well as other courts that have followed in its
path, has held that reverse engineering (or "decompiling") software from an executable
program to human-readable source code, in which a copy of the software program is
necessarily made, is permitted as fair use so long as decompilation is the only means of
gaining access to the uncopyrightable aspects of the program, and the defendant has a
legitimate interest in gaining access to those aspects. Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v.
Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 (9th Cir. 2000); Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992).
§ 109 - Transfers of a Particular Copy or Phonorecord. Better known as the "first
sale doctrine," this particular limitation allows the owner of a particular copy of a
copyrighted work to sell or otherwise dispose of that particular copy. The copyright owner
has the right to control the initial sale of the copy, but after that sale is completed, its present
owner may transfer the copy. Notably, however, subsection (b) of 109 provides an exception
for the rental of computer programs and phonorecords, which is not permissible absent the
copyright owner's authorization. Note also that the first sale doctrine does not affect the
underlying copyright, which is always retained by the copyright owner. The doctrine only
applies to individual copies and phonorecords embodying the copyright.
§ 117'- Computer Programs. Subject to certain conditions, section 117 allows the
owner of a particular copy of a computer program to reproduce it for the following limited
purposes: 1) for utilization of the program as it was intended; 2) for archival purposes; and
3) for maintenance purposes. Because the loading of a computer program into the
computer's RAM (random access memory) constitutes reproduction of the copyrighted
program, see MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993), the
owner or licensee's rights to utilize a computer program are severely limited and generally
determined by the license agreement under which the program was obtained.
E. Copyright Infringement Actions.
As noted above, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright infringement suits,
and a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court for infringement is that the allegedly infringed
work must be registered. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). The work need not be registered at the time of
infringement, however, meaning that a potential plaintiff may seek expedited registration by
the Copyright Office and then file suit.
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Once jurisdiction is established, the plaintiff must prove infringement. The Sixth Circuit
recently described in an unpublished opinion the burden a copyright plaintiff bears in this
circuit:
To establish a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove two
elements: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original." Feist Publ 'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Servs., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1991). In
the absence of direct evidence of duplication, "the copyright holder frequently
proves copying by showing that the defendant or the person who composed
the defendant's work had access to the copyrighted material and that the
defendant's work is substantially similar to the protected work." Robert R.
Jones Assocs. v. Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274,276-77 (6th Cir. 1988) (emphasis
added). The test for substantial similarity is sometimes called the "ordinary
observer test." See Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 n.2 (6th Cir. 1999). A
plaintiff bears the burden of proving the substantial similarity between
protected material and the allegedly infringing work. See Mihalek Corp v.
Michigan, 814 F.2d 290,294 (6th Cir. 1987).
Waite v. Patch Prods., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 13379 (6th Cir. 2001).
In addition to direct infringement, the plaintiff may assert contributory or vicarious
infringement. Those forms of infringement were recently at issue before the Ninth Circuit in
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). There the court described
contributory infringement in the following manner:
Traditionally, "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be
held liable as a 'contributory' infringer.'" Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); see also Fonovisa,
Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996). Put differently,
liability exists if the defendant engages in "personal conduct that encourages
or assists the infringement." Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158
F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1019. The court described vicarious liability as:
an "outgrowth" of respondeat superior. In the context of copyright law,
vicarious liability extends beyond an employer/employee relationship to cases
in which a defendant has the right and ability to supervise the infringing
activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.
Id. at 1022. In either case, however, "[s]econdary liability for copyright infringement does
not exist in the absence of direct infringement by a third party. It follows that [a defendant]
does not facilitate infringement of the copyright laws in the absence of direct infringement by
[another]." Id. at 1013, n. 2.
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F. Remedies for Copyright Infringement.
As with most intellectual property infringement actions, an injunction to halt future
infringing uses is a common remedy upon a successful showing of infringement. See 17
U.S.C. § 502. In addition, a copyright owner may recover actual damages and any additional
profits made by the infringer. 17 U.S.C. § 504. As with trademark infringement, a
successful copyright plaintiff need only show the defendant's gross revenue resulting from
the infringement, leaving it to the defendant to prove appropriate deductions attributable to
expenses or profit that resulted from something other' than the infringement. 17 U.S.C. §
504(b).
Because actual damages in copyright cases frequently prove difficult to show, and the
defendant's profits are often minimal, plaintiffs commonly elect to recover statutory damages
and attorney fees instead. As noted above, the infringed work must have been registered
prior to the infringement for these recoveries to be available. If that is the case, however, the
amounts can be substantial. For each infringed work, the plaintiff may recover up to
$35,000.00 for non-willful infringement, and up to $150,000.00 per infringed work in the
case of willful infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Those potential recoveries, coupled with
the threat of attorney fees, often prove much more successful in bringing the defendant to the
bargaining table prior to trial.
Finally, a successful plaintiff may obtain destruction or other appropriate disposition of the
infringing materials, as well as items by means of which additional infringing copies can be
made. 17 U.S.C. § 503.
III. Current Approaches to Licensing.
In drafting the license agreement, the legal practitioner's greatest challenge is to ensure that
the license meets the business needs of both the licensor and the licensee in light of the
nature and context of the transaction. This requires an analysis of many factors, such as how
the software is delivered to the buyer, what tasks the software perfonns, whether the software
will be the same for all buyers or customized to meet the purchaser's needs, whether
proprietary or confidential infonnation of the buyer is needed to develop the software or will
be used in its operation, whether the software will be exported out of the country, etc. Thus, a
license that makes sense between a software developer selling small application software
over the internet to numerous anonymous buyers will likely be wholly inappropriate for a
programmer working part-time to develop software for a single company to be used in-house
to manipulate confidential data or dangerous equipment. As shown below, there is a certain
amount of overlap between both types of licenses.
A. End User License Agreements
Despite a software license's dependence on all of these potentially different factors, many
types of provisions are found in almost all software licenses. This is because such provisions
address realities intrinsic in the nature of the way such software is licensed. One of the
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simplest forms of software licensing is the "End User License Agreement" (or "EULA")
typically used in commercially available software for home use. A review of these types of
licenses demonstrates that they include most or all of the same kinds of provisions. This
similarity is dictated by the fact that the developer is developing the software for home use or
for use at a place of business, with little or no interaction with the ultimate purchaser, no
customization of the software to see if the software will meet the purchaser's particular
needs, and no direct knowledge of the ways different purchasers will attempt to use the
software. Given such circumstances, it is understandable that the software developer will
narrowly circumscribe the rights granted to the software purchaser, and broadly limit its
liability for consequences arising out of unforeseen uses of its software. The following types
ofprovisions are found in almost all EULAs.
1. Manifesting Assent
Because in the context of commercial software most EULAs are not agreements signed by
either of the parties, the first and most critical provision is to establish that the EULA is
binding upon the parties. In the case of most "boxed" software purchased off the shelf, this is
accomplished with a "shrink-wrap" provision, which provides that the buyer's opening of the
package will bind her to the terms of the EULA unless she returns the software within a short
period unused. An example:
BY OPENING THE PACKAGE CONTAINING THE PROGRAM, YOU
ARE ACCEPTING AND AGREEING TO THE TERMS OF THIS LICENSE
AGREEMENT. IF YOU ARE NOT WILLING TO BE BOUND BY THE
TERMS OF THIS LICENSE AGREEMENT, YOU SHOULD PROMPTLY
RETURN THE PACKAGE IN UNOPENED FORM, AND YOU WILL
RECEIVE A REFUND OF YOUR MONEY.
However, a number of recent court decisions have refused to hold all or certain provisions of
agreements enforceable where the provision at issue is not prominently displayed to the
purchaser before acceptance of the EULA is required. This is of greater concern in the
context of "browse-wrap" licenses (where assent is to be inferred by an internet user's ability
to view web pages containing terms and conditions) and "shrink-wrap" licenses. In both of
these instances, the buyer's assent to the contract terms is inferred by their opportunity to
review the terms of the contract. This is less of a concern in the context of "click-wrap"
licenses, where the terms of the license are directly presented to the buyer and she is required
to click a button to affirmatively manifest assent. The careful practitioner should therefore
instruct the developer of this risk, arid suggest that some form of affirmative assent be built
into the process of installing and running the software, such as through the presentation of a
dialogue box to the user during the initial installation of the software.
2. Description of License
The next type of provision found in a EULA is the "licensed not sold" provision, which
states directly "The Software is licensed, not sold, to Licensee pursuant to the terms and
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conditions of this Agreement." This is designed to infonn the buyer that her purchase of the
software product only grants her a limited right to use the product, not to treat it as her own.
Any EULA, as with any kind of software license, will necessarily include a provision
defining the scope of the license, stating that "the Seller grants you a personal non-exclusive
right and license to use and execute the Program in object code fonn." The provision will go
on to explain that this right includes the rights to copy the Program from the media (such as a
CD-ROM disc) to the computer (usually the hard drive), on a single computer (as opposed to
a file server). Additionally, the provision may pennit the buyer to make a backup copy of the
Program: "You may make a single copy of the Software for backup and archival purposes
only." The EULA may prohibit the user from decompiling or reverse engineering the
software ("User may not translate, reverse engineer, or de-compile the Software Products.").
Finally, EULAs generally provide only "restricted rights" to government purchasers under
federal guidelines. An example:
U.S. Government Restricted Rights. The Software and related documentation
are provided with RESTRICTED RIGHTS. Use, duplication, or disclosure by
the Government is subject to restrictions as set forth in subparagraph (c)(I)(ii)
of the Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software clause at DFARS
252.227-7013 or subparagraphs (c)(I) and (2) of the Commercial Computer
Software - Restricted Rights at 48 C.F.R. 52.227-19, as aptPlicable.
Manufacturer for such purpose is Lighthouse Software, 555 12t Street,
Lexington, Kentucky 40507.
In addition to defining what the purchaser may do with the software, a EULA may identify
specific things that the purchaser may not do with the software. One such common exclusion
is to prohibit the software's use in "high risk" activities:
The Software is not fault-tolerant and is not designed, manufactured or
intended for use or resale as online equipment control equipment in hazardous
environments requiring fail-safe perfonnance, such as in the operation of
nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or communication systems, air traffic
control, direct life support machines, or weapons systems, in which the failure
of the Software could lead directly to death, personal injury, or severe
physical or environmental damage. Developer does not authorize You to use
the Software in applications where the Software's failure to perfonn can
reasonably be expected to result in a significant physical injury, or in loss of
life. Any such use by You is entirely at Your own risk, and You agree to hold
Developer harmless from any claims or losses relating to such unauthorized
use.
Further, in order to comply with export restrictions promulgated by the Commerce
Department, the Treasury Department, and other federal agencies, the license may provide as
follows:
The Software is developed by Developer in its offices within the United States
and is designed for use within the United States. Developer makes no
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representation that the Software is appropriate for use in other locations, and
use of the Software from territories where its contents are illegal is prohibited.
Those who choose to use the Software from other locations do so on their own
volition and are responsible for compliance with applicable local laws. You
may not export or re-export the Software except in full compliance with all
United States laws and regulations. In particular, none of the Software or
underlying infonnation or technology may be exported or re-exported into (or
to a national or resident of) any country to which the U.S. embargoes goods,
or to anyone on the U.S. Treasury Department's list of Specially Designated
Nationals or the U.S. Commerce Department's Table of Denial Orders. In
addition, You are responsible for complying with any local laws in Your
jurisdiction that may impact Your right to import, export or use the Software.
3. Liability Limitations
Having infonned the Buyer what she may do with the software, the EULA will go on to
state, in very broad tenns, that the software is provided "as is" and that the developer is not
responsible for any consequences that flow from the buyer's use of the software. This is
usually accomplished through three separate, but related, types of provisions. The first is a
broad disclaimer of any kind of warranty, other than perhaps a warranty that the physical
media on which the software is delivered is not defective. An example:
DEVELOPER PROVIDES THE SOFTWARE TO YOU "AS IS", AND
DOES NOT REPRESENT THAT THE PERFORMANCE OR OPERATION
OF THE SOFTWARE WILL MEET YOUR NEEDS OR THAT THE
OPERATION OF THE SOFTWARE WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR
ERROR-FREE. TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY
APPLICABLE LAW, DEVELOPER DISCLAIMS ANY AND ALL
WARRANTIES, DUTIES AND CONDITIONS, WHETHER EXPRESS,
IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY
WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF OR RELATED TO TITLE, NON-
INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, LACK OF VIRUSES, ACCURACY OR
COMPLETENESS OF RESPONSES, RESULTS, LACK OF NEGLIGENCE,
AND CORRESPONDENCE TO DESCRIPTION. THE ENTIRE RISK AS
TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE SOFTWARE AND
DOCUMENTATION IS WITH YOU.
Having disclaimed almost any kind of conceivable warranty, most EULAs go on to include a
provision designed to exclude any liability for most types of damage:
TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, IN
NO EVENT SHALL DEVELOPER BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL,
INCIDENTAL, INDIRECT, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES WHATSOEVER (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
DAMAGES FOR: LOSS OF PROFITS, LOSS OF CONFIDENTIAL OR
OTHER INFORMATION, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, PERSONAL
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INJURY, LOSS OF PRIVACY, FAILURE TO MEET ANY DUTY
(INCLUDING OF GOOD FAITH OR OF REASONABLE CARE),
NEGLIGENCE, AND ANY OTHER PECUNIARY OR OTHER LOSS
WHATSOEVER) ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO
THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM, OR
OTHERWISE UNDER OR IN CONNECTION WITH ANY PROVISION
OF THIS EULA, EVEN IF DEVELOPER HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
POSSffiILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES, WHETHER ARISING IN
CONTRACT, TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE), OR OTHERWISE.
Having provided for the exclusion of almost all types of claims and nearly all types of
damages, the EULA will generally provide that any remaining types of damages are
specifically limited in amount to the purchase price of the software:
NOTWITHSTANDING ANY DAMAGES THAT YOU MIGHT INCUR
FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER (INCLUDING, WITHOUT
LIMITATION, ALL DAMAGES REFERENCED ABOVE AND ALL
DIRECT OR GENERAL DAMAGES), THE ENTIRE LIABILITY OF
DEVELOPER AND YOUR EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR ALL OF THE
FOREGOING UNDER ANY PROVISION OF THIS EULA SHALL BE
LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT ACTUALLY PAID BY YOU FOR THE
PROGRAM. THE FOREGOING LIMITATIONS, EXCLUSIONS AND
DISCLAIMERS SHALL APPLY TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT
PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, EVEN IF ANY REMEDY FAILS
ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE.
As noted above, each of these provisions is generally found in one form or another in all
EULAs where the transaction is an "open market" transaction involving little or no contact
between the buyer and seller and no customization by the software developer to the user's
specific needs. Because such software is offered in a "one size fits all" manner at a
comparatively low price to the purchaser, such license agreements appropriately impose
significant limits on both the user's rights in the software and on liability for use of the
software in a context unknown to the developer.
B. Negotiated License Agreements
In stark contrast to the foregoing scenario, in more complex software development and
licensing transactions there is significantly more interaction between the developer and the
purchaser. In such transactions, the purchaser takes a much more significant role in defining
his business needs for the software so that the developer may customize the software to
address specific issues and requirements of the purchaser's business. Because much greater
care and responsibility is undertaken by both parties in the development process, the license
agreement must accurately and fairly reflect the different role of each party. For instance, the
developer can reasonably be expected to undertake greater responsibility for the proper
functioning of the software upon delivery, particularly in terms of the representations and
warranties undertaken in the contract. However, for its part the purchaser must also
undertake some responsibility for providing accurate information to the developer. In
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comparison to the "mass market" transaction described above, the developer commands a far
greater price for the customized software in exchange for much greater involvement in the
planning stage of the development process and greater accountability for the software's
suitability and performance. In addition, the buyer may obtain a license that is greater in
scope and may offer more rights in the final work product. As before, the software license
must reflect these different conditions.
Unlike a "mass market" license, where the terms of the software license are offered solely on
a "take it or leave it" basis, in a more complex development transaction the terms described
below are subject to prior negotiation between the parties. Accordingly, the appropriateness
of each of these provisions depends entirely on the circumstances and business needs of each
of the parties.
1. Warranty Protection
In the case of highly customized software, the software designer has typically worked hand-
in-hand with the user of the software to develop it to the purchaser's specifications. Thus, the
purchaser has a reasonable expectation that the software will function as promised so long as
it is used in accordance with the instructions:
Developer warrants that, for a period of one (1) year after installation of the
Software, the Software will operate in substantial conformity to the system
specifications when used in accordance with the operational parameters
described in the Documentation. Developer, at its own expense, will make all
adjustments and modifications necessary to cause the Software to so operate
upon receipt of written notice from Purchaser within such period that the
Software has failed to so operate.
In addition, the software designer may warrant that it holds proper title to the software and
that its use will not violate the rights of third parties:
Developer warrants that it has the right and authority to grant Purchaser the
right and license in the Software granted herein, and that Purchaser's use of
the Software in accordance with this Agreement shall not infringe the rights of
any third parties under any patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret or unfair
competition law in the United States.
Of course, as a matter of due diligence the purchaser of a complex and expensive software
system may wish to require the software developer to provide further assurances. This might
take the form of a representation in the agreement that all of the developer's employees and
subcontractors have signed appropriate assignments or work-made-for-hire agreements. The
purchaser may take the further step ofhaving the software designer provide copies of all such
agreements.
© 2001-2002 Stoll, Keenon & Park, LLP
B-12
2. Pre-implementation Testing and Change Orders
In some instances, a business may rely on one or more software programs to assist them on a
daily basis to perform their core functions. In such instances, it is simply unacceptable for
such programs to be rendered inoperable for any extended period. For example, an
architectural design firm may incur unacceptable losses if its work force is idled because its
design software will not function. To avoid such potential disasters, the license agreement
should provide for full testing of the newly designed software before the old system is
entirely supplanted:
Following installation of the Software at the Purchaser's premises, Developer
shall conduct an installation test in order to confirm that the Software
conforms to the Software Specifications in all material respects. Developer
shall give Purchaser notice of the installation test at least seven (7) days
before it is scheduled to commence, and Purchaser may permit any Purchaser
personnel to observe the installation test and verify the results. Developer
shall correct any defects in the Software revealed by the installation test and
thereafter confirm in writing to Purc4aser that such defects have been
corrected. Upon satisfactory completion of the installation test, Developer
shall send Purchaser a certificate indicating proper installation.
Once the software programs have been installed and appear to work properly, the purchaser
will have the opportunity to see how well the software works under actual operating
conditions. The purchaser may determine that one or more aspects of the functioning of the
software should be modified in order to improve its function. The license agreement should
anticipate this need and establish a process to facilitate such changes:
After Developer issues a certificate of proper installation, Purchaser may test
the Software as installed for conformity to the Software Specifications under
actual operating conditions during the ensuing thirty (30) calendar days.
During this period, Purchaser may review and request in writing from
Developer revisions to the Software. Upon receipt of that request, Developer
shall use commercially reasonable efforts to implement those revision
requests that are within the scope of, and consistent with, the Software
Specifications.
If Purchaser wishes to implement any revisions to the Software that deviate in
any material respect from the Software Specifications, Purchaser shall submit
to Developer a written change order containing (i) the revisions in detail and
(ii) a request for a price quotation for each change (collectively, the "Change
Order"). Developer shall promptly evaluate the Change Order and submit to
Purchaser for its written acceptance a proposal for undertaking the applicable
tasks and a price quote reflecting all fees associated with Purchaser's Change
Order. Purchaser shall have five (5) business days from receipt of that
proposal to accept or reject Developer's proposal in writing. If Purchaser
accepts Developer's proposal to undertake the work necessitated by the
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Change Order, then the Change Order, as supplemented and/or modified by
Developer's proposal, shall amend the Software Specifications. Developer
shall proceed to implement such revisions in accordance with the Software
Specifications as so modified.
3. Confidential Information
In order for the software designer to customize the software to meet the purchaser's needs,
the purchaser may need to provide detailed business, financial, or customer information to
the software designer. Such information is often gathered by the purchaser over time and at
substantial expense. Accordingly, the purchaser may wish to keep this information secret
from other businesses to keep its competitive advantage. Likewise, the software designer
may need to reveal certain aspects of the software's functioning to the purchaser in order to
assist in a meaningful exchange of information in the process of designing the software. The
software designer may wish to protect this information as well.
To facilitate the open exchange of needed information under these circumstances, the license
should provide that neither party is to disclose such information to any outside party, and
may only use such information in order to fulfill their obligations under the license
agreement:
Purchaser and Developer each acknowledge that Purchaser's Business Data
and Developer's Software may embody proprietary trade secrets of substantial
value. Purchaser and Developer shall treat all Trade Secrets identified in
Exhibit E as proprietary and confidential, and neither use, copy, or disclose,
nor permit any of their respective Personnel to use, copy, or disclose such
Trade Secrets, except as necessary to fulfill their obligations under this
Agreement.
Developer further acknowledges that any and all personal, business, financial
or other data contained in customer files delivered to Developer by Purchaser
to assist in the development and implementation of the Software are the
exclusive property of Purchaser and shall constitute part of Purchaser's
Business Data. Developer shall make no unauthorized use of such customer
data owned by Purchaser. Developer shall hold in confidence all information
relating to the business or affairs of Purchaser that is received by Developer in
rendering services under this Agreement, except where it is authorized by
Purchaser or compelled by governmental regulation or legal process. If
necessary, Developer shall provide back-up records and media reasonably
necessary to reconstruct current records ofPurchaser.
4. Software Maintenance, Training, and Support
Many software designers develop and market software designed to assist businesses in a
certain specialized field of business, such as medical billing and payment .systems or flight
control software for small regional airports. Such designers often develop an initial
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"template" software package that they then customize to meet the needs of a particular
customer. In such instances the software may be updated with some frequency, with the
updates offered to purchasers through a software maintenance provision
Developer will periodically issue Maintenance Releases, containing
incremental enhancements and modifications to the Software, to the Purchaser
if it is current in its Maintenance Fees. Maintenance Releases may include
new features other than major revisions, which are to be provided as described
in paragraph 3. There will be a media and documentation fee of $50 per
release. The maintenance fee and support begin upon installation of the
Software on Purchaser's hardware system(s).
The advantage of this type of system is that it ensures the most recent version of the software
to the purchaser while providing the developer with a reliable income stream and a pre-
established market for updates.
Particularly where the newly designed software represents a significant departure from the
purchaser's old practices or software, one of the purchaser's greatest costs is generally the
cost to train employees to use and fully implement the new software. The experienced
practitioner will bring this need to the purchaser's attention and incorporate needed
provisions into the agreement:
Once Purchaser has selected personnel who are qualified to operate the
Software, Developer shall provide Purchaser's personnel with training in the
operation of the Software. Such training shall take place at the dates, times,
and locations set forth in Exhibit D. Travel expenses related to the conversion,
or training, shall be reimbursed by Purchaser at cost. Developer shall provide
further training on mutually acceptable terms at Developer's customary rates
then in effect.
Finally, even the best training is unlikely to adequately simulate the demands and stresses
placed upon the software and employees alike under real-world conditions. Accordingly, the
agreement may wish to provide for additional remote support through the use of a customer
support line maintained by the software designer:
Developer will provide operational assistance for Purchaser's employees
using the Software via its toll-free Support Line between 8:00 am and 6:00
p.m., Central Time, Monday through Friday, excluding scheduled holidays
(New Year's Day, Memorial Day, 4th of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day,
the day after Thanksgiving, Christmas Eve and Christmas Day). Support
Line Services include Developer's "Application Support Line" (assistance in
proper use of the Software) at no charge. Purchaser may access Developer's
"Technical Support Line" (assistance addressing hardware or technical
problems related to use of the Software) at a rate of $2.00 per minute.
Developer shall determine whether each call is technical in nature and charge
Purchaser accordingly; employees of Purchaser are encouraged to inquire at
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the outset of the call whether the support requested is chargeable. The
Application Support Line may not be used to receive training on the use of the
Software over the telephone. Separate fees apply to such training whether
received during the initial implementation process or post-implementation.
The foregoing provisions are by no means exhaustive of the kinds of provisions that may be
needed to adequately document the needs of the parties to such a complex transaction. For
example, the parties may wish to negotiate in advance the costs for the customer to purchase
significant· software upgrades, provide that the purchaser is entitled to "most-favored
customer status" for new software products or modules, carefully delineate the circumstances
under which one or either party may terminate the development agreement and the
consequences of such termination at each step of the development process, or provide the
customer with rights to assistance from the developer in the event of termination before full
implementation of the software or thereafter.
Not even the most well thought out license and development agreement can hope to address
every possible situation that may arise between the parties. When a situation does arise that is
not addressed by the agreement, the parties may be left with little more than general
statements of intention in the opening habendum clauses of the contract, or worse, conflicting
recollections of conversations held early in the development stage. Of course, in commercial
law the Uniform Commercial Code has long provided "gap-filling" sections to address
"holes" in the contract. As described below, the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act (if it applies) can act to fill those holes, as well as perhaps provide answers to previously
troubling questions in the context of software licensing, such as issues of contract formation.
IV. THE EFFECT OF DelTA ON LICENSING
UCITA is an acronym for the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. As the
name indicates, UCITA is a uniform statutory scheme designed to govern transactions in
computer information - e.g., software licenses, database licenses, and other legal components
of the information age. In the absence of legislation specifically encompassing such
transactions, courts historically have tended to find contracts such as software licenses to be
governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g., Advent Sys. v. Unisys
Corp., 925 F.2d 670,675-76 (3rd Cir. 1991); Dahlmann v. Sulcus Hospitality Techs. Inc., 63
F.Supp.2d 772, 775 (E.D. Mich. 1999). A central premise ofUCITA is that current law, and
particularly UCC Article 2, is ill suited to govern modem transactions involving computer
information and that a uniform statutory scheme specifically focused on such transactions is
necessary.
The current version of UCITA, which can be accessed along with the official commentary
over the Internet at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm#ucita. is the result of over a
decade of efforts by various groups to craft a set of uniform laws to govern information
transactions. Originally proposed as Article 2B of the UCC, the Act took on its current name
when the views of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws (NCCUSL)
and the American Law Institute (ALI) diverged. When ALI withdrew its support for the Act
in the Spring of 1999 because it favored making certain changes to Article 2 of the UCC to
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accommodate information transactions, NCCUSL renamed the Act to reflect its independent
-status from the UCC.
On July 29, 1999, NCCUSL officially adopted UCITA. Two states - Virginia and Maryland
- have since passed the Act, see Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-501.1, et. seq.; Md. COMMERCIAL
LAW Code Ann. § 22-101, et. seq., and it is currently under consideration in other states as
well (though not yet in Kentucky). Because the Act is controversial, however, its future is
less than certain. Various interest groups, as well as Attorneys General from thirty-two
states, have voiced objection to the Act, and at least one state (Iowa) has adopted "anti-
UCITA" legislation - i.e. legislation that allows a contracting party to void a previously
agreed upon choice of law provision that selects UCITA or a substantially similar law. See
Iowa Code § 554D.104(4) (2002).
A. UCITA's SCOPE OF COVERAGE
One of the most important aspects of any law - something that corporate counsel and general
practitioners should know even if they know nothing else about a law - is the law's scope of
coverage. Knowing when a particular law is potentially applicable gives a lawyer the ability
to spot issues and consult the specific provisions of the potentially applicable law.
UCITA's scope of coverage is set forth in Section 103, which provides as its baseline that
UCITA "applies to computer information transactions." "Computer information
transactions" is defined in Section 102 (the definitions section) as "an agreement or the
performance of it to create, modify, transfer, or license computer information or
informational rights in computer information . . . . The term does not include a transaction
merely because the parties' agreement provides that their communications about the
transaction will be in the form of computer information." UCITA § 102(11). The term
"computer information" is, in tum, defined as "information in electronic form which is
obtained from or through the use of a computer or which is in a form capable of being
processed by a computer. The term includes a copy of the information and any
documentation or packaging associated with the copy." UCITA § 102(10). Thus, the initial
scope of UCITA would appear to include a wide assortment of transactions involving digital
information, such as software licenses, software and internet development agreements,
database licenses, software assignments, digital videos and audio recordings, etc. See UCITA
§ 103, Official Comment 2(a) - (e). Importantly, however, UCITA section 105 specifically
acknowledges the preemptive effect of federal law. For example, as noted above, section
204(a) of the Copyright Act imposes certain requirements on transfers of exclusive
copyright interests, which requirements preempt any contrary provisions in UCITA. See 17
U.S.C. § 204(a).
Operating from the section 103(a) baseline, the remainder of section 103 provides certain
specific exceptions and sets forth rules governing transactions of a mixed nature such as a
sale of goods containing embedded software (an increasingly common occurrence these
days):
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(b) Except for subject matter excluded in subsection (d) and as otherwise
provided in Section 104, if a computer information transaction includes
subject matter other than computer information or subject matter excluded
under subsection (d), the following rules apply:
(1) If a transaction includes computer information and goods, this [Act]
applies to the part of the transaction involving computer information,
informational rights in it, and creation or modification of it. However, if a
copy of a computer program is contained in and sold or leased as part of
goods, this [Act] applies to the copy and the computer program only if:
(A) the goods are a computer or computer peripheral; or
(B) giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access to or use of the program is
ordinarily a material purpose of transactions in goods of the type sold or
leased.
(2) Subject to subsection (d)(3)(A), if a transaction includes an agreement for
creating, or for obtaining rights to create, computer information and a motion
picture, this [Act] does not apply to the agreement if the dominant character of
the agreement is to create or obtain rights to create a motion picture. In all
other such agreements, this [Act] does not apply to the part of the agreement
that involves a motion picture excluded under subsection (d)(3), but does
apply to the computer information.
(3) In all other cases, this [Act] applies to the entire transaction if the
computer information and informational rights, or access to them, is the
primary subject matter, but otherwise applies only to the part of the
transaction involving computer information, informational rights in it, and
creation or modification of it.
(c) To the extent ofa conflict between this [Act] and [Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code], [Article 9] governs.
(d) This [Act] does not apply to:
(1) a financial services transaction;
(2) an insurance services transaction;
(3) an agreement to create, perform or perform in, include information in,
acquire, use, distribute, modify, reproduce, have access to, adapt, make
available, transmit, license, or display:
(A) a motion picture or audio or visual programming, other than in (i) a mass-
market transaction or (ii) a submission of an idea or information or release of
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informational rights that may result in making a motion picture or similar
information product; or
(B) a sound recording, musical work, or phonorecord as defined or used in
Title 17 of the United States Code as of July 1, 1999, or an enhanced sound
recording, other than in the submission of an idea or information or release of
informational rights that may result in the creation of such material or a
similar information product.
(4) a compulsory license;
(5) a contract of employment of an individual, other than an individual hired
as an independent contractor to create or modify computer information, unless
the independent contractor is a freelancer in the news reporting industry as
that term is commonly understood in that industry;
(6) a contract that does not require that information be furnished as computer
information or a contract in which, under the agreement, the form of the
information as computer information is otherwise insignificant with respect to
the primary subject matter of the part of the transaction pertaining to the
information;
(7) unless otherwise agreed between the parties in a record:
(A) telecommunications products or services provided pursuant to federal or
state tariffs; or
(B) telecommunications products or services provided pursuant to agreements
required or permitted to be filed by the service provider with a federal or state
authority regulating those services or under pricing subject to approval by a
federal or state regulatory authority; or
(8) subject matter within the scope of [Article 3, 4, 4A, 5, [6,] 7, or 8 of the
Uniform Commercial Code].
UCITA § 103(b) - (d).
B. uelTA's STRUCTURE
Probably the second most important aspect of UCITA for a general practitioner to know is
the overall structure of the Act. If one knows the general scope and structure of a particular
set of law, he or she is in a very good position not only to spot potential issues but also to
quickly find the answers to those issues. Because UCITA began its drafting life as a proposed
Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, the structure of the Act is quite similar to that
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of DCC Article 2, something that should provide a level of comfort to those otherwise
unfamiliar with the Act.
Part 1 of DCITA sets forth the Act's General Provisions, including a lengthy set of defined
terms (section 102), provisions regarding the Act's scope and applicability (sections 103
through 105), provisions regarding contract construction, enforceability, and authenticity
(sections 106 - 108, 111, 113, 114), and provisions regarding choice of law and choice of
forum (sections 109 and 110).
Part 2 addresses the formation and terms of a contract, including traditional contract issues
such as the formal requirements of a contract (section 201), offer and acceptance (section
203), acceptance with varying terms (section 204), conditional offer and acceptance (section
205), and the impact of things like trade usage and course of dealing (section 210). In
addition, however, Part 2 sets forth specific provisions governing circumstances that have
arisen only recently with the growing prominence of information technology, such as offer
and acceptance by electronic agents or "bots" (section 106), mass market licenses (section
209), and the effect of electronic error in an automated transaction (section 214).
Part 3 contains specific provisions governing contract construction and interpretation issues,
such as parol and extrinsic evidence (section 301) and modification and rescission (section
303).
Part 4 addresses warranties. The kinds of warranties include traditional ones well known to
most lawyers, such as express warranties (section 402), implied warranties ofmerchantability
(section 403), and disclaimed warranties (section 406). In addition, however, the Act also
addresses other, more modem forms of warranties such as warranties of noninfringement
(section 401), warranties regarding informational content (section 404), and warranties
concerning system integration (section 405).
Part 5 deals with the transfer of interests and rights in computer information. Subpart A
addresses transfers of ownership, such as ownership of informational rights such as copyright
interests (section 501) and ownership of particular copies (section 502). It also addresses
transfer of contractual interests and, particularly, sublicensing (sections 503 through 506).
Subpart B of Part 5 deals with various transfers as part of financing arrangements, including
those where the financier does and does not become a licensee of the computer information
being transferred (sections 507 and 508).
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Part 6 concerns the performance of contracts and other transactions involving computer
information. There are several sections that address general aspects of performance (sections
601 through 605) and several that address performance by the delivery of particular copies of
computer information (sections 606 through 610). In addition, Part 6 deals with certain
specific types of contracts such as access contracts (section 611), software support and
maintenance contracts (section 612), and contracts concerning the distribution of computer
information (mainly software) from publishers through dealers to the ultimate end-users
(section 613). Finally, Part 6 deals with traditional performance issues such as risk of loss
(section 614), impossibility (section 615), and termination (sections 616 through 618).
Part 7 deals with situations involving breach of contract. These include traditional issues
such as material breach (section 701), waiver (section 702), the right to cure (section 703),
the providing of assurances of performance (section 708), and repudiation of performance
(sections 709 and 710). In addition, Part 7 addresses breach by the providing of defective
copies of the computer information - e.g. software with significant "bugs" or other errors in
it (sections 704 through 707).
Part 8 addresses remedies. Again, the Act addresses both traditional remedy issues such as
the right to cancel (section 802), liquidation of damages (section 804), the limitations period
for bringing suit (section 805), measure of damages (sections 807 through 809), recoupment
(810), and specific performance (section 811), as well as issues more attuned to modem
computer information transactions.
Part 9 is the final part of the Act, and, as with DCC Article 2 and others, provides an
assortment "miscellaneous provisions" concerning matters such as severability of the Act's
various provisions (section 901) and the Act's effective date and its effect on transactions
occurring prior to the effective date (sections 902 and 904).
c. IMPORTANT SECTIONS / HOT TOPICS
Even the most superficial survey of all the provisions of DCITA would be a lengthy
undertaking well beyond the scope of these materials. This section will therefore focus on
several of the more significant or controversial aspects of the Act. Those wishing to access
more in-depth treatment of the various sections of DCITA may consult the sources
mentioned at the end of these materials, all of which provide excellent and detailed
discussions ofvarious issues.
1. Mass Market Licenses and Consumer Protection
One of the most difficult issues dividing the proponents and opponents of DCITA is the
question of how to treat consumers, especially in light of the ubiquitous nature of mass
market software licenses in today's world. DCITA's current version expressly provides that
the various consumer protection laws already in existence control to the extent of any conflict
with DCITA. See DCITA § 105(c). The Act also provides different rules applicable to
"mass-market licenses" and "mass-market transactions." See, e.g., DCITA §§ 105(44) - (45),
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209, 304(b)(2), 503(4). "Mass-market licenses" and "mass-market transactions" are defined
in section 102 in the following manner:
(44) "Mass-market license" means a standard form used in a mass-market
transaction.
(45) "Mass-market transaction" means a transaction that is:
(A) a consumer contract; or
(B) any other transaction with an end-user licensee if:
(i) the transaction is for information or informational rights directed to
the general public as a whole, including consumers, under substantially
the same terms for the same information;
(ii) the licensee acquires the information or informational rights in a
retail transaction under terms and in a quantity consistent with an
ordinary transaction in a retail market; and
(iii) the transaction is not:
(I) a contract for redistribution or for public performance or public
display of a copyrighted work;
(II) a transaction in which the information is customized or
otherwise specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee, other
than minor customization using a capability of the information
intended for that purpose;
(ill) a site license; or
(IV) an access contract.
DCITA § 102 (44) - (45). If an agreement constitutes a mass-market license, for instance,
there are special rules regarding the enforceability of terms and the opportunity for review
and assent that are designed to protect consumers. DCITA § 209. Similarly, provisions in
mass-market licenses that prohibit the transfer of contractual interests must be conspicuous, a
provision again designed to protect the consumer. DCITA § 503(4).
Notwithstanding these special rules, opponents of DCITA believe that the Act does not go
nearly far enough to protect consumers and instead places consumers at the mercy of
software vendors in many respects. DCITA opponent Cern Kaner's recent comments reflect
that sentiment:
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UCITA defines the typical consumer software transaction as an intangible
license, the purchase of a right to use the software, rather than the sale of a
copy of the software. So, when you buy a copy of Microsoft Word and a book
on how to use Microsoft Word at your local computer store, you buy two
things that contain copyrighted intellectual property. The sale of the book is a
sale of goods under DCITA but under UCITA, the sale of the software is not.
If you download that same book from Barnes & Noble, instead of buying the
paper copy at Barnes & Noble, the book is treated like software under
UCITA.
By defining consumer purchases of software as licenses, rather than sales,
UCITA pulls consumer software out of the scope of all of the consumer
protection statutes that protect buyers of "consumer goods." All of the
consumer warranty laws, for example, are "consumer goods" laws.
Comments of Cern Kaner in Educational CyberPlayground, dated December 21, 2001,
(viewed April 4, 2002, at http://www.edu-cyberpg.com/Technology/securityUCITA.html). .
Similarly, the Attorneys General of thirty-two states recently opined in a letter to NCCUSL:
Since UCITA would identify the transactions it covers as "licenses" of
"information" rather than "sales of goods," it would remove a vast range of
transactions from laws that specifically apply to the sale of goods. In addition
to the UCC, UCITA could effect an end-run around such federal statutes as
the Robinson-Patman Act (prohibiting price discrimination), which arguably
does not apply to mere "licensing agreements," and the Magnuson-Moss Act
(setting standards for consumer warranties), which applies to any "buyer ... of
any consumer product."
Likewise, arguments are sure to be made that state consumer protection laws
do not extend to "licenses" of "information." Thus, by designating a wide
range of consumer transactions as the licensing of "information," rather than
the purchase of "goods," UCITA could provide the basis for sellers to argue
that state consumer protection laws are inapplicable in the first instance.
While we believe any such argument should ultimately fail, it will still
generate litigation, create uncertainty and increase the likelihood that
consumers will not receive all the protections of existing consumer law in
transactions that are subject to UCITA.
Letter from Attorneys General to Carlyle C. Ring, dated Nov. 13, 2001 (viewed April 4,
2002, at http://www.4cite.org/pdf/Nov132001 Letter from AGs to Carlyle Ring.pdt).
NCCUSL has responded to criticisms such as these by noting that, to the extent state
consumer protection laws apply only to consumer goods, those laws should be updated in
any event to reflect the modem-day prevalence ofcomputer software licensing:
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What is dealt with here is the relationship between UCITA and prior
consumer protection law in a state. Subsequent consumer protection laws will,
of course, contain their own scope and preemptive tenns.
The legislative note in UCITA alerts legislatures of the need to examine state
consumer protection statutes applicable to goods to detennine whether they
ought to be amended to apply to computer infonnation. Both Virginia and
Maryland engaged in close analysis of their own consumer protection rules,
amending those laws to cover infonnation transactions when appropriate. This
type of examinati,on is needed for appropriate results since some consumer
law requirements would make no sense if applied to infonnation transactions
(e.g., a consumer statute requiring a label to appear on outside packaging for
goods cannot automatically be applied to downloaded software or to the right
to access a database; there is no "outside" in either case).
Agenda of UCITA Standby Committee for Nov. 16-18,2001, meeting at p. 21 (viewed on
April 4, 2002, at http://www.nccllsl.org/nccusl/meetingsIUCITA Materials/Agenda-nov-
01.pdO·
2. Electronic Self-Help
Another highly contentious issue, albeit one that may be largely resolved now, has been the
availability under UCITA for parties under certain circumstances to agree to allow a software
provider to exercise "electronic self-help" in the event of a dispute. "Electronic self-help
occurs when licensed software contains a mechanism that allows the provider to remotely
disable or "shut down" the software. Many opponents of UCITA have raised the specter of
software vendors disabling mission-critical software whenever disputes arose with the
software user. For example, the AFFECT coalition's website has stated:
uelTA would allow software to be disabled without notification.
• UCITA allows software publishers to shut down mission critical software
remotely without court approval and without incurring liability for the
foreseeable harm caused.
• UCITA allows software publishers to modify the tenns of contracts after
the sale simply by sending an e-mail -- regardless ofwhether the consumer
receives the notification or not.
• UCITA allows software publishers to remove their product, simply
because usage fees arrive late.
• UCITA puts consumers at the mercy of software publishers to "blackmail"
users for more fees by their unhindered ability to disable or remove their
product for unspecified "license violations."
Why We Oppose UCITA (viewed on April 4, 2002, at http://www.4cite.org/why.html).
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The issue may be largely resolved now, however, because Section 816, which permitted
electronic self-help in limited circumstances, was recently amended along with all other
references to electronic self-help in the Act to provide that electronic self-help is banned.
Nevertheless, initial reactions from UCITA's opponents to the proposed amendment were
luke-warm, suggesting that software vendors will find alternative means of accomplishing
the same ends. AFFECT's website stated:
At first glance, the recommended amendments to electronic self-help also
appear to provide some degree of relief: "Electronic self-help" in UCITA
means the remote disabling of a licensee's use of software or computer
information. Controversy about this issue has persistently plagued UCITA.
Although the proposed amendment is an improvement over existing language,
the complexity of the model statute makes it uncertain that the equivalent of
electronic self-help would not be permitted through other sections of the law.
Further, the proposed amendment does not prohibit a licensor from relying on
a contractual exclusion or limitation of damages to limit its liability for an
improper exercise of electronic self-help. As a result, a licensor could ignore
UCITA's prohibition of electronic self-help with little fear of the
consequences.
AFFECT Statement on Proposed New Amendments to UCITA (viewed on April 4, 2002, at
http://www.4cite.org/why.html). Similarly, Cern Kaner opined:
Electronic self-help is banned, but a vendor retains extensive power to protect
its rights under UCITA. For example, the software can come with a built-in
automatic termination, stopping performance after a specified number of days
or uses. In the event of a dispute, the vendor can simply refuse to renew the
license. The vendor can also get an injunction.
Comments of Cern Kaner in Educational CyberPlayground, dated December 21, 2001,
(viewed April 4, 2002, at http://www.edu-cyberpg.com/Technology/securityUCITA.html).
3. Choice of Law
A final issue that has provoked opposition to UCITA, and that is important to attorneys
practicing in states that have not yet adopted UCITA, is that of choice of law. Section 109 of
the Act provides:
(a) The parties in their agreement may choose the applicable law. However,
the choice is not enforceable in a consumer contract to the extent it would
vary a rule that may not be varied by agreement under the law of the
jurisdiction whose law would apply under subsections (b) and (c) in the
absence of the agreement.
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(b) In the absence of an enforceable agreement on choice of law, the following
rules determine which jurisdiction's law governs in all respects for purposes
of contract law:
(1) An access contract or a contract providing for electronic delivery of a
copy is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the licensor was
located when the agreement was entered into.
(2) A consumer contract that requires delivery of a copy on a tangible
medium is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the copy is or
should have been delivered to the consumer.
(3) In all other cases, the contract is governed by the law of the
jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the transaction.
(c) In cases governed by subsection (b), if the jurisdiction whose law governs
is outside the United States, the law of that jurisdiction governs only if it
provides substantially similar protections and rights to a party not located in
that jurisdiction as are provided under this [Act]. Otherwise, the law of the
State that has the most significant relationship to the transaction governs.
(d) For purposes of this section, a party is located at its place of business if it
has one place of business, at its chief executive office if it has more than one
place of business, or at its place of incorporation or primary registration if it
does not have a physical place of business. Otherwise, a party is located at its
primary residence.
DCITA § 109. Critics of UCITA complain that this provision gives software vendors the
ability to thrust unfavorable laws on their licensees in non-negotiable mass-market
agreements. However, as NCCUSL's Standby Committee noted prior to its November
meeting, existing law generally supports choice of law provisions in contracts:
Common law generally enforces contractual choices of law unless they are
unconscionable or violate fundamental public policy of a state. See Medtronic
Inc. v. Janss, 729 F.2d 1395 (11th Cir. 1984); Northeast Data Sys., Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Computer Sys. Co., 986 F.2d 607 (1st Cir. 1993).
Compare Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group, Inc., 61 Cal. App.4th 881,
72 Cal. Rptr.2d 73 (Cal. App. 1998) (California fundamental policy
invalidates choice of law that would be enforceable under Maryland law,
where the contract was made). The Restatement (Second) ofConflicts ofLaw
188 provides:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is
one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in
their agreement directed to that issue.
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(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties ... will be applied, even if
the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by
an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless
either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or
the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties'
choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable
law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
Agenda of UCITA Standby Committee for Nov. 16-18, 2001, meeting at p. 32 (viewed on
April 4, 2002, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccllsl/meetings/UCITA Materi,als/Agenda-nov-
01.pdt).
The current state of the law is significant for two reasons. First, UCITA's critics are focusing
on an aspect of UCITA that makes no change to existing law and instead is patterned after
the rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws. Second, and more
importantly for attorneys drafting licenses outside jurisdictions that have adopted UCITA,
non-UCITA law would appear to enforce contractual provisions that choose either (1) the
law of a state that has adopted UCITA if a reasonable basis can be shown for choosing that
state's law or (2) UCITA itself. Since it may be difficult to show a reasonable basis for the
choice of Maryland or Virginia law in many licensing situations, it may be more feasible at
this point for the parties to choose to apply UCITA to their transaction to the extent of
UCITA's scope of coverage and to apply the law of a particular state (regardless of whether
that state has adopted UCITA) to any issues outside the scope of UCITA. Given the ill-
suited nature of UCC Article 2 and common law to software licenses and other computer
information transactions, it would seem quite reasonable for the parties to such a transaction
to choose UCITA. Under existing law, therefore, that choice is likely to be enforced.
4. ADDITIONAL RESOURCES CONCERNING UCITA
Websites:
UCITA Online - http://www.ucitaonline.com
AFFECT Coalition website - http://affect.ucita.com/
Cern Kaner's website - http://www.badsoftware.com/uccindex.htm
Articles:
Cern Kaner, Software Engineering and UCITA, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
435 (1999).
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!
:
Cern Kaner, Why You Should Oppose UCITA, 17 COMPUTER LAWYER No.5, 20 (May 2000)
(available at http://www.badsoftware.com/claw2000.htm).
Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Uniform Rules for Internet Information Transactions: An Overview of
Proposed UCITA, 38 DUQUESNEL. REv. 319 (2000).
Holly K. Towle, Mass Market Transactions in the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, 38 DUQUESNE L. REv. 371 (2000).
Brian D. McDonald, The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 461 (2001).
Matthew J. Smith, An Overview ofthe Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act:
Warranties, Self-Help, and Contract Formation Why UCITA Should Be Renamed tiThe
Licensors' Protection Act, "25 S. ILL. U. L. J. 389 (2001).
© 2001-2002 Stoll, Keenon & Park, LLP
B-28














PATENT UPDATE:
The Patentability of a Business Method,
the Survival and Future of Internet Patents and
Other Important Patent Topics
Andrew D. Dorisio
and
Michael S. Hargis
King & Schickli, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Copyright 2002, Andrew D. Dorisio and Michael S. Hargis
SECTION C

PATENT UPDATE:
The Patentability of a Business Method,
the Survival and Future of Internet Patents and
Other Important Patent Topics
Michael S. Hargis
And
Andrew D. Dorisio
King & Schickli, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
Table of Contents
I. What is a Patent? C-2
A. Utility, Desigtl & Plant C-2
B. Statutes C-2
II. Patentable Subject Matter ...............•..•...........................•............................•.....•......... C-3
III. Utility Patent "Parts" ...................................................................•.............................. C-6
IV. Claims.............................•............................................................................................ C-7
A. Basic Types C-7
1. Product Claims C-7
2. Method Claims C-7
B. New Types to Cover Developing Technologies C-7
V. Patentability of Inventions C-8
A. Must Meet Requirements ofPatent Act C-8
VI. Patent "Life" C-9
A. Prepare and File Application C-9
B. Prosecution C-9
C. Allowance C-9
D. Enforcement C-9
SECTIONC
VII. Claims - Infringement..................................•.•............................................................ C-I0
A. Direct Infringement C-l0
B. Indirect Infringement C-ll
1. Contributory Infringement C-ll
2. Inducement of Infringement C-ll
3. Important Considerations C-ll
VIII. Business Methods - History C-12
A. Not New C-12
B. Originated in Dicta From Two Cases C-13
C. PTO Originally Followed Exception C-14
D. Ex Parte Murray C-15
E. 1996 Edition ofMPEP C-16
F. PTO White Paper (2001) C-17
G. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group C-18
IX. Business Methods - Generally..............•..................................................................... C-19
A. Rule C-19
B. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group C-20
C. Pre-State Street Exam.ples C-21
1. Arrhythmia Tech. Inc. v. Corazonix Corp C-21
2. In re Abele C-22
X. Business Method - Definition C-23
A. No Clear Definition C-23
B. Why Does it Matter? C-24
C. Exam.ples ofBusiness Methods C-25
D. Other Ways to Cover C-28
E. Statutory First Inventor Defense C-30
XI. First Inventor Defense .............................................•.................................................. C-31
A. Apparatus/Product Claims C-3l
B. "Prior art" C-31
C. Advice to Patent Applicant/Patent Drafter C-34
D. Exam.ples C-35
XII. Problems/Considerations C-40
A. Identifying Business Methods C-40
B. Examination - Quality Issues C-41
C. Examination - Other Issues C-42
D. Enforceability of Business Method Patents C-45
E. Treated Differently in Different Countries C-47
XIII. Benefits/Advantages..............................................•..................................................... C-48
A. Uncertainty Provides Patentee with Large Advantage in Litigation C-48
SECTIONC
XlV. Method Patents - Special Case C-49
XV. Internet/Software Patents .......................................................••................................. C-52
A. The (Recent) Past C-52
B. Past and Recent Enforceability C-53
c. The Present C-57
D. The Future C-58
XVI. Fixing the "Problems" C-59
SECTIONC

n
I
~
Patent Update: The Patentability of
a Business Method, the Survival
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Other Important Patent Topics
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What is a Patent?
• A grant by the Federal Government to
an inventor of the right to exclude
others from making, using, selling,
offering to sell, or importing an
invention in the United States
• Three types - Utility, Design, and Plant
• Statutes - Title 35, United States Code
•,.~' KINII & BCHICIeL.. PLLC
, Patent, Trademark, Copyright & Unfair Conlpetition Latv
Patentable Subject Matter
• 35 U.S.C. 101 -
"Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine,
2 manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."
Patentable Subject Matter
• Congress intended statutory subject
matter to "include anything under the
sun that is made by man." Diamond v.
2 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
• Three categories of unpatentable
subject matter - "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
•~! KINII" SCHICIeLI. PLLC
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Patentable Subject Matter
• Einstein could not patent E = mc2 ; nor
could Newton patent the law of gravity
• Mathematical algorithms are not
~ patentable subject matter "to the
extent that they are merely abstract
ideas." Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
•~~' KIND 6\ SCH'CKLI, PLLC
Patent, Tradelnark, C~~yright & llnfair Competition Law
Utility Patent "Parts"
• Background of the Invention
• Summary of the Invention
~ • Brief Description of the Drawings
• Detailed Description
• Drawings
• Claims - "Metes and Bounds" of
Invention
•~~ KINII" SCH.CIeL" PLLC
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Claims
• Basic Types -
- Product claim - covers an apparatus,
composition, machine, or structure
- Method claim - covers a method or
process by defining a series of steps
to be followed in forming a process
• New Types Defined to Cover
Developing Technologies
•@j:.) KIND" SaH,aleLI, PLLC
Patent, Tradetnark, Copyright & Unfair C01npetition LaUl
Patentability of Inventions
• Must meet requirements of Patent Act
- Invention must be "statutory subject
matter" and useful
~ - Invention must be properly described
- Novel - not found in the prior art in
identical form
- Non-obvious - not "obvious" in view of the
prior art
Patent, Trademark, Copyrigbt & lln[air Competition Law
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Patent "Life"
• Prepare and file patent application
• "Prosecution" - consideration by
Examiner at PTO; rejections,
~ appeals, etc.
• Allowance
• Issuance
• Enforcement
•~, KINrs & SCHICleLI. PLLC
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Claims - Infringement
• Direct Infringement - Two types
- Literal Infringement - each and every
element of the claim must be found in
the accused product or process
- Doctrine of Equivalents - element
performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same
way to achieve substantially the same
result; "insubstantially different"
Claims - Infringement
• Indirect Infringement - Two Types
- Contributory Infringement
- Inducement of Infringement
g • Important Considerations for
Indirect Infringement
- Both require knowledge or intent
- Must have direct infringer in U.S.
~"' KINII" SCHICleL" PLLC
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Business Methods - History
• Business Method Patents are not new
- Example
• u.s. Patent No. 63,889 (issued April 10, 1867),
entitled "Hotel Register" arguably describes
method of advertising in hotel register
• However, business "methods" originally
not considered patentable - non-
statutory "business method" exception
~-: KINII 6\ SaHlaKL.. PLLC
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Business Methods - History
• Originated from dicta in two cases
- Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F.
467 (2d Cir. 1908):
"A system of transacting business disconnected from
the means for carrying out the system is not, within
2 the most liberal interpretation of the term, an art."
w
- Loew's Drive-In Theaters, Inc. v. Park-In Theaters,
Inc.,174 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1949):
"[A] system for the transaction of business, ...
However novel, useful, or commercially successful is
not patentable apart from the means for making the
system practically useful, or carrying it out."
•~.' ...• KIND 6\ SCHlaIeLI, PLLC
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Business Methods - History
• PTO originally purported to follow
exception - 1994 Edition of Manual of
Patent Ex. Proc. (MPEP):
~ "Though seemingly within the category
of process or method, a method of
doing business can be rejected as not
being within the statutory classes. II
MPEP § 706.03(a) (1994) .
•~. KINII" BCH'CIeL" PLLC
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Business Methods - History
• Ex Parte Murray, 9 USPQ2d 1819
(PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988):
"While it may in some situations be problematic to
ascertain what falls within the penumbra of the
judicially prescribed 'method of doing business,' we find
no such difficulty in the present case. We are convinced
that the claimed accounting method, requiring no more
than the entering, sorting, debiting and totaling of
expenditures as necessary preliminary steps to issuing·
an expense analysis statement, is, on its very face, a
vivid example of the type of 'method of doing business'
contemplated by our review court as outside the
protection of the patent statutes."
,
...'.·····~~···········,·ir,,,,. -~ •. - KINII" SCHICleLI, PLLC
. Patent, Trademark, Copyright & Unfair C01npetition LaUl
~
I
~
~
Business Methods - History
• Next (1996) ed ition of MPEP
provided "[o]ffice personnel have
had difficulty in properly treating
claims directed to methods of doing
business. Claims should not be
categorized as methods of doing
business. Instead such claims
should be treated like any other
process claims. II
•~~ KINII" BCH'CKLI, PLLC
, Patent, Trademark, Copyright & Unfair C01npetition !aU)
~.. KINII" BaHlaIeL', PLLC
Patent, Tradenlark, Copyright & Unfair Competition Law
n
I
I--'-
-.....J
Business Methods - History
• PTO White Paper (2001) -
"Business data processing has
followed an unbroken evolutionary
path from mechanical technology up
to today's software controlled
microprocessors. . . . The business
method claim format has been used
in various forms throughout that
period. II
n
I
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Business Methods - History
• State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d
1368, 47 USPQ2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
• Considered "landmark" decision -
analyzed past decisions, brought
problems to light, and cleared up PTO
misconceptions, but really only
recognized and adopted standards from
past cases. ~ .
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Business Methods
• Rule - business methods and
mathematical algorithms are patentable
provided they produce some "useful,
concrete, and tangible result."
• Taken from In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526
(Fed. Cir. 1994), where a mathematical
algorithm produced "useful, concrete
and tangible result" - a smooth
waveform.
•~, KINII" SaH,aIeL', PLLC
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Business Methods
• In State Street, the claim was directed to a
data processing system for use with mutual
funds
• The court held that "the transformation of
data, representing discrete dollar amounts ...
into a final share price, constitutes a practical
application of a mathematical algorithm,
formula, or calculation, because it produces "a
useful, concrete and tangible result"--a final
share price ... ," just like the smooth
waveform in Alappat.
•~.~.. .•.... KINII a SaHlaIeL.. PLLC
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Business Methods
• Pre-State Street examples
- Arrhythmia Tech. Inc. v. Corazonix Corp.,
958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
- Claim 1 - "A method of analyzing
electrocardiograph signals, comprising the
steps of ... determining an arithmetic
value" of an amplitude
- Holding - the number obtained is not a
mathematical abstraction, but rather a
measure in microvolts of a specified heart
activity
Business Methods
• Pre-State Street examples
- In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
- Claim 5 - "A method of displaying data in a
field comprising the steps of calculating the
g difference between the local value of the
data ... and the average value of the data
... and displaying the difference."
- Holding - claim directed solely to the
mathematical portion of the invention and,
hence, not statutory subject matter
~."; KINII a SCHICKLI, PLL
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Business Method - Definition
• What is a "business method"?
- No clear PTO, legislative, or judicial
definition yet
- Legislation proposed to provide definition -
e.g., "Business Method Patent Improvement
Act of 2000" defined "business method" as:
(1) a method of (A) administering, managing, or
otherwise operating an enterprise or organization,
including a technique used in doing or conducting
business; or (B) processing financial data; (2) any
technique used in athletics, instruction, or
personal skills; and (3) any computer-assisted
implementation of a method described in paragraph (1)
or a technique described in paragraph (2).>.~....•••... KINII & SCHICIeLI, PLLC
. Patent, Trademark, Cop:)'right & Unfair Competition LatlJ
Business Method- Definition
• Why does it matter?
- For purposes of Section 101, it does not.
- Recognized in State Street. Claim 1 in the
patent at issue was directed to a machine.
~ The cou rt stated:
"for the purposes of a § 101 analysis, it is of little
relevance whether claim 1 is directed to a 'machine'
or a 'process,' as long as it falls within at least one of
the four enumerated categories of patentable subject
matter, 'machine' and 'process' being such
categories.1/
KINII .. SCHICIeLI, PLLC
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Business Method - Definition
11.1111111111111
US006269347Bl
(10) Patent No.: US 6,269,347 Bl
(45) Date of Patent: *Jul. 31,2001
Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4
Amount $100,000.00 $100,000.00 $100,000.00 $100,000.00
Interest Rate 7% 7% 7% 7%
(in percentages)
Monthly $665.30 $665.30 $456.19 $583.33
Payment
Term of Loan 360 mo. 216 mo. 360 mo. 257 mo.
Total Interest $139,508.00 $43,704.00 $64,228.00 $49,915.00
4 Claims, 1 Drawing Sheet
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or process
u.s. Patent No.
6,269,347, "Method
for Calculation of a
Reduced Interest
Mortgage Payment
Plan."
Example of true
"business method
..-~~
e
• WWW.usptO.gov
e
ABSTRACT(57)
A method for calculating a mortgage which provides appli-
cation of mortgage payments to principle first and then
interest in the amortization schedule of repayment of a
conventional loan is disclosed. The disclosure provides a
method for calculating mortgage payments on a conven-
tional mortgage loan by applying such payments first to
reduction of principle while accumulating accrued interest.
Payments are applied towards accrued interest after the
principle amount of the loan is reduced.
5,878,404 • 3/1999 Stout, Jr. et al. 705/38
FOREIGN PATENT DOCUMENTS
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5,960,411,
Amazon's "one-
click" patent
business
u.s.
Another Example
of claim to
"method"
•
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5,960,411
Sep. 28, 1999
ABSTRACf
26 Claims, 11 Drawing Sheets
A method and system for placing an order to purchase an
item via the Internet. 1be order is placed by a purchaser at
a client system and received by a server system. The server
system receives purchaser information including identifica-
tion of the purchaser, payment information, and shipment
information from the client system. 1be server system then
assigns a client identifier to the client system and associates
the assigned client identifier with the received purchaser
information.1be server system sends to the client system the
assigned client identifier and an lITML document identify-
ing the item and including an order button. 1be client system
receives and stores the assigned client identifier and receives
and displays the lITML document. In response to the
selection of the order button, the client system sends to the
server system a request to purchase the identified item. The
server system receives the request and combines the pur-
chaser information associated with the client identifier of the
client system to generate an order to purchase the item in
accordance with the billing and shipment information
whereby the purchaser effects the ordering of the product by
selection of the order button.
[57]
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Patent
Reverse Auction
u.s. Patent No.
5,794,207,
Priceline.com's
Apparatus claims
covering business
"method"
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•
5,794,207
Aug. 11, 1998
ABSTRACT[57]
Pri11l/lry EJ:aminef'-TbomIs H. TlIrcza
Assistant Emminel'-Pinchus M. Laufer
Anome~ Agent. or Firm-MOIl" 8£ Finnegan u.P; Jdfrey
LBrandt
44 CIaiIu, 20 On'" Sheets
The present inveatioll is a method and applII'atUs fex dfec-
tuati8g bilateral buyer-driveD coouocrce. The present inven-
tiOll allows prospective buyers of goods and services to
communicate a biadiag purchase offer globally to poteIltial
sellers. for Idlers conveaie8tly to search f(]l' relevllllt buyer
purchase offers. Md f(]l' selers potentially 10 biDd a buyer to
a COIlfract based OIl the buyer's pun:base offCl.1D a preferred
embodimeot. Cbe IJIIlUMUs oftbe present invention iDcludes
a COD1roIler' wbicb receives bindiDg purchase offers from
prospecti'Ye buya's. The control1c:l' .makes purcbase offers
available pobaIJy to potcatial sdJcrs. PoteDtial ders thea
have the optiOll to accept a purcbase offer ud thus IUd Ibe
correspoading buyer to a C08traet. The mctbocl and appar.
tus of the preseat iDvcDtion have applications OD the lDtctnet
as well as OOIIVeational c:omJDIJIlicaIi systems such as
voice tdepbony.
Richard E. Speidel 8£ Lee A. SchoU.~ of Electronic
C08tracting on CODtract Formation Under Revised uce
Article 2. Sales." C878 All-ABA 335. Dec. 9. 1993.
Jeffcey B. Rillei'. "Sccpe of the Uniform Commercial Code:
CoqKJtCl" Contracting Cases and Boctronic Commercial
Practices." 45 B'"- Law. 2533 (Aug. 1990).
Laura Del Rosso. "Marketel Says it Plans to LaullCb Air Fare
'Auction' in June." Tralle' Weekly. Air. 29. 1991.
Jeff Pelline. "Travelers Biddleg 08 AirIiae Tickets; SF Firm
Offers Olana: for Cut-rate Fares." San Francisco
Chronicle. Section A4. Aug. 19. 1991.
Micbael Schrage. "AD Experiment ia EcoIKllDic Thecry;
Labs Testing Real Markets." The Recol'd Section B 1. Nov.
26.1989.
Laura Del Rosso. 1ictet-Bidding FIml Ooses it Doors."
Tm,"' Weekly. Mar. 12. 1992.
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Business Method - Definition
• Other ways to cover:
- Computer-readable medium claims
(apparatus, computer program
product, "Beauregard" claims")
-"A computer-readable medium
containing instructions for ... by a
method comprising . . . ."
- In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583
(Fed. Cir. 1995)
..•.•....~~.'~:,~ -~~.......... KINII 6\ SCHICIeLI, PLLC
Patent, Tradelnark, Copyright & Unfair Competition Law
Business Method - Definition
- Data Structure claims
-"A computer-readable medium
containing a data structure for use in
~ allocating memory, the data structure
conta in ing .... II
-In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1994)
;> /.•~.,~., KINII" SaH,aIeLI, PLLC
Patent, Trademark, CoPJ'right & Unfair Competition La'llJ
~
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Business Method - Definitions
• Why does it matter what type?
• American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 -
"First Inventor Defense"
• 35 USC Section 273:
"It shall be a defense to an action for infringement ...with
respect to any subject matter that would otherwise infringe
one or more claims for a method in the patent being asserted
against a person, if such person had, acting in good faith,
actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least 1 year
before the effective filing date of such patent, and
commercially used the subject matter before the effective
filing date of such patent" (emphasis added).
~·.~····..··.·/··.· ···.···. ··· ·r·····'··r'···.. ,.-.. KIND til SCHICIeL"I, PL,LC
Patent, Traden'lark, Copyright & Unfair C01npetitt'on Lau'
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First Inventor Defense
• Apparatus/Product Claims - Invalidity is
a Defense to Infringement - claimed
invention is anticipated by or obvious in
view of the prior art
• "Prior art" comprises, inter alia, prior
use of an apparatus, product, etc., but
there can be no abandonment,
suppression, or concealment of the
invention
: ..•~~J ICINII a BCHICleLI" PLLC
Patent, Trade1-nark, Copyrig1:Jt & Unfair Competition Law
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First Inventor Defense
• Here, defense provided against "method" in
the patent based on "commercial" use
• "Commercial Use" defined in statute - does
not require public knowledge or accessibility
• Defense is personal to alleged infringer;
commercial use may not invalidate patent
• "Use" cannot be abandoned
• If successful, can only expand use on site, not
to other sites
• "Exhaustion" principle - does not extend to
product produced by patented method
~.....•~ KINII &, SaHlaieLI. PLLCPatent~ Trademark, CopJlright & Unfair G'ompetitiorl Lal/)
Patent, Trademark, Copyright & Uri/air COlnpetition Lazv
KINII & BCH'CleL'" PLLC
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First In,ventor Defense
• Makes it less risky to maintain trade
secret protection, BUT:
- Only extends to method claims in patents,
not apparatus/product claims
- Defense must be proven by "clear and
convi ncing evidence"
- If an unreasonable assertion of the defense
is made, the judge can declare the case
exceptional and award attorneys fees).'.~..•.'.~.> ~ :..........•..........'~.
~
I
~
~
. First Inventor Defense
• Advice to patent applicant's/patent
drafters - whenever possible,
present different types of claims
(apparatus, computer-readable
medium, data structure) to avoid
wholesale unenforceability against
alleged infringer
•~;.. KINII" SCHICleLI. PLLC
Patent, Trademark, COP'J/right & Unfair Competition LalLJ
First Inventor Defense
11.1111111111111
US006457317Bl
(10) Patent No.: US 6,457,317 Bl
(45) Date of Patent: Oct. 1, 2002
S Claims, 2 Drawing Sheets
5,878,401 A * 3/1999 Joseph 705122
5,930,770 A * 7/1999 Edgar 235/46243
5,975,390 A • 1111999 Saroli 224(274
6,067,813 A • 5(2000 Smith 62/371
6,129,796 A * 10l200O Steinberg et at. 1561270
* cited by examiner
Primary Examiner-William C. Doerrler
Assistant Examiner-Filip lec
(74) Attorney, Agent, or Firm--John R. Benefiel
J>atent, Traden-lark, Copyright & l.In:.fair Con~petitionLau)
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But, sometimes,
presenting claims
besides ttiose
directed to the
method may not be
possible
Example - U.S.
Patent No.
6,457,317, "Method
of Selling
MerchanClise on a
Golf Course"
e
e
ABSTRACT(57)
A method selling merchandise to golf course patrons, in
which a storage unit is stocked with an exactly inventory of
merchandise and is loaded onto a rental golf cart at the
beginning of each rental period and made accessible to the
rental patron as desired, the inventory retallied at the end of
each rental period and the patron debited for the merchan-
dise computed to have been removed from inventory.
Cooled beverages can be dispensed from a storage unit
which is cooled, as by the use of solar power, during the
rental period.
5,429,290 A • 7/1995 Greene, Jr. .. 224(274
5,535,883 A • 7/1996 Henderson 206/139
(21) Appl. No.: 09/766,804
(22) Filed: Jan. 22, 2001
(51) Int. CI.' B6SB 63/08; F25D 3/08;
G06F 17/60; G06G 1/14
(52) U.S. CI. 62/60; 62/371; 705/22
(58) Field of Search 62/371; 156/270;
206/139; 224/274; 235/462.43; 705/22
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U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS
(76) Inventor: Michael O'Donnell, 43510
Banoockbaun, Canton, MI (US) 48187
(54) METHOD OF SELUNG MERCHANDISE ON
A GOLF COURSE
( *) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this
patent is extended or adjusted under 35
U.S.c. 154(b) by 0 days.
(12) United States Patent
O'Donnell
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First Inventor Defense
Patent, Tradernark, Copyrigbt & llrifair G"ornlJetifion Lau}
IC.INB .. BCHIC:I(LI. PLLC
"technique used in
athletics, instruction,
or personal skills"
definition from
proposed legislation
~7. I["]···-~~.
u.s. Patent No.
5,616,089, "Method
of Putting"
• Business method?
5,616,089
Apr. 1, 1997
ABSTRACT
16
13 Cairns, 2 Drawing Sheets
A method of putting features the golfer's dominant band so
that the golfer can improve control over putting speed and
direction. The golfer's non-dominant hand stabilizes the
dominant hand and the orientation of the putter blade, but
does not otherwise substantially interfere with the putting
stroke. In particular. a right-handed golfer grips the putter
grip with their right hand in a conventional manner so that
the thumb on the right hand is placed straight down the top
surface of the putter grip. The golfer addresses the ball as if
to stroke the putter using only the right band. Then, the
golfer takes the left hand and uses it to stabilize the right
band and the putter. To do this, the golfer places their left
hand over the interior wrist portion of the right hand behind
the thumb of the right band with the middle finger of the left
hand resting on the styloid process of the right hand. The
golfer presses the ring finger and the little finger of their left
hand against the back of the right hand The golfer also
presses the palm of the left hand against the putter grip and
squeezes the right band with the left hanel. The golfer then
takes a full putting stroke with the above desaibed grip.
[57J
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• Another Example
• U.S. Patent No.
5,443,036, "Method
of Exercising a Cat":
1. A method of inducing aerobic exercise in
an unrestrained cat comprising the steps
of:
(a) directing an intense coherent beam of
invisible light produced by a hand-held
laser apparatus to produce a bright
highly-focused pattern of light at the
intersection of the beam and an opaque
surface, said pattern being of visual
interest to a cat; and
(b) selectively redirecting said beam out of the
cat's immediate reach to induce said cat
to run and chase said beam and pattern
of light around an exercise area.
22
5,443,036
FIG 2
16
Aug. 22, 1995
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(12) United States Patent
Olson
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(76) Inventor: Steven Olson, 337 Otis Ave., St. Paul,
MN (US) 55104
( .) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this
patent is extended or adjusted under 35
U.S.c. 154(b) by 0 days.
(21) Appl. No.: 09/715,198
(22) Filed: Nov. 17, 2000
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(52) U.s. CI 472/118
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(56) References Cited
U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS
242,601 A • 6/1881 Clement 472,/118
'••11••111111111
US006368227Bl
(10) Patent No.: US 6,368,227 Bl
(45) Date of Patent: Apr. 9, 2002
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* cited by examiner
Primary Examiner-Kien T. Nguyen
(74) AUorney, Agent, or Firm-Peter Lowell Olson
(57) ABSTRACT
A method of swing on a swing is disclosed, in which a user
positioned on a standard swing suspended by two chains
from a substantially horizontal tree branch induces side to
side motion by pulling alternately on one chain and then the
other.
4 Claims, 3 Drawing Sheets
e
e
e
Yet another example
u.s. Patent No.
6,368,227, "Method
of Swinging on a
Swing"
Personal skills?
Patent, Tradetnark, Copyright & Un:{air Competition Laul
~....•~.;~ KINII ,. HICI(LI~ PLLC
First Inventor Defense
Patent, Tradetnark, copyright & fJnfair Competition Laul
KINII ,. BCHICIeLI, PLLC
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• Yet another example
• u.s. Patent No.
6,080,436, "Bread
Refreshing Method"
1. A method of refreshing bread products,
comprising:
a) placing a bread product in an oven having at least
one heating element,
b) setting the temperature of the heating elements
between 2500 F. and 4500 F., and
c) ceasing exposure of the bread product to the at
least one heating element after a period of 3 sec. to
90 sec.
38
ABSTRACf
3 Claims, 5 Drawing Sheets
5,382,441 1/1995 Lentz et aI•......••..•.••............•.. 426/241
5,472,721 12/1995 Eisenberg et ai. ...................•.. 426/243
6,013,900 1/2000 Westerberg et aI. ........•........... 219/405
A method of refreshening a bread product by heating the
bread product to a temperature between 25000 F. and 45000
F. 11le bread products are maintained at this temperature
range for a period of 3 to 90 seconds.
Primary Examiner-Nina Bhat
Anorney, Agent, or Finn--Peter Vrahotes
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[45] Date of Patent: Jun. 27, 2000
References Cited
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[21] Appl. No.: 09/332,385
[22] Filed: Jun. 14, 1999
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219n25
[58] Field of Search 426/241,242,
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United States Patent [19]
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Problems/Considerations
• Identifying Business Methods
- In many cases, client does not realize
business method is patentable
~
~ - One year after "public use" - may be
too late to obtain patent
- May want to simply keep as trade
secret, if not previously disclosed
•~~. ICIND" SCH.CleL" PLLC
Patent, Trademark, Cop)/right & [l1ifai1" Cornpetitiol1 LazlJ
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Problems/Considerations
• Examination - Quality Issues
- Filings surged (but still less than 10/0)
- Primary Class - 705 - 1996 - 274
patents issued; 2001 - 877 patents
issued; 2002 - 668 through 10/1/02
- Not enough skilled examiners
- But, examiners given 31 hours to
examine applications in 705, as
compared to 18 hours in other arts
•~:~" KINII 6\ SaH.aleLI, PLLC
Patent, Tradernark, COpyl"'ight & Unfair Competition Laul
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Problems/Considerations
• Examination - Other issues
- Prior art not well developed, difficult to
locate
- Traditional notions of obviousness
sometimes hard to apply - does using a
computer or the Internet to perform a well-
known "brick and mortar" method somehow
create a non-obvious invention?
~......•~ KaNIi .. BO,HIOICLI, PLL
Patent, Tradernark, Copyright & Unfair C01npetition Lau'
Problems/Considerations
6\ SCHICICLI. PLLC
Patent, Trademark, Copyright & Unfair C01npetition LauJ
KIN
Another example
u.s. Patent No.
6,049,811, "Machine
for drafting a patent
application and
process for doing
same. II
e
e
6,049,811
Apr. 11,2000
ABSTRACT
Amacbineandmethodfordraftingapatentapplicationhas
a keyboard, mouse, display, printer, and a computer for
receiving and traosmitting data. The computer requests and
stores information regarding the invention including, if
appropriate: 1) qualities and benefits (QAB) of the invention
over the prior technology; 2) primary elements (PE) of the
invention that define the invention apart form prior tecbnol-
ogy; 3) secondary elements (SE) of the invention that may
be important but DOt necessary to define over the prior
technology; and 4) substitute elements (SUB) of the inven-
tion that may substituted or modified in an effort to avoid the
primary and secondary elements but not depart from the
invention. The QAB are requested and stored before the
objects of the invention are drafted, the PE are requested and
stored before the independent claims are drafted, the SE and
SUB are requested and stored before the dependent claims
are drafted, the independent claims are drafted before the
summary of the invention is drafted, the independent claims
are drafted before the dependent claims are drafted, the
dependent claims are drafted before the abstract of the
disclosure is drafted, and all claims are drafted before the
detailed description of a preferred embodiment is drafted.
The sectioos are drafted in a predetermined order probibiting
jumping ahead to draft a later section. At many sections,
initial draft text, examples, sample&, legal material, etc. are
available to the user. A final patent application is compiled
by combining the drafted sectioos with predetermined text.
18 Claims, 4 Drawing Sheets
[57]
11.1111111111111
US006049811A
[11] Patent Number:
[45] Date of Patent:
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Primary Examiner-Anton Fetting
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[54] MACHINE FOR DRAFl1NG A PATENT
APPLICATION AND PROCESS FOR DOING
SAME
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u.s. Patent No.
5,930,769, "Method
of Fashion
Shopping. "
Example of using
computer or Internet
to perform "old"
process
e
e
5,930,769
Jul. 27, 1999
ABSTRACf[57]
~ Claims, 6 Drawing Sheets
5,163,007 111l992Slilaty 364/470.03
5,495,568 211996 Beavio 364/188
5,551,021 811996 HMadaetal 707/104
5,680,314 10/1997 PattelSODdai 364/470.03
allIER PUBUCATIONS
Sizing Up Clothing Sizes, Know How Magazine, Spring,
1994.
Primary Examiner-Edward R. Cosimano
1be present invention provides a method of manual fashion
shopping and method for electronic fashion shopping by a
customer using a programmed computer, CD-ROM,
television, Internet or other electronic medium such as
video. 1be method comprises receiving personal informa-
tiOll from the customer; selecting a body type and fashion
category based on the personal information; selecting fash-
ions from a plurality of clothes items based on the body type
and fashion category; outputting a plurality of fashiOll data
based on the selected fashions; and receiving selection
information from the customer.
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Problems/Considerations
• Enforceability of Business Method
Patents
- Methods of golfing, swinging, exercising cat
- difficult to find infringer, prove
infringement
- Need direct infringer in United States -
contributory/inducement of infringement
requires knowledge - more difficult to
prove; thus, in most cases, want claims
directed at manufacturer/producer, not end
user, •~, KINII" BCHICIeLI. PLLC
Patent, Trademark, Copyright & Un/ail" Cornpetition Lat-v
Problems/Considerations
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• Tropicana's u.s.
Patent No.
6,143,347, "Early
season not from
concentrate orange
juice and process of
making"
• Claims both juice
and blending method
• PTO "looking at"
Not from concentrate orange juice is provided which
includes as a freshly squeezed orange juice component juice
extracted from an early season round orange cultivar which
bas a color intensity in excess of that provided by Hamlin
cultivars which are barvested at the same time as the early
season cultivar, which is not a Hamlin cultivar. The juice
extracted from sucb early season cultivar has sensory
attributes wbich are al least as acceptable as Hamlin fresh
juice. Preferred early season cultivars are within the Seleta
family or are Westin cultivars or are Ruby Nucellar cullivars.
OTIlER PUBUCATIONS
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Cams Processing Plants, vol. I, pp. 22-31, Intercil, Inc.,
Safety Harbor, Florida (1986).
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[21J Appl. No.: 09/311,956
(22J Filed: May 14, 1999
(51] Int.CI} A23L2I02
(52] U.s. CI 426/599; 426/616
[58] field or Search 426/616, 599
(73] Assignee: Troplcau Products, Inc., Bradenton,
Fla.
United States Patent (19]
Keithly et at.
(75] Inventors: James H. Keithly, Bradenton; Harold
PoUack, St Petersburg; Thomas
Taggart, Bradenton, all of Fla.
[54] EARLY SEASON NOT FROM
CONCENTRATE ORANGE JUICE AND
PROCESS OF MAKING
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Problems/Considerations
• Treated differently in different countries
- Europe - Business methods in the
Abstract are not patentable - must
define structure, such as a
programmed computer
- Japan - parallel to the United States
in some respects
- Elsewhere - mixed bag
•~ KINII 6\ SCH'CleL'_ PLLC
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Benefits/Advantages
• Uncertainty provides patentee with
large advantage in litigation
- Barnes & Noble lost at preliminary
injunction round and eventually
settled case over "one-click" patent
- E-Bay in lengthy dispute with
individual owning patents on various
aspects of online auction dating from
1995 - likely to settle
•~
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Method Patents - Special Case
• Medical Treatment Steps or Surgical
Techniques as "Business" Methods
• Patentable, but not enforceable unless
the use of a patentable machine,
~ manufacture, or composition is required
• 35 USC Section 287(c)
"With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical
activity that constitutes an infringement ... [of a patent], the
provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 [basically, the remedy
and damages provisions] of this title shall not apply against the
medical practitioner or against a related health care entity."
Method Patents - Special Case
n
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United States Patent (19]
Pallin
(~1 METHOD OF MAKING SELFoSEAlJNG
EPISCLERAL INCISION
(76) Inventor: Salftl L PalU.. 10615 W.
Thunderbird Blvd., Sun City, Ariz.
85351
(21) AppJ. No.:~
(22) rUed: J-. ~1990
(51) 1Dt. a.s ••••__ _ A'IF 9180
[52) u.s. a 1281898; 606/107
(58] Field of Search 6061107, 161, 166;
128/898; 623/6
(56] Referaas Oted
U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS
4,607,617 8/1986 Choyce _ 606/107
4,6]9,657 ]011986 Keates et aI 606/]07
4,702,244 10/1987 Mazzocco 606/]07
4,706,666 11/1987 Sheets 606/107
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1_.llIn.
US00S080111A
(11] Patent Number: 5,080,111
["S] Date of Patent: Jan. 14, 1992
4,773,415 9/1988 T. _ __ _ 6061107
4,844,065 7/1989 Faulkner .._ __ 606/107
4,959,070 9/1990 McDooaId _ 606/107
Prinuzry &am;n~r-John D. Vasko
AssisIDllt Examiner-William Lewis
Attome,. A,e1l4 or Firm-Harry A. Wolin
(51] ABSTRACI'
A substantially self-sealing episcleral incision having an
approximate central point 1.5 to 3.0 millimeters poste·
rior to the limbus. Portions of the incision extending
from the approximate central point extend laterally
away from the curvature of the limbus. The configura-
tion ofthe self-sealing incision allows the incision to seal
as the eye is inflated following surgery and therefore
requires DO sutures for lea1ing. Accordingly, the proba.
bility of astigmatism is eliminated or greatly reduced
and the reliance on sutures is eliminated.
29 am-. 1 Dmriq Sheet
• 287(C) came about as
the resu It of a patent
infringement action filed
by Dr. Samuel L. Pallin
against Dr. Jack A.
Singer over U.S. Patent
No. 5,080,111, which is
directed to a patented
surgical technique for
use during cataract
surgery.
t
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Method Patents - Special Case
• Only applies to "medical practitioners" -
defined in statute - licensed by state or acting
under the direction of such person
• Exempts "related health care entity" also
• Does not apply to veterinary procedures
£ (unless the animal is "used in medical
research or instruction directly relating to the
treatment of humans")
• Query - why is a surgical technique any
different from a medical device, drug, or
method of doing business?
KINII .. SOHIOKLI. PLLC
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Internet/Software Patents
• The (Recent) Past
- Software patentable subject matter,
including method claims if concrete result
produced
- Examination difficulties - overworked
Patent Examiners, limited prior art
- Big consideration for inventors - if software
is going to be obsolete in a short time, does
it make sense to make investment in patent
that might not issue for several years?
•~; KIN. 1\ BaH,aleLI, PLLC
Patent, Trade1nark, Copyright & ~Tnfair C01npetition Laul
Internet/Software Patents
• Past and Recent Enforceability
- Not many decisions upholding, but most
tend to enforce or suggest enforceability -
"one-cl ick"
- Litigation Rate - Patents in Class 705 issued
~ since 1975
eM
• February 2000 - 53
• December 2001 - 116
~~ KIND" BCH'CIeLI, PLL!C
Patent, Trade1nark, G10pyright & Unfair C'onlpetition Law
CHICIeLI, PLLC
Internet/Software Patents
• Some trying to enforce "old" patents on new
technology - e.g., British Telecom's U.S.
Patent No. 4,873,662 (filed in 1980) allegedly
covering "hyperlinking" asserted against major
ISP's in the United States
n
~ • Prodigy recently obtained summary judgment
of non-infringement - British Telecomms. PLC
v. Prodigy Communs. Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15521 (S.D.N.Y August 22, 2002)
•~. KIN
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Internet/Software Patents
• Past or Recent Enforcement Efforts
- Activebuddy's u.s. Patent No. 6,430,602
covers method and system for interactively
responding to instant messaging requests -
~ sent licensing offers
tit
tit
- News reports - targeted parties found
anticipatory prior art dated years before the
patent filing date in a matter of minutes
using Internet search engine
~;..........•_w, ICIN\II "* BCHICKL,I_ PLLC
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Internet/Software Patents
• Past or Recent Enforcement Efforts
- Since 1998, Microsoft accused of
patent infringement in at least 35
£ patent infringement lawsuits
- Only 7 suits in previous 22 years -
lost only one (but settled most)
-Microsoft - times are tough
- Patentees - Microsoft not playing fair
:.~; KINII & SCHICleL., PLLC
Patent, Trade1nark, Copyrigbt & Unfair Competition Law
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Internet/Software Patents
• The Present
- Economy down, number of filings up???
- No more "submarine" patents - term now
20 years from filing - patentee's delay
red uces patent term
- Automatic publication if foreign filing made
- third parties can submit art to examiner -
double-edged sword
- Alternate forms of protection (copyright)
~ IC,INII ., BC,HICICLI. PLLC
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Internet/Software Patents
• The Future
- Filings expected to increase exponentially
as transformation into "digital age"
continues
£ - PTO must expand and grow to handle
- Prior art will become more readily available
as PTO/EPO/JPO issue more patents
- Cases on obviousness that merely use
software or Internet to perform well-known
tasks needed to "raise bar."
'> •~~ .
Fixing the "Problems"
• Many believe problems will fix
themselves using existing legal
concepts; e.g., reexamination
~ • Publication opens door to
improvement - citation of prior art
by others (but no inter partes
participation)
~~ KINII a SCHIClCLI, PLLC
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Fixing the "Problems"
• PTO slowly getting "better"
- Overall grant rate 72%
- 2000 "business method" rate - 55%
~ - 2001 rate - 33.6%
C\
=
• "Second set of eyes" - Two QA Officers
• Presently sending Examiners on "field
trips" to corporations and arming with
corporate manuals on business
practices
n
I
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Fixing the "Problems"
• Other solutions - None attractive
- Eliminate "presumption of validity" to lower
burden of proof
- Shorter term, expedited examination
- No remedy for infringement
- Opposition
- Presumption of Obviousness (present in
proposed legislation)
- Compulsory licensing
~.~ KINeI .. BaH,aIeLI, PLLCPatent, Tradenlark, Copyright & Unfair C01npetition Lau'
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Fixing the "Problems"
• Viable solution to "obviousness"
problem - expand definition of
"analogous art"
• Section 103 - "A patent may not be
obtained ... if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
lJ1atter pertains" (emphasis added).
> ....•~J
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Fixing the "Problems"
• Under standard, inventor is charged with
"knowledge from those arts reasonably pertinent
to the particular problem"
• Amazon's "one click" patent - Claim 1
A method of placing an order for an item comprising:
displaying information identifying the item; and
in response to only a single action being performedl sending a request to orderthe item along with an identifier of a purchaser of tne item to a server system;
under control of a single-action ordering component of the server system,
receiving the request;
retrieving additional information previously stored for the purchaser identified
by the identifier in the received request; and
generating an order to purchase the requested item for the purchaser identified
by the identifier in the received request using the retrieved additional
information; and
fulfilling the generated order to complete purchase of the item
whereby the item is ordered without using a shopping cart ordering
model.
~...........•........ ~..-'...•~•.•......'.,...•......
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Fixing the "Problems"
• '411 patent says single action required
for ordering can be voice command
• Ordering room service? Analogous Art?
• Bar tab? Analogous Art?
• Can such events be cited by Examiner
as "analogous art"? If so, patent might
not have issued in the first instance
•~, KIND & BCHICtcL., PLLC
Patent, Tradetllark, Copyright & [.In/air Competition Law
PROTECTING AGAINST AND
PROSECUTING CYBERCRIME
(INCLUDING CYBERTERRORISM)
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SECTION D

PROTECTING AGAINST CYBERCRIME
Protecting against cybercrime requIres physical security, computer
security and network security, robust systems, constant vigilance and persistent
diligence. Cybercrime is not just a hardware problem or a software problem, it
is a people problem too. Cybercrime threats are real and can cause significant
damage if left uncontained. However, planning and prevention can do much to
help you contain them. And the public and private domains hold significant
resources to buttress your containment efforts.
THREATS
What threats exist and what resources are available to combat them?
Probably the most common type of malicious software ("malware") is the
virus, a piece of code that enters your machine secretly, often as an email
attachment or a download. Traditional viruses replicate within a machine, but
need human intervention to spread. Newer malware, including Trojan horses
("Trojans") and worms allow attacks of even greater scope.
Trojans infiltrate your machine and wait for an opportune time to open
the city gates. A Trojan listens on a designated network port and waits for an
external program to activate it, then takes control of the machine. Unlike
viruses, Trojans do not replicate themselves.
Worms, conversely, do replicate, but unlike traditional viruses, worms do
not need user assistance to move from machine to machine. Worms ride in on
email attachments, word macros and other innocent looking code. Today,
people are wary of email attachments they didn't request because an
unfortunate number of attachments have contained viruses, worms, or other
malware.
Defensive Devices
Fortunately, a number of defensive devices exist to help keep you safe
and protected. Anti-virus software is one such device. Provided that its virus
definitions are properly and frequently updated, anti-virus software will catch
many known threats. In addition, you should consider a firewall of some sort.
Firewalls are implemented in either software or hardware. You should
periodically check for downloadable patches for your operating system and
software at your vendors' website. Patches only remedy known flaws
vulnerabilities. New vulnerabilities are constantly being uncovered. And,
hackers seek them out through port scanning. Good fire walls can defeat such
scans. Configuration checks are the next line of defense. Net browsers have a
multitude of security settings that define which kinds of code can run, which
sites can receive information from your cookies, etc. Programs exist to test
your settings to find out how to fix them: e.g., Qualys's Free Browser
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Checkout (http://browsercheck.qualys.com). Windows users can also try
Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer, a free download from Microsoft Technet
that scans your system looking for misconfigured settings. Last, software and
hardware firewalls exist to close off systems to scanning and entry. See PC
Magazine, November 19, 2002, pgs. 99-112. Also see PC Magazine,
November 19, 2002, pgs. 117-130. The earlier article deals generally with
software firewalls. The second deals with small office security appliances.
Apart from these hardware and software defensive devices, you can adopt
and execute a defensive strategy.
Defensive Strategies
Executing a defensive strategy involves at least six steps:
Preparation Evaluation Containment Eradication Recovery and Learning.
Preparation
Of these the most important is preparation. In accordance with near-
universal principles, incidents always occur at the worst possible time. They
result in confusion that is not conducive to intelligent decision making. You
must already have a plan in place.
Before any incidents occur, form a Computer Security Incident Response
Team ("CSIRT") with the needed training, expertise and authority to handle
problems. Usually, a CSIRT contains several groups: on-site groups to
3
implement responses at the affected locations; and a central command team to
coordinate the action. Team members need to know exactly what their·
individual roles will be in the case of an incident and be prepared to execute
them.
The CSIRT should include executive level management representatives
who can understand the corporate ramifications of various decisions and can
approve shutting down core business systems when needed. The CSIRT may
also need a public relations specialist to act as the main contact with the press to
help the company make the best public presentation, especially if it is publically
traded. The CSIRT may also include a database administrator and a good
programmer to craft any custom forensic tool needed for a precise analysis.
Last, the CSIRT needs a project manager who can effectively coordinate the
actions of all the technical members of the team. One member of the team must
be designated as the central contact.
Prepare a Draft Incident Response Plan containing carefully thought-out
checklists detailing the exact actions to take for each type of attack. The
incident response plan also should outline the company's goals and objectives
for handling incidents; its guidelines for determining the seriousness and impact
of an attack; a reference detailing who should notify whom when an attack is in
progress; information about any legal issues to be aware (of); a statement of any
4
rules one needs to follow for handling the labeling of evidence; and templates
for keeping detailed records of everything that happens and every measure that
is taken in response to the attack. Obviously, the plan must be based on
thorough knowledge of the company's critical servers and applications and the
business impact of lost, exposed or unavailable data. Have the plan approved
by top management. Then, make sure each member of the CSIRT has a copy of
the incident response plan and a call list with contact information for each team
member, regularly updated.
Test the Plan and Keep It Updated. Find any gaps in it and mend them.
Use any actual security incidents to improve the plan.
Develop a Support System. Identify and cultivate the right contacts at
your local law enforcement agency and your internet service provider. Discuss
with your local law enforcement contacts how to handle evidence that may be
needed in court. Consult your ISP about how to collect any relevant data from
its logs. You will need to provide date, time zone, time and activity data to help
your ISP identify.
Evaluation
Evaluating an incident means detecting it, making a preliminary
determination of its scope and initiating the response plan. Identify The
Incident. Did an actual intrusion occur (or is it occurring)? Determine The
5
Scope Of The Incident. Is one system involved or multiple ones? One site or
several? Is valuable information affected? Try to identify the intruder's entry
point into your system.
Before taking any action Alert The CSIRT to avoid damage from
inappropriate responses by the organization's own personnel that might leave
systems unsecured, destroy evidence, etc. Start An Incident Log: a
comprehensive, chronological recording of all observations, actions, which
actors acted, where and why.
Containment
Secure the Area to limit the damage as much as possible. Backup
Affected Systems before altering them to preserve evidence for analysis and
prosecution. Examine all Systems Logs for clues and analysis. Disconnect the
Affected Systems from the Network to prevent the problem from spreading or
recurrIng.
Eradication
Analyze the Attack. Where did it come from and how was it executed?
Protect the Systems. Place your fire wall in a new location. Move some
systems to new IP addresses. Add new software or install OS patches, but do
not reconnect any affected systems to the network until you know you can
6
prevent another intrusion. Clean Up the Mess by removIng vIruses or
reinstalling the system from scratch, and restoring lost or contaminated data.
Recovery
Restore Affected Systems from backups or from scratch. Install the latest
software patches when you do. Continue Monitoring for additional attacks.
Learning
Prepare an Incident Report soon after an attack while the information is
fresh. Include the lessons learned, identify the known costs and summarize
findings for management. Evaluate how your CSIRT teams performed.
Implement changes to be better prepared to repel or avoid the next attack.
Other Threats
Consider some potential sources of attack. A PriceWaterhouseCoopers
survey suggested that the greatest threat was from insiders such as current and
former employees, on-site contractors, consultants and OEM's, vendors,
suppliers and even strategic partners. Other potential threats come from
"outsiders" such as hackers or "crackers ", competitors,
shareholders/speculators, the media and Governments, e.g. Echlon and
Carnivore.
Many companies fail to plug well known technological holes which
account for a great number of the successful break-ins. The SANS Institute
7
(Cert.org) is a center of Internet Security Expertise located at the Software
Engineering Institute operated by Carnige Mellon University. Among other
things, it tracks security holes in operating systems, e-mail browsers and other
common software. More specifically, CERT/CC studies internet security
vulnerabilities, provides instant response services to sites that have been the
victims of attack, publishes a variety of security alerts, does research in wide
area network computing and develops information and training to help
companies improve security at their sites. Treat yourself to a visit to the SANS
Institute website at cert.org.
Also, consider denial of service ("DoS") attacks. A DoS attack "floods"
a network with bogus information or information requests that prevents
legitimate network traffic thereby disrupting connections between two
machines, preventing access to service or preventing a particular individual
from accessing a service or disrupting service to a specific system or person.
However, service overloading and message flooding are but two of several
ways that DoS attack may occur.
Writing in the Richmond Journal of Law and Technology, Jeff
Nemerofsky states:
There are several ways a denial of service attack may
occur-service overloading and message flooding are
but two -and these attacks may be directed against
either a user, a host computer, or a network. These
8
attacks have a vernacular all their own and can be
categorized as "fork bombs" "malloc bombs " "SYN, ,
flood" and "mail bombs," with specific names such as
"Ping of Death," "Teardrop," "Boing," "New Tear"
and "lceNewk." For instance, one attack paints a
huge black window on the user's screen in such a way
that the user can no longer access the remainder of
their screen.
6 J.L. & Tech. 23 (Spring 2000)
REMEDIES
The Computer Fraud And Abuse Act
In response to these and other threats, Congress enacted the first
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in 1984 and has amended it from time to time
thereafter, in 1986, 1994 and 1996. In its present form, the Act provides:
(a) Whoever-(5)(A) through means of a computer
used in interstate commerce or communications,
knowingly causes the transmission of program,
information, code, or command to computer or
computer system if- (i) the person causing the
transmission intends that such transmission will- (I)
damage, or cause damage to, a computer, computer
system, network information, data, or program; or (II)
withhold or deny, or cause the withholding or denial,
of the use of a computer, computer services, system or
network, information, data, or program; and (ii) the
transmission of the harmful component of the
program, information, code, or command- (I) occurred
without the authorization of the persons or entities
who own or are responsible for the computer system
receiving the program, information, code, or
command; and (II)(a) causes loss or damage to one or
more other persons of value aggregating $1,000 or
9
more during any I-year period; ... shall be punished.
In 1998, Robert Morris, a 23 year old first year graduate at Cornell
University's Computer Science program created a computer program later
known as the internet "worm" or "virus." Morris intended to release the worm
into university, government or military computers around the country to
demonstrate the inadequacies of the then current security measures. However,
after releasing his worm, Morris discovered it was actually infecting many other
machines eventually causing computers at over 6000 educational institutions
and military sites around the country to cease functioning. U.S. v. Morris, 928
F.2d 504 (2nd Cir. 1991)
Morris was prosecuted and found guilty of violating the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, Section 1030 (a)(5)(A) which prohibited intentional,
unauthorized access to federal computers and sentenced to three years
probation, four hundred hours of community service, fined $10,500 and the cost
of his supervision. Id. at 506
Morris claimed that the statutory language "intentionally accesses a
Federal interest computer without authorization, and by means of one or more
instances of such conduct, alter, damages, or destroys information in any such
Federal interest computer, ..." required the Government to prove that he
intentionally accessed the Federal computer and intentionally altered
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information or prevented its use. The 2nd Circuit agreed with the District Court
that the intent required applied only to the act of accessing the system, not the
alteration of information or prevention of authorized use, and let Morris'
convictions stand. Id. at 510-11.
In 1994, Congress amended the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to
broaden the Federal laws that related to computer "worms" and "viruses."
Coverage of the Act was expanded to include computers used in interstate
commerce. The requirement of an unauthorized access was removed so that
company insiders and authorized uses could be held liable and certain types of
reckless conduct and intentional acts were deemed criminal.
Then in 1996, Congress further expanded the 1994 act to include
computers in the private sector, called protected computers, as well as those in
the government domain. Today, the 1999 statute covers protected computers,
or computers no longer strictly under government domain.
Not unexpectedly, America Online, Inc. has been involved in a number
of cases involving the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and other statutes. For
example, in America Online, Inc. v. LSGM, Inc., et al., 46 F.Supp. 2nd 444
(E.D.Va. 1998), AOL sued website operators and their principals alleging that
they sent unauthorized and unsolicited bulk e-mail advertisements to AOL
customers. The district court held that the operators' use of providers' internet
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domain name violated Lanham Act prohibitions on false designations of origin,
operators' use of domain name constituted dilution and operators violated
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Virginia Computer Crimes Act.
Moreover, the operators' conduct amounted to trespass to chattels under
Virginia law. Specifically, AOL estimated that defendants in concert with their
"site partners" transmitted more than 92 million unsolicited and bulk e-mail
messages advertising their pornographic websites to AOL members from
approximately June 17, 1997 to January 21, 1998. Indeed, defendants admitted
that they sent approximately 300,000 e-mail messages a day at various intervals
from their Michigan offices. Further, defendants admitted to maintaining AOL
memberships to harvest or collect e-mail addressesofotherAOLmembers.to
using the AOL Collector and e-mail Pro/Stealth Mailer extractor programs to
collect e-mail address of AOL members and to using software to evade AOL's
filtering mechanisms. Defendants also forged the domain information
"aol.com." in the address line of e-mail messages sent to AOL members and
committed a number of other violations ofAOL's Terms of Service.
According to the court, the defendants violated 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(2)(C)
of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act which prohibits individuals from
"intentionally accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding
authorized access, and thereby obtaining information from any protected
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computer if the conduct involved interstate or foreign communication." Also,
defendants exceeded authorized access in violating the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act. Similarly, defendants impaired computer facilities by their conduct
in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act damaging AOL's computer
network, reputation and good will. Also see Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America
Online, Inc., 948 F.Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996); America Online, Inc. v. National
HeaIthcare Discount, Inc., 121 F.Supp. 2nd 1255 (N.D. Iowa 2000); America
Online, Inc. v. GreatdeaIs.net, et aI., 949 F.Supp. 2nd 851 (E.D. Va. 1999); and
America Online, Inc. v.IMS, et aI., 24 F.Supp. 2nd 548 (E.D. Va. 1998).
CONCLUSION
As this short discussion shows, defensive devices, defensive strategies
and network and computer security are vital steps to protect oneself from
hackers, crackers, snoopers, downl0aders, tamperers, spoofers, jammers or
£looders and virus mongers. Here, an ounce of prevention is worth many
pounds of cure.
Also, legal remedies exist. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as
presently drawn provides both civil and criminal protection and remedies
against people who violate it in any of the several ways the Act forbids. The
USA Patriot Act allows one to seek the assistance of law enforcement
authorities and, in appropriate circumstances, permits them to enlist the
13
assistance of internet service providers. Finally, where theft of trade secrets are
at issue, the Economic Espionage Act can provide a remedy.
Mr. Kenneth J. Tuggle
Frost Brown Todd LLC
400 W. Market Street, 32nd Floor
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3363
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CVBER-TERRORISM
&
CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTI CJ N
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Western District of Kentucky
AGENDA
• What is "Cyber-TerrorismJt and Critical
Infrastructure Protection?
• Applicable Federal Statutes
• National Security Law Issues and
Information Sharing
VVHAT IS THE CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
• We use portions of our
infrastructure to:
- communicate
- manage industrial activities
- conduct business
- perform scientific research
• Portions of our infrastructure are
considered critical to the day-to-
day functioning and the safety
and well-being of society
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VVHAT IS THE CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
• Critical Infrastructure:
- Telecommunications
- Banking and Financial Systems
- Electrical Power Grids
- Oil and Gas Pipelines
- Transportation Networks
- Water Distribution Systems
- Emergency Services
- Government Operations
- Medical and Health Care
-Food Su I
CRITICAL
INF'RASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION
• Prevent conventional criminals,
terrorists, hostile nation-states from
interrupting these services
• Prepare and assist in the reconstitution
of systems that are downed or
attacked
• Investigate attacks on the critical
infrastructure
WHAT IS CVBER-
TERRORISM?
CONVENTIONAL
TERRORISM
LOOKS LIKE.
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YlHAT IS CVBER-
TERRORISM?
WHAT WOULD AN ACT OF CYBER-
TERRORISM LOOK LIKE?
WE DON'T KNOW.
AND HOPEFULLY WE WON'T
FIND OUT.
CVBER-TERRORISM & CI·P:
SHOTS ACROSS THE Bow
• 1997 Cyber Attack on Florida 911 System
• 1998 ·Solar Sunrise" intrusions into over 500
gov't installations, military, and civilian
systems
1998 Telephone Switch Hack doses an
Airport
• 2001 Hackers protesting U.S.lChina conflict
enter US electrical power systems
• Recent worms
VVHAT IS CVBER-
TERRORISM?
• Cyber-Terrorism Is Distinct from
other computer crime
• Cyber-Extortion
- Many cases involving financial
institutions and e-commerce retailers
• Cyber-Espionage
- Attempts to exploit access to vulnerable
networks for intelligence purposes
• Other Malicious "Hacking"
- Many institutions are the subject of
malicious hacking
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DEVELOPING A DEFINITION
OF CVBER-TERRORISM
• Based on 18 U.S.C. 2331:
- An act involving use of a computer;
- That is dangerous to human life;
- That is intended to:
-intimidate or coerce a ci vilian population; or
-influence the polie y of a government by
coercion or intimidation
- 2332b(G)(5)(B) limits this to certain 1030
offenses.
CIP AND CVBER-
TERRORISM
Some Gov't
Computers
local
Business
FEDERAL STATUTES IN
C I P/CVBER-TERRCRISM
CASES
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FEDERAL STATUTES IN
C I P/CVBER-TERRORISM
CASES
• Terrorism Statutes
- 18 U.S.C. 2332b
Computer Intrusion Statutes
- 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5)
• RICO Statute
- 18 U.S.C. 1961
• Threat
- 18 U.S.C. 875(c)
• Sentencing Guidelines
- 3A1.4
ACTS TRANSCENDING'
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
1 B U.S.C. 2332B
• An offense under 2332b must:
- be an act that ~ranscend[s] international
boundaries" and
- Kills, maims any person within the United States;
or
- creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to
another person by destroying or damaging any
structure, conveyance, or other "real or personal
property" in the U.S. in violation of State or U.S.
law.
• Includes threats, attempts, and conspiracies
• Death eli ible or 25 ears
ACTS TRANSCENDING
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
1 B U.S.C. 2332B
• An offense under 2332b must:
- be an act that 'ranscend[s] international
boundaries" and
- Kills, maims any person within the United States;
or
- creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to
another person by destroying or damaging any
structure, conveyance, or other "rear or personal
property" in the U.S. in violation of State or U.S.
law.
• Includes threats, attempts, and conspiracies
• Death eli ible or 25 ears
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ACTS TRANSCENDING
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
1 B U.S.C. 2332B
• An offense under 2332b must:
- be an act that "transcend[s) international
boundaries" and
- Kills, maims any person within the United States;
or
- creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to
another person by destroying or damaging any
structure, conveyance, or other "real or personal
property" in the U.S. in violation of State or U.S.
law. •
• Indudes threats, attempts, and conspiracies
• Death eli ible or 25 ears
ACTS .TRANSCENDING
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
1 B U.S.C. 2332B
ACTS TRANSCENDING
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
1 B U.S.C. 2332B
DENIAL OF"
SERVICE ATTACK
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ACTS TRANSCENDING
NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
1 B U.S.C. 2332B
• Limitations of section 2332b
- Is erasing or altering data damage or
destruction ot "real or personal property"?
- Does the "damage" have to be direct or
does foreseeable resulting damage count?
- Is a Denial-ot-Service attack damage to
"real or personal property"?
- Must be an international incident
COMPUTER INTRUSION
1 B U.S.C. 103C(A)(S)(A)(III)
- Knowingly causes transmission of program,
info, code, command, and intentionally
causes damage without authorization to a
"protected computer J" and
-loss to 1+ persons or affecting 1+ ·protected
computer" aggregating to at least $5,000.
-I mpairment of medical exam, diagnosis, treatment,
or care of 1+ person.
-Phy sical injury to any person.
-a threat to pUblic health or safety.
-Dam age affecting a computer system used by a
gov't entity for administration of justice, national
defense, or national security.
RICO STATUTE
1 B U.S.C. 1 961 ET. SEQ
- Certain 1030 offense are now RICO predicates
- 1030 offenses where damage is:
• IfI1)airment of medical exam, diagnosis, treatment, or care of
1+ person
• Physical injury to any person
• a threat to public health or safety
• Damage affecting a computer system used by a gov't entity
for administration of justice, national defense, or national
security
- A terrorist group that is a RICO enterprise and
conducts its business through a Pattern of acts of
cyber terrorism is subject to prosecution under RICO
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THREATS
1 B U.S.C. B?S(c)
• Whoever transmits in interstate or
foreign commerce any communication
containing any threat to kidnap any
person or any threat to injure the person
of another, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
3A 1.4
• §3A1.4. TERRORISM:
- (a) If the offense is a felony that involved, or
was intended to promote, a federal crime of
terrorism, increase by 12 levels; but if the
resulting off~nse level is less than level 32,
increase to level 32.
• Application Note 1:
- The offense level increases if the offense
involved, or was intended to promote, a
federal crime of terrorism. "Federal crime of
terrorism" is defined at 18 U.S.C. §
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
3A1.4
• This provision should be used
judiciously...
• See US v Leahy, 169 F.3d 433 (7th Gir.)
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NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
ISSUES
NATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY
• Missteps in the past have resulted in
limits being placed on use of
intelligence authorities
• Law, Policy, and Regulation control
how information can be used and
shared
• Some of those were relaxed as a
result of the USA PATRIOT Act
- FISA and Title III Limitations
- Information Sharin
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT
SO U.S.C. 1 BO 1 ET SEQ.
• FISA v. Title III
- FBI's National Security Division v.
Criminal Investigations Division
- Not a 4th Amendment search
requiring "Probable Cause"
- Obtained from the FISA Court at
Main Justice
- Restrictions on use for criminal
investigations
- Oversight by Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review (OIPR)
9
FI SA AND TITLE III
• Restrictia
FISAinfJ
-"Prim
-July
• Restric
informa
-20000
FI SA AND TITLE III
• "Significant Purpose" is to gain foreign
intelligence.
• 18 USC 2517 now states:
- Any investigative or law enforcement
officer, or attorney for the Government,
may disclose such contents to any other
Federal law enforcement, intelligence,
protective, immigration, national defense,
or national security official to the extent
that such contents include foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence
FISA AND TITLE III
• How will these issues come up?
- FISA Authority is being used by FCI
agents just like Title III wiretaps are used
by CIO agents
- Increasingly, national security and
criminal investigations are going to
intersect
- May need to share Title III info
- Internal Security Section at Justice
oversees criminal use of the FISA
statute
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INFORMATION SHARING
• FISA and Title III Information
• Grand Jury
• Duty to tum over any Foreign
Intelligence Information
INFORMATION SHARING
GRAND .JURY MATERIAL
• May disclose to federal law
enforcement, intelligence, protective,
immigration, national defense, or
national security officials in performance
of his official duties when matters
involve foreign intel or counterinteL
FRCP 6(c){i)(v)
• Must file notice that information was
disclosed and the entities to which
disclosure was made. FRCP 6(c)(ii)
"WE'RE FROM THE
GOVERNMENT, "WE'RE
HERE TO HELP You.
• U.S. Attorney's office: (502) 582-5930
• E-Mail: marisa.ford@usdoj.gov
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I. Introduction
The information age heightens the value of informational assets. This affects what
are the ordinary focal points for credit transactions. There result a number of issues about
how credit law interacts with these new assets.
This paper focuses on secured lending relating to informational subject matter and
concludes with a brief overview of selected bankruptcy issues. We will not deal with the full
details of secured financing law or with consumer credit legislation. Rather, we focus on
several significant legal issues in this and in related forms of financing. 1 This is a context in
which significant questions lack clear answers and which, like many topics in licensing law,
is experiencing significant change. Many of the difficult issues entails resolving conflicts
between federal and state law which, for purposes of financing transactions often take
diametric approaches. Currently, the most significant changes are in the enactment of a
complete revision of UCC Article 9, and in promulgation of new standards for lease and
unsecured financing in UCITA.
II. Sources of Credit Law for Information Assets
Credit financing here is characterized by two conceptually difficult characteristics.
One relates to practice issues, while the other relates to an interaction between federal and
state law.
As a matter of practice, asset-based financing in intellectual property and related
fields often follows different traditions and terminology than other types of financing. Some
of this involves the use of terminology and techniques associated with conveyancing. While
1 In addition to the questions addressed in this chapter, which deal primarily with creating, perfecting and obtaining
priority in an interest, there are issues regarding foreclosure that we do not discuss here. These issues have generated
virtually no litigation in intellectual property law. As a general matter, foreclosure is governed under state law,
Article 9 of the VCC, although the results of foreclosure proceedings must conform to federal intellectual property
law transfer rules when applicable. See Lilly v. Terwilliger, 796 P2d 199 (Mont. 1990). See also Chesapeake Fiber
Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packing Corp., 143 Bankr. 360 (D. Md. 1992) (assignment ofpatent application permitted
further assignment in the event of termination for material breach as part of fmancing arrangement). Because of
massive changes in foreclosure law under new Article 9, anyone involved in this field must re-evaluate their forms
and procedures.
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other fields of asset-based financing have used Article 9 terminology of "security interest"
since the mid-1960's, it remains common to describe some intellectual property financing
agreements as "conditional assignments." The form of agreement may nominally entail an
assignment with a condition subsequent, reverting the asset back to the assignor in the even
of breach (e.g., non-payment or the like).2 The assignor in such structure is often the lender
and, thus, the entire deal may involve an initial transfer to the lender with a conditional
assignment back.
Other financing issues are handled differently in the information asset area than in
other contexts because of substantive differences in the recording systems and in the
underlying substantive property law. This includes, for example, rules in trademark law that
prohibit "assignments in gross" and raise questions about whether a security interest offends
that substantive law rule.3
Beyond terminology issues, then, there is a fundamental structural problem. Secured
lending is governed by an interaction of federal and state law, but the contours of what is
governed by federal and what issues are governed by state law are not clear.4 This problem
arises most often in transactions associated with "federal intellectual property", such as
copyright, patent, and federal trademarks. Pure trade secret and state law trademark
financing in concept does not present a federal-state issue.5
[1]. Federal Property Rights Systems: State Law Interface.
The primary federal intellectual property rights systems (copyright, patent,
trademark) do not contain extensive coverage of toward asset-based financing, although the
statutes may contain references to "mortgages" or security interests.6 Yet, each of the
statutory systems does contain substantive rules that affect the use of intellectual property
assets as the subject matter of asset-based financing. In cases of conflict, of course, these
federal rules prevail over contrary state law rules. The difficulty comes in determining when
a conflict exists and whether the conflict creates a preemptive, rather than a parallel rule
system.
2 See Raymond T. Nimmer, Commercial Asset-Based Financing (1988). See also Chesapeake Fiber Packaging
COIp. v. Sebro Packing COIp., 143 Bankr. 360 (D. Md. 1992) (assignment of patent application pennitted further
assignment in the event of termination for material breach as part offmancing arrangement).
3 See Roman Cleanser Co. v. National Acceptance Co., 802 F2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that a security interest
in a trademark was not an assignment in gross). See generally McCarthy on Trademarks § 18.7.
4 See, e.g., Muldo v. Matsco (In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc.), 52 USPQ 2d 1693 (9th Cir. BAP 1999); Broadcast
Music Inc. v. Hirsch, 41 USPQ2d 1373 (9th Cir 1997); In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 BR 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1997); In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 Bankr. 194 (CD Cal. 1990).
5 Determining when or whether the trade secret fmancing is purely a state law issue is not always a straightforward
question. If, for example, a trade secret is embodied in a writing in a form that creates a copyrightable work,
arguably there are two distinct rights based claims in this asset (confidentiality of infonnation, copyright exclusive
rights). See, e.g., In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 BR 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).
6 For example, the Copyright Act defmes a "transfer of copyright ownership" to include: "an assignment,
mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
nonexclusive license." 17 USC § 101. Section 261 of the Patent Act also refers to mortgages in reference to it
priority of rights rules. 35 USC § 261.
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The points ofpotential conflict include the following issues:
• The federal statutes contain registration or recording rules premised on a
property-law focus on the property as the organizing features of the records-
keeping system, rather than focusing on a party-based approach focus as in
Article 9 on secured financing. The issue is to what extent federal filing rules
over-ride state law rules as applied to security interests and, to the extent that they
do, how does a lender or other party reconcile two functionally different filing
systems in an efficient manner?
• The federal statutes contain priority rules based on a different conceptual
structure than that used to resolve priority of rights issues under state credit laws,
including Article 9. The issue created is to what extent the priority of rights rules
in the federal statutes over-ride the different rules in state law?
• The federal statutes and case law establish standards for creating enforceable
transfers of intellectual property. These differ from rules associated with other
types of asset-based financing collateral, especially goods. The issue concerns
how these different standards interact with state law rules about creating
enforceable security interests?
• Federal law places limits on what rights are transferred and what rights are
withheld in ordinary transactions (e.g., non-exclusive licenses). The questions are
to what extent these rules defeat ordinary forms and formats of secured lending
under state law.
[2]. State Law Systems: Revised Article 9 and Other Law
The dominant, relevant state law applicable to financing assets is Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. Article 9 covers all secured lending in personal property with
several defined exceptions that are not relevant here.? Effective in July, 2001, a new
substantially revised version of Article 9 became effective in most states, working significant
changes in applicable law relevant to intangibles financing. For purposes of this discussion,
we treat the uniform version of Article 9 in existence before 2001 as the "original" Article 9,
and the 2001 revision as "revised" Article 9.
Article 9 relies on a single concept of "security interest" that covers a range of
previously differently described financing frameworks.
• Although the term "security interest" ordinarily refers to a lending transaction, the
scope of Article 9 is not limited to transactions that are formally described as loan
7 The exceptions differ between what we here describe as "original Article 9" and the 2000 version, which we here
describe as "revised Article 9. See vee § 9-104 (Original); vee § 9-109 (Revised).
E-3
transactions - substance controls over form. A conditional assignment that entails a
secured loan transaction in fact will be treated as a security interest.
• "Security interest" is broadly defined in the uee as any property right taken to
assure the performance ofany obligation by the other party.8
• Additionally, Article 9 applies to sales or absolute assignments of certain intangible
assets, such as accounts and payment streams associated with other assets. Under
revised Article 9, this picks up many transactions in which payment (royalty)
streams are transferred for current value, whether by way of a lien or by way of an
assignment.
Article 9 contains elaborate priority and other rules, many of which are relevant to
information-based financing, but uses a simplified system of recording and simplified rules for
creating a security interest with minimal formalities. Both were changed from prior law by
transition to Revised Article 9.
• The primary place to file and, thus, perfect, a security interest is the debtor's
location.9 The rule governs, of course, only to the extent that federal law does not
require filing (recording or registration) in a different location.
Among the many changes made by revised Article 9 were numerous changes targeted to
licensing and intellectual-property. The reason stems from a confluence of simple facts. First, a
goal ofArticle 9 was to expand the maximal availability ofcommercial values for use for asset-
based financing. 1o This supposedly frees up value to provide capital and other support for
business. Second, intangible assets have become important forms of value in the modem
economy. Thus, the law revision focused in part on these assets.
As we discuss later, there are many contexts in which this effort appears in the language
ofRevised Article 9. These include:
• Redefining the term "account" to include contractual rights to payment coming from
a license and, thus, covering virtually all transactions in such payment rights. 11
• Invalidating in part contract terms that prohibit transfer of a payment (royalty)
stream.
8 vee § 1-307(37) (1990 Official Draft).
9 vec §§ 9-301; 307 (Revised).
10 Interestingly, for various reasons, this premise was not followed with respect to conswner-related fmancing. In
that context, indeed, many of the innovations of Article 9 (revised) are expressly excluded from application to
conswner assets and several other changes are made to reduce the easy availability of conswner assets as
collateral. See, e.g., vee §§ 9-108 (description of collateral); 9-109(d)(13) (conswner deposit accounts)
(Revised)
11 vee § 9-102(a)(2) (Revised).
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• Invalidating in part contract terms or the terms in other law that prevent a lender
from creating and perfecting an interest in a non-exclusive license. I2
• Reworking the language on deference to other filing rules to limit the extent of
deference to that mandated by the other law.
• Rules dealing directly with computer programs as assets and distinguishing between
programs customarily embedded in goods which are treated as goods, as compared
to other programs which are treated as "software", an intangible asset. I3
• Creating an idea of licensee in the ordinary course.
The ultimate effect of these and other rules remains to be seen, but it is clear that financing
issues are different under revised Article 9 in contrast to practice and law under original Article
9.
Ofcourse, while Article 9 dominates state law regarding secured finance, there are other
sources of state law that may need to be considered. For example, most states have adopted
Article 2A of the DCC, dealing with leases of goods. Article 2A contains specific provisions
validating what it described as a "finance lease.,,14 This is a financing format in which the
financier obtains the particular goods for purpose of leasing them to an identified lessee as a
financial accommodation. The lessee has picked out the goods to be leased and the financier
"purchases" them at the lessee's instructions. In such transactions, under Article 2A, the finance
lessor is treated in a manner consistent with its actual role in the transaction - as a lender, rather
than as a true lessor - for purposes ofwarranties and the like.
Additionally, UCITA contains limited provisions dealing with the position of a creditor
other than a secured lender with reference to license interests in computer information
transactions. These provisions deal with both lease-based lending and a form of unsecured
lending.
III. Defining the Collateral or Asset
Under Article 9, important issues about the enforcement and the proper approach to
creating or perfecting a se,curity interest hinge on describing the collateral that is the subject
matter of the transaction. Filing and other rules often hinge on the type of collateral
involved. It is also the case that, especially when the transaction involves parties who come
to the issue primarily from a commercial finance, rather than from an intellectual property
background, parties also frame both the security agreement and the financing state (in stat
records) in terms of the, so-called collateral classifications found in Article 9 (other original
and revised).
12 vee § 9-408 (Revised).
13 vee § 9-102(a)(75) (Revised).
14 vee § 2A-103 (1998 Official Text).
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[1]. Statutory Nomenclature and Classification
Article 9 sets out various "collateral classifications" or "collateral types" and frames
many rules around the type of collateral involved. The primary distinction of significance
involves separating goods, intangibles, and intangibles represented by a significant writing
(such as a promissory note). We will not discuss intangibles represented by a significant
writing, but concentrate on the other two categories.
Both general categories (goods and intangibles) involve various subcategories and
classifications. The important point for modem practice is that, reflecting the increasing
perceived value of intangibles as assets, revised Article 9 alters the definitions or categories
that existed under original Article 9 and creates several new categories relevant to intellectual
property assets and licensing.
Under original Article 9, the analytical framework involves first distinguishing
between goods and intangibles. "Goods" includes "all things which are movable at the time
the security interest attaches.... ,,15 Within the category of goods, a particular item is
classified as inventory, equipment, fann products, or consumer goods largely based on the
manner in which the debtor uses the item. Within the context of intangibles, the two further
categories of importance to us were "accounts" and "general intangibles," defined in the
following manner:
• "Account means any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services
rendered which is not evidenced by [a significant paper such as a negotiable]
instrument or chattel paper."
• "General intangible means any personal property (including things in action)
other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, ... instruments ... ,,16
As this indicates, "general intangible" was a background, or catchall category that included
all collateral not covered by a more specific classification. Most intellectual property rights
and licenses, however, fell within the definition of "general intangible." This included rights
under a license, either rights to use the licensed subject matter or rights to collect royalties
under the license.
Revised Article 9 was drafted at a time when the value of informational assets was
clearly understood. While Revised Article 9 retains the differentiation between goods and
intangibles, it makes significant changes in each definition that affect information asset
financing. Some pertain to computer programs as collateral, which we address in a
subsequent subsection. Beyond that, revised Article 9 alters several intangibles
classifications.
It defines the term "account" to expressly include rights to payment resulting from a
license, lease or assignment of property. I? For a commercial lawyer, this classification
15 vee § 9-105(1)(h)(Original).
16 vee § 9-106(Original).
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reflects a more comfortable and intuitive classification. Coupled with other changes, it
places most rights to payment flowing from unsecured commercial transactions within a
single category. As we discuss later, this affects the scope of Article 9 since, subject to some
narrow exclusions, it places all transactions (sales or security interests) in which the subject
matter involves a payment stream arising from other transactions within Article 9. 18
Previously, sales of rights to payment arising out of licenses or assignments were governed
under other law.
Revised Article 9 also creates a new sub-category within the class of "general
intangibles." This is a "payment intangible", defined as "a general intangible under which
the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation.,,19 This does not include
contractual rights to royalties under a license. Subject to preemption and various stated
exclusions, however, sales of and security interests in a payment intangible is within the
scope of revised Article 9.
To understand how these classifications work together, consider the following
illustrations:
Illustration 14.1. Assume that Debtor owns a patent, which it has licensed
various people to use in return for stated running royalties. One of these
people is Licensee. Under original Article 9, in a loan to Debtor, a security
interest in the patent or in the proceeds of the licenses to Debtor are general
intangibles.
In Illustration 14.1, we are dealing with intangibles and not with interests in goods. Under
original Article 9, in a loan to Licensee, the contract rights under the license are general
intangibles. In contrast, under revised Article 9: 1) in a loan to Debtor, the patent is a general
intangible, while the license royalties are accounts, and 2) in a loan to the Licensee, the
contract rights under the license are general intangibles. Under both versions of Article 9,
sales of general intangibles are not within the scope of Article 9, while sales of accounts
(both versions) and sales ofpayment intangibles (revised Article·9) are within that scope.
Illustration 14.2. Assume that Debtor owns the copyright to a motion
picture. It enters into licenses with various theaters for showing performances
of the motion picture. Debtor has also made many thousands of copies of the
motion picture on CD's which it plans to sell to retail distributors. It has, in
fact, already sold ten thousand copies to Block Video.
Illustration 14.2 presents an issue that has presented conceptual difficulty for the financial
community and courts dealing with financing questions in information assets. In a loan to
Debtor, the copyright is a general intangible and the right to payment in the licenses with the
theaters are accounts under Revised Article 9.
17 vee § 9-102(a)(2)(Revised).
18 vee § 9-109(Revised).
19 vee § 9-102(a)(61)(Revised).
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Now consider the tangible copies in Illustration 14.2. For copies that remained
owned by the Debtor, one can view a tangible copy as goods or as an asset involving
intangible rights. Indeed, both descriptions might reasonable apply and, in fact, both aspects
could serve as collateral in a loan to Debtor for these copies. The difference in tenns ofwhat
one claims as collateral can be immense. The copy, stripped of intellectual property rights
associated with it, may be valueless and in any event is clearly of less value that the
combined copy and copyright. On the other hand, it is not clear that an interest in a copyright
gives one any security interest in a particular copy. The security interest might relate to
either the intellectual property (intangible) or the tangible embodiment (e.g., goods). The
choice alters what a creditor must do to perfect its interest20 and affects the rights that the
lender has in the event ofdefault.21
For copies that have been sold to a third party (not the copyright or patent owner),
doctrines of first sale and patent exhaustion clarify the issue. The buyer obtains no rights in
the underlying copyright or patent and, thus, cannot use them as collateral. The collateral,
rather consists of the copy and the right of the copy owner to further transfer that copy. The
issue then arises whether the copies (when made) should be treated as tangible or intangible
collateral for purposes of Article 9. As we see below, under original Article 9, there were
cases in analogous contexts' that go in conflicting directions. Revised Article 9 does not
resolve this question for purposes· of motion pictures or sound recording, but it does resolve
the question for computer programs. The program are general intangibles. This is because it
is the intangible (infonnation), not the medium containing it that constitutes the value a
purchaser acquires. In Illustration 14.2, then, in the hands of Block Video, the copies might
be goods, but if the infonnation is in digital fonn, the motion picture might be considered a
"computer program" and thus a general intangible or, perhaps, treated as such by analogy to
programs.
On the other hand, had Debtor delivered a copy to Block Video under a license giving
it the right to make thousands of copies for sale, Block Video would most likely not be the
owner of the copy. Its asset would be a license to make copies. Those license rights are
general intangibles because we are not then dealing with rights to payment.
[2]. Software, Computer Programs, Data and the Like
The distinction between an interest in goods and an interest in intangibles often
creates problems in infonnation asset-based lending. The issue potentially arises in any case
where the security agreement provides for less than a comprehensive grant of a interest in all
of the debtor's assets (e.g., an interest in debtor's "inventory" where significant value resides
20 See In re Information Exch., Inc., 98 Bankr. 603 (Bankr. ND Ga. 1989).
21 At some level, one can wonder whether a secmity interest in a copy that has not been sold to a third party gives
the lender any significant rights at all in the event of a default, since both a patent and a copyright give that rights
owner control over the ability to sell the copy until a fIrst sale occurred. Although there has been no reported
litigation on this, however, the better view would be that, if the copyright (or patent) owner created the secmity
interest in the copy, there is an implied license in the event of default and foreclosure for the lender to sell the copy
in satisfaction of the debt. See McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917,920 (Fed.Cir.1995) ("Whether
express or implied, a license is a contract 'governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.").
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in an underlying patent, trademark or copyright),22 or where the lender has followed
procedures of perfecting or enforcing an interest based on a conclusion that the collateral is
of one type and it in fact turns out to be characterized by a court as being of a different type
requiring a different approach to perfecting the interest.
This issue is often encountered in cases involving data, text or code. The security
interest might relate to either the intellectual property (intangible) or the tangible
embodiment (e.g., goods). The choice alters what a creditor must do to perfect its interest and
what rights it has in the event of default.
In re Bedford Computer Corp.23 held that software would be considered tangible,
rather than intangible property because the "technology cannot exist independent from the
actual hardware components to which it gives operational life." This requires use of state law
for perfection and priority, but also tends toward the view that the security interest does not
cover intellectual property rights. One may have a lien against one copy of source code, but
not in the copyright interest that involves a right to make further copies of the code.
Obviously, this leaves the lender with less position than if the lien related to both the copy
and the copyright.24
In contrast, In re Information Exchange, Inc. 25 reached a different result in reference
to computer tapes that contained a debtor's data base. The creditor took possession of the
computer tapes. It argued that possession perfect~d the security interest without any filing. If
the database were tangible, this would be correct. The court, however, held that the security
interest was in an intangible. It emphasized the actual character of the transaction and the
source of the value it entailed, rather than the form in which the value was held. As the court
noted, it was "not the computer tape itself which is actually in issue ... but the information
and programming which is recorded on the tape." Information is an intangible, treated under
the Dee as a general intangible in which a security interest can be perfected only by filing.
The comparison of these cases shows the uncertainty that can arise in understanding
exactly what constitutes the collateral when Article 9 interacts with the world of intellectual
property rights. Revised Article 9 addresses this problem with respect to one type of
intangible collateral - computer programs - and by doing so provides appropriate guidance
with respect to other types of digital information as collateral. Whether its method of treating
22 See, e.g., United States v. Antenna Systems, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D.N.H. 1966) (Secwity interest in
inventory, work in progress, contract rights, and equipment of a software company did not cover "blueprint and
technical data produced when the company's engineering staff designed a product."). The reader should note,
however, that use of an agreement that refers simply to "all assets" creates problems entirely unassociated with the
subject matter of this book. Such descriptions have been held to be overly broad and therefore inadequate under
Article 9. Revised Article 9 makes this rule explicit as applied to a secwity agreement. UCC § 9-108(c)(Revised).
23In re Bedford Computer Corp., 62 Bankr. 555 (Bankr. DNH 1986).
24The district court in In re C Tek Software, Inc., 117 Bankr. 762 (DNH 1990), also treated software as a tangible.
That case dealt with the impact on a creditor's lien of the movement of tangible copies of source code from one state
to another, an action that may require refiling under the general rules of the UCC for some goods. In C Tek, the
secwity interest covered both the source code and all ownership rights in the software, thus seeming to expressly
cover copyright interests.
25 In re Information Exch., Inc., 98 Bankr. 603 (Bankr. ND Ga. 1989).
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the distinction works well in practice or not remains to be seen, of course, since there has
been no reported case law under revised Article 9.
Revised Article 9 treats a computer program ordinarily as a general intangible, rather
than goods, even if contained on a tangible medium. Revised Article 9 provides that the term
"goods" does not include a "computer program embedded in goods that consist solely of the
medium in which the program is embedded.,,26 Instead, with an enumerated exception,
computer programs along with any supporting information transferred with it are defined as
"software" and expressly defined as a general intangible. This also should control the
designation of the medium that holds the program since the medium has no value
independent of its content and any approach other than considering the two together would
create hopeless classification and enforcement problems, but the statute does not clearly
answer that question.27
Revised Article 9, however, treats some computer programs as goods. This exception
involves a computer program embedded in goods if the goods are not simply the medium in
which the program is embedded and if:
(i) the program is associated with the goods in such a manner that it
customarily is considered part of the goods, or (ii) by becoming the owner of
the goods, a person acquires a right to use the program in connection with the
goods.28
Comments to revised Article 9 do not give illustrations of this bifurcated treatment, but the
general parameters are relatively clear.
• Programs not embedded in goods or embedded solely on a medium of affixing
them (e.g., a diskette or a CD) are general intangibles.
• Programs customarily or actually separately licensed apart from the sale or lease
of the goods in which they are embedded are also general intangibles.
• If, however, the program is customarily treated as part of the goods and in which
it is embedded or is sold in a manner that the buyer of the goods has a right to use
the program in those goods, the program is treated as goods for purposes of
Article 9.
Thus, a program that operates a toy robot that is sold to the general public and not separately
licensed would be goods for purposes of Article 9, while a program embedded in a computer
and separately licensed is a general intangible. A program provided on a diskette or CD is a
general intangible, regardless ofwhether it was sold or licensed to the transferee-debtor.
26 Dee § 9-102(a)(44)(Revised).
27 See Antenna case. See also the defmition of"computer infonnation" in DelTA § 102 (2000 Official Text).
28 Dee § 9-102(a)(44)(Revised).
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Article 9 does not define the term "embedded" or the term "computer program." One
might rely on the definition of computer program in the Copyright Act, but there is no
reference to that Act in this statute. Alternatively, the term might be construed in light of
other state law, such as DCITA. Also left unanswered is whether digital products that are
representations or copies of motion pictures or sound recording are covered by this concept.
The argument that they should be included is simple: the digital medium is the same for
programs and has the same effect (instructing a computer how to operate» and, furthermore,
a with programs, the value lies in the intangibles, not the diskette or CD.
Part A. Secured Lending and Intellectual Property Rights as Assets
IV. Scope of Article 9: Intellectual Property Rights
The scope of Article 9 is defined by two analyses. The first involves the defined
affirmative scope and limitations contained in the Act itself. The second concerns the
preemptive influence of federal law which, by potentially preempting certain applications of
Article 9, in effect narrows the scope of that statute. With respect to both, however, we need
further to distinguish between issues of scope which ask whether Article 9 applies at all to a
particular transaction, and questions which ask, assuming that Article 9 has some application
to a given transaction, does the Article 9 rule on the particular question at issue control or
does other law govern?
In this section, we focus on those questions as they relate to intellectual property
issues. We discuss contract and contract rights issues in a subsequent part of this chapter.
[1]. General Application of Article 9: Security Interest
Both original and revised Article 9 apply broadly to ~ transaction, regardless of
form, intended to create a security interest in personal property. 9 Article 9 also applies to
sales of certain contractual rights. Revised Article 9 expands this to include, in relevant part,
"a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.,,30 Each of
these, which may not be familiar to parties lacking extensive experience with Article 9, is a
defined term. Both in its definition of "accounts" and in the new teim "payment
intangibles", revised Article 9 greatly expands the scope of its application into intellectual
property licensing arrangements.
It is clear that the intent of the affirmative statement of scope is to be broad and to
apply regardless of the form or label adopted by the parties for their transaction. The scope
of Article 9 relevant to intellectual property rights (as compared to contract payment rights),
is largely controlled by two terms: "security interest" and "personal property."
29 vee § 9-102(a)(Original); vee § 9-109(a)(Revised).
30 vee § 9-109(a)(3)(Revised).
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[i]. Personal Property
The DCC does not define "personal property." However, various comments to both
versions of Article 9 make clear that the intent includes copyright, patent, trademark and
similar rights. Comments to revised Article 9 dealing with the content of one of the Article 9
collateral types ("general intangibles") comment:
[This] is a residual category of personal property, including things in action ...
Examples are various categories of intellectual property ... As used in the definition
... "things in action" includes rights that arise under a license of intellectual property,
including the right to exploit the intellectual property without liability for
infringement.31
To an intellectual property lawyer, the device of including licensed rights within a concept of
"things in action" seems out of place. Since the concept seems to deal with contractual
collateral, however, we will return to that problem later.
The Comment makes clear the drafters' intent to cover intellectual property and
associated forms of "personal property." Indeed, the idea that intellectual property rights are
a form ofpersonal property is commonplace.32
The issue that will strike the intellectual property bar as interesting about this focus
on personal property concerns the idea of property itself. Most traditional fields of
intellectual property law have been held to create property rights in their particular subject
matter. However, what of information that falls outside these fields and that designation?
Does Article 9 apply only to subject matter that would be considered to be property? For
example, if a factual database were used as collateral for a loan or similar transaction, would
Article 9 apply if the database were not copyrightable and were not held in a manner that
constitutes it to be a trade secret?
We should also note that, in the comment, the reference to rights created under a
license refers to rights held by a licensee under a license. In some aspects of intellectual
property law and practice, a non-exclusive licensee is not treated has holding a property right,
but as being merely the beneficiary of a promise to not sue. Whether such position elevates
into a "property" right for purposes of Article 9 might be questioned, but it is clear that the
licensee at least has a contractual interest and contract rights are adequate in modem law for
setting financing arrangements.
More generally, the unique concepts of property limitations under intellectual
property law might indicate that some transactions are not covered. Yet, it is not likely that a
court would or should reach that conclusion on the scope of Article 9. The purpose of the
statute is to cover all transactions that engage a security interest as a focus and that deal with
valuable collateral. The formal conclusion that data is or is not property does not bear on
31 uee § 9-102, cmt. 5d (Revised).
32 See, e.g., 35 USC § 261 ("Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal
property.").
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achieving that goal. Indeed, if one sought a technical justification for describing an
uncopyrighted database as personal property, one could find it in the numerous state criminal
laws that expressly so state for purpose of criminal theft and similar prosecutions.
[ii]. Security Interest
The second element of the scope of Article 9 relevant to intellectual property rights
refers to a transaction that creates a "security interest." Revised Article 9 defines "security
interest" to mean:
An interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or perfonnance of
an obligation. The term also includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of
accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible or a promissory note in a transaction
that is subject to Article 9.3
The definition does not depend on the form of a transaction, but the function of the property
interest created by the transaction.34 While there is no case law directly on point, a
conditional assignment of rights in intellectual property should qualify as a security interest if
the conditions involved rights that secure payment or another obligation. The same holds
true for an "exclusive license" under the same conditions and analysis.
This result seems unsurprising if the primary purpose of the transaction centers on
securing performance of credit repayment obligations under a loan or a credit purchase
related to the intellectual property where the effect of the transaction is to convey to the
transferee essentially all rights in the intellectual property on payment of all obligations.35
Some risk exists, however, that the language of Article 9 might cover more broadly a
reversionary right in a license or assignment (e.g., a reversion if the licensee's use exceeds
the exclusive license scope). That would be a misapplication of Article 9, even if one could
argue that such conditions are nominally within the language, since the purpose of Article 9
remains on property-based assurances of the performance under credit obligations and the
remedies or other rules of Article 9 are suited solely to the context of a credit transaction and
enforcing payment through sale or other disposition of the collateral. Those remedial
provisions are not appropriate to ordinary license breach and have appropriately never been
applied to that context.
33 vee § 1-201(37) (2000 Official Text).
34 See vee § 9-102, cmt. 3b (Revised) ("Whether an agreement creates a security interest depends not on whether
the parties intend that the law characterize the transaction as a security interest, but rather on whether the
transactions falls within the definition of"security interest" in Section 1-201.").
35 In a marginally analogous context, there has been extensive judicial and legislative activity regarding when or
whether a transaction characterized as a lease of goods was in a fact a sale of the goods subject to a security
interest. As the law eventually evolved in that context, a critical issue in making the distinction involves whether
the economic nature of the transaction in effect conveyed all relevant rights in the leased goods to the lessee as a
practical matter, or whether the lessor retained a significant residual interest (e.g., retained value after the
transaction was fully performed). See vee § 1-201(37) (1990 Official Text).
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[2]. Application of Particular Article 9 Rules: Partial Exclusions
If a transaction falls within the affirmative scope of Article 9, there remain questions
about whether or to what extent Article 9 governs a particular issue in the transaction.
Frequently Article 9 does not govern the entire relationship.
One way in which this occurs comes directly from the focus of Article 9 itself. The
provisions ofArticle 9 deal with the creation, perfection and enforcement of security interests
and with validating or invalidating certain other aspects of a contractual relationship
associated with those functions. This leaves many issues untouched and, therefore, subject to
other law. The clearest example concerns warranties or other assurances of the quality of the
subject matter. These issues are not addressed in Article 9; other law controls. Similarly,
Article 9 does not discuss standards for delivery or performance, issues of cure, questions of
repudiation, or in transactions other than sales, issues about where or whether title transfers.
On all of these, other law governs.
Article 9 focuses on issues associated with the relationship between the interest in
personal property and the obligation it secures. Within that scope, the general rule is that
Article 9 controls over other state law, unless it expressly defers to other law, such as on
issues of perfection of a security interest in an asset covered by a state certificate of title
statute.36
There are two parts of this selected deference or exclusion that affect secured lending
in intellectual property assets and, perhaps, also to interests in license contract rights. The
first is that Article 9 does not govern where a federal law or regulation preempts. Revised
Article 9 states this premise in the following terms:
This article does not apply to the extent that ... a statute, regulation, or treaty
of the United States preempts this article37
This language narrows the deferential language in original Article 9. That language excluded
original Article 9 coverage for any security, interest subject to a law of the United States to
the extent that the law "governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by
transactions in the particular types of property.,,38 Under revised Article 9, deference
requires preemption; that is, there is no state law deference based on the mere fact of federal
coverage unless the federal coverage is preemptive in effect, in which case, of course, state
law has no choice but to give way to federal law.
For intellectual property assets, the most important potentially preemptive federal
laws relate to copyright, patent and trademark. Both original and revised Article 9 contain
rules specifically referring to deference in regard to filing or recording rules. The relevant
language in revised Article 9 provides:
36 See, e.g., vee §§ 9-303; 9-311(a)(2)(Revised); vee §§ 9-302(3)(b).
37 vee § 9-109(c)(1)(Revised).
38 vee § 9-104(a)(Original).
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[The] filing of a financing statement is not necessary or effective to perfect a
security interest in property subject to ... a statute regulation or treaty of the
United States whose requirements for a security interest's obtaining priority
over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to property preempt [the section
requiring filing in state records to perfect an interest.]39
The term "perfect" or "perfection" in Article 9 refers to placing the security interest into the
best possible position with respect to the rights of third parties in the relevant property.
Under the foregoing rule, for property covered by such a preemptive statute, compliance with
the relevant federal rules is the only way to perfect the interest.
Once again, the language in revised Article 9 narrows language in original Article 9
by merely stating the truism: a federal preemptive law preempts Article 9 which, after all, is
merely state law despite its national importance. The language in original Article 9 had
stated:
The filing of a financing statement ... is not necessary or effective to perfect a
security interest in property subject to ... a statute or treaty of the United
States which provides for national or international registration ... or which
specifies a place of filing different from that specified in this Article for filing
of the security interest.4o
While this language required merely that there be a federal registration system applicable to
the subject matter, the revised Article 9 language requires a registrations system of a
particular type (e.g., giving priority over a judgment lien creditor) and that the system be
preemptive, rather than concurrent in nature.
The change from original to revised Article 9 language embodies a state law policy
change, moving in a direction more favorable to the treatment of secured interests under state
law. In this regard, it is interesting that, while the comments to original Article 9 describe
the Copyright Act registration rules in illustrating a system that displaces Article 9, the
comments to revised Article 9 do not cite the Copyright Act. Yet, one doubts that secured
lenders or others relying on a security interest will act differently under original Article 9, at
least until definitive judicial ruling signal a true and definitive change in law. The risk that
copyright preempts state law filing remains strong and a change in Article 9 comments
cannot alter that effect.
Under revised Article 9, Article 9 rules are displaced by federal law only if the federal
rules preempt Article 9 rules. Revised Article 9 states this rule twice - recognizing
displacement to the extent that federal law generally preempts, and also if a federal
registration rule of a particular type preempts the state rule.
39 vee § 9-311(a)(1)(Revised).
40 vee § 9-302(3)(a)(Original).
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v. Creating a Security Interest: Intellectual Property Rights
The threshold legal issue in asset-based financing in any context entails how one
creates an enforceable interest.41 The basic theme of secured lending focuses on property
interests created by agreement. Thus, the core questions center on creating an enforceable
agreement, what formalities or other requisites apply, and what law governs concerning
them?
[1]. Required Writing and Description
Both versions of DCC Article 9 require a signed writing that describes the collateral
in order to establish an enforceable security interest unless the creditor is in possession of the
collateral.42 Consistent with modem law and DCITA, Revised Article 9 describes this
requirement as an authenticated record, changing prior law only to the extent that electronic
signatures and records are permitted.
This state law requirement corresponds to requirements under Eatent and copyright
law that transfers of interests in those rights must be in writing. 3 The federal act
requirement does not apply to all contracts involving copyrights or patents, but is more
narrow. The language in the Copyright Act is as follows:
A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid
unless an instrument of conveyance or a note or memorandum of the transfer,
is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed.44
The requirement under this federal rule arises only if the transaction entails a transfer of
"copyright ownership." The technical issue thus presented concerns whether a security
interest in a copyright entails a "transfer of copyright ownership." This is a defined term in
copyright law.45 It generally has been held to apply to security interests.
The Patent Act similarly provides that "Applications for patent, patent, or any interest
therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.,,46 As a general rule, the term
"assignment" involves a transaction that transfers title.47 The requirement of a written
41 We are following a traditional connnerciallending structure here in differentiating between issues that define the
rights between the parties (creditor and debtor) to the agreement and issues that focus on the rights of the creditor,.
through its property interest, against third parties. The latter issue, discussed below, concerns how one peifects a
security interest and what priority that perfected interest has against third parties.
42 UCC § 9-203(Original); UCC § 9-203(b)(Revised).
43 17 USC § 204(a); 35 USC § 261. The federal electronic signature statute presumably allows the writing
requirement to be satisfied by an electronic record or signature.
44 17 USC § 204(a).
45 17 USC § 101.
46 35 USC § 261.
47 See In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 52 USPQ2d 1683 (BAP 9th Cir. 1999); Rite-Rite Cotp. v. Kelley Co., 56
F.3d 1538, 1551 [ 35 USPQ2d 1065 ] (Fed. Cir. 1995) (assignment is the conveyance of title in patent Law);
Public Varieties of Miss., Inc. v. Sun Valley Seed Co., 734 F.Supp. 250,252 (N.D. Miss. 1990) (assignment is "a
conveyance which transfers the entire bundle ofconnnon law rights residing in a patent>cq».
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agreement is absolute and in the nature of a statute of frauds.48 A security interest under
modern practice does not require a transfer of title and, thus, arguably falls outside this
standard in cases where title was not conveyed.49 We will have more to say about this
standard later.
In part because of the over-riding Article 9 requirement and in part because of
questions about the scope of the federal writing requirements, preemption or deference issues
between state and federal law here are seldom debated on the question of whether there was
an adequate writing.
The writing must adequately describe the subject matter and the fact that a transfer
occurred. As a general rule, practitioners approaching the issue from an intellectual property
perspective tend to describe a copyright, patent or' trademark in formal, specific tenns
referencing the registration numbers. In part this is caused by the traditional focus of those
fields, but in part it is caused by the registration systems that copyright, trademark, and patent
law implement. For example, the Copyright Act provides that a recordation of a document
pertaining to a transfer of copyright ownership. In contrast, commercial finance practice
often relies on general VCC categories. When they adequately encompass the particular
rights involved, such more generic descriptions ordinarily suffice.
Of course, as we have seen earlier, misconceptions about what actually comprises the
collateral are not uncommon. Thus, for example, in United States v. Antenna Systems, Inc.,5o
the court held that a security agreement extending to inventory, work in progress, contract
rights, and equipment of a software company did not cover "blueprint and technical data
produced when the company's engineering staff designed a product." The court described the
visual reproductions of "engineering concepts, ideas ~d principles [as] general intangibles"
under the V.C.C. The court suggested that ideas dominate intellectual property, making the
tangible embodiment of the ideas inseparable from the ideas themselves. Thus, the fact that
these were in tangible form did not control their classification.
[2]. New Developments and Technology
Article 9 allows the creation of an interest in current and after-acquired property with
minimal formality. 51 This approach facilitates so-called revolving loan financing, a situation
48 See Valente-Kritzer Video v. Pinckney, 881 F2d 772 (9th Cir. .1989). Compare Great S. Homes, Inc. v. Johnson
& Thompson Realtors, 797 F. Supp. 609 (MD Tenn. 1992) (exclusive copyright licensee had standing to bring
infringement action even though license agreement was oral when complaint was filed).
49 See In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 52 USPQ2d 1683 (BAP 9th Cir. 1999). Compare Waterman v. MacKenzie,
138 U.S. 252, 11 S.Ct. 334, 34 L.Ed. 923 (1891) (Patent mortgage was an assignment where mortgage was created
by transferring ownership ofthe patent, subject to defeasance upon payment ofa loan.).
50 United States v. Antenna Systems, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D NH 1966). See also Chemical Bank v.
Communications Data Servs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1401 (SD Ia 1991) (refusing to resolve whether a subscription list
was "goods" or "general intangibles" but treating the list as goods by applying U.C.C. 9-310); Dabney v.
Information Exch., Inc. (In re Information Exch., Inc.), 98 BR 603, 604 (Bankr. ND Ga. 1989) (computer
information and programming are general intangibles not goods).
51 The agreements here may be couched expressly in the form of a security agreement like that used in UCC
generally or, especially when drafted by lawyers whose specialty lies in intellectual property law, in terms of a
"collateral assignment." The form does not control the substance of the agreement. See generally Nimmer,
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in which both the debtor and the creditor understand that the collateral basis for the
transaction will be a shifting, rather than a fixed set of assets.
That approach does not fit easily into the framework of intellectual property law. In
that law, determinations about ownership are made based not solely on derivation of the
subsequent work or invention, but on who contributed the creative work product and whether
that contribution was authorized and not an infringement. Furthermore, in federal intellectual
property regimes, registration systems and the rights flowing from them tend to be organized
in terms of specific patents, trademarks or copyrights, rather than in reference to the debtor,
thereby making it more difficult to simply follow a premise that a single agreement or
registration automatically covers entirely separate works or inventions.
In In re C Tek Software, Inc. 52 a lender had a security interest in various assets,
including a particular computer program developed to the level of version 3.7. Subsequent to
the security interest being created, a third party was given an exclusive license to develop,
enhance, and market the program. After the licensor defaulted, the lender sought to foreclose
on the software copyright, including the copyright on the then-current version of the program
(4.1). The court, however, ruled that the secured party's lien was limited to the version in
existence at the time of the loan. The enhancements could be identified separately from that
earlier version and were not within the lien.
Significantly, in this case, the copyright in the derivative work was held by the
licensee who was not a party to the loan agreement. Even if the security agreement by its
own terms extended to new versions of the software, in this case that new version was not
and had never been owned by the debtor. Nor had the licensee given the debtor permission
to encumber licensee's property. If the derivative work were developed and owned by the
debtor, however, a different result might arise, at least under revised Article 9. Article 9
gives a lender an automatic interests in any identifiable proceeds of its original collateral.
While original Article 9 treats proceeds as referring largely to property received on sale,
lease or other disposition of collateral, Revised Article 9 uses a broader concept that includes
"rights arising out of collateral.,,53
In contrast to C Tek the court in Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packing
COrp.54 held that a security interest in a patent application extended to the patent issued as a
result of the application enforcing the intent and language of the transaction. This approach
parallels modem commercial financing law. No clear reason exists to disregard an interpretation
of a financing contract (security agreement, assignment, or license) that reflects modem
commercial expectations and one suspects that the modem commercial view will prevail.
C Tek involved a failure to make the security interest extend to new property defined
in a manner consistent with copyright law. A related problem occurs if the lien attaches to
technology only in its current state or only to new property. The difficulty entails identifying
Commercial Asset-Based Financing ch.22 (1988).
52 In re C Tek Software, Inc., 127 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. DNH 1991).
53 VCC § 9-102(a)(64) (revised).
54 Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packing Corp., 143 Bankr. 360 (D. Md. 1992).
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the encumbered technology separate from the other technology of the debtor or its new
versions. The court in Bedford Computers55 invalidated an ownership claim to "new
software" because the alleged owner who had financed the development could not separate
its technology from other software. The critical step involves establishing and enforcing a
method of tracing or identifying the specific collateral. Absent a means for that, it may be
that no security interest exists because the secured party failed to provide a reasonable
description of the collateral.
VI. Filing, Perfection and Registration: Intellectual Property Rights
Whether a security interest is effectively created affects various issues. Primarily,
however, it sets out the existence of enforceable rights against the debtor. With reference to
rights against third parties, under Article 9 and federal intellectual property law, an
enforceable security interest is merely a precondition for having rights, but further steps must
occur to establish protection or priority of rights against third parties to the extent pennitted
under the applicable law. Article 9 refers to these added steps as steps that relate to
"perfecting" the security interest, tenninology that we follow in this chapter even though the
same language does not appear in federal intellectual property law, where the statutes tend
instead to refer to the validity of the interest as against certain third parties.
Although there are several exclusions from this requirement, for most collateral
relevant to this discussion, to perfect an interest, Article 9 requires either filing of a financing
statement in a relevant state office or taking possession of the collateral to perfect the
interest.56 Taking possession is not a pennitted means ofperfecting a security interest in true
intangibles, such as general intangibles and accounts, which include intellectual property
rights and license rights under both versions ofArticle 9.57 On the other hand, either filing or
taking possession suffices for perfecting a security interest in goods. Filing under Article 9,
of course, ordinarily requires filing in a state office, while recordation rules under federal
laws relevant to intellectual property ordinarily require recording in a federal office.
State law filing systems under Article 9 are ordinarily indexed according to the
debtor's name, rather than to the collateral, except in atypical cases where a title system
exists, such as in state laws relating to certificates of title in motor vehicles. Importantly,
however, for ordinary collateral, revised Article 9 changes the rules as to which office in
which state provides the location for filing. For most cases, the filing location under revised
Article 9 will be at the debtor's location, which for corporations is at the debtor's place of
incorporation,58 rather than at the location of the collateral or the transaction that creates it.
A basic theme in the Article 9 rules focuses on requiring a creditor to take steps that
law treats as giving constructive notice to third parties of the creditor's interest, but a further
justification for the Article 9 rules centers on the creditor's ability to plan a transaction:
augmented by knowing both how and where one checks to detennine what prior interests
55 In re Bedford Computer Corp, 62 Bankr. 555 (Bankr. DNH 1986).
56 vee § 9-302 (Original); vee §§ 9-308-316 (Revised).
57 See discussion ofcollateral categories in ~ 14.--.
58 vee §§ 9-301; 307 (Revised).
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exist and what steEs one need to take in order to set the priority of the interest against
subsequent parties. 9
Under either version of Article 9, once one correctly determines the nature of the
collateral, location of the collateral or debtor, and the name of the debtor, guidance on how to
perfect an interest becomes relatively straightforward to the extent that Article 9 governs:
• General intangibles (e.g., intellectual property, including trade secrets):
filing is required and is to be made in designated state records in the
debtor's location and under the debtor's name as described in Article 9.
• Goods: filing or possession may perfect; filing is to be made under the
debtor's name; which state's records govern depends on whether original
or revised Article 9 applies.
This state law system sets the background for the preemption and practical issues that
affect asset-based financing of intellectual property assets. Mostly, these issues focus on the
involvement of federal intellectual property regimes. As we have seen, original Article 9 and
revised Article 9 each contain two provisions that expressly defer to federal registration or
filing systems when they are applicable to personal property collateral. The two versions of
Article 9 do so in different language, with revised Article 9 limiting its deference to federal
systems to the extent they preempt state law, while original Article 9 leaves open the
potential ofbroader deference to federal filing systems.
[1]. Nature of the Options
As we consider these issues, an important practical question needs to be set out as the
background for discussion. The filing systems (federal and state) use conceptually different
frameworks. The federal systems are based on a property-rights model, akin to real estate
records. They register interests based on the work (the property). In part, at least, this is
because of the primary function of the systems, which includes tracking title in intellectual
property. In contrast, Article 9 records require filing based on the debtor's name. That is
because they track primarily a credit-lien process that does not purport to concern itself with
recording or tracking title in an asset, but focuses on giving a limited picture of the credit
status of the particular debtor.
The two systems optimally support structurally different types of financing. To
understand this, consider the following illustration:
Illustration 14.3. ABB Productions creates a copyrighted motion picture
(titled: Race Times), having obtained all relevant rights from all relevant
persons. ABB is a corporation located in California. It has produced two
hundred other motion pictures. To support production of Race Times, ABB
seeks financing from Bank 1. Bank 2 also gives ABB general financing for its
overall business operations.
59 Raymond Nimmer, Ingrid Hillinger & Michael Hillinger, Secured Financing (1999).
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What Bank 1 must do to determine the priority of its interest differs significantly
depending on whether copyright rules apply or whether the Article 9 system applies. To
determine whether other interests will compete with its interest in the designated motion
picture, if the copyright work-based filing system controls, Bank 1 need only confirm that
there are no other interests of record in that copyright. There is no need to search or clear
rights in the other motion pictures or in the general financing records applicable to the debtor,
ABB, or to determine the scope of any interest lenders who financed the two hundred other
motion pictures took. One might well argue that a work-based title system is thus the most
efficient for financing that focuses on specific works, since the system narrows those to
whom the lender must look for finding and negotiating away conflicting interests. In our
illustration, a debtor-based system might require clearing the interests of two hundred entities
and still determining whether the debtor (ABB) owned the copyright in the particular work.
In contrast, a debtor-based filing systems seems better suited to the support of
financing based on the general assets of a debtor. We can see this from the perspective of
Bank 2, which is a general asset lender. Its lending approach benefits from a single, debtor-
based filing system since, under that system, it can determine which prior lenders makes
claims with respect to which assets of the debtor from a single search and a resulting series of
inquiries. A work-based system, in contrast, requires the general lender to search for and
determine interests in all of the copyright works individually, in Illustration 14.3 this means a
search of over two hundred different records systems. One can easily observe that a debtor-
based system better supports lending against general assets.
There are ways to blend the two, of course, and there are limits on the effects we have
mentioned. But the relevant point is that the choice of which system dominates does not
merely pertain to a question of where to file, but affects the process and methodology of
asset-based lending.
[2]. Criteria for Preemption
In determining whether or to what extent federal rules on filing or priority displace state
l.aw, ultimately requires both a federal preemption analysis and an analysis ofstate law which, in
some cases, may defer to federal law even if the federal law does not in fact preempt state law
on the issue. Quite obviously, under U.S. law, if it chooses and if it operates within a scope of
federal law competence, any federal law can preempt state law regardless of what the state law
says to the contrary. That simple federalism principle is sometimes not fully considered in
discussion of the interaction of federal and state law in the realm of asset-based financing. The
question of whether a federal filing or priority (or other) system displaces state law is not
initially a question ofwhat Article 9 rules provide, but a question ofwhat federal law mandates.
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The standards under which preemption occurs focus on several characteristics of the
federal rule and the overall system in which it applies, as these relate to the particular state rule
about which preemption arguments arise. For our purposes, we can state three relevant
approaches to federal preemption of state law, without delving deeply into the intricacies of
each:60
1. State law is preempted if federal law entirely occupies a field and the state
law attempts to intrude into that field. (field preemption)
2. State law is preempted if a federal law· expressly provides for such
preemption and the federal law deals with a topic to which federal law
appropriately can be applied. (express preemption)
3. State law is preempted if a state law is inconsistent with and impedes the
achievement of federal policy as expressed in federal law or regulation.
(conflict preemption)
In context ofasset-based financing and the registration and priority rules ofArticle 9 and federal
law, these three preemption analyses have been only sporadically and incompletely evaluated.
Instead, courts and commentators often focus on the language of Article 9 itself: and the scope
of its "deference" to federal law. But, of course, that is backwards. The proper discussion is to
ask 1) does federal law preempt contrary state law on this particular issue, and if it does not then
2) does state law nevertheless defer to federal rules?
It is on this latter point that there exists a difference at least in the language of revised
and original Article 9. Revised Article 9 makes it quite clear that it defers to federal systems of
registration and priority only to the extent those systems are preemptive, while the language of
original Article 9, at least as to filing and perfection rules, permits a broader interpretation,
finding deference based on the mere existence ofan applicable federal recordation system.
[3]. Copyrights
Section 205 ofthe Copyright Act provides:
Any transfer ofcopyright ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright may be
recorded in the Copyright Office ... Recordation of a document in the Copyright Office
gives all persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document, but
only if-
(1) the document, or material attached to it, specifically identifies the work to
which it pertains so that, after the document is indexed ... it would be revealed by a
reasonable search under the title or registration number of the work; and
60 See Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166 F.3d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Cybernetic Servs. Inc., 239 BR 917
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1999).
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(2) registration has been made for the work.61
The section goes on to set out priority rules with respect to "conflicting transfers" and based in
part on the timing of filing in the federal system in a manner that gives constructive notice to
third parties.
The first question relevant to preemption is whether this rule applies to security interests
in copyright. There are two aspects about the scope of this recordation statute that have
significance in this context. Initially, Section 205 permits recording of any "transfer of
copyright ownership" or of a document pertaining to copyright. A "transfer of copyright
ownership" means:
An assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance,
alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights
comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time place or effect, but
not including a nonexclusive license.62
The term "hypothecation" expressly brings security interests within the copyright law filing
system, at least for works that have been registered with the Copyright Office.63
The fact that Section 205 permits recording security interests in registered copyrights
suggests that its rules, rather than those of state law govern in such cases. This is buttressed by
the fact that copyright law provides that no state law can create rights equivalent to those under
copyright law, a statement that borders on an express "field preemption" within the scope of
copyright in addition to the express preemption embodied in Section 205 itself:64 The official
comments to original Article 9 use the Copyright Act to illustrate an alternative filing system
which would render a V.C.C. filing unnecessary or ineffective.65 That language does not appear
in the comments to revised Article 9, but this does not appear to alter the preemptive effect of
federal legislation dealing with recording, notice and, ultimately, with priority issues concerning
security interests in a manner differently than does Article 9.
Several courts have properly held that the Copyright Act supersedes VCC filing
requirements to perfect security interests in copyrights and this rule should continue to govern
under revised Article 9.66 Notice that a conclusion that copyright law governs this issue affects
not only where a registration occurs (federal as compared to state), but also what is filed
61 See 17 U.S.C. 205(a) (1988).
62 17 USC § 101.
63 See Black's Law Dictionary 742 (6th ed. 1990) ("Hypothecate" means: "To pledge property as security or
collateral for a debt. Generally, there is no physical transfer of the pledged property to the lender, nor is the lender
given title to the property; though he has the right to sell the pledged property upon default."). See also In re
Cybernetic Services, Inc., 52 USPQ2d 1683 (BAP 9th Cir. 1999).
6417USC§301.
65 U.C.C. § 9-302 cmt. 8 (Original). Notice the absence ofany reference to the Patent Act and the Lanham Act.
66 See Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Zenith Prod., Ltd. (In re AEG Acquisition Corp.), 127 B.R. 34, 40-
41 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991) (discussing perfection of a security interest in three films under a conditional sales
contract), aff'd, 161 B.R. 50 (BAP 9th Cir. 1993); In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517 (B.C. D. Ariz, 1997);
National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Savs. & Loan Assoc. (In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194,
198-204 (CD Cal. 1990) (VCC filing does not perfect an interest in copyright).
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(document specifically describing the title or the work or its registration number) and what
priority rules apply.
The case law, however, is not consistent on a what rule governs security interests in
copyrightable works for which no copyright registration occurred. As indicated above, under
Section 205, federal recording does not give constructive notice to third parties unless
"registration has been made for the work." Section 205 provides priority rules, but only with
respect to works that are recorded in a manner that gives constructive notice under the statute.
This leaves open whether the recording system preempts state law for unregistered works.
Several courts have held that state law filing does not perfect an interest in an
unregistered cOEyrightable work because the federal recording rule controls. In In re Avalon
Software, Inc., 7 for example, a Bankruptcy Court held that, in the absence of a filing in
Copyright Office records, a security interest was not perfected in software and other
copyrightable works. The basic approach of the court was that Copyright Act rules
completely preempt state filing and perfection rules, even for works lacking a copyright
registration. This point is significant in that, in the absence of a registration, no Copyright
Office filing can occur. The court emphasized that, if a creditor undertakes to obtain a
security interest in a copyrighted work, it must comply with both the Unifonn Commercial
Code and federal copyright law. That is, in order for a security interest to attach, UCC
compliance is necessary.
As to perfection rules, relying on UCC 9-302 in original Article 9, the court held that
perfection requirements are different if the property is subject to a federal statute which
requires central filing in another registry or location. The Bank had argued that if Avalon did
not register its copyrightable material or software, perfection must be made under the UCC
for such works. The court expressly rejected this argument. This would leave unregistered
coipyrights essentially unavailable for financing.
Under the Avalon approach, the burden is on the creditor to ensure registration and
proper filing. Without so doing, it holds an unperfected security interest, invalid in
bankruptcy, and has no means of avoiding this. In contrast, in Aerocon Engineering, Inc. v.
Silicon Valley Bank68 the court held that state law governs perfection of interests in
unregistered copyrights. The Aerocon court concluded that there was no federal preemption
here because the federal rules do not establish a means to perfect or to detennine the priority
of an unregistered copyright. While Avalon considered this as placing a burden on the
creditor to ensure that steps were taken to qualify under federal law, the Ninth Circuit in
Aerocon regarded the omission as leaving the perfection and priority issue to state law. Thus,
there was no field preemption, conflict preemption or express preemption, since nothing in
the Copyright Act precludes perfecting interests under state law in unregistered copyrights.
67 In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. Ariz. 1997).
68 Aerocon Engineering, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank, -- F.3d -- (9th Cir. 2002) (no preemption of state law
regarding unregistered copyrights).
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The Aerocon approach does not mean that a creditor can safely ignore copyright
recording. Whether or not a copyrighted work is registered, of course, does not reflect an
inherent character or quality of the work, but a discretionary choice by the copyright owner.
Registration of the work can occur at any time and, even under Aerocon, that step would·make
federal law applicable and preemptive.
[4]. Patents
Patent rights are created under the Patent Act and issued by the Patent Office. Thus, by
their nature, patents their ownership and control are focused around a governmental registry and
issuance system such as does not exist in copyright law where federal registration is not a
precondition to holding a copyright. This would seem to indicate that the likelihood of
preemption should be greater under patent law than under copyright. Buttressing that idea, the
Patent Act provides that:
[a]n assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date
or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage.69
Federal regulations authorize (but do not require) recording of a "mortgage, lien [or]
encumbrance" in a patent.70
Yet, the impact of these patent law rules on state law concerning filing and priority of
security interests is seemingly less than under copyright law. There are two reasons for this.
The first concerns the scope of the rule itself Notice that this patent law recording-priority rule
deals only with assignments, grants. and conveyances. These words are not necessarily self-
defining, but one way of approaching the preemption issue is to ask whether a security interest
falls within this language. Ifnot, then one could argue that there is no preemption ofa topic that
is not addressed in the Patent Act and that, therefore, unless Article 9 nevertheless defers to the
federal filing system, state law governs perfection of such a security interest.
Once this question is directly addressed, the tendency has been to focus on the term
"assignment." As a general matter, in most contexts, this term in patent law involves the
transfer of title to the patent (e.g., I assign the patent to yoU).71 The traditional importance of
title affects the relationship with Article 9 since, unlike former methods of personal property
financing which may have involved title-based mortgages and the like,72 when adopted in the
early 1960's, Article 9 specifically eschewed any reliance on questions of title, dealing
instead with a concept of a security interest as a form of personal property interest not
69 35 USC § 261 (1988).
70 37 C.F.R. 1.331(b) (1992); see also 37 C.F.R.. 1.131(b) (1992) (permitting recordation of liens that "affect the
title of the patent or invention to which it relates").
71 See In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 52 USPQ2d 1683 (BAP 9th Cir. 1999); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F3d
1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("assignment" is the conveyance of legal title in patent); Public Varieties of Miss., Inc. v.
Sun Valley Seed Co., 734 F.Supp. 250, 252 (N.D. Miss. 1990).
72 See Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
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connected to title concepts. Article 9 security interests in patents usually leave title in the
debtor or simply do not address the location of title. Because the federal recording system for
patents arguably requires only the recording of transfers of title, Article 9 filing may not be
preempted.73
That conclusion was reached by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Cybernetic
Services, Inc. 74 The question there was whether a security interest filed only in state records
was enforceable against the trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor. The court there focused on
the title-related connotations of the term "assignment" and essentially concluded that, by not
referring to security interests, the patent rule left the field of filing and perfecting security
interests regarding patents to other law, even though administrative rules might permit
recording a security interest in federal records, this was not a statutory mandate and did not
establish a preemptive effect for the patent rule.
The court also held that Article 9 Section 9-302 did not require deference to the federal
filing system by the state law filing system here. The court noted:
[The] Patent Act is not sufficiently comprehensive to exclude state methods of
perfecting security interests in patents. The Patent Act does not include security
interests within any of the scope or definition provisions. Security interests in patents
are not assignments governed by the mandatory recording records provision of
Section 261 of the Patent Act. Because the Patent Office records security interests on
a discretionary basis and such recording does not provide constructive notice, the
Patent Act registration system is insufficient to provide the sole method of perfecting
security interests in patents.
The Cybernetic conclusion has been followed by other courts. For example, in City
Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc.,75 the District Court held that "the failure of the [Patent
Act] to mention protection against lien creditors suggests that it is unnecessary to record an
assignment or other conveyance with the Patent Office to protect [a lender's] security interest
against [a lien creditor].,,76 The court also held that a D.C.C. filing perfects a security interest in
a patent.
73 The administrative rules regulating the function and operation of the Patent Office are consistent with the
conclusion that the focus of the Patent Act recording provisions is transfers of title. 37 C.F.R. 3.11(a) provides that
"assignments," accompanied by a cover sheet, will be recorded, and that "other documents" affecting title will be
recorded at the discretion of the Commissioner. Assignments are defined as transfers by a party of all or part of its
right, title and interest in a patent or patent application. 37 C.F.R. 3.1. The tenns "security interest" and "lien" are
not included in the C.F.R. provisions on patents.'
74 In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 52 USPQ2d 1683 (BAP 9th Cir. 1999).
75 City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780, 782 (D. Kan. 1988) (because Congress has not
expressly required the filing of an assignment with the Patent Office to perfect a security interest in a patent,
notwithstanding amendment to the Patent Act following the advent of modem commercial law, the Act leaves
open the area of protection against the interests of lien creditors). See also Holt v. United States, 13 UCC Rep.
Servo 336 (D.D.C. 1973) (35 U.S.C. Section 261 applies only where title has been conveyed, not to creation of a
security interest); In re Transportation Design & Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
76 Id.
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A second approach that gives state filing efficacy for patents centers on the second part
of the recording-priority rule in Section 261. That second part concerns against whom the
patent conveyance is made ineffective if not recorded in the federal system. The conveyance is
void only against a "subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration". The
court in Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packaging Corp. ,77 concluded that federal
law preempts state law filing systems, at least in part, but that Section 261 did not resolve the
question of priority between a security interest and a judgment lien creditor (or trustee in
bankruptcy). The competing claimant was not a bona fide purchaser and, therefore, could not
claim priority over the secured creditor. The court reasoned that the priority provisions in
federal patent filing give priority only to bona fide purchasers, not to all subsequent claimants
against an unrecorded interest. Under this approach, state law recording perfects against a
judgment lien creditor, but may (or may not) give protection against other parties.78
The net effect of these rulings is that an ordinary Article 9 security interest appears to be
considered outside the scope of federal preemption and, even under original Article 9, state law
deference in cases ofpatents. Perhaps left unanswered, however, is the appropriate treatment of
a security device that utilizes a conditional assignment of title, rather than a straightforward
security interest. Does the format employed alter the applicable law where, in this context, the
format does nominally involve a transfer of conditional title? Conditional assignments are
treated, for purposes of state law, as simple security interests under the doctrine that substance
prevails over form. Yet, the reason why there exists no preemption of fling rules for security
interests rests in the fact that they do not deal with title, while a conditional assignment does.
The better rule would seem to be that a federal law system designed to record and trace title to
patents should govern when the parties deal in a transaction that conveys title, albeit
conditionally and even though for other purposes state law will treat that conveyance oftitle as a
security interest.
If the cases are taken at their face value, we have a records system for patents that splits
the idea of title (federal) from the idea of security interest (Article 9). That bifurcation creates
numerous conceptual and practical problems. Some concern the question ofpriority between an
ownership transfer (federal records) and a security interest (Article 9), a topic we discuss later.
But even beyond technical priority questions, the split is cumbersome and creates uncertainty. It
contrasts to the rules developed for interfacing with other title-based records systems, such as
certificates of title for automobiles, where the perfection of the security interest must ordinarily
be made on the document that traces (records) title. In part this is because, even ifwe claim that
the separate security interest system can be independent, in fact a lender or other party is forced
to deal with both systems when they are split. Thus, for example, a lender could not safely lend
against a specific patent without confirming ownership of that patent, an exercise that requires
reference to the federal records on ownership. Logically, the two systems need to be joined into
one and, since federal law is not likely cede control ofpatent ownership to the state systems, that
one should be the patent records system.
...
77'Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packaging Corp., 143 B.R. 360, 368 (D. Md. 1992), affd, 8 F.3d 817
(4th Cir. 1993). See also In re Transportation Design & Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1985).
78 In re Transportation Design & Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 639 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
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One commentator argues that the approach of Otto Fabric, which focuses on priority,
rather than filing, strikes an appropriate balance - giving at least some efficacy to the state law
filing as against non-voluntary transferees.
There is much wisdom in the balance struck by Transportation Design and
Otto Fabric. Together, the cases recognize that Section 261 of the Patent Act
is not a secured financing statute in the modem sense, its use of the word
"mortgagee" notwithstanding. Rather, it is concerned with ownership or title
transfers, not the security interests of commercial financers. The lineage of
Section 261 is traceable back into the nineteenth century, and the statute is
hopelessly out of touch with the notice filing concept incorporated in Article
Nine of the U.C.C. which was not widely enacted until 1955 through 1965.
The Patent Act says nothing about the priority of either security interests or
judgment liens. Thus, it makes good sense to leave this issue to the state law
of Article Nine where it is specifically and carefully addressed. ... Similar
caution is appropriate before determining that Article Nine has been
preempted if the question arises whether section 261 governs a dispute
between competing security interests. Once again, a security interest in an
asset is not the equivalent of title to the asset. A secured party is not an
assignee or a mortgagee. Only Article Nine contains an extensive treatment of
secured party priority.79
[5]. Trademarks
Trademark rights can arise under either federal or state law.
State law trademarks are, for purposes of secured financing, clearly covered under
Article 9. Both original and revised Article 9 classify trademarks as· general intangibles. Under
original Article 9, license interests arising from trademarks are also general intangibles. As we
have seen earlier, however, under revised Article 9, a right to receive money stemming from a
license of intellectual property will be treated as an account.
The federal trademark system is the Lanham Act. Federal law provides for registration
and recording ofassignments under the Lanham Act. Section 10 of that Act provides:
An assignment shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser for valuable
consideration without notice, unless the prescribed information reporting the
assignment is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within 3 months after
the date ofthe subsequent purchase or prior to the assignment.80
The Act mandates a recording only with respect to assignments but permits recording of other
instrument related to trademarks at the Commissioner's discretion.
79 lC Peter F. Coogan et a!., Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code Section 25.08 [3] [b]
[iii] (1999).
80 15 USC § 1060 (1988).
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This trademark rule is similar to section 261 of the Patent Act, but even more clearly
focused on registration of "assignments" and priority with respect to purchasers. As in the
. patent context, the concept of an "assignment" generally encompasses all rights in the
trademark, including title.81 If a transaction does not transfer title, several courts have held that
a DCC filing perfects the interest because, unlike in an assignment, a security interest does not
deal with title.82 This pattern seems to state established law and creates many of the same
problems pointed out in our prior discussion of security interests in patents. A different result
may occur when the parties utilize a title-based fonnat, such as a conditional assignment which,
while merely a security interest under state law, does entail a conveyance oftitle.
In trademark financing, an additional complication arises because of peculiarities of the
substantive law of trademarks regarding "naked licenses" and "assignments in gross." To avoid
abandoning the trademark, the owner of the mark (perhaps the lender in a collateral assignment)
may be required to monitor use of the trademark to avoid ensure quality retention.83 Similarly,
the ordinary rule holds that a transfer of a mark cannot occur unless the transfer includes
relevant accompanying goodwill of the business.84 In Roman Cleanser, the Sixth Circuit
examined this issue related to the trademark of certain cleaning products. The court held that
the sale of the mark along with the fonnulas and customer lists was sufficient without including
the equipment used to make the products.85 A security interest holder must record not only its
interest in the trademark but also its interest in the "goodwill" in order to be able to foreclose on
its interest.86
[6]. Trade Secrets
Trade secret rights to control the use and disclosure of confidential infonnation arise
under state law. Thus, as a matter ofprinciple, Article 9 filing and ~riority rules govern. Trade
secret rights also fall within the category of "general intangibles." 7 As we have seen earlier,
however, under revised Article 9, a right to receive money stemming from a license of
intellectual property will be treated as an account.
One recurring difficulty in discussing financing based on trade secrets as collateral is in
distinguishing the secrets from the tangible property. Courts have difficulty in drawing this
distinction. The proper inquiry should not be with respect to the tangibility of the collateral but
with the nature of the proprietary rights claimed. If the lender wishes as part of its collateral to
81 Acme Valve & Fittings Co. v. Wayne, 386 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
82 See, e.g., Joseph v. 1200 Valencia, Inc. (In re 199Z, Inc.), 137 B.R. 778, 782 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992)
(distinguishing the statutory copyright language of Peregrine from the language of the Lanham Act); In re
Chattanooga,Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R. 792, 796, 798 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding that a U.C.C. filing perfects
a security interest in trademarks and priority governed by Article 9); In re C.C. & Co., 86 B.R. 485, 487 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1988); Creditors' Comm. ofTR-3 Indus. v. Capital Bank (In re TR-3 Indus.), 41 B.R. 128, 131 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1984); Roman Cleanser Co. v. National Acceptance Co. (In re Roman Cleanser Co.), 43 B.R. 940, 946
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984), atrd on other grounds, 802 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1986); See Red Bam, Inc. v. Red
Bam Sys., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 98 (ND Ind. 1970).
83 See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992).
84 15 USC § 1060 (1988). See Green River Bottling Co. v. Green River Corp., 997 F.2d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 1993).
85 802 F.2d at 209.
86 Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 1984).
87 See United States v. Antenna Sys., Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D.N.H. 1966).
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control the right to disclose or use the infonnation, the claim covers intangible assets describable
as trade secrets. If the lender wishes as part of its collateral to obtain possession of existing
copies, the claim covers goods.
The difficulties involved are compounded because of the possible role of copyright law
as an intervening source of rights with respect to some trade secret infonnation. While trade
secrets are not embodied in a tangible medium in a fonn that pennits copyrightability, some and
many can be so expressed. When for example, secret infonnation is expressed in a
memorandum that qualifies under copyright law for copyright protection, what framework for
establishing a security interest governs: Article 9 state law, or the preemptive provisions of
copyright law?
Properly understood, the answer lies in what aspects of the infonnation the lender
desires to control as part of its collateral. Copyright law deals with making and distributing
copies, while trade secret law deals with enforcing confidentiality even in contexts of restricted
disclosure and use. Only one court has directly addressed the problem. The court in In re
Avalon Software, Inc. 88 properly recognized that, whether registered or not, many trade secret
materials are also copyrighted works under current law. The court went on to conclude that
an unregistered computer program (a copyrighted work) could be perfected on as collateral
only through the device of complying with federal copyright law, a result later rejected by the
Ninth Circuit. The Avalon court, however, deviated from its own rule in part, holding that
state law filing covered customer lists (not asking whether the list was copyrightable) and
also covered manuals associated with the software products. The manuals certainly are
copyrighted works.
A rule that leaves to state law the issue of perfection of a security interest in an
unregistered copyright avoids this problem. However, that rule leaves the choice between
state and federal law to the discretionary actions of the debtor (or other copyright owner) on
whether it registers or does not register its copyright.
VII. Priority Issues: Intellectual Property Rights
The importance of recording regimes (whether federal or state) lies in the fact that
recording fixes or establishes the strength ofa transfer as against designated other parties, while
failure to file leaves the transferee more exposed to potential claims from such persons. Most
often, the act of recording (as contrasted to complying with an applicable statute of frauds) does
not affect rights between the two parties involved in the particular transfer. That is certainly true
with respect to Article 9, which does not require filing an interest to establish its position with
respect to the debtor and its individual creditor. Instead, recording issues typically relate to the
relationship between the recorded (or unrecorded) interest and third parties with claims to the
same property. Article 9 describes this as a question ofpriority ofrights.
Priority issues often relate to licenses. We discuss that question later. The focus here
centers on priority in intellectual property rights themselves. In the realm of using intelle~tual
property rights as collateral, there are two distinct priority questions. One relates to priorities
88 In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209 B.R. 517 (Be D Ariz 1997).
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linked to the underlying distribution ofrights themselves, and the other relates to priority among
transfers of the underlying rights.
[1]. Underlying Ownership Rules and Priority
For secured lenders, one potential source of conflict and an important priority question
comes from the relationship between the creditor's interest in intellectual property and the
underlying distribution of initial ownership created under intellectual property law without any
transfer having to occur.
Intellectual property regimes contain their own unique rules of ownership. Indeed, the
difference between ownership in intellectual property law and ownership concepts in other
fields of personal property constitutes one important difference that affects financing practice.
For example, intellectual property ownership does not hinge on physical possession or, often, on
whether property was created using the financial resources of a particular person. Indicia of
ownership, if any, are often far more obscure than in tangible goods or contract rights. A
recitation of the ownership concepts in various areas of intellectual property law would go well
beyond our scope.
However, a basic general principle relevant to lenders is important: an interest (e.g.,
security interest) sought or obtained in intellectual property ordinarily can only attain a status
consistent with the rights that the transferee (debtor) has a right to control. While copyright,
patent and trademark law, as well as Article 9, provide recording-based priority rules, all of
these deal with priority of rights among transfers or transactional interests. None deal with the
rights of the underlying property owner, except as they have been transferred. As a result, an
interest property recorded as the first record of a transfer may be entirely ineffective as against a
true underlying owner ofan property right. Consider the following illustration:
Illustration 14.4. Client Company hires software developer to create an
inventory control program for Client. The contract does not specify who owns
the program. Client has possession of the only copies of the software. Lender
makes a loan to Client, including in the collateral, the copyright in software. It
may even demand that Client register the copyright to clarify where Lender
should file.
In this illustration, a proper state or federal filing of the security interest (or both) would
suggest that Lender has a priority interest in the software. It does not. At most, it has a security
interest in the tangible copies, but it has no interest in the copyright since that interest is owned
by the software developer. The facial assurances that the recording systems coupled with the
Client's possession of a copy suggest are entirely incorrect. Client (debtor) cannot give an
interest in what it does not own and the software developer's failure previously to record its
interest does not alter its ownership rights.
A second illustration may further underscore the conceptual problems.
E-31
Illustration 14.5. Scientist, working with various other employees ofCompany
1, develops an important new method ofprocessing residue from nuclear energy
plants. The process is not patented, but is used by Company for competitive
advantage. Unknown to it, however, Company 2 discovers the same process.
Later, Scientist leaves Company 1 and creates her own company (Company 3)
based in part on the process she developed: Assume that the arrangement
between Scientist and Company 1 was not sufficient to preclude h~r subsequent
use ofthe process she developed.
Some forms of intellectual property can be co-owned by parties who have worked together or,
even, by parties entirely unaware of each other. In such cases, a security interest obtained in the
intellectual property by dealing only with one such party does not ordinarily bind the other. A
lender providing a secured loan to Company 1 in the prior illustration cannot take an
enforceable lien in the valuable process that supersedes the ownership rights of Company 2 and
the Scientist. The filing systems do not deal with that risk.
[2]. Priority Among Transfers
While one can solve issues about where to file or record simply by complying with .all of
the potentially applicable recording laws, the same cannot be said to be true with respect to rules
of priority. In intellectual property, federal and state law systems use entirely different and
conflicting priority rules.
Both original and revised Article 9 contain elaborate priority rules, the details of which
are ordinarily irrelevant to intellectual property licensing. For present purposes, the Article 9
rules can be reduced to three premises:
1. A first-filed security interest ordinarily has priority on current and after-
acquired collateral over a subsequently filed security interest or a subsequent
buyer of the collateral uriless the first filed interest consents to the
subsequent transaction (first to file rule).
2. A first-filed security interest can be ousted from priority over some after-
acquired collateral by a person who finances the debtor's acquisition of the
collateral and complies with stated notice-giving steps (purchase priority).
3. A first-filed security interest can be ousted from priority by a buyer of goods
that acquires the goods from the debtor in a sale in the ordinary course of the
debtor's business (buyer in ordinary course).
None of these rules hinge priority on whether the second party had actual notice of the first
interest (as compared to constructive notice). None of the state law rules conform to rules in
federal intellectual property law. None.
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Federal rules in trademark, patent and copyright law determine priorities based on grace
periods, actual notice, and bona fide purchase. The relevant issue thus becomes one of
determining when one rule (federal or state) governs or when the other rule (federal or state)
applies. As we have seen, this involves determining when federal law preempts and, if it does
not, determining when state law defers to federal law. A simple premise is that, if federal law
provides one result, state law cannot provide a different result in the same context.
Priority rules can be conceived of as defining a relationship the parameters ofwhich are
defined by answering two questions: ''what type ofparties are involved" and ''what rule governs
between those parties?"
[il. Copyrights
The Copyright Act rule differs from patent and trademark law. Section 205 of the
Copyright Act provides:
As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it is
recorded, in the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c),
within one month after its execution in the United States or within two months
after its execution outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in
such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise the later transfer prevails if
recorded first in such manner, and if taken in good faith, for valuable
consideration or on the basis of a binding promise to pay royalties, and without
notice of the earlier transfer.89
This rule governs between "transfers" of copyright. A transfer includes a security interest, an
assignment of cOPFght, and an exclusive license of a copyright, but does not include a non-
exclusive license.9
For conflicts between such claims, this federal rule controls and sets out a rule of "first
created" subject to a grace period "first-to-file" concept. Thus, if my transfer occurs before
yours and I file within one month after it, you are subordinate to my interest even if you file
first, paid value, and had no notice of my interest. A first-created transfer is also senior to a
subsequent transfer ifnot recorded within one month, so long as it records first.
The idea of"first-created" as governing priority interacts awkwardly with the filing rules
that lenders have used for other types of property since the 1960's adoption of Article 9. Yet,
viewed from a property-rights perspective, it has merit. If a rights owner has already transferred
its rights (in whole or in part) to another person, the subsequent transferee starts with the notion
that what was once transferred can no longer be conveyed to another person. The grace period
and recording rule can be seen as exceptions to the basic theory that an owner cannot effectively
transfer again what it already gave away.
There may be potentially significant limits on this first-created, grace period rule.
89. 17 USC § 205(d).
90 17 USC § 101.
E-33
It is not clear whether the copyright rules apply to unregistered copyrights. One can
read the priority rule as only dealing with priorities between interests in registered copyrights,
since registration is a precondition for constructive notice under the Copyright Act and the
stated rule refers to that effect as a factor in determining relative rights. On the other hand, one
can read the federal rule as applying to all copyright interests, whether or not in a registered
copyright, and giving precedence to interests in registered copyrights. The plain language ofthe
statute supports this latter result. Thus, the Peregrine court held that the Copyright Act rule
preempts the VCC rules. That is too broad, but for types of disputes actually dealt with in
Section 205, copyright law controls. Clearly, the Copyright Act controls in a conflict between a
recorded interest in a registered copyright and other transfers of that registered copyright.
Section 205 gives no guidance to settle disputes where neither transferee records it
transfer in federal records. State law should apply. As to conflicting security interests, Article 9
gives precedence to the first to be created or perfected.91
Section 205 does not resolve a conflict between two interests In an unrecorded
copyright.92 Article 9 should govern under the rules set out above.
Section 205 may not settle disputes in which one conflicting party is a bankruptcy
trustee or judgment lien creditor in a registered copyright. In such cases, arguably, the interests
acquired by the bankruptcy estate do not entail a transfer ofcopyright ownership as measured by
the terms of the Copyright Act, but focus on the rights of an creditor obtaining rights through
involuntary, judgment-enforcement processes.
[ii]. Patents and Federal Trademarks
Federal patent and trademark law contain priority rules that are similar to each other.
They provide, respectively, as follows:
Patent:
An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is
recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date
or prior to the date ofsuch subsequent purchase or mortgage.93
Trademark:
An assignment shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser for valuable
consideration without notice, unless the prescribed information reporting the
assignment is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within 3 months after
the date of the subsequent purchase or prior to the assignment.94
91 uee § 9-312 (original).
92 17 USC § 205(c)(2).
93 35 USC § 261.
94 15 USC § 1060 (1988).
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We suspect that the word "void," were it written today, would refer to a lack of priority, but
nevertheless federal law literally voids the loser's interest (as compared to merely rendering
it subordinate), suggesting that the interest has no role or influence in respect to the senior
interest.
Both trademark and patent rules deal with assignments and both provide that an
assignment is void against designated subsequent parties if it is not recorded within three
months of the assignment or before the subsequent transaction. The term "assignment"
focuses on transfers of essentially all rights; it is like a sale. As we have seen, several courts
have held that the term does not refer to a security interest in that modem security interests
do not involve a transfer of title, at least before the occurrence ofdefault and foreclosure.
Both rules give assignments priority over a subsequent "purchaser" of the patent or
trademark. Neither statute defines "purchaser." But that term is defined in the DCC. There,
it includes any person that acquires an interest in property by a voluntary transfer, including
by buying or obtaining a security interest in it.95 It is not clear whether that DCC concept
applies in these federal statutes.
Putting that issue aside momentarily, we have a "clear" rule: as a matter of federal
law, an assignment of a trademark or patent has priority over a subsequent purchaser of the
trademark or patent if there was a recording of the assignment within the three-month grace
period or in any event before the recording of the conflicting "purchase." Arguably, then,
both statutes control a conflict between a transfer of ownership (assignment) and a security
interest or other voluntary transfer of the former owner's trademark or patent (purchase).
This is consistent with the title law idea that, if a person has already sold property, it cannot
thereafter defeat or subvert that transfer by giving a further purported interest to another
person. The ownership rules trump lender rules within the scope of these statutes in
reference to intellectual property rights.
Having defined that basic premise, however, we also need to recognize the
uncertainty left by the mismatch of language between federal and state law and, more
importantly, between the two federal statutes. These otherwise similar statutes use different
language in significant respects. The differences in language suggest differences in law.
The patent law rule refers to an "assignment, grant or conveyance," while the
trademark rule refers merely to an "assignment." The term "assignment" apparently does not
include a modem security interest (although it may include a transaction set up as a conditional
assignment), but what of the other words in the Patent Act. Quite clearly, unless we assume that
the language means nothing, the patent rule covers transfers that are not covered by the
trademark rule. What transfers are these? Reported cases do not answer that question.
However, the reference to a "grant" or "conveyance", when juxtaposed to "assignment,"
suggests that the federal rule at least encompasses exclusive licenses or like transactions that are
short ofan actual assignment of the patent but may entail property rights transfers. On the other
hand, a similar logic suggests that the more limited trademark language does not go beyond
actual and complete assignments.
95 vee § 1-201 (1998 Official Text).
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The structure of both priority rules is similar in that they define a particular type of
claim (e.g., assignment) and treat its position as against designated other claims. Looking at
the second part of the two rules, the statutes also se different language in describing against
whom a filed assignment prevails. The patent rule refers to rights against "any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee", while the trademark rule refers only to rights "against" a subsequent
purchaser. Once again, while the patent rule is broader, the meaning of the difference has not
been articulated in case law.
Taking the statutes in reverse order, the federal trademark rule clearly resolves conflicts
between assignments (transfers of ownership) and subsequent purchases; it does so based on
federal filing. Thus, an assignment with a federal filing made within the grace period takes
priority over any intervening assignment in a trademark. Another assignee is clearly a
"purchaser." Yet, the tenn "purchaser" goes further. One view, consistent with commercial
usage is that a "purchaser" is any person who acquires an interest by a voluntary transaction.
Under that reading, any such voluntary transaction, including the creation of a security interest,
would seem to be subject to the federal rule that an assignee takes precedence if created or
recorded first or within the tenns of the priority statute. Courts that have held that UCC filing
perfects a security interest in a trademark also often hold that the priority disputes addressed
were governed by Article 9. While that may be true for conflicts not dealt with in federal law, it
is not true for priority conflicts between assignments of a trademark and conflicting interests of
purchasers as that tenn is used in federal law. The crux of the issue is whether the tenn
encompasses a secured lender. It should be noted, however, that even if "purchaser" includes a
secured party, the federal rule does not cover priority conflicts among two secured parties since
the federal act deals only with the rights <?f an assignee against designated purchasers.
The patent law rule is broader than the trademark rule. Clearly, it addresses the priority
of assignments (and grants and conveyances) among themselves (e.g., the priority of rights
between two assignments of the same patent.96 It also addresses rights of an assignee as against
a purchaser or a mortgagee of the patent. If "purchaser" broadly covers any voluntary
transferee, then the tenn mortgagee is redundant and inoperative, since mortgages are voluntary
transactions. Ordinarily, one should not interpret a statute in a manner that renders a part of the
statute inoperative. This argues for reading "purchaser" in a more narrow manner, perhaps
limited to assignees and exclusive licenses, treating the tenn as roughly equivalent to "buyer.".
Under such an interpretation, the federal priority rule does not apply to conflicts between an
assignee and a security interest. But that interpretation conflicts with the traditional concept that
"buyers" ofthis type ofproperty are described as "assignees" of the title to the patent.
How to cut through this is not entirely clear since we are dealing with language that is
not readily connected to modem usage and is not specifically defined in the statute or
dispositive case law. However, the basic structure of both statutes indicates an intent to govern
priority of rights between a title-based transfer of the patent or the trademark in conflict with
rights of other claimants. Without doing damage to the structure of the federal law, one view
would simply treat the references to "purchasers" as indicating that the federal rule governs the
96 Thomas v. Topco Acquisitions, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 431, 435 (ED Wis. 1991) (Even if the last purchaser of an
interest was not recorded, it has priority over prior unrecorded interests.).
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rights of a title transferee as against all other voluntary transferees, including security interests.
That view leaves lesser or different transfers governed by other law.
Neither statute expressly treats the position of either an assignment, or a security
interest, in reference to rights acquired by enforcing judgments, such as through a judicial lien,
garnishment or the like. The importance of deciding what are the rules for such potential
conflicts resides primarily in reference to dealing with the status of such claims in the event ofa
bankruptcy filing. Among the effects of a bankruptcy filing is that the bankruptcy trustee or the
debtor in possession obtain the rights ofa judgment lien creditor as of the date of the filing. 97
One inference is that federal silence on the issue does not transfer the topic to state
law, but merely leaves the question governed by a first created rule - that would elevate an
unrecorded interest over a judgment lien creditor. That result would give special treatment to
such interests that does not arise under any state law. It is not an appropriate inference.
In contrast, some reported cases treat the failure of the Patent Act to expressly address
priority between voluntary transfers and judgment liens as indicating an intent to leave that issue
to state law. Two trial court decisions hold that either filing in the patent office or under state
law protects a lender against judgment lien creditors because such parties do not qualify as
the bona fide purchasers that the federal priority rule specifically addresses.98 But the
language of neither the federal statutes nor the state law support a conclusion that creates
parallel systems from the fact of federal silence. Actually, V.C.C. section 9-302 may render
the state law filing "ineffective." The secured parties' interests would then be unperfected
unless federally filed.
The most reasonable conclusion, at least with respect to a security interest in conflict
with a judgment creditor is simply that federal law does not apply at all. A federal
registration and filing is not relevant. The issue is entirely outside the scope of federal law
and entirely within the scope of state law.
VIII. Enforceability Issues: The Nature of the Rights
While one can become entranced by the federal-state relationships that define
problematic questions about financing based on ownership rights pertaining to intellectual
property, those conflicts may be less important than are issues which require a lender(and
debtor) to understand the nature of the basic property rights and how they integrate with lending
practice.
In many respects, intellectual property is not a property right that can merely be simply
defined and used as collateral without paying attention to what needs to be done to actually
acquire and enforce the property itselfor even recognizing what is covered or not covered by the
property right.
97 11 USC § 544(a).
98 See City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 BR 780 (D. Kan. 1988); In re Transportation Design &
Technology, Inc., 48 BR 635 (Bankr. SD Cal. 1985).
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The issues are most clearly applicable in dealing with trade secrets and trademarks. In
both cases, the property right is defined not only by identifiable subject· matter, but by the
relationship between that subject matter and either the overall business of the debtor or the
network ofconfidential relationships which exists· in reference to that subject matter.
[1]. Trade Secrets
While trade secrets are property, the information involved as an alleged trade secret is
treated as property only in reference to the associated confidential and similar interests that are
established with respect to it. A piece of information is not, in itself, a protected trade secret that
constitutes property. It becomes a trade secret and a valuable property in reference to lending
transactions only in reference to actual and enforceable conditions of confidentiality associated
with it. That fact has significance for potential lenders.
Consider the following illustration:
Illustration 14.6. Debtor company manufactures rings for high school and college
graduates. It uses an automated process to make the rings which gives it a substantial
cost and price advantage over competing companies. The automated process consists of
a number of elements that are not generally known. Most Debtor employees have
agreed to non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements about Debtor's process. Lender
makes a loan to Debtor based on Debtor's tangible assets and its trade secrets. It
properly files in state and federal record systems.
When the collateral consists in whole or in part of information whose value derives from
its secret character, interests in that "property" have value only if they encompass the ability to
control and enforce that confidentiality. In Illustration 14.6, for example, the value or existence
of any lien on a secret process hinges not on the subject matter- (information), but on the
information and control of its secret nature. To effectuate the lien requires assuring the
enforceability of confidentiality restrictions and ensuring that the lender controls them in the
event ofdefault. For example, in the illustration, does the lender acquire an enforceable right to
insist on compliance with employee confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements about the
alleged secret process? If not, there may be no property covered by the lien as to that subject
matter or, at least, at most a property interest whose value can be undermined at any time by
persons against whom the lender has no resulting cause ofaction.
[2]. Trademarks
A trademark exists only in reference to enforceable rights in a name, symbol or other
enforceable mark because it is associated with a property or business activity used in
commerce.99 When split from that connection, the trademark "right" may expire.
Because of this relationship, issues associated with security interests in trademarks
include questions about whether creating or enforcing the interest of the lender does or does not
create a context in which the underlying right expire and, thus, the value of the collateral ends
99 McCarthy on Trademarks, §§ 2.15; 18.1 et. seq. (1999).
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because of the security interest. Trademark law doctrine prohibits transfers that separate the
goodwill or underlying business activity from the mark itself. In reference to assignments, this
doctrine is described as involving an "assignment-in-gross", the effect of which may be to
abandon the mark itself:100 In context of trademark licensing, a similar concept involves so-
called "naked licenses" under which the licensor fails to retain and exercise the right to control
the quality of the licensee's performance under the mark. 101
These doctrines obviously have significance in reference to licensing practice, but they
are also important in reference to secured lending. An early issue, now largely resolved,
concerned whether creating a security interest in a mark constitutes an "assignment-in-gross"?
Both logic and the result reached in the reported cases indicate that it does not. The basic
rationale is that merely creating an interest does not in itself separate the mark from the goodwill
of the business or the quality control of the mark owner. Indeed, under modem financing
practice, creating a security interest in such an intangible is likely to have virtually no effect on
the use of the mark in commerce. The rationale applies regardless of whether the parties style
their transaction as a simple security interest or as a conditional assignment. l02 At most, the
transaction involves a promise to assign or transfer in the future under stated conditions and that
promise does not constitute a present assignment-in-gross.l03
This rationale, however, does not protect the transfer that might occur when an actual
default and foreclosure occurs. Typically, at this point in the credit transaction, default results in
an actual sale (assignment) of the collateral and this transfer must comply with the underlying
rules about ensuring a continuity of connection between the mark and the underlying
goodwill. l04 Because of this, creating a security interest that covers only the mark and not any
of the business or business assets associated with the goodwill symbolized by the mark leaves
the creditor in a position from which it cannot effectively foreclose its interest without creating
an invalidating assignment-in-gross.l05
Part B. Licenses and Other Contracts as Collateral
IX. Character of Contract-Based Financing
Intellectual property rights provide one direct focus for financing, but an alternative
basis lies in using the contract rights that may arise with respect to intellectual property and,
most specifically, rights associated with licenses or assignments of information and intellectual
property. Commercial use of contract rights as collateral has widespread application in modem
financing. When brought into the context of licensing law, however, the nature of the contracts,
100 See, e.g., Marshak v. Green, 746 F2d 927 (2d Cir. 1984); Pepsico, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F2d 285 (8th Cir.
1969); Ph. Schneider Brewing Co. v. Century Distilling Co., 107 F2d 699 (10th Cir. 1939).
101 McCarthy on Trademarks § 18.48 (1999). See generally Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F2d
358 (2d Cir. 1959); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977).
102 See, e.g., In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986) (trademark security interest not an assignment
in gross). See also Restatement (Third) pfUnfair Competition § 34, comment e (1995).
103 See Gaia Technologies, Inc. v. Reconversion Technologies, Inc., 93 F3d 774 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Li'l Red Bam,
Inc. v. Red Barn Systems, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 98 (ND Ind. 1970), atrd, 174 USPQ 193 (7th Cir. 1972).
104 See, e.g., In re Roman Cleanser Co., 802 F2d 207 (6th Cir. 1986).
105 See generally Simensky, Enforcing Creditors' Rights Against Trademarks, 79 Trademark Rep. 569 (1989).
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the rights they create, and the background of federal law in which they occur all combine to
make the lending practice here unique.
T'o set the context for the following discussion, it is important to clearly indicate the
nature of the financing structure in the context of contract-based financing. In broad tenns,
this breaks down into two distinct financing practice fonnats.
• The first deals with the transferor's use for financing purposes of rights it acquires
under a contract, most frequently this focuses on the transferor's (licensor) right
to receive payments from the transferee (licensee). The financing arrangement
occurs when the right to receive payment is transferred to a third party (lender,
buyer) as a means ofconverting a future payment into present cash.
• The second format occurs where the transferee (licensee) is the debtor. In this
context, the licensee will use its contractual rights as a basis for obtaining funding
from a third party (lender). Sometimes, the contract rights may be the only
collateral, but more often they form one part of the collateral, perhaps having
significance primarily because the licensed rights are important to maintaining the
value and operational capacity ofother property.
These two different formats entail markedly different legal issues.
x. Licensor's Interest as Collateral: Cash Flow from Contracts
Cash flow from contracts can come from a variety of underlying agreements. When
the cash obligations arise from the sale of goods or services, state law (most often Article 9)
governs. For cash flow from licenses or assignments, whether treated in the agreement as a
fonn of royalty or as a deferred purchase price payment, also presents potentially significant
and valuable collateral. In dealing with that collateral, however, several legal issues arise
that are relatively unique to this context.
[1]. What Law Applies: Federal Law
As we have seen, the three primary federal intellectual property rights regimes have
recording or filing rules that apply to certain transactions relating to intellectual property
rights. The better view is that none of these statutes applies to interests taken in contractual
obligations or rights, such as a right to receive royalty payments. The statutes, by their own
tenns and by their context deal only with interests in the intellectual property; the right to
payments resulting from a transaction in reference to that property is not equivalent to a
property right in the intellectual property.
This result seems perfectly clear with respect to patent and trademark law, where the
recording rules deal with "assignments" or other conveyance of the property. It should also
be clear with respect to copyright law where the recording statute deals only with transfers of
copyright ownership.l06 These statutes deal with recording title to the property and not with
106 17 USC 101.
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priority of rights in contractual obligations, even if associated with use or conveyance of the
property. But in the copyright context, two lower court rulings place this simple conclusion
under a cloud.
Among other issues, the court in In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd.,107 dealt with
questions about proper filing of security interests in the contract rights (licenses) associated with
the intellectual property. Without substantial discussion or sufficient analysis, it held that one
must file in the Copyright Office to perfect a security interest in a nonexclusive license
involving a c0fsyrighted work. Peregrine was followed on this issue by In re Avalon
Software, Inc. l 8 After holding that copyright law governed filing regarding unregistered or
registered copyrights, the court extended this analysis to include the proceeds of those
copyrights. This included all licenses from the software (as compared to service contract
receivables). If the claim to these contract rights had been solely as proceeds, the court's
conclusion here would be a follow-up from its analysis of the copyright-state law interface.
In fact, however, the security interest also claimed the contract rights as direct collateral.
While the court did not discuss this, by wrongly extending the copyright analysis to the
contract rights, it in effect indicates that one must perfect on licenses and on license proceeds
in the Copyright Office, a decision consistent with the Peregrine case, but at odds with the
scope and character of copyright filing structure which deals solely with property rights
transfers. Of course, as we have seen, a later court rejected the Avalon analysis as applied to
unregistered copyrights and, presumably, would also have rejected that court's analysis
concerning license proceeds, at least with respect to licenses ofunregistered copyrights. 109
The better view is that, while recording in federal records may be necessary to ensure
priority or validity of rights in the underlying intellectual property when a transfer occurs,
that filing has no association with establishing or enforcing the interests of a third party
transferee of the cash flow that comes from a transfer. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Broadcast
Music Inc. v. Hirsch 110 reached the better result when it held that a contractual assignment of
royalties to creditors need not recorded under the Copyright Act. As the court analyzed this
case, even though the assignment conveyed the significant beneficial interest associated with
the copyright, the contract was not an assignment of the copyright, ,but of a contractual right
to receive royalties. That being true, state law controlled and, in this case, did not require a
filing to fully enforce the assignment.
This result creates a bifurcation of legal coverage that is common in relationship to
title-based systems. Simply stated, the effect of a transaction in reference to establishing
ownership or other property interests in the underlying intellectual property itself is governed
by the property-rights law, while the effect of a transfer of the contract and rights under it to
a third party is otherwise governed by other law.
107In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 Bankr. 194 (CD Cal. 1990).
109 Aerocon Engineering, Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank, 244 BR 149 (Bankr. ND Cal. 1999) (no preemption of state
law regarding unregistered copyrights).
110 Broadcast Music Inc. v. Hirsch, F3d 41 USPQ2d 1373 (9th Cir 1997) (assignment ofroyalties to creditors need
not recorded under copyright act provisions; this was not assignment of a copyright even though it, in effect,
conveyed beneficial interest in the copyright).
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[2]. What Law Governs: State Law
A wrong holding that federal law applies to some transfers of contractual rights
associated with copyrights, patents or trademarks would, of course, create preemption questions
like those discussed earlier. For present purposes, however, we will assume that perfection and
enforcement of interests in contractual rights to receive royalty or other payments are governed
by state, rather than federal law.
Given this assumption, the basic question of applicable law thus becomes a question of
whether the transaction is governed by Article 9 or by general state common law and statutes.
The answer to this question changed dramatically under Revised Article 9, with the effect of
placing most forms of cash flow financing associated with licenses under the governance of
Article 9.
Subject to two relevant exceptions we will discuss shortly, original Article 9 applies to
security interests in accounts and general intangibles, and to sales of accounts and chattel
paper.111 Since this version of Article 9 defines accounts to include only rights to receive
payment for the sale or goods or services, payments made pursuant to a license of information
are treated as "general intangibles", rather than accounts. 112 The effect is that, under original
Article 9, transactions involving financing of a licensor (or assignor) based on the cash flow
from licenses is within Article 9 if the transaction ttntails a security interest, but not if the
transaction involves a sale of the contract rights to a third party.
Ofcourse, the reason why this is significant comes from the fact that, in cash-flow based
financing, sales and security interests are often treated as interchangeable since negotiated
agreements can use either framework to achieve the same or at least similar economic results.
Because of this co.mmercial reality, one goal of revised Article 9 was to expand the coverage of
transactions involving sales of cash flow as a form of financing. It does so in two ways, both of
which affect practice in reference to intellectual property contract rights.
Initially, as discussed earlier, Revised Article 9 redefines the term "account" to
expressly include rights to payment for "property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed,
assigned or otherwise disposed of'. 113 This expressly covers licenses. It yields more than just a
change in language.114 The scope of Revised Article 9, like that of original Article 9 includes
sales of accounts.115 That term now includes transactions that entail a sale of cash flow rights
111 vee § 9-102 (Original).
112 vee § 9-106 (Original). See In re SSE International Corp., 198 B.R. 667 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (settlement
agreement that represented amounts due under license agreement was a general intangible for pmposes of Article
9; it was not covered by a security agreement referring to "accounts").
113 vee § 9-102(a)(2) (Revised).
114 The language change, however, is also important for practice after July 2001, the effective date of Revised
Article 9 because it means that security agreements that refer solely to "accounts" after that date may include in
their scope the proceeds of licenses, while agreements that refer solely to "general intangibles" after that date may
not include licenses. Compare In re SSE International Corp., 198 B.R. 667 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (settlement
agreement that represented amounts due under license agreement was a general intangible for putposes of Article
9; it was not covered by a security agreement referring to "accounts").
115 vee § 9-109(a)(3) (Revised).
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arising out of license agreements. The tenn also includes property that has been assigned, thus
arguably also bringing within Article 9 any transaction that involves a sale of a cash flow right
arising out ofan assignment ofa copyright, patent or the like.
The second expansion involves the tenn "payment intangible." This tenn means a
general intangible in which "account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation.,,116
Revised Article 9 applies to security interests in and sales ofpayment intangibles.
The assumption under Revised Article 9 should be that all transactions involving
monetary obligations are within the scope ofArticle 9 unless pulled out by an express exception
or by a misapplied concept of preemption. Under original Article 9, it might have been better
practice to make that same assumption, but as a matter of law original Article 9 does not apply
to sales of monetary obligations arising out of a license or assignment of intellectual property.
Indeed, this latter conclusion was one factor that resulted in one court holding that an
assignment of contract royalty rights was outside Article 9 and was perfected without the need
for recording in either federal or state systems.117
The broad coverage in both versions ofArticle 9 of financing based on contract rights is
cut back in limited fashion by state-law exceptions from the scope of Article 9 unrelated to
federal preemption issues. The exceptions, as stated in Revised Article 9 are as followS: 118
• A sale ofaccounts or payment intangibles as part ofa sale ofthe business out
ofwhich they arose.
• An assignment of accounts or payment intangibles which is for the purposes
ofcollection only.
• An assignment of a right to payment to an assignee that is also obligated to
perfonn under the contract.
• An assignment of a single account or payment intangible to an assignee in
full or partial satisfaction ofa preexisting debt.
These exceptions take the entire transaction out of Article 9, leaving questions about priority,
enforceability and other matters to ge:peral common law or other applicable statutes. They
replicate exceptions under original Article 9.119 The obvious purpose is to keep Article 9
applicability away from certain transactions that are not involved in financing the transferor-
debtor.
116 vee § 9-102(a)(61) (Revised).
117 Broadcast Music Inc. v. Hirsch, 41VSPQ2d 1373 (9th eir 1997).
118 vee § 9-109(d) (Revised).
119 vee § 9-104(f) (Original).
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[3]. Perfecting an Interest
For transactions to which it applies, both original and revised Article 9 typically require
filing in relevant state records systems in order to perfect an interest in contract rights to receive
payment, whether characterized as accounts or general intangibles. 12o Both versions ofArticle 9
contain elaborate rules delineating which office in which state is the appropriate place to file.
Under Revised Article 9, filing with respect to corporate debtors will typically be in the state
where the corporation is incorporated, while under original Article 9, the appropriate state for
filing with respect to corporate debtors ordinarily is the state in which the debtor's chief
executive office is located.12l
Both versions ofArticle 9, however, permit some interests to be perfected without filing.
The relevant rules are substantially the same in both versions. Revised Article 9 provides:
[No filing is required to perfect an interests in] an assignment of accounts or payment
intangibles which does not by itselfor in conjunction with other assignments to the same
assignee transfer a significant part of the assignor's outstanding accounts or payment
intangibles122
This rule, of course, permits the creation of hidden, unrecorded interests that will have priority
under Article 9 over later transfers. 123
[4]. Contractual Restrictions on Transferring Cash Flow
As a general rule, parties to a contract have the right to contractually limit the persons
with whom they are willing to deal. Nevertheless, for transactions within the scope ofArticle 9,
that right is precluded with respect to transfers ofpayment rights.
Under Article 9, terms that require consent, that prohibit, or otherwise condition the
right of the party receiving payments to transfer that right to another party are generally
rendered unenforceable and without anyeffect. 124 This rule applies even if the remainder of the
contractual relationship is nontransferable because of the personal nature of the services
required of the transferor or for other reasons.
This rule of invalidation originated in original Article 9. Its impact on licensing and
related practice, however, will be far more significant under revised Article 9 because of the
broader scope of revised Article 9, including its application to sales of the right to receive
payments under a license. The comments to the relevant Article 9 provision indicate that
clauses conditioning transfers of payments streams are entirely ineffective, but they invite the
courts to recognize that other terms affecting the handling of cash within a relationship are not
120 vee §§ 9-308(a); 9-310(a) (Revised).
121 vee § 9-307(e) (Revised); vee § 9-103(3) (Original).
122 vee § 9-309(2) (Revised); vee § 9-302(1)(e) (Original).
123 Revised Article 9 also provides that no filing is required to perfect a sale ofa payment intangible. The apparent
distinction between a sale and an assignment is not explained in the statute.
124 vee § 9-406(d) (Revised); vee § 9-318 (Original).
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rendered invalid even if they may make assignment of a right to a cash flow difficult. For
example, a requirement that the licensor set-aside funds received in a fonn of reserve would be
enforceable, even though it might make any transfer of the right to payment valueless.
XI. Licensee Interest: Licensed Rights as Collateral
The circumstances become materially more complicated if a lender obtains a security
interest in technology or processes that the debtor holds under a license from a third party. The
threshold question in such cases centers on whether the debtor (licensee) holds any transferable
interest to which the security interest can attach.
[1]. Assignability in General
As a basic premise, while modem financing law does not depend on questions about title
or ownership, for something of value to serve as collateral for a loan, that something must in
principle be transferable, at least to the extent that admits of the creation ofa security interest.
As a general rule, the assignability of a license or similar contract will be judged under
state law. State law ordinarily pennits transfers of a contract right without consent of the other
party unless the transfer will have a material, adverse effect on the other party or the contract
itself precludes transfer. This rule governs many contracts pertaining to infonnation and
intellectual property rights. In the absence of contrary contractual tenns, it ordinarily precludes
transfer only special cases such as where the transfer would expose confidential material or
would jeopardize a party's expectation that a particular individual or group would actually
perfonn the contract in the sense that the contract is of a personal nature and "the perfonnance
depends upon a special relationship, special knowledge, or a unique skill, upon which the
other party is entitled to rely.,,125 The court in In re Sentry Data, Inc.,126 applying Minnesota
law, concluded that the exclusive license to market software did not create such a
relationship, because perfonnance of the contract did not depend on special action by the
licensee and did not involve any obligation to protect trade secrets, but merely an obligation
to market a product.
An entirely different background rule governs a licensee's interest in a nonexclusive
license of federal intellectual property. In this context, cases routinely conclude that the
licensee's contractual interest is not transferable unless the licensor consents to the transfer.127
Applying a federal law policy derived by case law, rather than statute, courts routinely
emphasize that a nonexclusive license is a limited conveyance that does not establish sufficient
rights to enable the transferee to make a reconveyance without pennission of the licensor. This
result flows in part from the concept that a non-exclusive license is personal in nature. 128 In
125 In re Rooster, 100 BR 228 (Bankr. ED Pa. 1989)(Pennsylvania law).
126 In re Sentry Data, Inc., 87 BR 943 (Bankr. ND Ill. 1988).
127. See Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306-07 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929
(1973); PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp., 597 F2d 1090 (6th Cir.), cert. den., 444 US 930 (1979);
Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1984) (copyright); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71
B.R. 686, 688-89 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987) (patent).
128. See Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 787 F.2d 655, 658 (D.C.Cir.1986) (nIt is well settled that a non-exclusive
licensee of a patent has only a personal and not a property interest in the patent and that this personal right cannot
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addition, as described by the court in Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrax Corp. (In re CFLC,
Inc.),129 a case dealing with a non-exclusive patent license, allowing "free assignability... of
nonexclusive patent licenses would undennine the reward that encourages invention because
a party seeking to use the patented invention could either seek a license from the patent
holder or seek an assignment of an existing patent license from a licensee. In essence, every
licensee would become a potential competitor with the licensor-patent holder in the market
for licenses under the patents." The rule against transferability is a preemptive federal law
rule. 130
[2]. Revised Article 9: Creating Interests in Licensee Rights
While the rule against transferability rests on a federal law policy and cannot be
changed by state law, Revised Article 9 purports to provide a state law financing rule that
allows some use of licensee interests as collateral even without the assent of the licensor.
These new provisions are premised on a purported distinction between transfer on the
one hand and the mere creation or perfection of a security interest on the other. Section 9-
408 of Revised Article 9 invalidates both contractual restrictions and rules of law that
preclude or condition the creation or perfection of a security interest in a general intangible,
including a license. The provision regarding any contrary rule of law reads as follows:
A rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of
a government [or an] account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a
security interest in, a ... general intangible, including a contract, pennit, license, or
franchise between an account debtor and a debtor, is ineffective to the extent that the
rule of law ...
(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest;
or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest
may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense,
. . 'gh f .. d 131tennlnatlon, n t 0 tennlnatlon, or reme y ...
be assigned unless the patent owner authorizes the assignment or the license itself permits assignment.");
Stenograph Cotp. v. Fulkerson, 972 F2d 726, 729 n. 2 (7th Cir.1992) ("Patent licenses are not assignable in the
absence of express language."); Rock-ala Manufacturing Cotp. v. Filben Manufacturing Co., 168 F.2d 919, 922
(8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 335 U.S. 855-6, 69 S.Ct. 134, 93 L.Ed. 403 (1948); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1114 (De1.1985) (rights conveyed by nonexclusive patent license are personal to
licensee and not susceptible to sublicensing unless specific permission given).
129 Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrax Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996).
130 But see Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp. (The court did not contest the relevance of the basic
federal policy, but noted that Chapter 11 presumes a continuation of the prior debtor, albeit under a different legal
structure. Viewed in this manner, in a Chapter 11 case at least, unless the debtor proposes to transfer the license to
a new party, the risks involved in the federal policy are not presented. The license enters the bankruptcy estate.).
See also Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F3d 608 (1st Cir. 1995).
131 UCC § 9-408(c) (Revised). It should be noted that, while this discussion emphasizes the effect of this rule on
non-transferable licensee interests, the rule itself applies with equal force to any limit on transferability of the
licensor's rights (other than the right to receive payment, which is fully allowed to be transferred.
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Quite obviously, this rule cannot over-ride federal law, if applicable. Thus, the focus of the
rule properly understood deals with two issues. The first is to create, under state law, the
broadest possible reach for attaching a security interest. Contrary state laws and contractual
agreements cannot prevent the creation or attachment of a security interest. Secondly, the
provisions of this section create a basis for arguing that the federal rule only precludes an
actual transfer to a third person, not merely the creation of an inert right. In effect, the
argument is that the federal rule (or contract term) might be implicated in any eventual effort
to foreclose on and sell the license interest, but that it does not come into play at the level of
mere creation of the interest.
Under revised Article 9, if the contract term or the other rule of law preventing or
conditioning transfer would be enforceable were it not for the new Article 9 invalidation rule,
then the extent of the invalidation under Article 9 is quite limited. Section 408 sets out six
express limits on its rule and what the creditor can do with the interest it can create despite
contrary contract or legal terms. These include that the interest created in the licensee's
interest:
• is not enforceable against the licensor
• does not impose duties or obligations on the licensor
• does not require that the licensor render any performance to the lender
• does not entitle the lender to use or assign the licensee's rights under the license
• does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or have access to any
trade secrets or confidential material, and
• does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest132
Overall, then, what is created under Revised Article 9 is a non-waivable, non-
alterable right to create a security interest in a license, but only to create and perfect the
interest, not to enforce it. This is a passive property right whose value may not be
immediately apparent. That value emerges, however, when one considers that creating the
security interest gives the lender a right to the proceeds of any sale of its collateral. Thus, if
the license were sold (for example, as part of a liquidation of a bankruptcy estate), the
lender's lien would attach to the proceeds of sale and, like any other security interest, would
take priority over unsecured creditor and ownership interest. That, indeed, is the primary
intended effect of the rule.
132 vee § 9-408(d) (Revised).
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XII. Priority Issues and Licenses
When two or more parties claim an'interest in a single asset, in this case, a license or
other contractual right, the resulting legal issue is treated in modem commercial finance law
as a question of resolving priority of rights in that asset. We previously discussed priority
issues focused on ownership claims and the role of federal law in that context. Here we
focus on the relationship of priority questions associated with contractual rights. Yet, even
so, we will have to deal with questions about the role ofownership.
The easiest contest to understand involves a fact setting in which two persons claim a
direct interest in contractual rights of a debtor. Here, the issue does not seem to depend on
whether the debtor is licensor or licensee in the particular contracts. Under either
assumption, the core issue centers on whether the priority conflict is resolved under federal
or state law. That, in tum, depends on what type of contracts are involved, what rights are
claimed as collateral in reference to that contract, and as previously discussed what is the
scope of the particular federal recording rule involved.
In general, the three primary federal statutes do not deal with security interests or
other transfers of rights in a contract. Properly understood, the federal statutes primarily
concern priority of rights in property which rights may be transferred by contract. For
example, consider the following:
Illustration 14.7. Trademark Owner enters into a contract to assign its mark
to Buyer-I. Subsequently, Trademark Owner enters into a second contract to
assign the same mark to Buyer-2. In addition, Trademark Owner has security
agreements with Lender 1 and Lender 2, both of which cover contracts with
respect to the mark, but do not purport to create any security interest in the
mark itself.
When the issue concerns a conflict over ownership of an intellectual property right, the
federal priority rules may apply. As we have seen, those rules give precedence to the first
transfer to be made, so long as it is recorded within a stated grace period. Federal law of that
type would control in any conflict between Buyer-I and Buyer-2, both of whom, in separate
contracts, sought to purchase the mark. This is a question concerning property rights, not
priority of claims to contract rights.
In contrast, in Illustration 14.8, Lender 1 and Lender 2 have an interest in the debtor's
contract rights. A conflict over who has precedence with respect to, for example, rights to
payment under the contract with Buyer-I should be resolved under state law. That conflict
does not concern ownership of the trademark, but a conflict of claims to rights under the
particular contract.
As we previously discussed, however, two lower courts have held that copyright law
recording rules cover not only the property rights dispute, but also this latter question about
perfection and priority with reference to the contract rights. When placed into a context
dealing with priority rules, this result if it stands has great significance. The Article 9 priority
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rule with resEect to the contract right dispute gives priority to the first lender to file or perfect
its interest. 1 3 The property law rule deals with the issue differently. We believe that the
Article 9 rule should apply to the disputer between lenders over rights to the rights contained
in a contract, but given the presence of two lower court rulings in the field of copyright law,
the potential of a contrary result cannot be dismissed.
Another type of priority conflict that affects licenses involves the mixed context in
which ownership interests are involved and the conflict pertains to the rights of the licensee
(or other transferee) against the other interest holder. If the transferee takes an ownership
interest and the contract pertains to a transfer of ownership in a fonn covered by federal law
recording rules, then the conflict will be resolved based on the federal priority rule. For now,
however, we will assume that the transaction is a license of a type not directly covered by the
federal priority rules we have already discussed.
The Copyright Act Section 205(e) provides that a no.n-exclusive license, whether
recorded or not, prevails over a conflicting transfer of copyright ownership if the license is in
a written instrument signed by the rights owner and either:
• the license was taken before the conflicting ownership transfer was executed; or
• the license was taken in good faith before the recordation of the transfer and
without notice of it. 134
This rule, which has not been extensively litigated, has several important implications
for financing that pertains to copyright interests and licenses. In understanding the
significance of these, it is important to recall that the copyright law concept of a "transfer of
ownership" includes a security interest. Thus, Section 205(e) arguably states priority law as
between a secured party and a licensee, displacing any contrary state law.135
First, copyright law rule confinns a limited, but important principle of first in time (or
first to occur). In effect, a transferee of copyright ownership takes subject to existing, written
non-exclusive licenses, even though not recorded. That rule, however, does not apply to
licenses that are not in writing. The omission could mean several things. For example, one
could simply argue that the issue was left to state law. While a possible argument, the more
natural implication of the statutory language is that the unsigned or oral contract does not
prevail over even a subsequent transfer of copyright ownership.
What about licenses taken after the transfer of ownership? The Copyright Act section
gives only limited protection to such interests. The prevail.over the ownership transfer only
if taken in good faith and in writing before recordation of the transfer. These limited
protection seems to confirm the converse assumption that, after a recorded transfer of
ownership, licenses take subject to that recorded transfer. In effect, the nonexclusive license
133 uee § 9-322 (Revised); uee § 9-312(5) (Original).
134 17 USC § 205(e).
135 As discussed earlier, there is a disagreement in courts over whether the primary copyright law priority rule
applies to unregistered copyrights, but the language of205(e) seems less conditioned on the recording rules.
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gives rights only if obtained from the record owner of the copyright or its authorized agent
and, then, only under a concept ofconsent or authorization.
These rules do not, of course, apply patents or trademarks and licenses in them and do
not apply to interests in intellectual property arising solely under state law. With reference to
the federal intellectual property, however, it is likely that the rules of Section 205(e) would
be inferred from the nature of a title-based system, except perhaps for the requirement of a
writing to document the prior license.
What role remains for state law on this issue? Clearly, state law rules apply to purely
state law interests. In addition, in the patent and trademark context, it is possible that state
law, rather than an inference from the nature of the title records system should control in
order to fit this area of practice more smoothly into general commercial law. That is an
especially strong argument when, as in trademark and patent law, there is no clear treatment
of transactions involving less than a full sale of the right.
The issue has special importance under Revised Article 9 since that statute adopts a
rule regarding licenses that conflicts with the approach seemingly taken in the Copyright Act.
Section 9-321 creates a new concept of "licensee in the ordinary course of business" and
provides that such a licensee, under a non-exclusive license takes free of any security interest
in the underlying property rights even if that security interest is perfected and the licensee
knows that it exists.
This rule comes from a model created in original Article 9 for transactions in goods
and reflects a concept of bona fide purchaser protection applicable to cases where an actual
transfer of possession or potential thereof gives indicia of ownership that are protected in the
general marketplace. As applied to licenses, one wonders about whether its underlying
concept applies, even if copyright law were to allow states to create rules contrary to its rules.
Transfers of intangibles and right therein often do not bear the same indicia of rights that
accompany possession and delivery of a tangible item.
Revised Article 9 contains a lengthy description of a licensee in the ordinary course
of business. This definitions makes clear that the concept refers to a transferee for value and
in good faith who acquires the license in the ordinary course of the licensor's business.
Furthennore, the "person becomes a licensee in the ordinary course if the license ...
comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the licensor
is engaged or with the licensor's own usual or customary practices.,,136
As this indicates, an alternative justification for this priority rule focuses on a fonn of
implied consent on the part of the secured party. Thus, in the goods world, a lender who
takes as collateral the goods inventory of the debtor knows and implicitly consents to the fact
that the debtor will try mightily to sell those goods and that the buyers should take from of
the interest. The analogy here makes sense in a retail context where one deals with mass-
market world, but it strains somewhat in a world where intangibles mayor may not be
136 vee § 9-321(a) (Revised).
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licensed to others. Of course, however, Article 9 applies its rule only if the debtor/ licensor is
in the business of licensing intellectual property of the kind.
Part C. Bankruptcy Issues
XlV. Rights and Goodwill As Assets
The bankruptcy estate consists of all property owned by the debtor at the time of the
bankruptcy petition and any property acquired by the estate after the filing. 11 USC § 541.
Post-petition rights engendered from pre-petition property become property of the estate
(e.,g., royalties earned from pre-petition copyrighted works). There is an exception for post-
petition value obtained through personal services of the individual who is the debtor.
• Cusano v. Klein, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 2001). Assets of songwriter's estate
consisted of copyrights in songs he authored and rights to receive royalties based on
pre-petition use of the songs. Plan that abandoned "songrights" at confirmation of
bankruptcy plaw place them back in debtor's control, giving him the right to sue for
any post-petition royalties. Pre-petition royalties, however, were not properly listed
in the bankruptcy filing, which referred only to "songrights of unknown value, and
thus did not revert back to debtor. "Songrights" could reasonably be interpreted to
mean copyrights and rights to royalty payments, and while it would have been more
helpful for debtor to break down description by naming songs, albums, and royalty
agreements, such details would not have revealed anything that was otherwise
concealed.
Debtor's open book account claim under California law for royalties owed in
connection with songs he had written accrued for bankruptcy purposes, and thus was
required to be scheduled as a receivable or a cause of action after debtor filed Chapter
11 bankruptcy petition, to extent that sums were owed on account at time he filed his
petition, as an action could have been brought for those sums at that time. Debtor's
failure to schedule as asset open book account cause of action under California law
for prepetition royalties owed in connection with songs he had written prior to filing
of bankruptcy petition, or other claims for prepetition royalties, resulted in claims
being vested in bankruptcy estate, and thus deprived debtor of standing to assert such
a claim following confirmation of Chapter 11 plan.
• In re Prince, 85 F.3d 314 (7th Cir. 1996) (Value of stock of Chapter 11 debtor's
incorporated orthodontics practice included the goodwill of the practice and was not
generally excluded from the estate by the statutory exclusion for personal earnings
post petition. This was true even though the professional corporation did not have
contractual guarantee that debtor would not leave practice and compete with it as
debtor's assets were valued at time plan was confirmed when debtor owned stock
himself and was not likely to compete with himself. The goodwill could be
transferred by covenants not to compete and other devices. In this case, however, the
value could not include the value of the doctor's future personal services because 11
USC 541(a)(6) excludes this. "In an important sense, however, Dr. Prince's goodwill
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is unlike his skills, his schooling, or his dental license. These components of Dr.
Prince's human capital can only manifest their value by increasing the worth of his
future labors. Dr. Prince's innate physical ability, his personality, or his professional
degree increase the market value of his services, but they cannot be sold to another
orthodontist; they have value only as attributes of Dr. Prince. On the other hand, Dr.
Prince's goodwill, like the practice's physical equipment, can be sold and transferred,
and once sold and transferred can generate value for another orthodontist. Although
the mechanism of using his best efforts to transfer his patients' loyalties to Dr. Clare
and then securing the transfer with a covenant not to compete is not as simple as
signing over title to a physical asset, the functional effect is the same. ... Thus, Dr.
Prince's goodwill is not intrinsically part of his human capital, but rather is a separate
intangible capital asset of the practice, like a trademark would be.")
• Shanno v. Magee Indus. Enter., Inc., 856 F.2d 562, 566 (3d Cir.1988) (In most
cases, liquidation value is only an appropriate estimation of stock worth where a
company is dissolving. In dissolution, liquidation distributions are the only
foreseeable future cash flows to the shareholder, and thus liquidation value is an
accurate tool for measuring the stock's present value. On the other hand, where a
business is expected to continue as a going concern, the company's expected future
earnings from operations often far exceed the liquidation value of the company's
physical assets.
• In re FitzSimmons, 725 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.1984) Involved an individual
attorney operating his practice as a sole proprietorship, a situation quite analogous to
Dr. Prince and his wholly owned professional corporation. The attorney,
FitzSimmons, objected to being directed to pay any of his practice's future profits to
his creditors as part of a Chapter 11 reorganization, arguing that the profits were
excluded from the bankruptcy estate by § 541(a)(6). The Ninth Circuit held:
FitzSimmons is thus entitled to monies generated by his la w practice only to the .
extent that they are attributable to personal services that he himself performs. To the
extent that the law practice's earnings are attributable not to FitzSimmons' personal
services but to the business' invested capital, accounts receivable, good will,
employment contracts with the firm's staff, client relationships, fee agreements, or the
like, the earnings of the law practice accrue to the estate.
• In re Andrews, 80 F.3d 906 (4th Cir. 1996). Chapter 7 debtor sought to exclude from
debtor's estate all postpetition payments due debtor under noncompetition agreement.
Held: postpetition payments to debtor pursuant to noncompetition agreement were not
"earnings from services performed," and thus, payments could not be excluded from
bankruptcy estate. According to the majority, this result would hold even if the no-
compete contract were treated as executory because payments were plainly rooted in,
and grew out of, debtor's prepetition sale of debtor's share in ready-mix concrete
business. Forebearance (e.g., non-competition, was not treated as later personal
services. "Pre-petition assets, like the NCA payments, are those assets rooted in the
debtor's pre- petition activities, including any proceeds that may flow from those
assets in the future. These assets belong to the e~tate and ultimately to the creditors.
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Post-petition assets are those that result from the debtor's postpetition activities and
are his to keep free and clear of the bankruptcy proceeding.")
• Non-Compete in connection with sale of assets is treated as a means of conveying
and preserving the goodwill. Payments on them will be treated as assets associated
with the sale and thus, with pre-petition activity.
o Unsecured Creditor's Committee v. Prince (In re Prince), 127 B.R. 187, 192
(N.D.IIl.I991) (holding that agreement not to compete provided in
conjunction with sale ofbusiness is agreement not to undermine value of good
will that has been sold)
o In re Mid-West Motors, Inc., 82 B.R. 439 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1988) ("Such
[non-competition] provisions are necessary to secure the goodwill purchased
by the buyer of the business.").
• Casey v. Hochman, 963 F.2d 1347 (10th Cir. 1992) (Patent on device invented by
debtor after filing of his original Chapter 11 petition, as well as any income derived
from patent, were assets of debtor individually and excluded from property the
estate.)
• In re Tudor Motor Assoc., 102 B.R. 936, 948 (D.N.J.1989) ("franchisee's contractual
rights in a Franchise Agreement are generally considered property of the estate,
except where said agreements have been effectively terminated prior to a debtor's
filing.")
• Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 1998)
(Under Pennsylvania law, "[t]he ownership of a trade-mark has, in general, been
considered as a right of property." "Trademarks are property, and franchises are
licenses to use such property. Thus, under Pennsylvania law, these franchises are
interests in property, and as such are property of the estate under section 541."
• Trademarks and Bankruptcy Generally
o Stuart M. Riback, The Interface ofTrademarks and Bankruptcy, J. Proprietary
Rts., June 1994, at 2
o David M. Jenkins, Licenses, Trademarks, and Bankruptcy, Oh My!:
Trademark Licensing and the Perils ofLicensor Bankruptcy, 25 J. Marshall
L.Rev. 143, 155-59 (1991)
o Richard Lieb, The Interrelationship of Trademark Law and Bankruptcy Law,
64 Am. Bankr.L.J. 1, 35-38 (1990).
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xv. Sales of Rights in Bankruptcy
Section 363 allows the sale of assets of the estate, either in the ordinary course of
business or otherwise with the approval of the court. 11 USC § 363.
• In re Cult Awareness Network, Inc., 151 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1999) The court held that
an anti-cult organization that objected to the sale of its trade-name, in its Chapter 7
case, to alleged affiliate of a church believed by organization to be cult, lacked
standing to object to that sale. In the Chapter 7 case, the debtor had no pecuniary
interest in the trade-name. There were, according to this court, no exceptions to
pecuniary interest standing rule for debtor's Lanham Act and First Amendment
claims.
• In re Gucci, 126 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1997). Court held that a buyer at a bankruptcy sale
of assets including trademarks was a good faith buyer even though evidence indicated
that it intended to reject licenses and perhaps destroy the transferred trademark.
"There is no question that some consequences of this sale are unsettling. As a result
of it, several businesses that have made substantial investments to develop a market
for Paolo Gucci goods will suffer. However, contrary to arguments made by
appellants, Guccio Gucci's intent to terminate trademark licenses and destroy the
trademarks themselves did not constitute bad faith within the meaning of § 363(m),
nor does it violate public policy. Any apparent inequities in this case are as much an
indictment of bankruptcy law generally as they are of the Gucci companies' intended
use of the assets.... We conclude that Guccio Gucci's intended use of the assets
purchased is not relevant to the good faith inquiry, and therefore we agree with the
bankruptcy court's detennination that Guccio Gucci is a good faith purchaser within
the meaning of § 363(m)."
• Hoese Corp. v. Vetter Corp. (In re Vetter Corp.), 724 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1983)
(objector who challenged debtor's sale of assets to newly fonned corporation could
not premise a lack of good-faith defense upon knowledge of patent infringement
when the issue of patent infringement was not before the Bankruptcy Court, and
therefore, the newly fonned corporation was a good-faith purchaser)
• Kennedy v. Wright, 867 F.2d 616 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished) (Kennedy, the
inventor and patentee, sued Wright for infringement, but Wright set up as a defense,
and the trial court held, that the suit could not be maintained because Wright had
bought and paid for the patents and become their equitable owner. This occurred as
a result of a bankruptcy sale. Kennedy, however, contends that the bankrupt, NPI,
never was more than a licensee and he had validly revoked the license before the sale.
The court held that, despite arguments that the debtor was a mere licensee, the
defendant could assert as a defense that it took from an assignor (the debtor) with
valid right to transfer ownership and that this was proper because the patent owner
was the alter ego of the bankrupt company.)
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• Denbicare USA, Inc. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996) (Bankruptcy
trustee's sale of reusable diapers packaged in box that was subject to copyright
protection, for original owner of copyright, in foreign trade zone subject to United
States jurisdiction, was "first sale," barring subsequent copyright owner's right to
claim that later sale of those particular boxes of diapers infringed owner's exclusive
right of distribution. Owner of copyright in packaging for reusable diapers consented
to sale of particular boxes of diapers by owner's bankruptcy trustee, for purpose of
first sale doctrine. "When McCoy objected to the sale of the diapers, he could have
exercised his right as the owner of the copyright in the diaper boxes to prevent the
bankruptcy trustee's sale altogether. The proposed sale would have constituted a
distribution of copies of the copyrighted work, and McCoy, as the copyright owner,
had the exclusive right under § 106(3) to make or authorize such distributions.
Without his authorization, the bankruptcy trustee's sale--a sale of copies located
within the physical territory of the United States that required the approval of a
federal court in Califomia--would have been an infringement of his copyright.
Instead of seeking to prevent this infringing sale, however, McCoy stipulated in court
that the sale could proceed if the buyers were enjoined from reselling in the United
States and Canada. Thus, McCoy consented to the sale of the copies; the fact that the
buyers later violated the conditions imposed on the sale does not negate his consent.")
• Men's Sportswear, Inc. v. Sasson Jeans, Inc., 834 F.2d 1134 (2nd Cir. 1987)
Licensor's failure to object to the bankruptcy court's assumption of "core jurisdiction"
at any point in the extensive proceedings on Chapter 11 debtor's action for breach of
license agreements and advertising plan and further failure to object to any part of the
appeal process in the district court constituted "consent" to final adjudication of
action before the bankruptcy court and permitted the bankruptcy court to enter final
judgment as if action were "core proceeding".
• Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490 (3d Cir. 1998)
(Chapter 11 debtor-automobile dealership moved to reject buy-sell agreement for its
interest in one of three franchises and to assume and sell all three franchise
agreements. Held that manufacturer was not "person aggrieved" by bankruptcy court
orders permitting debtor to reject buy-sell agreement and to assume and sell
franchises and that appeal from bankruptcy court's orders was rendered moot by
buyer's failure to obtain stay of sale pending appeal. Section 363(m) applies to the
sale of the franchises.)
• Kuntz v. Cray Computer Corp. (In re Cray Computer Corp.), 97 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir.
1996) (Court rejects contest about the validity of a bankruptcy sale of patents where
no stay pending appeal was granted)
• La Preferida, Inc. v. Cerveceria Modelo, S.A., 914 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1990)
Distributor, which had operated under distributorship agreement of malt beverage
trademark holder, brought action against trademark holder's transferee. Held: consent
judgment entered in trademark transferor's bankruptcy did not preclude relitigation of
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whether transferor had breached distribution agreement with its exclusive distributor,
but bankruptcy sale was binding on trademark transferor's exclusive distributor.
XVI. Contract Rights: General
The bankruptcy estate incorporates all contract rights existing at the time of the
bankruptcy filing. 11 USC § 541. There is special treatment for so-called executory contracts,
which are contracts where important performance remains outstanding on both sides of the
transaction at the time ofbankruptcy. 11 USC § 365.
• In re Andrews, 80 F.3d 906 (4th Cir. 1996). Postpetition payments to debtor pursuant
to noncompetition agreement were not "earnings from services performed," and thus,
payments could not be excluded from bankruptcy estate. "Pre-petition assets ... are
those assets rooted in the debtor's pre- petition activities, including any proceeds that
may flow from those assets in the future. These assets belong to the estate and
ultimately to the creditors. Post-petition assets are those that result from the debtor's
postpetition activities and are his to keep free and clear of the bankruptcy
proceeding.")
• Cusano v. Klein, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 2001). Debtor's open book account
claim under California law for royalties owed in connection with songs he had written
accrued for bankruptcy purposes, and thus was required to be scheduled as a
receivable or a cause of action after debtor filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, to
extent that sums were owed on account at time he filed his petition, as an action could
have been brought for those sums at that time. Debtor's failure to schedule as asset
open book account cause of action under California law for prepetition royalties owed
in connection with songs he had written prior to filing ofbankruptcy petition, or other
claims for prepetition royalties, resulted in claims being vested in bankruptcy estate,
and thus deprived debtor of standing to assert such a claim following confirmation of
Chapter 11 plan.
XVII. Executory Contracts
Under Section 365, a debtor in possession or a trustee may assume or reject an
executory contract. If a trustee of debtor-in-possession meets the Bankruptcy Code's
requirements for assumption of an executory contract, it must assume the executory contract
entirely. 11 USC 365. Once a trustee assumes an executory contract, the Bankruptcy Code
also authorizes assignment. Bankruptcy law generally supports the right to assign, and allows
a trustee to assume and assign executory contracts regardless of applicable laws or
contractual provisions restricting assignment.
[1]. Licenses as Executory Contracts: Generally
• Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In Re Select-A-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th
Cir.1980) ("an obligation of a debtor to refrain from selling software packages under
an exclusive licensing agreement made a contract executory as to the debtor
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lnotwithstanding the continuing obligation was only one of forbearance. ")
• Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th
Cir.1985) (continuing duties of notice and forbearance render a technology license
contract executory for the purposes of § 365; "although the license to Lubrizol was
not exclusive RMF owed the same type of unperfonned continuing duty of
forbearance arising out of the most favored licensee clause running in favor of
Lubrizol. Breach of that duty would clearly constitute a material breach of the
agreement.").
• Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679-80 (9th
Cir.1996) (license is an executory contract: "Cadtrak owes significant continued
perfonnance to the licensee: it must continue to refrain from suing it for
infringement, since a nonexclusive patent license is, in essence "a mere waiver of the
right to sue" the licensee for infringement.... The licensee also owes perfonnance: it
must mark all products made under the license with proper statutory patent notice.
Since failure to mark deprives the patent holder of damages in an infringement action
before the infringer has actual notice of the infringement, the licensee's perfonnance
of this duty is material. Therefore, the license is an executory contract under § 365.).
• In re Superior Toy & Mfg. Co., Inc., 78 F.3d 1169 (7th Cir. 1996) (Doctrine of
estoppel barred Chapter 7 trustee from arguing that bankruptcy court erred in entering
assumption order on grounds that debtor's licensing agreement was not executory
contract; trustee's predecessor assumed licensing agreement with court approval,
contracting party honored contract and allowed debtor to retain exclusive license, and
bankruptcy estate benefited from contract for almost two years.)
• Otto Preminger Films, Inc. v. Quintex Entertainment Inc., 950 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir.
1991) Contract between debtor-film company and distributor which gave distributor
exclusive right to subdistribute motion pictures and to colorize and distribute
colorized versions of motion pictures was "executory contract," and thus, contract had
to be assumed in order to be considered part of bankruptcy estate subject to sale,
where agreement contained several significant unperfonned obligations of both
parties. Subdistribution agreement between debtor-film company and distributor and
colorization agreement were not severable so as to make only one portion of contract
executory and to allow sale of nonexecutory portion as asset of bankruptcy estate.
However, television contracts between actor and debtor-film company were not
executory and were properly sold as assets of debtor's estate, where contracts
contained no substantial unperfonned duties owed by actor or his agent to debtor.
• In re Three Star Telecast, Inc., 93 B.R. 310,312 (D.P.R.1988) (television program
licensing agreement)
• In re New York Shoes, Inc., 84 B.R. 947, 960 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1988) (trademark
contract).
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• In re Best Film & Video Corp., 46 B.R. 861, 869 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1985) (movie
distribution contract).
[2]. Effect of Bankruptcy Termination Clauses
• Computer Communications, Inc. v. Codex Corp., 824 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Unilateral tennination of joint marketing and development agreement to purchase
computer equipment from debtor after debtor filed petition for reorganization violated
automatic stay. Contractual clause allowing for termination upon either party's
declaration ofbankruptcy was void.)
[3]. Employment Contracts
• Cinicola v. Sharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 2001) Trustee ofdebtor-healthcare
system sought approval ofproposed settlement agreement involving sale of assets and
assignment of executory contracts, including employment contracts of some
physicians, who then objected to the sale arguing that it assignment of their contracts
to a non-affiliate hospital without their consent violated their employment
agreements, and that adequate assurance of assignee's future perfonnance of their
contracts had not been provided. Although the sale was approved, on appeal, the
court held remanded for determination of the effect, if any, that vacating or modifying
the assumption and assignment order would have on the overall sale. If assignment
of their contracts were to be vacated, physicians might have claim for rejection
damages, and covenants not to compete contained in the contracts might have
survived physicians' resignations.
[4]. Non-Competition Agreements
• In re Andrews, 80 F.3d 906 (4th Cir. 1996) (postpetition payments to debtor pursuant
to noncompetition agreement were not "earnings from services performed," and thus,
payments could not be excluded from bankruptcy estate. According to the majority,
this result would hold even if the no-compete contract were treated as executory
because payments were plainly rooted in, and grew out of, debtor's prepetition sale of
debtor's share in ready-mix concrete business. Forebearance (e.g., non-competition)
was not treated as later personal services. "Pre-petition assets, like the NCA
payments, are those assets rooted in the debtor's pre- petition activities, including any
proceeds that may flow from those assets in the future. These assets belong to the
estate and ultimately to the creditors. Post-petition assets are those that result from
the debtor's postpetition activities and are his to keep free and clear of the bankruptcy
proceeding.")
• In re McDaniel, 141 B.R. 438, 440 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1992) (payments to former
employee in exchange for non-competition agreement not made for services
performed and thus not excluded from estate under § 541(a)(6»; In re Bluman, 125
B.R. 359, 363 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1991) (same).
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• In re Hughes, 166 B.R. 103, 105 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1994) (obligation to refrain from
competition does not make no-compete contract an executory contract); In re
Paveglio, 1995 WL 465339 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.1993); In re Drake, 136 B.R. 325,
327-28 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992); In re Oseen, 133 B.R. 527, 529 (Bankr.D.ldaho 1991);
In re Bluman, 125 B.R. at 362; In re Cutters, 104 B.R. 886, 890
(Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 1989).
• In re Hammond, 35 B.R. 219 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1983) (payments pursuant to a
noncompetition agreement are not "property" within the meaning of § 541(a)(I);
debtor had "not done all acts necessary to accrue his right to the future payments."
The court went on to assert that, in order to receive the payments, "Hammond must
abide by the agreement. We cannot force him to comply. It)
• In re Udell, 18 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 1994) (In a Chapter 13 case, employer's right to
injunction to prevent former employee from violating his covenant not to compete did
not qualify as a "claim" dischargeable in bankruptcy, but bankruptcy court could lift
stay to allow creditor to seek permanent injunctive relief only after considering
prejudice to debtor or bankruptcy estate, relative hardship to debtor and employer,
and employer's probability of success on merits. For bankruptcy purposes, a "debt" is
a liability on a "claim." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12). Under § 101(5) of the Code, a " 'claim'
means"-- (A) right to payment ... or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right
to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.")
[5]. Assumption of Licensee's Interest in License
• Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 2002 WL 123296 (9th Cir. 2002) (Exclusive licensee did not
have right to re-sell or sublicense copyright without consent ofowner.).
• In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999)
Debtor-in-possession (DIP) may not assume executory contract over nondebtor's
objection if applicable law would bar assignment to hypothetical third party, even
where DIP has no intention of assigning contract in question to any such third party.
In this case, federal patent law made the nonexclusive patent licenses personal and
nondelegable, thus barring debtor from assuming patent licenses without licensor's
consent.
• Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679-80 (9th
Cir.1996) (federal patent law of nonassignability preempts state law relating to patent
license assignability; prevents assumption or assignment of the license in bankruptcy;
"Allowing free assignability -- or, more accurately, allowing states to allow free
assignability--of nonexclusive patent licenses would undermine the reward that
encourages invention because a party seeking to use the patented invention could
either seek a license from the patent holder or seek an assignment of an existing
patent license from a licensee. In essence, every licensee would become a potential
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competitor with the licensor-patent holder in the market for licenses under the
patents. And while the patent holder could presumably control the absolute number
of licenses in existence under a free-assignability regime, it would lose the very
important ability to control the identity of its licensees. Thus, any license a patent
holder granted--even to the smallest firm in the product market most remote from its
own--would be fraught with the danger that the licensee would assign it to the patent
holder's most serious competitor, a party whom the patent holder itself might be
absolutely unwilling to license. As a practical matter, free assignability of patent
licenses might spell the end to paid-up licenses such as the one involved in this
case.").
• In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1806 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1987) (Section
365(c) precluded an entity, which had acquired the corporate debtor's stock pursuant
to a chapter 11 reorganization plan, from exercising the debtor's rights under a
prepetition patent license. Following the conversion of its original chapter 11
reorganization case to a chapter 7 liquidation, Alltech discontinued all operations and
discharged its employees. Before the debtor once again converted to chapter 11, its
trustee liquidated virtually all its assets, except for its patent license. Noting that
plan confirmation is a fact-intensive, equity-based inquiry, the bankruptcy court
characterized the sale of Alltech's stock as a de facto assignment of the patent license
to a noncontracting party.)
• Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1983) (copyright license is
not transferable and does not become part ofbankruptcy estate)
• Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Buiotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1 st Cir. 1997) (Chapter
11 reorganized debtor was not different entity from that with which patent holder
entered into licensing agreement, so that federal common law and contractual
restrictions against assignment of patent licenses did not preclude assumption of
license by Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession.). See Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v.
Leroux (In re Leroux), 69 F.3d 608 (1st Cir.1995).
• In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27,29 (1st Cir.1984) (Breyer, J.) ("[W]e see
no conflict, for (c)(I)(A) refers to state laws that prohibit assignment 'whether or not'
the contract is silent, while (f)(I) contains no such limitation. Apparently (f)(I)
includes state laws that prohibit assignment only when the contract is not silent about
assignment; that is to say, state laws that enforce contract provisions prohibiting
assignment. These state laws are to be ignored. The section specifically excepts
(c)(I)(A)'s state laws that forbid assignment even when the contract is silent; they are
to be heeded.")
• Rieser v. Dayton Country Club Co. (In re Magness), 972 F.2d 689, 695 (6th
Cir.1992) ("There is simply nothing in the language of § 365(f) which supports the
limitation read into it by [the Pioneer Ford] court ... Neither Pioneer Ford nor any
other decision to date provides a defensible explication of the parameters of the §
365(c) exception."). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Claremont Acquisition Corp. (In re
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Claremont Acquisition Corp.), 186 B.R. 977,980-984 (C.D.Cal.I995) (discussing the
conflict and evaluating the two main positions).
• PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian Industries Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930, 100 S.Ct. 272, 62 L.Ed.2d 187 (1979) ("[q]uestions with
respect to the assignability of a patent license are controlled by federal law".)
• Unarco Industries, Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303, 1306 (7th Cir.1972) ("[T]he
question of assignability of a patent license is a specific policy of federal patent law
dealing with federal patent law. Therefore, we hold federal law applies to the question
of the assignability of the patent license in question."), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929, 93
S.Ct. 1365, 35 L.Ed.2d 590 (1973).
[6]. Effect of Rejecting a License in a Licensor Bankruptcy
• Section 365(n) gives the licensee of an "intellectual property right" the ability to
either accept a licensor's rejection of the license, or to keep the licensed rights by
continuing to pay any royalty payments required. The term "intellectual property" in
Section 365(n) does not include trademarks.
• In re Gucci, 126 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1997) (court reserves judgment on the effect that a
rejection of a trademark license would have on the "rights" created by that rejected
license. "The effects of a rejection of a trademark licensing agreement are a matter
that remains to be litigated. To date, this Court has not addressed whether a § 365
rejection operates as a kind of avoiding power to bring back into the estate a license
of the debtor's trade name or trademark that was conferred by the debtor prior to its
bankruptcy filing.")
• In re Lavigne, 114 F.3d 379,387 (2d Cir.1997) ("rejection merely frees the estate
from the obligation to perform; it does not make the contract disappear").
• Lieb, The Interrelationship of Trademark Law and Bankruptcy Law, 64 Am.
Bankr.L.J. at 36-37 ("transfer of rights in a trademark should not be rescinded as a
consequence of rejection, but, should be subject to continued enjoyment by the
licensee").
[7]. Royalties to be Paid To Retain Rights
• In re Prize Frize, 150 B.R. 456 (9th Cir. BAP 1993), affd, 32 F.3d 426 (9th
Cir.1994) (Prize Frize had granted a licensee an exclusive license to manufacture, use
and sell its patented french fry vending machine. In exchange, the licensee agreed to
pay certain license· fees to Prize Frize. After Prize Frize filed for bankruptcy, it
rejected the agreement. The court held that the license fees still owed by the licensee
were "royalty payments" within the meaning of § 365(n), and that therefore § 365(n)
required the licensee to pay those fees to the debtor in order to retain its rights under
the agreement.)
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XVI. Debtor's Use of Licensed IP After Filing Bankruptcy
• In re DAK Industries, Inc., 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995) (Contract under which
computer vendor (debtor) had entered prepetition allowing debtor to install software
on computers that debtor sold, was in effect a sale of a right to make multiple copies
of software in a particular format and, thus, payments due under the contract were not
post-petition obligations, but a pre-petition debt; court had to look through form of
transaction to the economic realities of the particular arrangement, to determine
whether creditor was entitled to administrative expense for debtor's postpetition use
of subject property. "The agreement here provided that upon signing, DAK was
absolutely obligated to pay $2,750,000, even if it sold only one copy of Word. The
fact that some of the payments became due postpetition does not alter the fact that the
entire debt was absolutely owed prepetition, and was therefore prepetition debt."
"DAK did not employ Word over a period of time in order to run its operation.
Rather, it sold the program to consumers. Accordingly, DAK's postpetition
distribution of Word is more like the sale of inventory than the utilization of the
claimant's trademark or device described in B-K ofKansas and Neville Island. ")
• In re B-K of Kansas, Inc., 82 B.R. 135 (Bankr.D.Kan.1988), affd, 99 B.R. 446
(D.Kan.1989) (court allowed an administrative expense claim for the debtor's
postpetition display of the Burger King trademark in order to attract customers)
• In re Neville Island Glass Co., Inc., 78 F.Supp. 508 (W.D.Penn.1948) (court allowed
an administrative expense claim for the debtor's use in its glass manufacturing
process of the claimant's patented equipment, which was installed in the debtor's plant
pursuant to a lease-license agreement.)
• Broadcast Corp. ofGeorgia v. Broadfoot, 54 B.R. 606 (N.D.Ga.1985), affd sub nom.
In re Subscription Television of Greater Atlanta, 789 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.1986)
(court allowed an administrative expense claim because the claimant had continued to
provide video scrambling services to the debtor, a subscription television station, after
it had filed for bankruptcy)
• In re Prize Frize, 150 B.R. 456 (9th Cir. BAP 1993), affd, 32 F.3d 426 (9th
Cir.1994) (Prize Frize had granted a licensee an exclusive license to manufacture, use
and sell its patented french fry vending machine. In exchange, the licensee agreed to
pay certain license fees to Prize Frize. After Prize Frize filed for bankruptcy, it
rejected the agreement. The court held that the license fees still owed by the licensee
were "royalty payments" within the meaning of § 365(n), and that therefore § 365(n)
required the licensee to pay those fees to the debtor in order to retain its rights under
the agreement.)
XIX. Automatic Stay
As a general rule, a bankruptcy filing places an immediate, automatic stay against the
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continuation or initiation of any action against the debtor, including actions alleging
infringement of an intellectual property right. 11 USC § 362 (a).
• Seiko Epson Corp. v. Nu-Kote Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(manufacturer's filing of bankruptcy petition resulted in automatic stay of patent
infringement proceedings against the manufacturer but not against the manufacturer's
affiliate, which had not filed bankruptcy)
• Checkers Drive-in Restaurants, Inc. v. Commissioner ofPatents and Trademarks,
51 F.3d 1078 (DC Cir. 1995) (Service mark holder seeking to cancel debtor's own
similar mark was not barred, by automatic stay in place in debtor's Chapter 11 case,
from filing affidavit required to maintain registration for its mark; filing of affidavit
merely preserved status quo, and did not qualify as action or proceeding "against" the
debtor barred by automatic stay. Competing service mark holder's filing of affidavit
to maintain registration for its mark was not attempt to exercise control over Chapter
11 debtor's own similar mark, so as to be barred by automatic stay; both debtor and
competitor had independent property right in their own service marks. 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(3). "Moreover, while the application of the section 8 filing requirement may
appear harsh in this case, Checkers failed to avail itself of a simple means of avoiding
this result. Checkers neglected to take the prudential step of seeking clarification
from the bankruptcy court, or even from the Commissioner, as to whether its section
8 filing obligation was stayed. Checkers had ample time to make such an inquiry;
CRG filed its petition for bankruptcy approximately two months before the first day
of the year-long "window" during which Checkers was required to file its section 8
affidavit. By failing to inquire, Checkers assumed the risk that the required filing was
not stayed.")
• United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1473 (D.C.Cir.1991), eert. denied, 502
U.S. 1048, 112 S.Ct. 913, 116 L.Ed.2d 813 (1992) ("The object of the automatic stay
provision is ... to make sure that creditors do not destroy the bankrupt estate in their
scramble for relief." The automatic stay did not bar the Department of Justice from
using computer software provided by, and claimed by, a debtor in bankruptcy. Court
rejected debtor's argument that the Department's use of the software without the
debtor's consent amounted to an "exercise of control" over property of the estate
within the meaning of subsection 362(a)(3), commenting that such a construction of
the statute "would take it well beyond Congress's purpose."). See also In re Morton,
866 F.2d 561,564 (2d Cir.1989) (operation of state law requiring lien holder to renew
lien in state court was not stayed by section 362 because "extension ... simply allows
the holder of a valid lien to maintain the status quo--a policy not adverse to
bankruptcy law, but rather in complete harmony with it").
• Time Warner Cable ofNew York city v. M.D. Electronics, Inc., 101 F.3d 278 (2d
Cir. 1996) (Cable television corporation brought action against Chapter 11 debtor and
its president for selling signal decoders in violation of Communications Act and New
York law governing cable television rates. Held: corporation was required to seek
discovery relief in bankruptcy court.)
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1
xx. Infringement Actions
• In re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) Assignee of patents
directed to structural components of and methods of detecting presence of two types
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and its United States licensee brought
infringement action in bankruptcy court against purported sublicensee, which claimed
that it obtained sublicense from another licensee through a cross-license agreement.
The court held that the claim could be brought in the bankruptcy court since it
involved a so-called "core proceeding." It further held that the assignee, through its
licensee, breached the "best efforts" clause ofcross-license agreement.
• In re Wilson, 149 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 1998) Bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion when it ordered that sealed memorandum and judgment which it entered in
prior action for misappropriation of trade secrets between debtor, debtor's company,
and holder of trade secrets be disclosed to two employees of defendant in holder's
state-court action, which alleged in part defendant's violation of injunctive relief
granted in prior action; defendant was not party to prior action and therefore needed
documents to understand core allegations leveled against it, and bankruptcy court's
order reflected that it balanced harm from disclosure against defendant's need for
employee access to documents.
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The State of Privacy
Then & Now
While the steady collection of consumer data has been going on (practically
unnoticed) in the United States since the beginning of commerce, the efficiency and
automation of the Internet, together with the ease with which one can conduct business
worldwide through the Internet, is pushing the privacy issue to the forefront.
I last spoke on privacy issues in March of 2000. In the last two and one-half years,
there has been much gnashing of teeth and wringing of hands over the privacy issue on both
sides of the Atlantic. Set forth below is an overview of significant events in the field of
privacy that have occurred since March of 2000.
Headlines
As a good place to begin the "Then & Now" comparison of the state of privacy, I am
going to pick up where I left off in March of 2000. At that time, the Washington based
Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") had filed a request with the Federal Trade
Commission to look into the data collection practices ofDoubleClick, Inc.
In November of 1999, DoubleClick merged with Abacus Direct Corp., a marketing
research company that allegedly maintains a data base of names, addresses and other
marketing information for approximately 90% of American households, containing over
ninety million personally identifiable individual purchaser profiles. Stephen F. Ambrose, Jr.
and Joseph W Gelb, Consumer Privacy Regulation and Litigation, The Business Lawyer,
Vol. 56, May 2001, citing Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Protecting Consumer Privacy:
Are you Prepared?, N Y.L.J., Apr. 11, 2000, at 3. EPIC claimed that, prior to the
announcement of the merger, DoubleClick had represented that the information it collected,
i.e., clickstream data from visitors to web sites that featured DoubleClick ads, would remain
anonymous. Beginning in June of 1999, DoubleClick apparently revised its privacy policy to
say that DoubleClick might combine personally identifiable data with clickstream data.
Privacy Group Seeks FTC Investigation ofNet Marketer's Information Collection Practices,
Electronic Commerce & Law, February 16, 2000, Vol. 5, No.7, p. 157.
In January of 2001, the FTC concluded its investigation of DoubleClick, dropping
charges that DoubleClick had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices. This occurred
after DoubleClick hastily retreated from its plans to combine the DoubleClick and Abacus
databases. FTC Ends DoubleClick Privacy Investigation, Jupitermedia Corporation,
January 23, 2001, www.atnewyork.com/news/article.php/567441. DoubleClick agreed to
rewrite its privacy policy and modify certain of its privacy practices as a result of the FTC
investigation, however, the public was not satisfied.
Since the initiation of the FTC investigation, DoubleClick has been the subject of
federal and state class-action lawsuits alleging that DoubleClick violated the privacy of
Internet users by using cookies and other data collection tools "to surreptitiously intercept,
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monitor, and sell information about Web browsing habits and other personal data".
DoubleClick Settles Class Actions, Agrees to Change Privacy Practices, Electronic
Commerce & Law, April 3, 2002, Vol 7, No. 14, p. 316. The cases were settled this past
s'ummer with DoubleClick agreeing to pay legal fees and costs up to $1.8 million and
agreeing to take the following actions, among others: (1) DoubleClick will revise its privacy
policy to include an easy to understand description of its services; (2) it can not combine
personally identifiable information that it collects with previously collected click stream data
without a clear and conspicuous notice to the internet user and receipt of the end user's opt-in
documentation; (3) it will ensure that an internet user's information will only be used
consistent with the privacy policy in effect when the information was collected; (4) the
company must undertake a consumer education effort on the topic of online privacy; the
company will establish internal policies to ensure the protection and routine purging of data
collected on line; (5) the company will purge certain data it obtained during the course of
testing the manner in which online and offline data could be merged; (6) the company has
agreed to limit to five years the life of new ad servicing cookies; and (7) the company has
agreed to have a nationally recognized accounting firm audit the company's compliance with
certain terms of settlement. DoubleClick Settles Class Action Suits, Agrees to Implement
Privacy Protections, Electronic Commerce & Law Report, April 3, 2002, Vol. 7, No. 14., p.
316.
On August 26, 2002, DoubleClick settled with the Attorneys General for ten states
(Arizona, California, Connecticut, Mass., Michigan, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York,
Vermont, and Washington) following 30 months of investigation by the Attorneys General
into the data collection and use practices of DoubleClick. DoubleClick has agreed, among
other agreements, to increase the visibility of its tracking activities, so consumers will have
more notice that their activities are being monitored. Further, web sites that allow
DoubleClick to profile their visitors must disclose DoubleClick's activities in the privacy
policies of such web sites. In addition, DoubleClick will pay the states $ 450,000 to cover
investigation costs and for use in connection with consumer education. DoubleClick Reaches
Agreement with States on Visibility of Consumer Tracking Activities, Electronic Commerce
& Law Report, Vol. 7, No. 35, September 11, 2002 (text of settlement available at
www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a 02 attach.pdO.
"[T]o maintain its position as a leader in on-line privacy, DoubleClick has worked
closely with the attorneys general to build upon the robust privacy practices it has already
implemented, said Elizabeth Wang, DoubleClick general counsel." Id. Thus DoubleClick
has apparently survived the onslaught and faithfully carries on.
So What Parameters Exist for The Regulation of Privacy?
Life After Geocities
While there always seems to be one or more proposals for comprehensive privacy
legislation pending in Congress, it does not appear that such legislation will be adopted in the
current session. ABA Panel Predicts Congress May Not Act Soon, But Privacy Legislation
Inevitable, Electronic Commerce & Law Report, Vol. 7, No. 32, p. 809. To date, Congress
has taken a sectoral approach to privacy, adopting the Children's Online Privacy Protection
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Act, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (relating to financial institutions), and the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (relating to medical information) and earlier
adopting the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the
Federal Videotape Privacy Protection Act, among others. In 1998 and 1999, the FTC, with
some disagreement among FTC commissioners, recommended to Congress that no
comprehensive legislation relating to privacy be adopted and that given the opportunity, the
private sector would appropriately self-regulate. Speech of Commissioner Orson Swindle,
Federal Trade Commission, Perspectives on Privacy Law and Enforcement Activity in the
United States, June 2002 www.ftc.gov/speeches/swindle/perspectivesonprivacy.htm citing
Online privacy: A Report to Congress (June 1998), wwwftc.gov/reports/privacy3/index.htm;
and Federal Trade Commission, Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: A Federal Trade
Commission Report to Congress (July 1999), wwwftc.gov/os/1999/9907/privacy99.pdf
In 2000, the FTC changed its position and formally recommended that Congress
adopt comprehensive legislation to address privacy issues, concluding that the private sector
had made "insufficient progress toward developing genuine, pragmatic privacy protections
for consumers". Id. citing Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information
Practices in the Electronic Marketplace: A Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress
(May 2000), www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf In the Fall of2001, the FTC
announced another shift in its focus indicating that it would in the future emphasize
enforcement instead of the enactment of comprehensive privacy legislation. Elaine M
Laflamme, Privacy is Becoming a Company Affair, New York Law Journal, June 10, 2002,
Vol. 227, Pg. S6.
FTC Enforcement
Even before the FTC's shift in focus, it had taken the primary role in enforcement in
the privacy arena in the United States. The FTC asserts jurisdiction over privacy through its
enforcement power to regulate "deceptive acts and practices" under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
Geocities. The first time the FTC flexed its muscles in the privacy area was with the
well known Geocities case. www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9902/9823015d&0.htm. As of April of
1998, the Geocities web site was one of the 10 most frequently visited sites. It was a virtual
neighborhood featuring web sites of interest to children, such as the "Enchanted Forest".
Geocities did not have a comprehensive privacy policy but did indicate that it would not
share information collected with third parties. In fact, that information was being shared with
third parties. The FTC took action and required Geocities to correctly inform users of how
information was collected and used, and it further restricted Geocities' collection and use of
information gathered from children in a manner now essentially embodied in the Children's
On-line Privacy Protection Act of 1998. Id.
Toysmart.com. In 2000, the FTC took action against Toysmart.com as a result of an
all too familiar dot.gone experience. While solvent, Toysmart.com collected information
from customers with a privacy policy in effect that indicated that the company would not
share the information with third parties. When the company went into decline,
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Toysmart.com solicited bids for the sale of its assets, namely, customer lists that included
information collected under the above referenced privacy policies. The creditors of the
company forced it into bankruptcy and the customer information thus became an asset of the
bankrupt estate. The FTC filed suit to prevent the sale of the customer information and to
allege a violation by Toysmart.com of its privacy policy and of the Children's On-line
Privacy Protection Act. The parties settled and as a result Toysmart.com's data could be
sold only to a qualified buyer in the same market as Toysmart.com that would abide by the
terms of Toysmart.com's privacy statement. A buyer who wanted to use the information
differently had to get the consent of the customer. In addition, Toysmart.com was required to
delete or destroy all information obtained in violation of COPPA. Speech of Commissioner
Orson Swindle, Federal Trade Commission, citing FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC, and
Toysmart.com, Inc., Civ. Action No. 00-11341-RGS (D. Mass 2000). Also see
wwwftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm.
Eli Lilly. Eli Lilly, the large pharmaceutical company that manufactures and sell
drugs including prozac, operated a web site at www.prozac.com that offered a reminder
service to prozac users to help them remember to take or refill their prozac medication. In
June of 2001, Eli Lilly decided to terminate the service, and one of its employees sent an
email to all subscribers notifying them of the termination of service. Unfortunately, that
notice included all 670 of the subscribers' email addresses within the "To" line of the
message, thus disclosing to subscribers the email addresses of all other subscribers. The FTC
claimed that Eli Lilly had failed to maintain or implement internal measures to protect the
highly sensitive information of subscribers. In settlement, Eli Lilly agreed to strengthen
internal standards relating to privacy protection, including employee training and monitoring
of data. Speech of Commissioner Orson Swindle, Federal Trade Commission,
wwwftc.gov/speeches/swindle/perspectiveonprivacy.htm.
In addition to its settlement with the FTC, on July 25, 2001, Eli Lilly settled with the
Attorney Generals of eight states (Mass., NY, Cal., Conn., Idaho, Iowa, NJ, and Vermont)
pursuant to which Eli Lilly has agreed to pay $ 160,000 to the states and to strengthen
internal standards relating to privacy protection, training and monitoring. The company must
undergo an annual, independent compliance review for the next five years and report findings
to the states. In response to the action taken by the states, Eli Lilly has put into place
additional security measures to prevent such a disclosure from ever happening again,
including implementing software that blocks emails with more one name on the email. Eli
Lilly also appointed a director of Global Privacy, has in place a privacy policy team, and has
in place security measures that "place personal information from customers in an
environment as secure as Lilly's trade secrets". Eli Lilly Reaches Agreements with States
Over Accidental Release ofCustomer Data, Electronic Commerce & Law Report, Vol 7, No.
30, July 31,2002.
Microsoft. Most recently, the FTC has settled with Microsoft in regard to its
Passport products, namely, Passport Single Sign-In (known as "Passport"); Passport Express
Purchase (known as "Passport Wallet"); and Kids Passport. The "Passport" products
collected and stored information from users that allowed them to sign in at any participating
web site with a single name and password. Passport Wallet collected and stored user credit
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card information and allowed users to apply the stored information when making purchases
at participating web sites. Finally, Kids Passport allowed parents to create Passport accounts
for their children that would block the collection of personal information by participating
web sites. Microsoft Settles FTC Charges Alleging False Security and Privacy Promises,
The Computer & Internet Lawyer, Vol. 19, No. 10, October 2002.
In July of 2001, the Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a complaint with the
FTC regarding Microsoft's Passport products and as a result, the FTC launched an
investigation. The FTC complaint alleged that Microsoft had misrepresented that purchase
transactions made using Passport Wallet were generally safer than purchase transactions
made without Passport Wallet, when in fact the same security measures were employed
whether or not Passport Wallet was used in the transaction. The FTC further alleged that
Microsoft misrepresented its practice in collecting personally identifiable information.
Contrary to its privacy policy, Microsoft did collect and hold for a limited time certain
personally identifiable information. Finally, with respect to Kids Passport, the FTC alleged
that Microsoft misrepresented the control a parent would have over what information their
children could provide to participating web sites when children were able to edit or change
certain fields of information and change account settings previously established by a parent.
Commissioner Orson Swindle, United States Federal Trade Commission, Perspectives on
Privacy Law and Enforcement Activity in the United States,
www.ftc.gov/speeches/swindle/perspectivesonprivacy.htm.
The settlement requires that Microsoft refrain from making any misrepresentations
about its information practices and the qualities of its products and services. In addition,
Microsoft must implement and maintain a comprehensive security program in relation to
personal information collected by Microsoft, and the program must be certified by an
independent professional every two years. Id.
Consistent Approach by FTC. There appears to be a common thread to the recent
FTC settlements, to the FTC's final rule under Gramm-Leach-Bliley and to the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development's new guidelines for security of information
systems and networks. The U.S. delegation to the OECD was headed by U.S. FTC
Commissioner Swindle. Barbara Yuill, Attorneys Create Compliance Roadmap From Terms
of Eli Lilly, Microsoft Settlements, Electronic Commerce & Law Report, Vol 7, No. 33, p.
838, August 21,2002.
Legal commentators conclude that the FTC takes the position that companies that
collect consumer data must (1) have a written, comprehensive information security program,
(2) designate qualified personnel to coordinate and oversee data protection and information
security, (3) identify reasonably foreseeable risks and take action to protect against them, (4)
conduct periodic audits (that may be done by independent third parties), and (5) make
adjustments to the program if appropriate in light of the results of the audit. Id. at 839.
This may answer some questions for companies looking for guidance on privacy and
data collection, but it leaves many questions unanswered, one of the most significant of
which is what rules govern information collection outside of the online environment and
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what governs information that has been collected by long standing US entities for decades
past.
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act. The Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act, effective as of April 21, 2000, regulates online services that collect
information from children under 13. 15 U.S.C. § 6501-6505. As noted earlier, this statute
came into effect in part due to the alleged transfer to third parties of information collected
from children by Geocities. This is a fairly rigorous statute that uses a parental opt in
approach to regulate the use of information provided by children to online services. As of
April 22, 2002, there had been only six enforcement cases under COPPA, the most recent
one involving the Etch-A-Sketch Web site, which resulted in Etch-A-Sketch agreeing to pay
a fine of $ 35,000. The FTC alleged that Etch-A-Sketch collected personal information from
children registering with "Etchy's Birthday Club" for a chance to win an Etch-A-Sketch on
the child's birthday. This information was collected without prior parental consent and with
Etch-A-Sketch merely directing the child to "get your parent or guardian's permission first".
Etch-A-Sketch Draws $ 35,000 Penalty for Violating the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act, KeyTLaw, www.keytlaw.com. April 22, 2002. Also, see
wwwftc.gov/os/04/ohioartcomplaint.htm.
In February of 2002, the American PopCorn Company, maker of "Jolly Time"
popcorn agreed to settle with the FTC by paying $ 10,000. The FTC alleged that the
company maintained the web site www.jollytim.e.com. through which it collected
information from children without parental consent. Popcorn Company Settles FTC Privacy
Violation Charges, KeyTLaw Business, Internet, e-Commerce & Domain Name Law,
February 14,2002, www.keytlaw.com.
In an action against the web site girlslife.com, the respondent claimed on its web site
privacy statement that it did not structure its site to attract anyone under the age of 13. In
addition to being required to comply with COPPA, the respondent agreed to pay penalties of
approximately $ 30,000. John F. Noble, Children's Online Privacy Protection Act Marks Its
First Anniversary, Internet Law & Business, Vol,. 2, No. 10, p. 865. The only regulatory
changes relating to the statute is the FTC extended to April 21, 2005 the time in which online
services can rely on an email from a parent coupled with other verification methods for the
collection and internal use of personal information about children. FTC Extends Time for E-
Mailed Consent From Parents for Information Collection, Electronic Commerce & Law
Report, Vol. 7, No. 17, p. 381, April 24, 2002.
Congressional and State Initiatives
Although two bills have been advanced in Congress that address privacy
comprehensively, it does not seem likely either of those bills will become law prior to the
end of 2002. Anandashankar Mazumdar, ABA Panel Predicts Congress May Not Act Soon,
But Privacy Legislation Inevitable, Electronic Commerce & Law Report, Vol. 7, No. 32, pg.
809, August 14, 2002. One of the competing bills is The Online Personal Privacy Act (S.
2201) sponsored by Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D.-S.C.). This bill provides for an opt out
approach, mandatory notice online of privacy practices, a private right of action for
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violations, a limited right of access to information, and opt-in protection for sensitive
information. It also provides for the federal preemption of all state and local privacy laws.
Michael E. Aruda, Ross A. Dreyer, and Margaret R. Prinzing, Can Congress Opt Out of
Privacy Legislation in an Election Year?, Electronic Commerce & Law Report, Vol. 7, No.
28, p. 728, July 17,2002.
The other bill that gained support throughout the year but that probably will not make
it past the finish line is the one sponsored by Rep. Clifford B. Stearns (R-Fla.) and known as
the Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2002 (H.R. 4678). The Stearns legislation would
also preempt state law but would take a less stringent approach from the business
perspective. Businesses must provide notice only the first time they collect personally
identifiable information if such information may be used for purposes unrelated to the
transaction in question. The notice must be prominently displayed and the consumer must be
able to easily access the privacy policy of the company, which must be "plainly written". A
significant difference in the Steams proposal is that it applies to all personally identifiable
information whether collected online or offline. Id.
Although as a general rule businesses are adverse to general legislation governing
privacy, many in the business world are beginning to advocate a consistent nationwide
policy. Many states are enacting legislation that is more restrictive than current or proposed
federal legislation. In 2001, Vermont adopted legislation requiring that consumers "opt-in"
with respect to the use of personal financial and medical information. New Mexico requires
that financial institutions obtain customer permission before they share information with
third party marketers. Richard Cowden, Privacy Issues May Advance to Top of Policy
Agendas in 2003, Experts Say, Electronic Commerce & Law Report, Vol. 7, No. 25, p. 612,
June 19, 2002.
In June of this year, North Dakota residents voted overwhelmingly in favor (72.2%)
of reinstating legislation that required that financial institutions obtain written approval prior
to the disclosure of customer information. Mark Wolski, North Dakota Voters Trounce Bid
to Let Banks Use Opt-Out on Financial Privacy, Electronic Commerce & Law Report, Vol. 7,
No. 25, p. 612, June 19, 2002. California's legislators are also considering financial privacy
legislation that is much more stringent than the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. If legislation of
this type passes, "California could set a de facto national standard". Treasury Receives Some
50 Comments on Early Effect of Consumer Privacy Notices, Electronic Commerce & Law
Report, Vol. 7, No. 21, p. 486, May 22, 2002.
As a part of a study of information sharing practices among financial institutions, the
FTC, the Treasury Department and other federal agencies requested public comment on the
adequacy of existing law to protect consumer privacy. Thirty-five state Attorneys General
responded indicating that they "believe that the current practices allowed under GLB are
insufficient to protect consumers and pose considerable risk to them." Id. at 487. In 2001, 5
% or fewer consumers elected to opt-out of having information shared by their bank. Id.
The Attorneys General indicated that the notices sent by financial institutions "have been
dense and require a high reading level to comprehend, resulting in consumer confusion and
inability to exercise informed choice." Id. .
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European Union Privacy Issues
Background. In October of 1998, the European Union Privacy Directive became
effective. The Directive prevented E.U. businesses from transferring any personal
information to businesses in other countries if such countries did not provide adequate
privacy protection. The United States is one country that has been deemed to not provide
adequate privacy protection. Since the adoption of the Directive, representatives of the
European Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce have been negotiating to
establish a safe harbor to facilitate a process by which U.S. companies can comply with the
Directive. In May of 2000, after the submission of seven proposals by the U.S. delegation,
the parties finally achieved an agreement known as the Safe Harbor Principles. Participation
in the safe harbor creates a presumption that the business provides an adequate level of
privacy protection, which enables the business to receive data from E.D. entities. Anna E.
Shimanek, Do you want Milk with Those Cookies?: Complying with the Safe Harbor Privacy
Principles, 26 Iowa J Corp. L. 455, Winter 2001.
E.U. Data Transfer Options. In addition to complying with the safe harbor, there
are two other ways that U.S. companies can comply with the Directive. The first is to obtain
express consent from the individuals with respect to whom the data relates. Consent is
defined as "any freely given specific and informed indication" of the individual's agreement
to the use of the information for the described purpose. Parliament and Council Directive
95/46/EC of October 24, 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing ofPersonal Data on the Free Movement ofSuch Data, 1995 O.J (L 281), article
2(h). This approach may be appropriate in many circumstances but will likely not work in an
employer/employees situation since many European countries would not honor an
employee's consent in this context. Christopher Terry, Clock Running on Time to Comply
with the EU Privacy Directive, Chicago Lawyer, February 2002.
A third approach is for businesses to enter into a version of the EU model contract
with the transferring party. Most U.S. companies have rejected this approach because it
imposes joint and several liability on all parties, is highly regulated by ED data protection
agencies and allows third parties, such as the individuals about whom the data relates, a
private right of action. Id.
Safe Harbor Requirements. To receive the benefits of the safe harbor, businesses
must comply with the Safe Harbor Principles set forth in the Directive and "publicly declare
that they do so." Do you want Milk With Those Cookies at 473 citing Issuance of Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666
(July 24, 2000).
For a business to satisfy the public declaration requirement, the business must certify
on an annual basis to the Department of Commerce that the business adheres to the Safe
Harbor Principles. To comply with the Safe Harbor Principles, the privacy program of a
business must (1) provide clear notice with respect to the purpose for the data collection and
use of the data, (2) provide an option to opt out of allowing use of the information; provided,
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that with respect to certain sensitive data, the individual must opt in; (3) provide access by an
individual to his or her data, (4) implement reasonable security measures; (5) take steps to
ensure and protect the integrity of the data, making sure it is reliable, accurate, complete and
current and that the data is being used for its stated purpose; and (6) implement effective
enforcement mechanisms. Barbara Crutchfield George, Patricia Lynch, Susan J. Marsnik,
U.S. Multinational Employers: Navigating Through The Safe Harbor Principles To Comply
with the EU Data Privacy Directive, American Business Law Journal, Summer 2001, Vol. 38,
Issue 4, p. 735 citing the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and Transmission to European
Commission at 45,666 - 45, 677.
In addition, the business must certify that it has joined a private sector privacy
program such as TRUSTe or BBB Online, that it has developed and pronounced its own
privacy policies in conformity with the Safe Harbor Principles or that the business is already
subject to a sector-specific statute, regulation or legal requirement. To effect the self-
certification, the business must send a letter signed by a corporate officer to the Department
of Commerce stating that it is joining the safe harbor. The letter must include a description
of the privacy policy, information about how the business uses the EU data, information
about who handles complaints and requests for access to information, among other
information. Id.
How are We Doing So Far? As of October 17, 2002, the Department of Commerce
web site reflected 254 self-certified companies. www.export.gov/safeharbor. On February
13, the EU Commission issued a report on the operation of the U.S. safe harbor program and
indicated that fewer than one-half of the businesses in the Safe Harbor at the time of
evaluation posted a privacy policy that complied with all of the Safe Harbor Principles. In
particular, the ability of an individual to access his or her data was not addressed in most
policies. Many of the policies failed to clearly explain how a party could make use of the
dispute resolution mechanism. The Commission further reported that 27 complaints had
been received against Safe Harbor participants and that all had been resolved without any
formal enforcement action. Marc Roth, EU Takes New Look at Safe Harbor Program, e-
Commerce Law & Strategy, Vol. 18, No. 11, p. 1, March 2002, citing the European
Commission Feb. 13, 2002 report at
http://europa. eu. int/comm/internal market/en/dataprot/news/02-196 en. pdf
In Nov. of 2001, Arthur Anderson conducted a study that indicated that none of the
75 Fortune 500 companies that were participating in the safe harbor at the time complied
with all safe harbor requirements. Two of 75 had five of the eight requirements of the safe
harbor and several of the companies only had one safe harbor requirement. U.S. Firms Slow
to Adopt Global Privacy Practices, Direct Marketing, Nov. 2001, Vol. 64, Issue 7, p. 12.
While the studies above mayor may not be accurate, it is obvious that American
organizations struggle in creating privacy policies, monitoring their compliance and
implementing effective security. In July of2001, the Department of Commerce discovered
that its safe harbor site inadvertently exposed information about U.S. companies that was
confidential. The site revealed sales figures, employee head counts and other details about
the company's European operations. In addition, visitors to the site could modify a
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company's infonnation without any authorization from the company. Ted Kemp, Privacy
Rules Cross the Pond, InternetWeek, July 16,2001, Issue 869, p.1.
Enforcement. The EU agreed not to take enforcement action against US companies
until after January of this year and as of the date of its report in February, the FTC' had taken
no enforcement action in regard to U.S. Safe Harbor companies. The EU took action in the
European Court of Justice in January of 2001 against Luxembourg, France and Ireland for
not adopting the Directive as law. Those matters were still pending as of January of 2002.
Also, the country of Spain fined MicroSoft approximately $ 57,000 in early 2001 for an
alleged violation of the Directive. Christopher Terry, Clock Running on Time to Comply
with EU Privacy Directive, Chicago Lawyer, February 2002.
The Beat Goes On. Financial institutions were not included under the Safe Harbor
agreement between the U.S. and E.U. because the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was in the
process of being adopted by Congress. The U.S. banking industry's position is that the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act provides adequate protections to infonnation, however, many who
are watching the progress of this negotiation believe the European Commission will not
agree. In the meanwhile, the Commission has begun approving contract provisions, which if
inserted in a contract between the U.S. and E.U. party would satisfy the Directive. Another
approach by financial institutions is to adopt a sector-by-sector model contract being
proposed by industry associations in the United Kingdom and Gennany. One of the U.S.
banking industries most significant concerns regarding the Directive is the ability to use data
without consent to prevent fraud. Anandashankar Mazumdar, As U.S., EU Reengage on
Financial Privacy, Industry Argues Current Law is Good Enough, Electronic Commerce &
Law Report, Vol. 7, No. 15, p. 324, April 10, 2002. Other concerns by the financial industry
center on whether U.S. bank regulators would regulate financial institutions with respect to
privacy issues or some other regulator and the relationship between American and European
banking regulators with regard to privacy enforcement. Id.
Technology Solutions
While it seems that a significant portion of the population is focusing on legislative
approaches to privacy issues which have yet to come to fruition, the more technology
oriented population has been working on possible technological solutions. The World Wide
Web Consortium was fonned in 1994 to develop and promote common protocols to ensure
the ongoing evolution and interoperability of the Internet. www.w3.org. The World Wide
Web Consortium has developed an industry standard called the Platfonn for Privacy
Preferences Project ("P3P"), which is an automated way for a user to access and obtain
infonnation about a web site's privacy policy. www.w3.org/p3p/. P3P also enables a user
to take certain actions with respect to a web site, such as the ability to block the installation
of cookies. For the system to work, a web site must make its privacy policy P3P enabled.
Close to 500 web sites are using the protocol, including ffiM's and Microsoft's webs sites.
www.w3.org/P3P/compliance sites.
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Conclusion
Much has occurred in the privacy arena over the last two and one-half years. Slowly
but surely privacy issues are getting more attention and legislators are responding
accordingly. While for the last few years businesses have successfully fended off broad
privacy legislation, the regulation of privacy will undoubtedly come. Going forward,
businesses must accept the reality that the gathering and protection of private information
must be seriously addressed and tended to, and that such a task will now and in the
foreseeable future be a regular part of doing business.
LOUIMDMS/195061.1
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Box 1 IEthical prlnclpl•• of human subject research
Mark A. Rothstein and Phyllis Griffin Epps
Ethical and lega,LiJriplications
of pharmacQgenomics
might vary in frequency among different
population subgroups,. important social
issues arise in multi-ethnic countries, such as
the United States. Finally, phannacogenomics
will change the standard ofcare for pharma-
ceutical companies and health professionals,
including physicians and pharmacists.
This article provides an overview ofsome
ethical and social concerns that arise with the
integration ofpharmacogenomics into the
discoveryofdrugs and the practice ofpleven-
liveand therapeutic medicine. SpecificaD)', the
article addresses issues associated with the
design ofclinical trials, the relatively higher
cost of pharmaceuticals developed using
pharmacogenomics, and the allocation of
ethical and legal responsibility. The objective
is to highlight a few ofthe questions andchal-
lenges that will require further atte,ntion in
the near future.
A new model of cllnlCli. trill..
Pharmacogenomicspromises to reduce the
time and moneyrequ~ to develop adrug.
The abilltyto predietdrugefficacybygeno-
typing participants during the earlystages of
clinical trials ... for .. a drug would enable
researchers to recruit for latertrials9nly those
patients who, accordingto their genotype, are
likely to benefitfrom thedrur~As a result,
clinical trials could become smaller, cheaper
and faster to run.
The prospect ofclinical trials that are com-
posed ofsmaller groups with the same poly-
morphisms at one or more loci of interest
poses some risks, however. A group that
reflects the diversityofthe population yields
information on how a drug will behave in a
greater number ofpeople. Ifthe clinical trial
group is smaller, or .is. less genotypically
diverse, there is a grrJiter risk.that so.me side
effects will go undetected. So,the trials will
yield a greater quantity.and qualityofinfor-
mation, buton a sp18Iler.segrnentofthe popu-
lation.Whereas the conventional model yield-
ed information aboutharmfulside effects in a
greater proportion ofthe population, the con-
centration of individuals. pre-selected for a
favourable response under the newer model
might not produ~thesameinformation.
. Comparedwith.traditionaDydesigned human
clinical trials, genotype-specific human clini-
cal studies might besubject to equal orgreater
limitations in that the relatively short duration
ofthe study, combinedwith the narrowersub-
jectpopulation and smaller size, would hinder
the ability of the studies to identify rare or
delayed adverse reactions or drug
interaetionss.A drug could reach the market
with less information about the side effects or
risk ofhann frQm its·non-prescribed uses. An
and other technologies to construct clinical
trial groups that are composedofpeople most
likely to benefit from a particular drug. The
abilityto stteamline clinical trials bygenotyp-
ing will enable researchers to crescue' drugs
that could not beapproved under convention-
al models ofresearch trials. In other words,
drugs that were previously.rejected after giving
unacceptable rates ofadverse responses in tra-
ditionally constructed trials will yield lower
adverse-response rates after testing under the
new model, therebybecomil1g acceptable can-
didates for approval. Pbannamgenomics will
not only produce better drugs but also yield
greater efficiencyin the allocation ofresources
in drug development.
Other changes attributable to pharma-
cogenomics will.. be .less welcome.
Notwithstanding the increasingly efficient
research and development process, pharma-
cogenomic-based drugs will be ~xpen~ive,
because of, for example, the need to recoup
the cost ofinvestment in neW technologies.
The ability.to develop specializeddrugs that
are ultimately approved for smaller popula-
tions rather than for general use will fragment
the market for pharmaceuticals.Will a phar-
maceutical manufacturer react to this eco-
nomic reality in a way that better suits profit
margins· than health, and is that socially
acceptable? The use ofgroups in clinical trials
that are increasingly similar genotypically
raises several important ethical issues regard-
ing social inclusion and the adequacy ofcur-
rent regulatory frameworks. Because poly-
morphisms of pharmacological interest
In the United States, federal regulationS that govern human subject research stem from three
ethiQl1 principles that were identified in the Belmont Report: respectfor persons, beneficence .
and justKe26.~ a principle, respect for persons includes two moralrequimnents:
acknowledgement ofpersonal autonomy and protection ofindividuals with diminished
autonomy. In research that involves human subjects. the proper exercise ofautonomy demands
that research participants agree to enter into research voluntarily and with adequate information.
The participant's informed consent is essential. Beneficence also entails two requirements: do no
harm and maximize the possible benefi~ whUe minimizing the possible banns. Justice looks at
how to fairly distribute the benefits and burdensofresearch. In the context ofresearch on human
subjects, questions regarding how and why research participants are selected are important in
satisfying the principle of justice27•
Pharmacogenomics is changing the way that
drugs are developed, approved, marketed and
prescribed~ The objective of pharmacoge-
nomics is to define the pharmacological sig-
nificanceofgeneticvariation among individu-
als and to use this information in drug
discovery, thereby decreasing the number of
adverse drug responses that injure and kill
thousands each year·. Bydetermining which
genetic variations are likely to affect a~n's
ability to metabolize a drug, drug manufactur-
ers intend to develop more predictable and
effective therapeutic agents. Towards this end,
pharmaceutical companies are investing huge
amounts ofcapital in the technologies that
will revolutionize bothhow researchers identi-
fy drug targets and the amount oftime needed
to move a drug through development and
approval2.3. Pbannacogenomicspromises to
streamline the clinical trial phase of drug
development. Researchers hope to use knowl-
edge gained from high-throughput screening
Pharmacogenomics is the application of
genomics technology to the discovery and
development of drugs. A greater
understanding of the way in which
indMduais with a particular genotype
respond to a drug·allows manufacturers to
identify population subgroups that will
benefit most from a particular drug. The
increasing emphasis on phannacogenomics
isli~eIy to raise ethical and legal questions
regarding. among other things. the design of
research studies. the construction of dinical
trials and thepricing of drugs.
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Box 2 IPost-approval monitoring of pharmaceuticals
Despite continuing efforts to harmonizepharmaceuti~ regulations worldwidet the protection
afforded to populations from the risks attendant to drugs that have been approved, after testing in
smaller, less genotypically diverse cJh\ical t!ial groups, depends on the market, memberstate or
country at issue. ,_ - "-~;'~
United States: In additiol], to cliniCal trials, the Food and Drug Administration requires
manufaeturen to maintairi records ofclinical experience that would be relevant to determining
whether approval ofa drug should be withdrawn, and to submit adverse drug ftPOrts.
European Union (EU): For pharmaceuticals that have been approvedaccording to the
centralized approval process administered by the EU, the European Agency for the Evaluation
of Medicinal Produet5 and the Commission on Proposed Medicinal Products require that
reports on adverse reactions besubmitted everysix months for the first two years after approval.
Individual member states may have different guidelines in effect that override the guideUnes of
the European Agency.
Japan: Through the Pharmaceuticals Affairs Bureau, the MinistryofHealth and Welfare
requires the manufacturer to collect data on advene drug reactions and to submit products for re-
examination and re-evaluation.
unresolved issue is whether the ethical princi-
ples ofbeneficence (BOX 1) and non-malefi-
cenc~ (that is, not causing harm to others)
would preclude the deliberate inclusion of
anyone who is not likelyto respond favourably
to treatment. With the advent ofgenotype-
specific clinical trials; manufacturers and regu-
lators must be ready to carefullyevaluate post-
market data by strengthening the existing
guidelines for phase~or post-approval,clin-
ical tJ'ials2J.5.6-8 (BOX2).
As in other areas ofgenetic research that
involve human subjects, the likely effect of
pharmacogenomics on clinical trials raises
important questions regarding informed con-
sent, which might include considerations of
privacy and confidentiality'. Current ideas
regarding patient autonomy and informed
consent require that patients agree to enter
into research on the basis ofadequate infor-
mation regarding the risks and consequences
ofparticipation. Genotyping that is appropri- .
ate to pharmacogenomic research might not
produce information regarding susceptibilitY
to disease or early death, but it might reveal
evidence ofgenetic variation that could lead
to individuals being classified as 'difficult to
treat~ 'less profitable to treat'~ or 'more expen-
sive to treat'. The fear ofbeing so classified
could act as a barrier to the recruitment or
research participants. .
Fearofstigmatization might prove to be a
significant.barrier to participation in clinical
trials among members of population sub-
groups. Genetic variations ofpharmacologi-
cal significance are known to occur in varying
frequency in groups categorized by their eth-
nicitylO.ll. For example, different variants of
glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase (G6PD
- an enzyme critical for NADPH (nicoti-
namide-adenine dinucleotide phosphate
reduced) generation in mature red blood
cells) are found at a high frequency in African,
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Mediterranean and Asiatic populationsl2,
some of which disrupt the function of the
enzyme.AdeficiencyofG6PD can predispose
individuals from these populations .to: .
haemolytic anaeDUa, both in individuals with
loss-of-function G6PD mutations and in
The ability to develop
specialized drugs ... for
smaller populations .rather
than for general use will
fragment the market for
pharmaceuticals. Will a
pharmaceutical
manufacturer react to this
economic reality in a way
that better suits profit
margins than health ...?
response to some'drugs, such as the malarial
drug primaquinel3.Isoniazid isan anti-tuber-
culosis drug that is inactivatedbyacetylation;
its impaired metabolism byslow acetylation
causes it to accumulate to toxic levels.
Variation in the N-acetyl transferase 2
(NAT2) gene accounts for whether individu-
als are rapid or slowacetylatori of isoniazid,
as well as ofother therapeutic and carcino-
genic compounds14.About 50% of individu-
als in many Caucasian populations are geno-
typically slow acetylators of isoniazid, but
more than 80% of individuals in certain
Middle Eastern populations and fewer than
20% in the Japanese population have the slow
acetylator phenotype13.
G-34
The significance ofdata that impJya role
for ethnicity in research has been a source of
considerable debate among the research
ethics communityl5. One issue is how to
advise potential research participants about
the possibility ofsocial harms from group-
based findings even where the research is con-
ducted without using the names ofpartici-
pants. Another matter ofconsiderabledebate
in the literature is whether it is necessary or
fea!iible to engage in communityconsultation
when genetic research focuses on socially or
politicallydistinct population subgroUpsl5.16.
Cost ... barrier to ecc...
Pharmacogenomic drugs will be expensive,
cheaper clinical trials notwithstandiqgl7.
Collectively, the pharmaceutical industry is .
investing huge amounts oftime and money
in the development ofnew technologies that
will yield drugs that are more effective than
those already availableZ.Without the opportu-
nity to recoup their investment, drugcompa-
nies will not continue their efforts. At the
same time, insurance systems and consumers
are struggling to absorb the riSing costs of
pharmaceutical productsl " I'.
Pharmacogenomics is based on the idea
that pharmaceuticalco~umers will be better
served by drug therapy once they have been
subdivided by genotype and matched with
the most suitable drug. Prom the industry
perspective, the subdivision ofa market into
smaller markets ishardly ideal7• Incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to invest time,
effort and resources into the development of
drugs to treat limited populations are few
compared with the development ofdrugs to
treat more prevalent genotypes in the context
ofpharmacogenomics. Most drug mmpanies
might be expected to direct their resources
towards the development ofdrugs to treat the
more prevalent genotypes.
Those groups characterized by less-prof-
itable genotypes are at riskofbecoming thera-
peuticcorphans'. At present, pharmaceuticals
for rare diseases are termedcorphan drugs~20.
The United States and Japan have enacted leg-
islation to stimulate research and the develop-
ment oforphan drugs through market mecha-
nisms, such as.tax-based cost incentives and
time-limited monopolies20, with varying
degrees ofgovernmental intervention. Canada,
Sweden, France, the United Kingdom and
other countries relyon broader national drug
policies based on moresubstantial governmen-
tal intervention. The European Union has
entertained initiatives to stimulate1egislative
action on orphan drugs, and the Eu~opean
Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products has a provjsion that exempts drug
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companies from having to payapplication fees
to develop a drug if it is an orphan drug (see
link to The European Commission's report pn
orphan medicinal products). Despi!E~"­
tions ofoverpricingoforphan~ under the
American model19, nearly a.Il effortS have.been
followed bya measurable-fucrease in the num-
ber of drugs that have been developed and
approved for the treatment ofrare diseases2 l •
& clinical trials increasinglyconsist ofgeneti-
cally non-diverse groups, policy makers will
need to consider whether to expand the con-
cepts underlyingorphan drug policies to stim-
ulate research into and the development of
drugs for populations who, byvirtue oftheir
genetic make-up, face inequities in drugdevel-
opment efforts.
Cost might act as a barrier to access to
phannacogenomics in that the cost ofpartici-
pating in clinical trials orofthe resulting drug
'\herapymight be excluded from insurance
coverage. Particularly in the United States,
where managed care systems attempt to con-
tain costs by rationing medical services, pub-
lic and private third-party payers have refused
or been reluctant to payfor treatments that
they deem cexperimental' or not cmedically
necessary'22.23. Increasingly, these terms have
more political than legal or medical signifi-
cance. There is some evidence that the insur-
ers' disinclination to cover expenses that are
associated with new drug therapies can be
countered by high physician or consumer
demand for the new drug21. If consumers
must absorb rising. pharmaceutical costs,
pharmacogenomics will not introduce new
questions so much as it will intensifyexisting
ones about equitable access to medical care.
Prof...IoMI "'ndald. of CIIF8
As pharmacogenomic-based drugs enter into
the marketplace, physicians will encounter
alternatives to conventional drug therapy and
prescription practices. Although the evalua-
tion ofgenetic variation amongpatients to
determine proper medication and dosage
during the course of treatment is not the
standard ofcare at present, ethical concerns,
economic considerations and the threat of
malpractice liability are likely to encourage
physicians to begin testing for arid prescrib-
ing medications designed for use by specific,
smaller groups of individuals. Moral and eth-
ical proscriptions against causing harm
might require a physician to integrate phar-
macogenetics into clinical practice where
necessaryto·minimize risk to a patient. By
contrast, budgetary constraints imposed by
insurers could slow the acceptance ofdrugs
developed through pharmacogenomics by
limiting their use by physicians and their
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availability to patients. The issues raised are
D9t unique to pharmacogenomics but do
.fequire new applications ofethical principles
and legal doctrine.
In countries where the legal systems are
based on common law (that is, the English·
tradition oflaw-making based on the court
decisions ofjudges), physicians and pharma-
cistsare subject to liability under theories of
negligence, which involve the violation ofa
duty based on acreasonableness' standardora
standard ofreasonable care. The s~dard of
care is defined by how a similarly qualified
practitioner would act in treating a patient
under the same orsimilarcircumstances. The
literature, which includes professional schol-
arship and guidelines published by profes-
sional societies, andclinical experience estab-
lish the standard ofcare. In cases based on
negligence in the form ofmedical malprac-
tice, the standard ofcare is defined through
the testimony ofwitnesses regarding what
constitutes conventional practice within the
medicalcommuni~
Genotyping appropriate to
pharmacogenomic research
may not produce
information regarding·
susceptibility to disease or
early death, but it may
reveal evidence of genetic
variation that could lead.to
individuals being classified
as ... less profitable ... or
(more expensive to treat'.
As phannacogenomic-baseddrugs inaease
in prevalence over the next several years, the
useofgenotyping or genetic testing as a diag-
nostic tool and the prescription ofmedications
based on genotypic information will become
thestandard ofcare for physicians. Physicians
and pharmacists mightbesubject to liability if
they lack sufficient knowledge ofgenetics to
adequately interpretdiagnostic tests, prescribe
appropriate pharmacogenomic-based drug
therapy in proper dosages, consider pharma-
cogenomic-based drug interactions,orproper-
lydispense pharmacogenomic-based prescrip-
tions. With greater knowledge comes greater
responsibility. Pharmaoogenomics might pro-
vide greater information about the likelihood
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ofa drug being effective or causingadverse
reactions in persons possessing a particular
genetic characteristic, and will certainlyyield
drugs that are more likelyto be suitable for
smaller, specific groups of individuals. By
increasing the information available for con-
sideration in drog therapyand·the importance
ofmatching the right drug to the rightperson,
pharmacogenomics will raise the standard of
care applicable to all involved in the safe pre-
saiption anddistrIbutionofpharmacegticals.
Pharmacists are primarilycharged with
the dispensation ofprescriptions as admin-
istered by physicians, but the sCope oftheir
responsi~ilitieshas expanded over time to
include ensuring that prescriptions ,and
patient directions are correct and appropri-
ate. Pharmacists also have a duty to warn
their customers of the potential adverse
effects or other problems associatedwith.a
prescribed drug therapy. Even ifa pharma-
cist has dispensed a prescription according
to a physician's instructions, some jurisdic-
tions have imposed liabilityon pharmacists
for the harm that resulted from a drug that
was properly dispensed in accordance with
an improper or harmful prescription24• As
information regarding the genotype ofan
individual becomes increasingly important
to safe prescription and dosage, pharmacists
might be charged with greater knowledge of
their customers'genetic information than
they now require. The increased amount of
genetic information in pharmacies raises
privacy and confidentialityconcerns, espe-
cially where pharmacists belong to large
pharmacy chains or corporations with
widely accessible, centralized records. For
physicians and pharmacist$,the issue of
continuingprofessional education and
record maintenance will become more
important, not only for improving compe-
tence but also for preventing liabili~
Pharmacogen0mics islikelytoinaease the
burden shared by the pharma.ceutical indus-
try to provide adequate wamiJlgs ofthe limi-
tations and dangers oftheirproduets. In the
United States, for example, pharmaceutical
manufacturers have a duty to warn physicians
about any known or knowable risks, or dan-
gers, ofthe use ofa manufactured drug. Many
states in the US will impose strict liabilityon a
drug companyfor harm causedbythe failure
to adequately warn against the dangerous
propensities ofa drug that it has manufac-
tured. Unlike negligence theory, the rules of
strict liability are not concerned with the stan-
dard of care nor the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct; and an aggrieved
party need only prove that the manufacturer
did not adequatelywarn ofa pa~icular risk
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Physicians· and pharmacists
migJtt be subject to liability
if they lack suffic:ient
knowledge of genetics to
adequately interpret
diagnostic tests, ... , or
properly dispense
pharmacogenomic-based
prescriptions. With greater
knowledge comes greater
responsibility.
thatwas knowable in the light of generally
recognized and prevailing best scientific and
medical knowledge'available at the time of
manu&cture and distnbution. Pharmaceutical
companies must consider the potential for lia-
bility ifpatients are harmedbecause theywere
excluded from the subgroup for which a
pharmacogenomic-based drug is deemed safe
and efficacious, particularly if the exclusion
leads to aJailureto yield information on pos-
sible side effects or alternative therapies. Not
all adverse side effects are predictable, owing
to· the number of genes relevant to drug
responsiveness, as well as environmental fac-
tors'.The question is how to allocater~n­
sibility for taking the greatest advantage of
drugs specialized to suit relatively smaller seg-
ments ofthe population.
In June 2000, four individuals filed a class
action lawsuit against SmithKline Beecham,
alleging that the manufacturer ofavaccine for
Lyme disease knew that some individuals
would be susceptible to arthritis on exposure
to the vaccine because oftheir genotype,but
failed to warn about this by labelling25. The
case is still pending. Similar cases involve mal-
practice actions bythe patient against the pre-
scribing physician, who in tum seeks to
recover against the manufacturer for failure to
provide ad~quate information..Put simply,
pharmacogenomics will'raise the legal stakes
for all involved whenever a patient suffers
adverse reactions from the use ofa drug that
might have been contraindicated basedon his
or her genotype.
Conclusion
By lessening the uncertainty associated with
the selection ofdrug targets and the design of
human clinical studies in the development of
new drugs, pharmacogenomics will result in
the production ofsafer, more effective drugs
f9r use in therapeutic medicine. The integra-
:~tion ofpharmacogenomic technology into
the drug development process and the prac-
tice ofmedicine will require consideration of
ethical, social and legal questions. Answers to
these questions might well determine the
level ofsocial acceptance and realization of
the benefits ofpharmacogenomic technology.
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Years ago, attorneys did not publicly discuss compensation for legal work. Yet, by
the mid-eighties, Gilson and Mnookin noted a change in the profession regarding
discussion of compensation with the comment that "yesterday's taboo has become
today's fixation." See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Symposium on the
Law Firm as a Social Institution: Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37
Stan. L. Rev. 313 (1985).
This statement may apply exponentially regarding the practice of investing in clients.
I. Background
In recent years, for a variety of reasons, some lawyers have turned to the option of
taking an ownership interest in the client business. See Jason M. Klein, No Foolfor a
Client: The Finance and Incentives Behind Stock-Based Compensation for Corporate
Lawyers, 1999 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 329. See also Debra Baker, Who Wants to be a
Millionaire, 86 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 36. Generally, lawyers did not use such
schemes before the 1990s. See John C. Coffee, The New Compensation, N.Y.L.J.,
Mar. 16, 2000, at 5. In some areas of the country, the practice may have been more
common earlier. See Shawn Neidort: Silicon Valley Lawyers Embrace VC-Like Role,
Venture Capital Journal, Oct. 1999, at 35.
One in three lawyers representing the more than 500 companies in Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs) in 1999 held stock in that company at the time of the IPO. Sixty-
three law firms handled the 500 IPOs. Those lawyers held stock in 174 of the
companies. As of the time of an ABA study, the lawyers' investments in forty percent
of the companies were worth over one million dollars each. Nine investments
exceeded ten million each. See Debra Baker, Who Wants to be a Millionaire, 86
A.B.A. J., Feb. 2000, at 36.
B-1
At the end of 1999, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, the California finn most often
associated with the concept of investing in clients, held stock worth $230 million in
newly-public clients. That amount divided into $1.9 million per partner. Renee
Deger, Taking Stock: Hitting the Jackpot, Recorder, Jan. 6, 2000, at 1, cited by
Royce De R. Barondes, Professionalism Consequences of Law Finn Investments in
Clients: An Empirical Assessment, 39 Am. Bus. L. J. 379 (2002).
Yet, many nascent businesses fail. Less that ten percent of start up companies ever
reach the initial public offering stage. See Mark Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The
Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in
Silicon Valley, 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 679 (1996). Even if the company gets past
the IPO stage, chances are that the investment will not yield a return. Nelson D.
Schwartz, The Ugly Truth About IPOs, Fortune, Nov. 23, 1998, at 190.
Even after the sharp downturn of the market, lawyers have continued to be interested
in investing in clients. See Francy Blackwood, Lawyers Take Long View and Put
Stock in Clients, S.F. Bus. Times, June 16, 2000. See also Krischer Goodman, Some
Entrepreneurs are Replacing Cash with Equity when Seeking Legal Help: Start Ups
and the Law, San Diego Union-Trib., June 11, 2000. ("The volatility will change our
thinking process, but it won't scare us off. We won't get out of the service-for-stock
business. We'll just be much more selective about what kind of companies we take
equity positions [in] in the future.") (quoting Eliot Abbott of Kluger, Peretz, Kaplan
& Berlin).
II. Forms of Arrangements With Clients
A. Equity as Compensation
1. Equity for Fees
The lawyer agrees to do the work but instead of receiving money, the
lawyer receives stock. If the company is ultimately successful, the
lawyer will be well-compensated for the lawyer's efforts. If the
company is not successful, the lawyer has agreed to no payment. This
arrangement is much like a traditional contingency fee.
2. Equity Plus an Hourly Fee at a Discounted Rate
Perhaps the lawyer agrees to do the work for a much lower than usual
hourly fee with the added compensation of equity. The lawyer
shoulders some risk ofnonpayment but is certain ofpartial payment.
B-2
3. Equity Plus a Standard Hourly Fee
The equity premium may be consideration for the delay in obtaining
payment. The equity may be consideration for the entree the lawyer or
firm gives the company in the venture capital market or the
reputational benefit in general that comes from being represented by
that lawyer or firm.
B. Equity not as Compensation
1. Opportunity to Invest in Start-Ups as a Condition to Representation
The lawyer in demand might request an opportunity to invest as a
condition of representation but the equity is not linked to
compensation for the legal work performed.
2. Lawyers Buy Stock in On-Going Client Enterprises
III. Motivations
A. Client Access to Legal Services
Taking an ownership interest in the client in exchange for services provides
for payment of the lawyer but at the same time does not call for the client to
expend sums it does not yet have. Like contingency fees, the stock approach
to payment for legal services allows clients to obtain legal services when the
client might not otherwise be able to do so.
B. Access to Legal Advice Plus
In addition to legal advice, lawyers invested in the company tend to be more
involved in the business decisions. See Poonam Puri, Taking Stock ofTaking
Stock, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 99 (2001).
C. Vote ofConfidence
Clients like the notion that the lawyer doing the client's work believes in the
client. The lawyer who agrees to be paid in stock in the client is showing
confidence in the client.
D. Potentialfor a Healthy Paycheckfor the Lawyer
Lawyers like the potential for financial rewards but not necessarily the
potential for financial penalty. Apparently, some firms see the opportunity to
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share in clients' equity as a way to keep good lawyers from jumping ship and
going in-house with clients.
IV. Investment Vehicles
A. Individual Lawyer
The lawyer, whether s/he is in a finn or not, does the legal work and also does
the investing. The lawyer decides how much and when.
B. Investment Pool
The lawyer's finn might have an investment pool. Investments would be
subject to a committee approval and subject to guidelines as to lawyer
involvement and appropriate size of the equity holding. The pool, not the
lawyer, would hold the investment.
c. Outside Investment Vehicle
Usually, finns that have an outside-the-finn investment vehicle use a limited
liability company fonn. Unfortunately, some finns have so many partners
that the limited liability company may be subject to the Investment Company
Act of 1940. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l. Compliance with the Act can be very
burdensome.
V. Ethical Concerns: Introduction
Some lawyers, uncomfortable with any payment scheme that is not tied to the billable
hour, have not ventured into taking stock in clients. Other attorneys have worried that
such an arrangement creates insurmountable ethical problems, regardless of whether
the equity is compensation for legal services or not.
The ethics issues involve several different ethical principles represented in Kentucky
by Rules 1.8(a), 1.5, 1.7(b), and 2.1. (Note that Kentucky's ethics rules are contained
in the Kentucky Supreme Court Rules at Rule 3.130.)
In 2000, the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 00-418 in which the Committee concluded that
taking stock in a client as a form of payment can be ethical if the lawyer takes proper
precautions with regard to these ethical rules.
Other ethics committees have addressed the issue and have issued the following
opInIons:
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Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof. & Judicial Ethics,
Formal Ope 2000-3 (2000);
D. C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm. Op. 300 (2000);
Miss. Bar Ope 230 (1995);
Utah Op. 98-10 (1998); and
Va. Op. 1593 (1994).
VI. Ethical Concerns: Any Compensation for Legal Services Must be a Reasonable
Fee
A. Rule 1.5(a) ofthe Rule ofProfessionaI Conduct
Rule 1.5(a) states:
"(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. Some factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment
will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
servIces;
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client;
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent."
Comment 2 to Rule 1.5(a): A fee paid in property "may be subject to special
scrutiny because it involves questions concerning both the value of the
services and the lawyer's special knowledge of the value of the property."
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B. Factors in the Stock Payment Scenario
Obviously, if the lawyer has agreed to equity in exchange for legal services, a
big factor is the risk that the stock ultimately will be worth nothing. The
lawyer who agrees to do the legal work in exchange for a share of the stock of
the company is taking a huge risk that s/he will never realize the value of the
legal services. The lawyer who agrees to do the work at a discounted rate plus
equity also takes a risk, but does have the possibility, though not certainty, of
some payment for the legal work. The lawyer who receives equity on top of
standard fee takes the risk of reputational injury if s/he is perceived to have
backed a losing enterprise.
Other factors that must be considered in determining reasonableness of a stock
for fee arrangement:
1. whether the stock can be publicly traded,
2. when the stock can be traded,
3. other restrictions on transfer, and
4. presently anticipated value.
See Utah Op. 98-13 (1998).
C. Time ofJudging Fairness
The determination of reasonableness must be judged by facts known at the
time of the agreement. See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 126, cmt. e, which states, "Fairness is determined based on facts
that reasonably could be known at the time of the transaction, not as facts later
develop." This stance is consistent with how contingent fees are judged. See
Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies, 37 V.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 29 (1989).
D. How Can a Stock Fee Be Reasonable?
Determine what would be a reasonable fee under 1.5(a) and then make the
agreement give the attorney stock worth that amount at the time of the
agreement. The stock should "be valued at the amount per share that cash
investors, knowledgeable about its value, have agreed to pay for their stock
about the same time." ABA Op. 00-418.
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If the stock does not have an ascertainable value, the agreement can award the
attorney a percentage of the stock that represents the value that the legal
services will "contribute to the potential success of the enterprise." ABA Op.
00-418.
E. The Condition ofan Opportunity to Invest
If the lawyer demands an opportunity to invest as a condition of taking the
client, one must ask what the client is buying by "paying" the opportunity. If
Rule 1.5(a) applies to this setting, note that the "fee" is the opportunity, not
simply the investment.
F. Rule 1.5(b) Requires Communication ofthe Details
The Rule states:
"(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate
of the fee should be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before
or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation."
VII. Ethical Concerns: A Stock Transaction with a Client or Prospective Client Must
Abide by Rule 1.8(a), Which Deals with Business Transactions with Clients
A. TheRule
Rule 1.8(a) states:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be
reasonably understood by the client;
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of
independent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) The client consents in writing thereto.
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B. The Rule Applies to Stock Transactions
ABA Fonnal Opinion 00-418 states that an agreement with a client to be paid
by stock in the client is clearly a business transaction with the client governed
by 1.8(a). See also Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers §
126, cmt. a and G. C. Hazard & W. W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering (3d
Ed. 2001) § 12.4.
This rule does not apply when the lawyer gets the stock on the open market or
any other way that does not directly involve the client.
Note that the ABA recently issued an opinion clarifying that a contractual
security interest obtained by a lawyer to secure a fee must abide by Rule
1.8(a) as well. See ABA Op. 02-427.
C. There Must Be Full Disclosure in Writing So that the Transaction is
Understandable to the Client
Match the disclosure to the sophistication of the client.
General disclosure requires discussion of
"1. the nature of the transaction and each of its tenns;
2. the nature and extent of the lawyer's interest in the transaction;
3. the ways in which the lawyer's participation in the transaction
might affect the lawyer's exercise of professional judgment in
concurrent legal work for the client, if any;
4. the desirability of the client's seeking independent legal advice if
the client is not already independently represented; and
5. the nature of the respective risks and advantages to each of the
parties to the transaction."
C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (1986) § 8.11.4, at 484-85 (footnotes
omitted).
The required disclosure includes a discussion of potential effects. If the
lawyer's interest will limit the client's control of the corporation, the lawyer
must explain this to the client. If the lawyer is acquiring rights not shared by
stockholders generally, the lawyer should explain this.
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The lawyer must explain that the lawyer's ownership can create conflict of
interest problems for the lawyer in the future. The lawyer must explain that it
is possible that the attorney will be tom between acting in the best interest of
the corporation and maximizing his own share value. Note that this is
especially an issue when the client does poorly. The lawyer should explain
that if the conflict manifests, the attorney may feel the need to withdraw
completely or with regard to the issue in which the conflict has arisen. See
Rule 1.16(b) on the right ofpermissive withdrawal.
Full disclosure requires a clear statement of the services to be provided in
exchange for the stock and a clear statement of the terms of the stock
payment. For example, if the stock is to be nonrefundable regardless of the
amount of work done, the agreement needs to clearly so state. (Note that some
courts, but not in Kentucky (KBA E-380), have found nonrefundable fees
contrary to public policy unless the fee is a true retainer--payment to take the
matter and to be available. See In re Cooperman, 83 N.Y.2d 465, 611
N.Y.S.2d 465, 633 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1994».
A recent amendment to the Model Rules (not yet adopted in Kentucky)
requires that the client give informed consent "in a writing signed by the
client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the
transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the
transaction."
D. Advice About Independent Counsel
The client must be told of the right to consult other independent counsel.
Actual consultation with independent counsel is not required. The lawyer
might protect against future claims by having the client state in writing that
the client declined from obtaining advice from independent counsel.
See Passante v. McWilliam, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1240, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 298 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997). A lawyer for a corporation could not recover $33 million in
stock in connection with legal services because the lawyer failed to advise the
board of directors prior to the authorization of the stock deal that the board
should consult independent counsel.
A recent amendment to the Model Rules (not yet adopted in Kentucky)
requires that the client be advised "in writing of the desirability of seeking"
independent legal advice.
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E. Burden ofProving Validity
If the agreement is ever questioned in the future, the burden will be on the
attorney to prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable and in
accordance with 1.8(a). Attorneys should take special care to document the
circumstances of the transaction at the time of the agreement. See In re
Robins Co., 86 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1996). See also Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers § 126 and cmt. e.
***Give the client a choice.
VIII. Enforcement of the Contract as a Matter of Common Law
The relationship of attorney and client is fiduciary in nature. Thus, the lawyer is
presumed to have used undue influence in any contractual arrangement with a client.
As the Kentucky Court stated in Hunt v. Picklesimer, 162 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1942),
"Even where a conveyance by a client to his attorney is fair upon its face, it is
presumptively invalid, and the burden of establishing its fairness is upon tl;1e
attorney." See also Gold v. Greenwald, 55 Cal. Rptr. 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966);
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 126 and cmt. b. If the
lawyer cannot rebut the presumption, the contract is voidable. See generally Joseph
M. Perillo, The Law ofLawyers' Contracts Is Different, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 443
(1998).
IX. Rule 1.8(j)
Rule 1.80) states:
"A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action of subject
matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case."
This rule may be relevant in rare cases. For example, if the corporation has one asset,
and that asset is a claim or property right that is the subject of a pending or expected
law suit, Rule 1.80) may be applicable. If the stock represents a reasonable
contingent fee, 1.80) would not be relevant.
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x. Conflicts of Interest
A. Possible Scenarios
1. Scenario 1: The IPO
"Flipping through the morning's correspondence deposited in his in-
box, Tom Esquire shuffles past envelopes containing plane tickets to a
client meeting in New York, an invitation to speak at a conference in
Washington, and a chipper notice announcing his twenty-five year
high school reunion. Arriving at a gusset-sized envelope from a nearby
venture capital firm, Tom stops his shuffling. He slices through the
creased flap with his Waterford crystal letter opener and pulls forth the
draft offering statement for his new client, Cashout-Dot-Com.
Thumbing through the first few pages of the statement, Tom smiles at
how the success of this new client will provide him with a proportional
windfall. Tom's compensation package for his work on the deal
includes eight percent of the stock that he arranged to issue to the
incorporators of the company. Cashout-Dot-Com received its Angel
financing and substantial venture financing in its first venture capital
round. The venture capitalists are eager to take the company public.
The market for IPO issues seems strong, and the public offering is set
at 100 million dollars with the closing to occur in two weeks. Tom is
overwhelmed with pride in helping to facilitate this potential success,
and even more overwhelmed at the prospect of finally breaking free of
the shackles of his personal line of credit, so frequently strained since
the spring that his daughter was accepted at Stanford.
"Just then, Tom receives a telephone call from Washington. Cashout-
Dot-Corn's principal patent application has just been made the subject
of an interference proceeding with a patent application filed by a
competitor dot com company. Furthermore, the Patent Office has
named Cashout-Dot-Com's inventor as the junior party. As a junior
party, Tom's client will have the burden of proof to show that his
company invented first. Tom looks more intently at the draft offering
statement on his desk. The draft statement includes a section on patent
filings, but nothing about the interference. "Investors will want to
know about this," Tom thinks to himself. Then the phone rings again.
It's Victor Ventura, senior partner in the venture capital firm. Tom tells
him about the pending interference.
"Victor exclaims, 'We don't have to put that in there because you're
going to win that one for us, aren't you Tom?'
"Tom explains, 'As junior party, this is a tough hill to climb.'
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"Victor's response is immediate and authoritative: 'If we put THAT in
the statement, this deal may not go. We've got to have an opinion letter
from a top-drawer firm like yours that we will win the interference.'
"The phone call ends. Tom slumps in his chair. If he writes a strong
opinion letter, the client will think that his firm will win the
interference. If he hedges too much, the deal might not go. He doesn't
even have enough time before the closing to interview all the principal
individuals, analyze the competitor's legal and factual position, and
determine the strength of the evidence and the law supporting
Cashout-Dot-Com's date of invention. Tom now realizes that his
opinion letter is going to be a second-class piece of work. He wishes
that he could just pick up the phone, call Victor and say, 'No, we're not
going to give an opinion like that.'
"The phone rings again. It's Cashout-Dot-Com's founder. He says,
'Tom, I just talked with Mr. Ventura. He said that this market may
have only a short window for doing this IPO, and that you are working
on getting the disclosure issues resolved in time. I'm glad we have you
to solve these problems.'
"Tom's throat suddenly feels very dry. He can hardly choke out a soft
'thank you,' before hanging up. Tom now realizes his problem. If he
had this work on an hourly basis, he would have told Victor 'no way!'
without much hesitation ten minutes ago. After all, he has walked
away from other client schemes in the past even though the lost fees
could have amounted to twenty-five, fifty, or even a hundred thousand
dollars. But this one was much harder. In two weeks he would go from
a barely positive net worth to never having to work again. He would
COUNT. He would be one of the PLAYERS, not just a spectator in
the game. He could be worth five to eight million at the moment of
issuance, and maybe worth twenty million at the end of the first day's
run-up.
Tom knows what is wrong. He has lost his independence. He can no
longer provide effective legal advice. He's not practicing a profession
now. He's just trying to make money."
Robert C. Kahrl & Anthony T. Jacono, "Rushes to Riches" The Rules ofEthics
and Greed Control in the Dot.Com World, 2 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 51
(2001).
2. Scenario 2: The Merger
Genius and Greedy start Zoom Company. "Times are hard and
Greedy thinks that Zoom should merge with Big Pharma Corporation.
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Greedy offers Stock, Fore, Feis LLP one percent of all the stock
options in the company to handle the legal aspects of the merger. The
attorney at Stock, Fore, Feis LLP recognizes that if Big Pharma
acquires Zoom, their stock options will probably immediately vest at
three to five times any potential Zoom IPO price. Stock, Fore, Feis
LLP agrees to handle the merger on these terms and soon Big Pharma
arrives at Zoom for a visit. Genius is shocked and exclaims, 'What are
those suits doing here!' The attorney tries to calm Genius and to
explain the merger negotiations, but Genius adamantly refuses. 'I
worked for that company to help mankind and I'll not involve people
like them!' The attorney at Stock, Fore, Feis LLP now faces losing the
entire deal, not to mention their only chance at finally getting a good
price for all the stock options the firm has accepted. However, if it
came down to a vote, Stock, Fore, Feis LLP now has the deciding vote
in Zoom and can override Genius. The law firm owns one percent and
Genius and Greedy own equal parts of the remainder ofZoom."
Susan A. McQuiston, Ethical Issues in the Acceptance of Stock Options as
Fee Paymentsfor Legal Work, 6 Intell. Prop. L. Bull. 21 (Spring 2001).
3. Other Possibilities
--Conflicts with creditors of the client
--Conflicts with other classes of shareholders
--Conflicts with other constituencies
--Conflicts with venture capitalists
--Conflicts with serial entrepreneurs
--Conflicts in representation ofcompetitors
B. The Lawyer as Advisor
Rule 2.1 states:
"In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional
judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer
not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social
and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."
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C. The Basic Conflict Rule
Rule 1.7(b) states:
"(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall
include explanation of the implications of the common representation
and the advantages and risks involved."
Rule 1.7, comment 3 states, in part:
"Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider,
recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because
of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests."
Rule 1.7, comment 4 states:
"A client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However,
as indicated ... in paragraph (b)(l) with respect to material limitations on
representation of a client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the
client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the
lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement, or provide
representation on the basis of the client's consent. When more than one client
is involved, the question of conflict must be resolved as to each client.
Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the
disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer
represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses to
consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an
informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent."
A revised Rule 1.7 has been adopted by the ABA but not yet by Kentucky.
The revised rule states:
"(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client
if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another
client; or
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(2) there is significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same
litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing."
New Comment 14 states, in part:
"Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict.
However, as indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable,
meaning that the lawyer cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide
representation on the basis of the client's consent. "
New Comment 15 states:
"Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of
the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their
informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus,
under paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the
lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1(competence) and Rule
1.3 (diligence)."
D. Application
Owning stock in a client does not create an inherent conflict of interest.
Usually, the lawyer's interest in stock value and the corporation's interest are
consistent.
Conflicts can occur, however. In such a situation, the lawyer must consider:
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1. the lawyer's ability to render judgment uninhibited by personal
concerns and
2. the value of the lawyer's advice given the fact that others may know
of the lawyer's interest.
"A partner at one of these firms recently told friends that in 1999 his firm's
stock portfolio grew by over $2 million per partner-more by a significant
margin than the firm's per partner earnings from the practice of law. At this
point, such a firm truly does become 'mUltidisciplinary,' with portfolio
management being its principal business and legal practice becoming a
secondary activity." John C. Coffee Jr., The New Compensation, 223
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 16, 2000, at 5.
E. In-House Counsel Conflict
The issue for in-house attorneys may be even more difficult. Think about the
conflicts created by Mark Belnick's situation at TYCO International Ltd. Mr.
Belnick was general counsel. (He has been indicted for falsifying business
records to conceal more than $14 million in loans he obtained from TYCO.
Belnick received a salary of $700,000, a signing bonus of $300,000, a $1.5
million bonus in 1999, a $4 million bonus in 2000, and $34 million from the
sale of restricted shares. See Laurie P. Cohen, Tyco's Top Lawyer Joins CEO
on Hot Seat, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 13, 2002.
F. Proofofthe Conflict's Effect?
A recent article empirically examines the effect investment in clients has on
the legal service rendered. The author reported that law firm investment in
clients issuing stock may reduce the amount of negative disclosure in IPO
prospectuses. The result is that the public interest is injured. See Royce De
R. Barondes, Professionalism Consequences of Law Firm Investments in
Clients: An Empirical Assessment, 39 Am. Bus. L.J. 379 (2002).
SEC rules require disclosure in the prospectus of all material information.
One of the roles of lawyers in this process is the rendering of an opinion that
states that the IPO prospectus is not misleading. Barondes considered whether
lawyer ownership of stock in the client affected the disclosure by causing less
disclosure, burying the disclosure, or limiting the due diligence investigation.
Barondes compared the estimated IPO price that existed prior to due diligence
by lawyers and the actual IPO price. Barondes performed a regression
analysis regarding his hypotheses.
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Barondes based his analysis in part on the idea that a lawyer who is
improperly swayed by equity ownership has little risk of punishment. While
it is theoretically possible for a lawyer to be held responsible for inadequate
securities disclosure, that penalty is not likely. Thus, other than professional
morality, there are no significant restraints on fudging behavior.
1. Lawyers are subject to Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 only
with regard to portions of the prospectus included on the authority of
the lawyer as an expert. Usually, this applies to the description of the
validity of the securities issued, the description of tax consequences, or
unusual descriptions of legal matters.
2. Lawyers are not liable under Section 12 of the 1933 Act because
they, generally, are not offering the securities nor are they selling
them.
3. Lawyers could be liable under 10b-5 as a primary violator. Some
courts may have viewed a lawyer's acts in drafting documents as the
basis of a primary violation. See Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd.,
941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); Molecular Technology Corp. v.
Valentine, 925 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1991).
The Supreme Court has held that there is no private cause of
action against one who "aids and abets" a violation of 10b-5.
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
Other courts have held that lawyers cannot be guilty of
conspiracy regarding 10b-5. Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff,
Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837 (2d Cir. 1998). See
also Mary M. Wynne, Comment, Primary Liability Amongst
Secondary Actors: Why the Second Circuit's "Bright Line"
Standard Should Prevail, 44 St. Louis L. J. 1607 (2000).
4. The SEC could bring a civil action against the lawyer as one who
"knowingly provides substantial assistance" to a violator. 15 U.S.C. §
78t(e).
5. The receiver appointed to run the law firm's former client could sue
for malpractice.
6. The SEC under Rule 102(e) could suspend a lawyer who has
engaged in unethical practice before the agency.
For a discussion of the increased liability the practice of investing in clients
creates, see Tanya Patterson, Note, Heightened Securities Liability for
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Lawyers Who Invest in Their Clients: Worth the Risk?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 639
(2002).
G. NASD Provisions
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) forbids underwriters
of IPOs to "payor allocate stock to any of its agents in the transaction,
specifically ... attorneys, if the transaction will qualify as a 'hot issue. If' Yet,
the attorney does not know in advance want will become a hot issue. John C.
Coffee, The New Compensation, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 16, 2000, at 5. See also
NASD Manual, Standards of Commercial Honor and Principals of Trade, IM-
2110-1, Free Riding and Withholding, Part (b), Violations of Rule 2110, Nov.
1998.
H Disclosure
Regulation S-K imposes an obligation on an issuer's law firm to disclose stock
ownership in an issuer. Item 403 of S-K requires disclosure of more than 5%
ownership of any class of a company's voting stock. 17 C.F.R. § 229.403.
Item 509 of Regulation S-K requires any expert or counsel who is to receive a
"substantial" interest in a company in connection with the offering provide a
brief statement of the interest in the related prospectus. "Substantial" is
greater than $50,000. 17 C.F.R. § 229.509.
L Methods ofLimiting the Potentialfor Problematic Conflict
1. limit investment to an insubstantial percentage of stock,
2. limit the amount invested to a nonmaterial sum,
3. have the supervisory responsible or billing partner not have a financial
interest in the client,
4. require executive committee approval of any investment in a client,
5. allot investments in nonpublic clients to partners or put the stock in a
pooled fund,
6. take care with regard to securities laws and regulations,
7. use limited liability companies for investments.
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Jodi Brandenburg & David Cohen, Going for the Gold: Equity Stakes in Corporate Clients,
14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1179 (2001).
Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 29 (1989).
John C. Coffee, The New Compensation, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 16, 2000, at 5.
Laurie P. Cohen, Tyco's Top Lawyer Joins CEO on Hot Seat, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 13,
2002.
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Control in the Dot. Com World, 2 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 51 (2001).
Jason M. Klein, No Fool for a Client: The Finance and Incentives Behind Stock-Based
Compensationfor Corporate Lawyers, 1999 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 329.
Gwyneth E. McAlpine, Comment, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should Lawyers Be
Allowed to Invest in Their Clients' Stock?, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 549 (1999).
Susan A. McQuiston, Ethical Issues in the Acceptance ofStock Options as Fee Payments for
Legal Work, 6 Intell. Prop. L. Bull. 21 (Spring 2001).
Shawn Neidorf, Silicon Valley Lawyers Embrace VC-Like Role, Venture Capital Journal,
Oct. 1999, at 35.
Tanya Patterson, Note, Heightened Securities Liability for Lawyers Who Invest in Their
Clients: Worth the Risk?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 639 (2002).
Poonam Puri, Taking Stock ofTaking Stock, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 99 (2001).
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(2001).
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c. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (1986) § 8.11.4 (footnotes omitted).
Mary M. Wynne, Comment, Primary Liability Amongst Secondary Actors: Why the Second
Circuit's "Bright Line" Standard Should Prevail, 44 St. Louis L. J. 1607 (2000).
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SECTION I
DotGone-The Death of DotComs
Bankruptcy Issues in a Technology Based Economy
By Charles R. Keetonl
I. Introduction
Throughout history (indeed, even before recorded historY), technological advances
have generated growth in specific sectors of the society or economy. In recent years,
however, technological advances in industry led the way in tenns of over all economic
growth.3 The last decade's acceleration in the United States economy was largely technology
based. The winners in the stock market for nearly a decade were not the brick and mortar
companies, but software companies, computer companies and dot.com startups.4 Electronic
media such as broadcasting, cable, satellites, telephony and computers were responsible for
much of the growth and rapid expansion in communications; computer and Internet
.industries made a major impact on the way business was conducted.5
But technology's impact on business is not new. For example, businesses have used
computers since the 1940's.6 The Internet as we now know it emerged in 1993. With great
1 A.B., summa cum laude, Marshall University, 1971; J.D., With High Distinction, University ofKentucky
College ofLaw, 1975. Mr. Keeton practices with Frost Brown Todd LLC and is resident in its Louisville,
Kentucky, office. Mr. Keeton expresses his gratitude to Jessica C. White, B.A./B.S., University ofArizona,
1995; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1998, for her assistance in preparing this paper.
2 See Diamond, J., Guns, Germs and Steel, The Fates of Human Societies (Norton Paperback 1999).
3 Slater, Eric S., Intellectual Property and Failed Dot-Coms: A New Type ofLaw Practice, Chemical
Innovation, December 2001, Vol. 31, No. 12, at 56.
4 Agin, Warren E., Reconciling Commercial Law and Information Techn'ology: An Essay on Bankruptcy
Practice During the Next Business Cycle, ABA Business Section Spring Meeting, March 25, 2000,
http://www.swiggartagin.com!articles/reconcile.html.p 1.
S Slater at 56.
6 Agin at 2.
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speed the Internet and other computer based technology was integrated into U.S. business. It
took radio 38 years to capture 50 million listeners, 13 years for television to reach that mark
but only four years for the Internet to hit 50 million users.? Today, the Internet consists of
millions of websites and hundreds of millions of people now use it. Ten years ago, some
attorneys even in major law firms did not use personal computers, e-mail or the Internet.
Today, all major firms and many other industries must use this technology to stay
competitive.8
Despite technology's impact on today's economy, many technology companies have
gone out of business and many investors have lost money. The list of failed dot.coms is
enormous and, consequently, an article written today listing the closings would become
outdated virtually by the time it is printed. Technology companies extending beyond the
dot.coms continue to announce massive layoffs, reorganizations and bankruptcies and the
Nasdaq continues to be in bear market territory.9 Though this downturn has been
aggravated by many other factors, such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a
weakened job market, and the decline in consumer confidence resulting from accounting
errors at WorldCom and the collapse of Enron, issues facing technology companies will
continue to playa major role in the economy as companies that are now on the cutting edge
are most likely to fail as the business cycle continues to tum downward. lo
7 Conrad, Francis G., Development: Dot. Coms in Bankruptcy Valuations Under Title 11 or WWlv.Snipehunt in
the Dark. noreorg/noassets. com, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 417 (2001).
8 Agin at 2.
9 Slater at 56-57.
10 Agin at 2.
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In the midst of these chaotic times for the technology sector, a new specialty is
emerging in the practice of law, which includes a mix of bankruptcy, corporate, and
intellectual property law. II Technology issues now playa major role in many bankruptcy
cases as new forms of technology become more pervasive in industry. When technology
companies, or simply companies using technology, go bankrupt, old fact patterns will give
rise to new issues as bankruptcy attorneys gain greater knowledge of and appreciation for
technology related issues.
II. Bankruptcy Law vs. Intellectual Property Law and Commercial Law
In general, Bankruptcy law is designed around commercial law concepts. It works
well when applied to traditional brick and mortar businesses defined by contract law and the
Uniform Commercial Code; however, its application to technology issues is often more
difficult or uncertain. 12
Any analysis in bankruptcy begins with identification and valuation of a company's
assets. Unlike the typical brick and mortar company, technology company assets are often
described as "virtual," consisting of largely intangible property.I3 Individual intangible
assets include computer software, proprietary technology, copyrights, patents, trademarks,
contracts, licenses, employee relationships, supplier relationships, data and customer lists. I4
These assets are generally intellectual property assets and any disposition of such assets will
employ intellectual property law principles.
11 Slater at 56-57.
12 Agin at 3.
13 Slater at 56-57.
14 Reilly, Robert F., Valuation ofDot-com and Intellectual Property-Intensive Companies, 2000 ABI JNL.
Lexis 101, October 2000. (Note: Many of the citations in this paper are to versions ofperiodicals on Lexis.)
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Unfortunately, the fundamental goals of intellectual property law often directly
conflict with bankruptcy law and credit law creating. uncertainty for creditors, lenders,
investors and the company itself. Bankruptcy law can undermine the protections granted by
intellectual property law and has the potential to undo legal protections and interfere with
incentives for the creation, cultivation, marketing and distribution of artistic works, brand
names, marks and inventions. In addition, the special protections afforded by copyright,
trademark, and patent laws impair the predictability that is necessary to the operation of the
credit system that finances creative works. IS
Federal bankruptcy law provides a procedure through which a debtor can obtain a
·"fresh start," through the liquidation of property and payment of claims or through
reorganization. Within bankruptcy, secured creditors who have perfected their interests
obtain priority, in the liquidation of claims, over other secured creditors who have failed to
perfect, and over all unsecured creditors with respect to the secured creditor's collateral.
Perfected secured creditors also receive priority with respect to their secured claims (to the
extent of the value of their collateralI6) in bankruptcy reorganizations. 17
Intellectual property law includes three broad areas under federal law: copyrights,
trademarks, and patentsI8 ; and covers several incidental areas under state law, such as trade
secret law and unfair competition law. The law of secured credit encompasses both state and
15 Ghosh, Shubha, The Morphing ofProperty Rules and Liability Rules: An Intellectual Property Optimist
Examines Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L. J. 99, 102-110 (1997).
16 See 11 U.S.C. § 506.
17 Ghosh at 122.
18 See the U.S. Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.), the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.) and the
Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.). Intellectual property in technology businesses also include domain
names, customer lists, customer information databases, trade secrets, online content and back-end systems,
among other things.
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federal law, but is largely state law. The primary body of state law being Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which governs the rights of secured creditors against the debtor
and other creditors. It follows that the biggest implications of Article 9 are for the federal
law of bankruptcy, in which many legal disputes between creditors and the debtor are
settled. 19
Intellectual property law and the law of secured credit present two different property
rights regimes with different goals and mechanisms. Intellectual property law protects
creative efforts and allows creators to exclude others from using the product of such efforts.
On the other hand, state credit law and federal bankruptcy law protect the interests that
creditors may have in a particular property against claims of the debtor and claims by other
creditors. In doing so, the law gives the creditor a property interest in the debtor's
property.20
Registration of intellectual property rights creates the right of the owner to sue for
infringement under federal law; however, filing a security interest secures the rights of a
creditor in a legal battle against an owner under state law. This paper will discuss certain
rights that exist under the two property systems and will highlight certain conflicts that occur
when these two systems interact.
III. The Bankruptcy Code
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code defines the property of a bankruptcy estate as
including "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property." This definition includes
intellectual property, of course. The Bankruptcy Code defines intellectual property as
19 Ghosh at 110.
20 Ghosh at 111-112.
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including any trade secret, any invention, process design or plant protected by title 35 of the
United Sates Code (patents), patent application, plant variety, work of authorship protected
by title 17 of the United States Code (copyrights), or mask work protected under chapter 9 of
title 17 of the United Sates Code.21 If intellectual property is included in the bankruptcy
estate, it is subject to being sold in ordinary course, or outside of ordinary course,
transactions or included in a reorganization plan.22 Applicable non-bankruptcy law,
however, governs the extent of the bankruptcy estate's interest in intellectual property.23
IV. Licenses
Technology transfers typically take the form of licenses. In many cases, the licensee
requires use of the licensed technology for its business operations.24 Bankruptcy courts
generally treat licenses as executory contracts because perfonnance is due from both parties
to the agreement.
Prior to 1988 licenses for the use of intellectual property received no special
treatment or protection under the Bankruptcy Code.25 In bankruptcy, in general the debtor
has a choice between keeping a license in effect by "assuming" it, or terminating the license
by "rejecting" it. If a debtor who is the licensor rejects the license, the debtor would then
21 11 U.S.C. § 10I(35A).
22 As will be discussed later in this paper, a bankruptcy debtor-in-possession authorized under 11 U.S.C. § 1108
to operate the debtor's business may use, sell, or lease property of the estate in the ordinary course ofbusiness;
and under 11 U.S.C. § 363, may even use, sell or lease property outside the ordinary course so long as the
requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 363 (including, for example, the requirement that the use occur only "after notice
and a hearing," which, as defined in the Bankruptcy Code, really means notice and an opportunity for a
hearing.)
23 Mills, Aleta A., Note & Comment: The Impact ofBankruptcy on Patent and Copyright Licenses, 17 Bank.
Dev. J. 575,576, Spring 2001.
24 Agin at 3-4.
25 Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Reorganizing Failing Businesses, Volume I, p. 26-1 (2002).
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have lost the license's benefit, and the licensee would have been left with a pre-petition
unsecured claim against the debtor.26 Allowing a debtor to legally breach the terms of its
license and leave the licensee with only a claim for damages as a remedy was potentially
very destructive; the license might have been so crucial that its termination would put the
licensee out of business, while the debtor and the other creditors gain only a comparatively
minor benefit.27 This course of action also had the effect of denying a licensee of use of
intellectual property that it specifically bargained to obtain.28
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, InC.),29 exemplified this issue as the Fourth Circuit took the position that the hann
caused to a licensee by rejection of a license was not relevant to the court's decision whether
or not to authorize rejection of the contract. The decision created significant business risks
for companies relying on licensed technology that were feared would chill technology
development and innovation.30 In response, Congress enacted the Intellectual Property
Licenses in Bankruptcy Act (codified as 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)) which allows certain licensees
to retain certain rights under a license despite a debtor's rejection of the license agreement in
bankruptcy.31· Most importantly, a licensee can retain the right to retain use of the licensed
intellectual property for the remaining term of the license if the licensee continues to pay
26 Id.
27 Again at 4.
28 Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP at 26-1.
29 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985); eerl. denied, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Canfield, Bankruptcy Trustee for
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 475 U.S. 1057, 106 S. Ct. 1285, 89 L.Ed.2d 592 (1986).
30 Agin at 4.
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
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royalties due under the license contract.32 Under Section 365(n), when a debtor-licensor
rejects a contract for a license of intellectual property, the licensee may either elect to treat
the license agreement as terminated and assert a claim in the bankruptcy case for damages
arising from the breach or elect to retain its rights under the license agreement for the
duration of the agreement, as those rights existed immediately prior to the bankruptcy filing
by the licensor.33
v. Patents
Under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 134, an owner of a patent controls the use of a
unique process, business method or machine for twenty years. The patent system seeks to
bring advances in technology and design into the public domain. The patent laws encourage
public disclosure of new and useful ideas by giving an inventor the exclusive right to practice
an invention for a period ofyears.
In bankruptcy, issues arise for both patent holders and creditors. For example, patent
holders face uncertainty in anticipating whether a bankruptcy court will protect patented
technology in a sale pursuant to a confirmed plan of reorganization.34 On the other hand,
creditors are challenged by uncertainty in the bankruptcy court's interpretation of the law on
perfecting security interests in such property.35
32 Agin at 4.
33 Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP at 26-5.
34 Henschel, Virginia P., On the Edge: "Back Door" Access to Patented Technology, 1998 ABI JNL. Lexis 49,
February 1998.
35 Singer, George H., Security Interests in Patents Ninth Circuit Holds that Article 9 (Not the Patent Act)
Governs Perfection, 2002 ABI JNL. Lexis 33, April 2002.
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A. The Creditor's Perspective
Patents, copyrights, trademarks and other forms of intellectual property usually
constitute "general intangibles" under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.36
Nevertheless, the law on perfecting security interests in such forms of property is not entirely
clear. The primary source of uncertainty comes from the interplay between federal and state
law.37
There are a number of federal statutes that establish federal filing systems for
perfecting transfers or assignments for various forms of intangible property, some of which
possibly include security interests.38 State laws that either interfere with or are contrary to
such federal laws are preempted by the United States constitution's supremacy clause. The
DCC therefore makes it clear that Article 9 is displaced to the extent that a statute, regulation
or treaty of the United States preempts its application.39 The uncertainty in intellectual
property secured transactions arises from a lack of clarity with respect to whether federal law
or the DCC controls perfecting security interests in intellectual property. The authorities
interpreting the federal framework governing intellectual property rights and applicable
provisions of the UCC have not provided uniform guidance and limited case law on the issue
provides little comfort.4o
36 Uniform Commercial Code § 9-102(a)(42). See Official Comment 5(d) to § 9-102(a)(42). See also Holt v.
United States, 13 UCC Rep. Servo 336, 337 (D.D.C. 1973) (finding a patent to be a general intangible).
37 Singer at *2. See also R. Nimmer, Commercial Asset-Based Financing, Volume 3, at Chapter 22 (2001).
38 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 261 (patents); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-603 (copyrights); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128
(trademarks).
39 Singer at *2-*3 (citing Rev. UCC 9-109(c)(I)); accord, Rev. UCC § 9-311(a)(1) (providing that a financing
statement is "not necessary or effective" when federal law preempts its application through an alternative
scheme).
40 Singer at *3.
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In Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybemteic Services InC.),41 the Ninth Circuit ruled
that a creditor's security interest in a patent trumped the interest of a bankruptcy trustee, even
though the creditor did not record its interest with the U.S. PC:\tent and Trademark Office
("PTO,,).42 In this matter, Cybernetic Services, Inc. granted to Matsco Inc. and Matsco
Financial Corp. (collectively "Matsco") a blanket security interest in all of its assets,
including "general intangibles." Mastsco filed its security interest with the California
Secretary of State in accordance with the California Commercial Code. Matsco did not file
any form of documentation with the PTO. Later, Cybernetic Services Inc. was forced into a
Chapter 7 liquidation. As is often the case with many technology companies, the primary
asset of the bankruptcy estate was a patent on technology that the debtor developed.43
In the bankruptcy court, the trustee did not dispute the fact that the description of
"general intangibles" was sufficient to create a security interest in the patent. The trustee did,
however, contend that Matsco's failure to record its interest with the PTO rendered the
estate's right to the patent superior by virtue of the trustee's status as a hypothetical lien
creditor.44 The trustee, contending that Matsco was unperfected, asserted that the Patent Act
preempted Article 9's filing requirements and required a federal filing. ~he Patent Act
requires that any "assignment," "grant" and "conveyance" be recorded in the PTO to be
41 252 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, Moldo v. Matsco, Inc., 534 U.S. 1130, 122 S. Ct. 1069, 151 L.
Ed. 2d 972 (2002).
42 252 F.3d at 1059; accord, Chesapeake Fiber Packaging Corp. v. Sebro Packaging Corp., 143 B.R. 360 (D.
Md. 1992), aff'd, 8 F.3d 817 (4th Cir. 1993); and City Bank & Trust Co. v. Otto Fabric, Inc., 83 B.R. 780 (D.
Kan.1988).
43 Singer at *4.
44 See the rights granted to the trustee to exercise the rights of certain creditors and!or bona fide purchasers
under 11 U.S.C. § 544.
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effective against a subsequent "purchaser" or "mortgagee.,,45 The trustee contended that
this recording provision requires a patent security interest-holder to record that interest with
the PTO to be perfected as to a subsequent lien creditor.46
The court of appeals rejected the trustee's argument and ruled in favor of Matsco.
The court analyzed the text, context and structure of the Patent Act's recording provisions in
light of governing case law and concluded that the terms "assignment," "grant" and
"conveyance" all contemplate the transfer of an ownership interest only. The court observed
that Supreme Court precedent differentiated between those transfers that involved the
patent's title (ownership interests that are required to be recorded) and those that amounted to
"mere licenses" (less than ownership interests that are not required to be recorded). The
court reasoned that a security interest in a patent was similar to a license and did not
represent the kind of conveyance of an interest that was required to be recorded with the
PTO. Similarly, the court found that the Patent Act renders unrecorded conveyances void as
against only a subsequent "purchaser" or "mortgagee," which, as a hypothetical lien creditor,
the trustee was not.47
The court also opined that the applicable PTO regulations supported its interpretation
of the Patent Act. It observed that the regulations require all "assignments" to be recorded in
the PTO and that filing "other documents affecting title to applications, patents or
registrations" was permissive.48
45 See 35 U.S.C. § 261.
46 Singer at *5.
47 Singer at *6.
48 Singer at *7 (citing Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybemteic Services Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1057-67 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 3.11(a)).
1-11
For full protection a creditor is best served by making a dual filing both under Article
9 and under the Patent Act.49 Arguably, state filing, provides a creditor claiming an interest
in a patent with superior rights only against a subsequent lien creditor or bankruptcy trustee.
And also arguably, if the secured creditor also wishes to have priority over later voluntary
assignees oftitle to the patent (purchasers and perhaps exclusive licensees), the secured party
must also record an assignment with the PTO. Secured creditors and the counsel that
represent them should remain cognizant of the important role that the federal recording
system plays in the realm of secured transactions, particularly where intangible property
rights, such as patents, serve as collateral.50 Dual filing, both under Article 9 and with the
PTO, is the safest course.
B. Patent Holder's Perspective
A patent license is an agreement allowing the licensee to use a patent. It does not
transfer any ownership interest in the patent. In most circumstances, a patent license is an
"executory contract." Generally patent licenses are contracts interpreted under and governed
by state law. However, federal common law controls the assignability of patent licenses
depending on whether the license is "exclusive" or "non-exclusive." Generally, non-
exclusive patent license is construed as only a personal interest in the patent that cannot be
assigned unless the patent holder expressly consents. But the Bankruptcy Code has a policy
of "free assignability" of executory contracts, as an essential aspect of reorganization,5!
49 See Nimmer, Ope cit., at § 22.08. As Nimmer, Ope cit., points out, the filing with the PTO would be in the
form of a collateral assignment.
50 Singer at *9-*11.
51 Generally, a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession may assume and assign an executory contract despite
a contractual prohibition on assignment, unless (1) the contract is sufficiently personal that applicable law
excuses a party other than the debtor from accepting performance from, or rendering performance to, an entity
other than the debtor or debtor-in-possession (and such party does not consent to such assumption or
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which is at odds with the fundamental policy of the federal patent system that seeks to
motivate the inventor by allowing the inventor the exclusive right to the invention for a
period of years.52 Ordinarily, a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession may assume or
assign an executory contract without the consent of the other party to the contract even
though the executory contract purports to restrict assignment.53 The Ninth Circuit examined
these conflicting policies in Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrack Corp. ( In re CFLC, InC.).54
The debtor paid a lump sum fee for a royalty-free, worldwide, non-exclusive license to use
certain computer graphics technology. The license agreement specified that the license was
non-transferable; that it extended to any company more than 50 percent owned by the debtor;
that it conferred on the debtor no right to sublicense; that it could be terminated by the patent
holder upon an event of bankruptcy; and that the license agreement was to be construed in
accordance with California law.55
During the course of its bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor sold off certain divisions,
subsidiaries and other assets. The debtor ultimately received approval to sell substantially all
of its remaining assets to a third party. The parties to the sale agreement sought assumption
and assignment of designated exectutory contracts, including the key computer graphics
technology license. Predictably, the patent holder/licensor objected to the assignment. The
assignment, or (2) the executory contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt fmancing or fmancial
accommodation, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)
and (f). See also the discussion below.
52 Henschel at *2.
53 Henschel at 3 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a) and 365(f)(I». See also footnote 51 above.
54 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996).
55 Henschel at *2 (citing Everex Systems, Inc. v. Cadtrack Corp. (In re CFLC Inc.), 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996».
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bankruptcy court denied the motion for assumption and assignment; the district court
affirmed that decision.56
The Ninth Circuit examined the conflict between the "free assignment" policies of the
Bankruptcy Code and the federal common law policy of protecting patent holders. Section
365(c) provides an exception to Section 365's otherwise broad assumption and assignment
powers, stating in relevant part:
The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease
prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if
(l)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to
such contract or lease form accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor-in-
possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or
• 57
assIgnment . . . .
The application of the exception set forth in Section 365(c) depends, by its terms, on
the "applicable law." However, the Bankruptcy Code does not tell us which law, whether
state or federal, is the "applicable law." The statutes governing patents are basically silent on
the issue of licenses. Patent licenses are generally a matter of state contract law, except
where state law would be inconsistent with the aims of federal patent policy.58
The Ninth Circuit, in agreement with the Sixth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit, citing
PPG Industries Inc. v. Guardian Industries COrp.59 stated that "the fundamental policy of the
patent system is to 'encourage the creation and disclosure of new, useful and non-obvious
56 Henschel at *2-*3.
57 See also footnote 51 above.
58 Henschel at *3-*5 (citing In Ie CFLC, Inc.).
59 597 F.2d 1090 (6th Cir.), eert. denied, 444 U.S. 930, 100 S.Ct. 272, 62 L.Ed.2d 87 (1979).
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advances in technology and design' by granting the inventor the reward of the 'exclusive
right to practice the invention for a period of years. ",60 Allowing free assignability of non-
exclusive patent licenses would undermine the reward of the inventor's control of the
practice of the patent that encourages invention because a party seeking to use the patented
invention could seek an assignment of any existing patent license from a licensee instead of
seeking a license from the patent holder. If non-exclusive patent licenses are freely
assignable, licensees might become competitors with the license-patent holder in the market
for licenses under the patents. Even though the patent holder could probably control the
absolute number of licenses in existence under a free-assignability regime, it would lose the
ability to control the identity of its licensees, an issue perhaps more important than the
number of licensees. For example, a license might in that regime be assigned to the patent
holder's most feared competitor, to whom the patent holder itself might never grant a
license.61 In sum, the court held that under applicable law the patent holder would be
excused from accepting performance from, or rendering performance to, anyone other than
the debtor/licensee, in the absence of any express agreement by the patent holder to the
assignment.62
A later First Circuit opInIon, however, left the "back door" open for access to
technology licensed to a debtor.63 In Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech COrp.,64 the
60 Henschel at *5 (quoting from 89 F.3d 673, 679).
61 Henschel at *6 (citing 89 F.3d 673, 679).
62 Henschel at *6.
63 Henschel at *6-*7.
64 104 F.3d 489 (1 st Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1120, 117 S.Ct. 2511, 138 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1997).
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debtor proposed a plan of reorganization under which the stock of the reorganized debtor
would be sold to a company in direct competition with the patent holder. This is the "son of'
the nightmare scenario contemplated by the Ninth Circuit in In re CFLC, Inc. in which the
patent holder would lose the ability to control the identity of the entity exercising the license
rights.65
In ~his case the debtor (Cambridge) and the patent holder (Pasteur) entered into cross-
license agreements, whereby each acquired a non-exclusive perpetual license to use some of
the technology patented or licensed by the other. Each cross-license broadly prohibited the
licensee from assigning or sublicensing to others.66
The debtor proposed a reorganization plan under which it would assume both cross-
licenses, continue to operate using Pasteur's patented procedures, and sell all of the debtor's
stock to a subsidiary of Pasteur's direct competitor in international biotechnology sales.
Pasteur objected to the plan on the basis that to permit the assumption of the cross-licenses
and sale of the debtor's stock was a de/acto assignment of the right to use Pasteur's patented
technology without its consent, in violation of federal common law. 67
While the Court appeared to concede that the federal common law rule of
presumptive non-assignablility of non-exclusive patent licenses qualified as an "applicable
law" within the meaning of Section 365(c)(1)(A); and it agreed that Pasteur could not be
compelled to accept performance under the license from any entity other than the debtor
65 Henschel at *7.
66 Henschel at *7 (citing Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 490 (1 st Cir. 1997)).
67 Henschel at *8 (citing Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 490-491 (1 st Cir. 1997)).
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party with whom it originally contracted,68 the court nevertheless allowed assumption of the
cross-licenses.
The court relied on an "actual performance" test adopted in Summit Inv. & Dev.
Corp. v. Leroux,69 for the application of Sections 365(c) and (e) on a case-by-case basis. The
First Circuit disagreed with the In re CFLC, Inc. Court on the basis that the plan in In re
CFLC, Inc. provided for an assignment of the license to "an entirely different corporation,"
whereas the debtor in Institut Pasteur intended to utilize the patented technology by
assumption as the same corporate entity that operated pre-petition.7o Absent compelling
grounds for disregarding its corporate form, therefore, the debtor's separate legal identity,
and its ownership of the patent cross-licenses, survive without interruption notwithstanding
repeated and even drastic changes in ownership.71
The court suggested that the patent holder could have dealt with the prospect of a
change of ownership in or control of the licensee in drafting the license agreement. One
wonders though, whether a bankruptcy court sympathetic to a reorganized debtor's need to
use licensed technology might construe provision like those as unenforceable ipso facto
bankruptcy clauses.72
68 Henschel at *8-*9.
69 69 F.3d 608 (1 st Cir. 1995).
70 Henschel at *9 (citing Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493-94 (1 st Cir. 1997)).
71 Henschel at *9 (citing Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489,493-94 (1 st Cir. 1997)).
72 Henschel at *10. See also 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(I) that invalidates certain provisions in certain executory
contracts that purport to terminate the executory contract upon the happening of specified events, the so-called
ipso facto clauses.
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The "back door" has been closed in the Ninth Circuit.73 In Catapult Entertainment,74
the debtor (Catapult) had entered into a non-exclusive patent license with Perlman. As part
of a plan of reorganization, Catapult filed a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking to
assume the non-exclusive patent license. The bankruptcy court held that the debtor could
assume the non-exclusive patent licenses over Perlman's objection; the District Court
affirmed, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the plain language
of 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(I) links non-assignability under "applicable law" with the prohibition
on assumption in bankruptcy. The court held that since federal patent law makes non-
exclusive patent licenses personal and non-delegable, § t 365(c) is satisfied and as a
consequence the debtor was barred from assuming the Perlman license absent Perlman's
consent.75
Should the Ninth Circuit Rule prevail, the interest of the patent holder will be
protected at the expense of creditors,76 while it appears that the First Circuit leaves the back
door open for the strategic acquisition of otherwise inaccessible patented technology by
industry competitors.77
73 Hesse, Gregory G., Colunm: On the Edge: Ninth Circuit Slams Shut the HBack Door" Access to Patented
Technology, 1999 ABI JNL. Lexis 41 (April 1999).
74 Perlman v. Catapult Entertainment (In re Catapult Entertainment), 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 924, 120 S.Ct. 369, 145 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1999).
75 Hesse at *17.
76 Hesse at *18.
77 Henschel at *10.
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VI. Copyrights
Copyright law follows much of the same pattern as patent law. Federal copyright law
is found in 17 U.S.C. § 1010 et seq. and grants a limited monopoly to the copyright owner to
exploit his or her creation.
The Copyright Act establishes a priority scheme for interests in registered
copyrightS.78 Creators and owners of copyrightable materials, however, are not required to
register those materials with the U.S. Copyright Office to receive certain benefits of
copyright protection.79 Owners of copyrightable materials such as computer codes and
programs often choose not to register their works in order to protect trade secrets. Thus
when copyrightable materials are not registered, the Copyright Act provisions on recordation
and priority among conflicting transfers80 do not apply and the Copyright Act appears to
provide no procedure for recording a security interest in unregistered, copyrightable
materials.81 There is a split of authority on how a lender can perfect a security interest in
unregistered copyrightable material. Some courts have held that lenders can perfect a
security interest in unregistered copyrightable material by filing a financing statement under
the Uniform Commercial Code. But other courts have held that perfecting a security interest
in any copyrightable material must be accomplished under the Copyright Act.82
78 17 U.S.C § 205.
79 17 U.S.C. § 408(a).
80 See 17 U.S.C. § 205.
81 White, Bruce H., A Securied Creditor's Rights to Intellectual Property Licensed by a Debtor in Bankruptcy,
2001 ABI JNL. Lexis 91, May 2001.
82 Vogel, Justin M., Note: Perfecting Security Interests in Unregistered Copyrights: Preemption ofthe Federal
Copyright Act and How Filing in Accordance with Article 9 Leads to the Creation ofa Bankruptcy HForce
Play, " 10 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 463, Spring 2002. See also Zenith Productions, Ltd. v. AEG Acquisition
Corp. (In re AEG Acquisition Corp.), 161 B.R. 50, (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993); and In re Avalon, 209 B.R. 517
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).
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Over recent years, several District Court decisions have debated the correct
procedures for a lender to perfect a security interest in a copyright, specifically whether
Article 9, the Federal Copyright Act or some combination thereof controls perfection. In
National Peregrine, Inc. v. Capitol Fed. Savings and Loan Ass'n of Denver (In re Peregrine
Entertainment, Ltd.),83 the court concluded that a state recordation system pertaining to
interests in copyrights are preempted by the Federal Copyright Act, and therefore, a security
interest in a copyright can be perfected only by an appropriate filing with the United States
Copyright Office.84 However, the court in Aercon Engineering Inc. v. Silicon Valley Bank
(In re World Aux. Power),85 while agreeing with Peregrine that perfecting a security interest
in a registered copyright must be done at the federal level, concluded that the Copyright
Act's recording provisions are not comprehensive as applied to unregistered copyrights and,
consequently, do not preempt state law systems for perfecting a security interest in an
unregistered copyright.86 This area of law remains unclear at best. Accordingly, dual filing,
both under the Copyright Act and Article 9, is the recommended approach to fully protect a
lender.87
83 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Calif. 1990).
84 See also In re Avalon, 209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997).
85 244 B.R. 149 (Bankr. N.D. Calif. 1999), aff'd, 303 F.3d 1120 (N.D. Calif. 2002).
86 Vogel at 464; see also the District Court's opinion, 303 F.3d at 1120.
87 Rev. Article 9, Rev. 9-1 09(c), says that Rev. Article 9 defers to federal law only to the extent that Rev. Article
9 is specifically preempted, effectively rejecting the analysis of Peregrine. See Weise, S., The Financing of
Intellectual Property Under Revised UCC Article 9, 74 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1077, 1079 (1999). Rev. Article 9's
approach continues the uncertainty about the proper manner ofperfecting security interests in copyrights under
Rev. Article 9. See Nimmer, Ope cit., at § 22.09, 2001 Supp.
1-20
VII. Mergers and Acquisitions
As the stock market identifies unsuccessful tech companies and prices their stocks
accordingly, mergers and acquisitions transactions have emerged as a form of wealth creation
for more stable companies. For example, throughout 2000, successful dot.coms acquired
unsuccessful dot.com companies (or their assets) at record setting rates. The first quarter of
2000 saw more than $200 billion in Internet mergers and acquisitions transactions. This
period of activity is a model to create value from corporate restructurings.88
The over leveraged state of many U.S. corporations presents opportunities for well-
capitalized corporations to realize value from corporate restructurings. Such value may be
created in several ways. A well-capitalized corporation might acquire a business unit or the
entire company from an over leveraged corporation through a Chapter 11 sale or a sale
outside of bankruptcy proceedings. A corporation might also consider purchasing distressed
debt and exchange such debt for greater value, such as a controlling equity interest in the
reorganized debtor, in a Chapter 11 restructuring or a sale outside ofbankruptcy proceedings.
There are two fundamental methods of selling or acquiring assets of a debtor in a
Chapter 11 case. Assets may be sold outside of a plan of reorganization pursuant to Section
363 of the Bankruptcy Code or a sale can be effected under a plan of reorganization pursuant
to Section 1129.89 The procedures, benefits and detriments of each approach vary.
88 Reilly at Lexis 101.
89 Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLC at 11-4.
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VIII. The Intersection of Bankruptcy, Online Businesses and Privacy
One potentially valuable asset of a failed dot.com9o is the accumulated databases of
consumer information that dotcoms frequently obtain. Traditionally, business owners have
been able to treat consumer information databases just like any other business asset. As a
consequence, consumer information databases are candidates for purchase, sale, depreciation,
use as security, or otherwise to be treated as any other business asset. However, due to
consumer privacy concerns, there is a growing body of laws and regulations restricting the
legitimate uses of consumer information that go beyond the scope of this analysis.91
The technological development of the Internet marketplace that have made e-
commerce possible have also enhanced the ability of companies to collect, store, transfer, and
analyze vast amounts of data from consumers who visit their websites. As a result, the
Internet marketplace harbors greater risks to consumer privacy than ever before.92
The policies of obtaining a maximum and equitable distribution for creditors and
ensuring a "fresh start" for individual debtors are at the core of federal bankruptcy law. As a
consequence, it is the main duty of bankruptcy trustees to collect and reduce to money the
property of the estate for which the trustee serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is
compatible with the best interests of parties in interests. Many dot.coms have accumulated
substantial databases of consumer information, which can be extremely valuable. Thus, a
90 As is often the case in technology companies, this issue exists for any failed consumer business, but the
prevalence of: and technological ease of compiling, customer data in online transactions magnify this issue.
91 Wingate, John M., Comment: The New Economania: Consumer Privacy, Bankrutpcy, and Venture Capital
at Odds in the Internet Marketplace, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 895-897 (Spring 2001).
92 Wingate at 898-900.
1-22
trustee seeking to maximize a bankrupt companies estate will attempt to sell consumer
databases whenever permitted by law.93
These databases, however, often contain personal consumer data that was acquired in
the context of a posted condition of confidentiality. Consumers rely on contract law
principles for protection in the event of a bankruptcy arguing that posted confidentiality
provisions constitute ongoing contractual obligations that are a part of the online transaction.
But contract law fails to provide complete protection in the bankruptcy arena as debtors may
reject or assume executory contractual obligations.94
A clear rule of law essential to guide the actions of Internet companies and the courts
has not emerged though many are familiar with this issue in the aftermath of the
Toysmart.com bankruptcy.95
Prior to the commencement of bankruptcy, the company overseeing the sale of
Toysmart's assets placed an ad offering to sell Toysmart's customer information database.
Opposition to the proposed sale was based on the company's privacy policy, which
promised, "[w]hen you register with toysmart.com, you can rest assured that your
information will never be shared with a third party." The Federal Trade Commission brought
suit to enjoy the sale of Toysmart's customer list, alleging that such a sale would violate
Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair or deceptive trade practices. The
Commission argued that such a sale would directly contradict the representation made in the
privacy policy and that the representation was a deceptive trade practice. The district court,
93 Wingate at 912-913.
94 See the discussion at Section II of this paper.
95 Beckmann, Richard A., Comment: Privacy Policies and Empty Promises: Closing the "Toysmart
Loophole, " 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 765 (Summer 2001).
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however, refused to hear the merits of 'the case believing that the dispute was properly before
the bankruptcy court.96
The Commission eventually settled its charges against toysmart. Under the
settlement: Toysmart was not permitted to sell the customer information as a stand-alone
asset but was permitted to sell the information as part of an ongoing business. The
agreement further required that Toysmart only sell to a "Qualified Buyer" that expressly
agreed both to be Toysmart's successor-in-interest with regard to customer lists and to handle
the information in accordance with Toysmart's privacy policy.97
The FTC settlement was opposed in the bankruptcy court by creditors and the state
attorneys general on behalf of consumers; however, before the bankruptcy court decided
whether to approve the settlement, Toysmart withdrew its application to sell the customer list
because it considered the offers that it had received to be insufficient.98 Without a buyer, the
bankruptcy court'refused to rule on whether the list could be sold or the type of restrictions
that might be imposed. Thus, the question regarding whether consumer information
collected with a promise ofprivacy can be sold, remains unanswered.99
LOUIMDMS/195098.8
96 Beckmann at 767-770.
97 Beckmann at 767-770.
98 Beckmann at 769.
99 Beckmann at 767-770.
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GOING GLOBAL: ISSUES
TO CONSIDER WHEN CONDUCTING BUSINESS
WORLDWIDE THROUGH CYBERSPACED
I. ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL CONTEXT
Signatures, and this traditionally means in the handwriting of the signor, serve many
purposes in any given transaction such as:
• An expression of intent to be bound by and comply with the tenns of the signed
document
• Satisfaction of Laws that require certain kinds of documents to be signed in order
to be enforceable
• Authentication and Security devices to verify the integrity of a document and to
trace its origin to a specific person or entity.
In the electronic environment the purposes of a "signaturef1 are the same and this can be
said to apply in virtually all jurisdictions. However, a "signature" in the electronic environment
can be many things given the basic impediment to hand signing.
For example, an electronic signature could be:
• A name typed at the end of an e-mail message or purchase order
• A digital image of an actual signature at the end of an electronically
transmitted document
• A password or personal identification (PIN) number maintained by the
recipient of a communication
• A retinal scan
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• A fingerprint
• A voice print
• A mouse click (like clicking an "I agree" box on a computer screen)
• A "digital signaturett created through cryptography.
There are many others conceivable, but in the e-commerce area the security related
purposes of identity and integrity are critical if this kind of commerce is to work. Before one
takes the step of executing payment to a web-based supplier or, visa versa, before a supplier
makes shipment to a web-based customer (B2B or B2C), there needs to be sufficient faith in the
identity/security aspects of the electronics that the mouse click or the digital image or the typed
name really is that of the other party claiming to be who he is.
Domestically, federal and state legislation has given legal effect to digital signatures but
the element of the security and authenticity of these signatures is not specifically addressed.
These laws enforce the use of electronic signatures (and records) but say little, if anything, about
security procedures. This is the approach taken by the Federal E-SIGN law (Electronic
Signatures in the Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. 7001 et seq. and in the UETA
(Unifonn Electronic Transactions Act) approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws on July 23, 1999. The UETA has provided the model for domestic state
statutes.
The e-signature situation has developed differently on the international front where the
issue ofauthenticity and security has been specifically addressed.
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A. THE UNCITRAL MODEL
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) concluded
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce in 1996 (General Assembly Resolution
51/162 of 16 December 1996). This attached at Tab 1 for reference.
The object of the UNCITRAL model is to provide a draft that a given country may use to
enact its own legislation, not to replace any existing laws on contract formation or enforceability,
but rather to give legal recognition of electronic documents, records and signatures as being the
functional equivalent ofpaper records under existing national law.
As to e-signatures Article 7 of the UNCITRAL model provides:
"(1) Where the law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in
relation to a data message if:
(a) a method is used to identify that person and to indicate that
person's approval of the information contained in the data message;
and
(b) that method is as reliable as was appropriate for the purpose for
which the data message was generated or communicated, in the
light of all the circumstances, including any relevant agreement.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies 'whether the requirement therein is in the form of an
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the absence of a
signature.
(3) The provisions of this article do not apply to the following: [... ].tt (emphasis
added)
Thus under the UNCITRAL model the concept of security has been incorporated by use
. .
of the word "reliable" to describe the method used to tie the electronic signature to the actual
person using such signature. This method is left to be detennined by the adopting country
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involved including any relevant agreement between the e-transacting parties as to security
measures.
The UNCITRAL model has served its purpose. Similarities can be seen with the VETA
and it has been adopted in modified fonn by at least three Canadian provinces. Attached for
reference is the Manitoba enactment under Tab 2.
On balance, however, the UNCITRAL model has not gotten wide international
acceptance. The European Union approach has been much more widely embraced, probably
because it has addressed the security requirement of e-signatures with much greater specificity
than the UNCITRAL draft and certainly more than the VETA.
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE
In 1999, the European Union (ED) passed a Directive on electronic signatures which goes
into much greater detail on the security of e-signatures than other international forerunners. This
is Directive 1999/93/EC of December 13, 1999 on a Community framework for electronic
signatures, attached under Tab 3.
The object of this Directive is to require the ED member states to give legal recognition
ofelectronic signatures under their respective natural laws. However, it is very important to note
that it is not "electronic signatures", as defined in the Directive, which are given recognition but
rather "advanced electronic signatures" under Article 5. The differences are evident under
Directive's Article 2 which states:
"For the purpose of this Directive:
1. 'electronic signature' means data in electronic fonn which are attached to
or logically associated with other electronic data and which serve as a
method of authentication;
2. 'advanced electronic signature' means an electronic signature which meets
the following requirements:
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(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his
sole control; and
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any
subsequent change ofthe data is detectable;"
Furthermore under Article 5 in order for an "advanced electronic signature" to be given
legal effect it must be based on a "qualified certificate" and would have to be crated by a secure-
signature creation device" as both terms are described in Article 2(6) and (10) respectively:
"6. 'secure-signature-creation device; means a signature-creation device which
meets the requirements laid down in Annex III;
10. 1qualified certificate' means a certificate which meets the requirements laid
down in Annex I and is provided by a certification-service-provider who
fulfills the requirements laid down in annex II."
As can be seen from the above, the EU e-signature regime is based on the use of
technologies that can create a secure e-signature, accompanied by a third party qualified
certificate provider who attests to the authenticity of the particular e-signature. Under Directive
Article 6, the certificate provider is liable for damage caused by reliance on the certificate as to
the accuracy of its content; that it meets the requirements of the specific law governing such
certificate; that the signatory identified is valid.
While the Directive is an internal ED measure, Article 7 addresses recognition of
certificates issued by certification providers of third countries. These are to be given legally
equivalent treatment to EU issued certificates if:
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"(a) the certification-service-provider fulfils the requirements laid down in this
Directive and has been accredited under a voluntary accreditation scheme
established in a Member State; or
(b) a certification-service-provider established within the Community which
fulfils the requirements laid down in this Directive guarantees the
certificate; or
(c) the certificate or the certification-service-provider is recognized under a
bilateral or multilateral agreement between the Community and third
countries or international organizations.n
Unlike EU Regulations, EU Directives are not self executing. Directives are what the
tenn implies, directions to the member states to implement the provisions of the Directive into
their respective national laws. The basic tenets of the Directive are to be respected but
differences (for example in level of Fines) can result member to member.
Attached for comparison under Tab 4 and Tab 5 respectfully, are the Gennan and United
Kingdom enactment of the Directive. Both adhere to the tents of the Directive but differ in their
amalgamation into the national law.
C. THE GLOBAL DIRECTION
The global trend in e-signature legislation is clearly to parallel that of the EV. For
example, attached under Tab 6 is the Japanese "Law Governing Electronic Signatures and
Certification Services" (Unofficial Translation). This mimics the ED pre-occupation with e-
signator security and goes beyond in the creation of investigative processes and investigative
bodies in oversight of certificate providers. Singapore and Korea, two more major U.S. trade
partners have as well embraced the EU approach. We can expect this global trend to continue.
D. PRACTICAL REALITIES
The practical reality of the differing international approaches to recognition of
e-signatures is, of necessity, to accommodate them.
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As an actual or potential U.S. entity engaging in cross border activities, be it simple
exporting, all the way through to local investment with manufacturing, delivery and service
infrastructure, one needs to research the e-contracting law of the target jurisdiction. There is but
little choice to understand the e-contractingle-signature regimes of the target market. One can
then structure internet transactions to fully comply with the local requirements.
For example, if e-commerce is going to be conducted with customers/consumers in EU
member countries, and elsewhere with similar e-commerce laws, then it would make sense to
install the requisite secure signature creation devices and contract for third party certification
services to support such transactions. If any issues arise as to the applicability of local law, one
would certainly want to be assured that a valid signature has been established if needed to prove
the existence and enforcement of an agreement, among other things.
II. PRIVACY AND INTERNATIONAL DATA TRANSMISSION
The development of privacy and data transmission laws around the globe has been wide
and rapid. The most vexing issue for US based entities, especially multinationals, resulting from
this development has been the EU Data Protection Directive's restrictive impact on data flow
between the EU and the United States. This ED Directive 95/46/EC is attached under TAB 7.
The Data Protection Directive required European Union (EU) countries to implement
equivalent national legislation by 24 October 1998. Most ED countries have now complied.
A. The Problem With Data Transmission
Broadly speaking, the Directive sets out eight principles which organisations must
observe in use of personal data. Personal data is identifying infonnation about individuals such
as name, contact details, email address etc. The Directive also gives individuals rights in relation
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to their personal data. These include the right to access personal data held by an organisation,
the right to object to direct marketing and the right to compensation for contravention of the
principles.
Difficulty between the EU and US arose in relation to the prohibition, with few limited
exceptions, on the transfer of personal data outside the European Economic Area (EEA) to a
country which the EU determines does not afford an adequate level of protection to that data.
The EEA is made up of the 15 EU Member States together with Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Norway. ED officials have stated that the majority of countries outside the EEA, including the
US, have inadequate data protection regulation.
The consequences of this prohibition pose a serious threat to worldwide trade. In the
global economy, where companies freely need to transfer personal data from country to country,
a restriction of this sort is unacceptable. For example, a French based branch of a US company
would be unable to transfer data about its employees to its US head office.
Penalties for non-compliance with the eight principle are strict and can lead to the
offending party being de-registered. Any subsequent use by a company of personal data would
result in the commission ofa criminal offence.
B. 'Safe Harbor'
After much debate, a EU/uS solution came in the form of a 'Safe Harbor' arrangement
under the Clinton Administration.
However, since the introduction of the Safe Harbor arrangement in November 2000 and
despite an expectation that many US companies would sign up to it, relatively few companies
. .
have done so. The Bush administration has expressed reservations about the arrangement.
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Against this history, it remains to be seen whether the Safe Harbor arrangement plays any
significant part in solving the problems ofdata transfer from Europe to the US.
Nevertheless, the Safe Harbor should be considered as is an option. It provides for the
voluntary 'signing up' by companies in the US to adherence to a set of data protection principles
.which largely reflect those which apply in Europe. Companies can do this in a number ofways -
they can, for example, develop their own policy which 'meets those standards or they can comply
with existing US sector regulation which provides equivalent standards.
Those companies which are in the Safe Harbor will be deemed to provide adequate
protection to personal data transferred from the EEA. This means that a company in the EEA
can freely transfer data to Safe Harbor companies.
Once the US company has implemented the necessary standards, it must self-certify its
compliance to the US Department of Commerce. Self-certified companies will be listed by the
Department of Commerce on its websitt? at www.export.gov/safeharbor. Companies which fail
to self-certify annually will be removed from the Safe Harbor list. The overview pages from the
Commerce Department website are attached under TAB 8, along with the ED Commission
Decision ofJuly 26, 2000 on the agreement.
c. Safe Harbor Principles
The Safe Harbor principles are as follows:
Notice
Organisations must notify individuals
• about the purposes for which their data has been collected;
• the use to which that information will be put;
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• how the organisation can be contacted with any inquiries or complaints;
• the types of third parties to which it discloses infonnation; and
• the choices and means the organisation offers for limiting the use and disclosure of
data.
Choice/Opt Out
Organisations must give individuals choice (opt out) as to whether their personal data can
be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose which is incompatible with the purpose for
which it was originally collected.
Further Transfer
If an organisation wishes to disclose infonnation to a downstream third party, it must
apply the notice and choice principles i.e. tell the individual what it wishes to do and give the
individual the option to refuse.
Access To Data
Individuals must be permitted to access personal infonnation held about them by an
organisation. The individual also has the right to correct, amend or delete that infonnation where
it is inaccurate.
Data Security
Organisations must take reasonable precautions to protect personal infonnation from loss,
misuse, unauthorized access, disclosure etc.
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Data Integrity
Personal information collected must be relevant for the purposes for which it is to be
used. An organisation should also take reasonable steps to ensure that data is reliable for its
intended use, accurate, complete and current.
Enforcement
In order to ensure compliance with the Safe Harbor principles, organisations must put in
place a dispute resolution system to investigate individual complaints and disputes.
To provide further guidance, the Department of Commerce has issued a set of frequently
asked questions and answers (FAQs) that clarify and supplement the SafeHarbor principles.
These can be found at www.export.gov/safeharbor/SafeHarborDocuments.htm
Federal Trade Commission
Generally, the US policing function will be done by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) which will be able to take action against companies for unfair trade practices under the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FCTA) if companies fail to comply with their published privacy
statements. The FTC has power to require an offending party to stop carrying out offending
behavior.
The Safe Harbor arrangement does not extend to financial institutions or the
telecommunications sector and other sectors not under the purview of~he FTC.
Financial institutions for this purpose include banks, savings and loan institutions. The
FTC does not have jurisdiction over financial services companies and cannot enforce any of the
Safe Harbor principles. Financial institutions will have to rely on other acceptable procedures for
transferring data as described below.
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D. Alternatives to Safe Harbor
If the US importer of data does not sign up to the Safe Harbor, or if the Safe Harbor
procedure is not available, there are alternative approaches which can be taken.
1. Consent
An exception allows the transfer of personal data outside the EEA if the
individual who is the subject of that data consents to the transfer.
If the transfer is at the request of the individual, hislher consent can be implied.
In other circumstances, the best way to get consent is to use a document which the individual
nonnally returns (such as an order fonn) and provide a mechanism whereby the individual is told
that their personal data may be transferred outside the EEA and given the opportunity to
withhold their consent by clicking a box. Ultimately, however, the individual is completely
within hislher rights to refuse to consent to hislher personal data being transferred to a country
with inadequate data protection legislation. Without the benefit of a general exemption such as
the SafeHarbor principle, a company therefore remains at risk of the withholding of consent by
certain individuals.
2. Necessary for Contract Perfonnance
Transfer of data outside the EEA is exempted if it is 'necessary for the
performance of a contract' between the business and the individual. The ongoing question under
this exception is whether the transfer can be said to be 'necessary'. 'Necessary' is likely to be
narrowly construed ~d businesses should consider other justifications for transfer ofdata if they
do not believe that the transfer can be said to be absolutely necessary for performance of the
contract in question.
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3. Contract
Where exceptions are not practical, ED-based companies can transfer data outside
the EEA if they impose contractual obligations on entities to whom they transfer personal data.
These clauses are designed to assure adequate protection for the data. Key provisions are:
• the data importer must not disclose the data to any other entity (except where
there is a legal or regulatory obligation);
• the data importer will give the individual rights of access, correction etc.;
• the data importer will respond to questions from the individuals.
Pursuant to Commission Decision of December 27, 2001 (under TAB 9), the European
Commission has issued draft contract clauses which the EU would find as compliant with the
Directive. These clauses have been widely criticised. Data importers are jointly liable with data
exporters for damages arising from unlawful processing of data. These clauses are likely to set
the standard for contractual obligations which need to be imposed on data importers outside the
EEA by companies based in the EEA.
4. Adoption of a Compliance Policy
The option of adopting a data protection compliance policy is more suitable for
use by a multinational company or group of companies. The policy should set standards for data
protection which are required to be complied with by all in the multinational group. The
standards (which should satisfy the ED requirement for adequate protection of data) will allow
data to be freely transferred throughout the group. A tmaster contract' may need to be entered
into by the group ofcompanies to ensure compliance with the policy.
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Note, however, that a group compliance policy only addresses transfer of data within the
group. Transfer of data to non-group companies may need to be handled by the contract clause
option (ifother data transfer options are not available).
E. Steps To Take
The prohibition on transfer of data outside the EEA applies as of October 24, 2001. To
the extent not already done, the following steps would be in order:
• carry out an audit of the transfer of data practices of the business to determine
whether data is transferred outside the EEA
• identify the countries to which data is transferred;
• if data is transferred to the US, consider having the importing companies signed up to
Safe Harbor. If not, consider alternative compliance steps as outlined above. In
many cases, the contract and compliance policy options will constitute appropriate
solutions;
• if data is transferred outside the EEA but to countries other than the US, consider the
compliance ~teps as outlined above. Remember that SafeHarbor is not an option. In
many cases, the solution will be contractual and/or require the adoption of a
compliance policy.
Companies should also keep abreast of which countries have been deemed by the EU to
offer 'adequate protection'. This is likely to be a piecemeal by the European Commission going
forward.
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III. OVERALL CONSIDERATIONS
We have focused on just two issues with doing international business through
cyberspace. This topic encompasses numerous additional issues that can only be touched upon
as a checklist in deciding to open one's websites for international transactions. The following are
some of these issues.
A. All Websites Are Global
All websites are global- because they can be accessed anywhere. But most websites are
not truly global. Language, culture, distance, markets, logistics - all affect a commercial
•website's ability to transact business from outside the United States in a manner which is
compliant with the host of local nationaf legal requirements.
To market on the web requires recognition that one is operating in scores of markets.
Without this mindset, a US website is simply a US site broadcast worldwide, without the real
ability to reach global customers but can create a major non-compliance pitfall for the site owner.
Reaching a global market means adapting to language, culture, law, regulation and
logistics that enable goods and services to be sold to customers in far-flung locations.
B. Sale Restrictions
Countries limit what can be sold to their residents. For example, in Germany, the price of
books may not be discounted. Gambling is illegal in many areas, which affects give-aways and
prize contests offered on the web. Charging interest can he illegal in Islamic countries.
Wehsites cannot practically block particular browsers from seeing such content. An
international website must be designed to limit the terms of any offer to areas where purchase is
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valid, and this means a thorough legal research of each market intended to be opened by the
website.
C. Consumer Protection
Local consumer protection laws protect in-country internet customers, and each country
or state has its own regulations that may limit the terms of a sale. For example, requiring a
consumer to arbitrate a dispute in a distant location may not be enforceable. A website operator
should carefully review tenns of sale to ensure that they respect consumer protection laws in any
jurisdiction where an internet sale is intended to occur.
D. Content Restrictions
Local restrictions can arise in surprising ways. Yahoo was charged by the French
Government with marketing Nazi memorabilia to French residents, something illegal in France.
While it was impractical to block French users from having access to Yahoo auction sites, Yahoo
worked out a solution with France that makes auctioned Nazi items unavailable to French
residents. Advertising effective in one area may be totally inappropriate in another. Web
marketers should seriously consider having separate URLts and sites for discrete market areas of
the world. Through use of subdomains (e.g. de for Gennany, fr for France), a company could
have a website tailored specifically to particular national markets.
E. Product Regulation
The sale of one's US compatible product offshore may not be possible. The world is
replete with country specific product and service codes/standards. Does the US domestic
product/service meet those codes. Has the website marketer taken the cost of such compliance
into consideration before opening its website for business. In many cases, a non-compliant
product is subject to impoundment at the border. At a minimum there should be a disclaimer of
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its fitness for any particular purpose the user may have in mind. If the item has health or safety
issues associated with it, the website and order information should be clear about the limitations
of its use. For any potentially dangerous product, safety warnings in the consumer's language
should be included, again as is adequate under local law.
F. Export Control
All products are subject to some degree of export control under various US export control
laws and regulations. The principal law is the Export Administration Act and its attendant
regulations. Export controls address the type of product/service/technology and destination
along with some general overarching restrictions regardless of product/technology type, such as
the US embargo of Cuba. Accordingly, one needs to perfonn an audit of its products under the
U.S. export control regime prior to offering these on any global or country specific website.
G. Tenns of Use Agreement
The key to a good commercial website is a Tenns of Use Agreement. This should state
clearly the basis on which a purchaser of goods or services may do business with the site. There
are four basic purposes of a Terms of Use Agreement.
1. The website can set conditions and restrictions on its relationship with a
user.
2. The website can comply with the applicable local laws and regulations and
manage potential liabilities to users.
3. The intellectual property of the website owner can he protected.
4. Confidence in the site's usage can he increased.
This can only he achieved if a Terms of Use Agreement is enforceable. The most
effective way to enforce a Terms of Use Agreement is for it to be understandable and
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affinnativelyagreed by the user. Thus, for example as discussed above, ttl agree" procedure
required for European websites to obtain consent of users for use ofpersonal data.
Internationally, relying on implied or tacit agreement to tenns of use is very risky. In
many countries an affinnative demonstration is needed of agreement to tenns and conditions.
Taxation and domain name protection are further considerations when designing a truly
global website. Careful consideration and planning is needed for a website operator to avoid
unwanted tax exposure. Are you prepared to cope with the cost and infrastructure needed to
comply with value added tax (VAT) systems prevalent throughout the world. Protecting domain
names is essential, requiring a website operator to make sure that others are not pirating a brand
or tradename by variations at a primary domain level or with subdomain URL's.
In general, in designing B2B, B2C websites for international business, all of the aspects
of doing such business "on paper" need to be incorporated into the website design/operation,
along with the additional issues of privacy, etc. that have come to the fore via growth of
e-commerce.
WUIMDMS/193084.1
lO/2/l002 I :34 PM
J-36
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL)
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to
Enactment
1996
with additional article 5 his as adopted in 1998
CONTENTS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 51/162 OF 16 DECEMBER 1996
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Part one. Electronic commerce in general
Chapter I. General provisions
Article 1. Sphere of application
Article 2. Definitions
Article 3. Intetpretation
Article 4. Variation by agreement
Chapter II. Application of legal requirements to data messages
Article 5. Legal recognition of data messages
Article 5 bis. Incorporation by reference
Article 6. Writing
Article 7. Signature
Article 8. Original
Article 9. Admissibility and evidential weight of data messages
Article 10. Retention of data messages
Chapter III. Communication of data messages
Article 11. Fonnation and validity of contracts
Article 12. Recognition by parties of data messages
Article 13. Attribution of data messages
Article 14. Acknowledgement of receipt
Article 15. Time and place of dispatch and receipt of data messages
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/ml-ecomm.htm
J-37
9/24/02
Part two. Electronic commerce in specific areas
Chapter I. Carriage of goods
Article 16. Actions related to contracts of carriage of goods
Article 17. Transport documents
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT OF THE UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Purpose of this Guide
I. Introduction to the Model Law
A. Objectives
B. Scope
C. Structure
D. A "framework" law to be supplemented by technical regulations
E. The "functional-equivalent" approach
F. Default rules and mandatory law
G. Assistance from UNCITRAL secretariat
II. Article-by-article remarks
Part one. Electronic commerce in general
Chapter I. General provisions
Article 1. Sphere of application
Article 2. Definitions
Article 3. Interpretation
Article 4. Variation by agreement
Chapter II. Application of legal requirements to data messages
Article 5. Legal recognition of data messages
Article 5bis. Incorporation by reference
Article 6. Writing
http://www.uncitral.org/englishltexts/electcom/ml-ecomm.htm
J-38
Paragraphs
1-150
1
2-23
2-6
7-10
11-12
13-14
15-18
19-21
22-23
24-122
24-107
24-45
24-29
30-40
41-43
44-45
46-75
46
46-1 - 46-7
47-52
9/24/02
Article 7. Signature 53-61
Article 8. Original 62-69
Article 9. Admissibility and evidential weight of data messages 70-71
Article 10. Retention of data messages 72-75
Chapter III. Communication of data messages 76-107
Article 11. Fonnation and validity of contracts 76-80
Article 12. Recognition by parties of data messages 81-82
Article 13. Attribution of data messages 83-92
Article 14. Acknowledgement of receipt 93-99
Article 15. Time and place of dispatch and receipt of data messages 100-107
Part two. Electronic commerce in specific areas 108-122
Chapter I. Carriage of goods 110-122
Article 16. Actions related to contracts of carriage ofgoods 111-112
Article 17. Transportdocuments 113-122
III. History and background of the Model Law 123-150
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
[on the report ofthe Sixth Committee (A/51/628)}
51/162 Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966, by which it created the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, with a mandate to further the progressive harmonization
and unification of the law of international trade and in that respect to bear in mind the interests of all
peoples, in particular those of developing countries, in the extensive development of international
trade,
Noting that an increasing number of transactions in international trade are carried out by means of
electronic data interchange and other means of communication, commonly referred to as "electronic
commerce", which involve the use of alternatives to paper-based methods of communication and
storage of information,
Recalling the recommendation on the legal value of computer records adopted by the Commission at
http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcomlml-ecomm.htm
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its eighteenth session, in 1985,ill and paragraph 5(b) of General Assembly resolution 40/71 of
11 December 1985, in which the Assembly called upon Governments and international organizations
to take action, where appropriate, in conformity with the recommendation of the Commission,Olso
as to ensure legal security in the context of the widest possible use of automated data processing in
international trade,
Convinced that the establishment of a model law facilitating the use of electronic commerce that is
acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic systems, could contribute significantly
to the development of hannonious international economic relations,
Noting that the Model Law on Electronic Commerce was adopted by the Commission at its twenty-
ninth session after consideration of the observations of Governments and interested organizations,
Believing that the adoption of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce by the Commission will
assist all States significantly in enhancing their legislation governing the use of alternatives to paper-
based methods of communication and storage of information and in fotnlulating such legislation
where none currently exists,
1. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law for
completing and adopting the Model Law on Electronic Commerce contained in the annex to the
present resolution and for preparing the Guide to Enactment of the Model Law;
2. Recommends that all States give favourable consideration to the Model Law when they enact or
revise their laws, in view of the need for uniformity of the law applicable to alternatives to paper-
based methods of communication and storage of information;
3. Recommends also that all efforts be made to ensure that the Model Law, together with the Guide,
become generally known and available.
85th plenary meeting
16 December 1996
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce
[Original: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish]
Part one. Electronic commerce in general .
Chapter I. General provisions
Article 1. Sphere of application*
This Law** applies to any kind of information in the form of a data message used in the context***
of commercial**** activities.
* The Commission suggests the following text for States that might wish to limit the applicability ofthis Law to
international d~tamessages:
IfThis Law applies to a data message as defined in paragraph (1) ofarticle 2 where the data message relates to international
commerce."
** This Law does not override any rule of law intended for the protection ofconsumers.
http://www.uncitra1.org/english/texts/electcomlml-ecomm.htm
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EXPLANATORY NOTE
This Bill provides a set of rules designed to give legal
recognition to electronic documents and communications.
Part I contains definitions and application rules. It also
contains rules to enable a person to satisfy a legal
requirement to produce for inspection, or provide a certified
copy of: a document that happens to be in electronic form.
Part 2 enables, but does not require, the use of electronic
means to comply with a number of other legal requirements
under designated laws, such as a requirement to provide
information in writing or in a specified form or a
requirement for a signature. By designating laws for the
purpose of this Part, the government will be able to
facilitate and regulate electronic filing.
Part 3 gives legal recognition to contracts that are formed
using one or more electronic documents. It provides a
limited right to cancel a contract when a person makes a
mistake in dealing with an electronic agent of another
person. It also contains rules for establishing the time and
place of sending and receiving electronic documents in
connection with contracts.
Part 4 makes special provision for contracts relating to the
carriage ofgoods, to permit the use of electronic documents
in a field that has traditionally depended on unique paper
documents.
Part 5 allows regulatory requirements applicable to business
entities to be streamlined by providing for the use of
common business identifiers, combined forms, integrated
information systems and integrated filing and payment
procedures.
Part 6 amends The Consumer Protection Act
• by limiting a consumer's liability when credit card
information is lost or stolen;
• by giving consumers certain cancellation rights
relating to Internet purchases; and
by requiring a credit card issuer to reverse a credit
card charge for an Internet purchase if the vendor fails
to provide a refund after a consumer has exercised
such a cancellation right.
Part 7 makes amendments to the The Manitoba Evidence
Act that parallel recent amendments to the Canada Evidence
Act. They deal with the admissibility of electronic
documents and establish evidentiary presumptions about
electronic signatures and the integrity of electronic
documents.
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NOTE EXPLICATIVE
Le present projet de loi etablit un jeu de regles visant a
donner nne reconnaissance juridique aux documents et aux
communications electroniques.
La partie 1 contient les definitions et les regles
d'application. Elle contient egalement des regles permettant
de satisfaire a l'exigence juridique de produire, pour
examen, un document qui se trouve dans une forme
electronique ou d'en foumir nne copie certifiee conforme.
La partie 2 pennel, mais n'exige pas, remploi de moyens
electroniques pour satisfaire aun certain nombre d'autres
exigences juridiques que prevoient des lois designees,
comme l'exigence de fournir des renseignements par ecrit ou
dans nne forme precisee ou l'exigence relative a la
signature. En designant des lois pour l'application de cette
partie, Ie gouvernement sera en mesure de faciliter et de
regiementer Ie depot electronique.
La partie 3 donne une reconnaissance juridique aux contrats
conclus au moyen d'au moins un document electronique.
Elle prevoit un droit limite d'annuler un contrat en cas
d'erreur dans les negociations avec l'agent electronique de
quelqu'un d'autre. EIle comporte egalement des regles visant
la detennination de I'heure et du lieu d'expedition et de
reception de documents electroniques en rapport avec des
contrats.
La partie 4 etablit des dispositions speciales pour les
contrats de transport de marchandises, dispositions qui
visent a permettre l'emploi de documents electroniques dans
un domaine qui ne recourait jusqu'a maintenant quIa des
documents papier.
La partie 5 permet de rationaliser les exigences
reglementaires applicables aux entreprises par
retablissement de dispositions prevoyant I'emploi
d'identificateurs communs, de formules combinees, de
systemes d'infonnation integres et de methodes integrees de
depot et de paiement.
La partie 6 modifie la Loi sur fa protection du
consommateur :
• en limitant la responsabilite des consommateurs en
cas de perte ou de vol de leur carte de credit;
• en leur donnant certains droits d'annulation
relativement aux achats par Internet;
• en obligeant les emetteurs de cartes de credit a
annuler les frais des achats faits par Internet dans les
cas oil les vendeurs ne remboursent pas les
consommateurs qui ont exerce un tel droit
d'annulation.
La partie 7 apporte des modifications ala Loi sur fa preuve
au Manitoba, modifications qui calquent celles apportees
recemment a la Loi sur fa preuve au Canada. Ces
modifications portent sur l'adrnissibilite en preuve des
documents electroniques et etablissent des presomptions de
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DIRECTIVE 1999!93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 13 December 1999
on a Community framework for electronic signatures
19. 1. 2000
lHE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNOL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular Articles 47(2), 55 and 95
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee (~,
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the
Regions (3),
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article
251 of the Treaty (4),
Whereas:
(5)
(6)
The interoperability of electronic-signature products
should be promoted; in accordance with Article 14 of
the Treaty, the internal market comprises an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods is ensured; essential requirements specific to elec-
tronic-signature products must be met in order to ensure
free movement within the internal market and to build
trust in electronic signatures, without prejudice to
Council Regulation (EC) No 3381/94 of 19 December
1994 setting up a Community regime for the control of
exports of dual-use goods (~ and Council Decision 94/
942/CFSP of 19 December 1994 on the joint action
adopted by the Council concerning the control of
exports of dual-use goods (6);
This Directive does not harmonise the prOVISIon of
services with respect to the confidentiality of informa-
tion where they are covered by national provisions
concerned with public policy or public security;
(I)
(2)
On 16 April 1997 the Commission presented to the
European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a
Communication on a European Initiative in Electronic
Commerce;
On 8 October 1997 the Commission presented to the
European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a
Communication on ensuring security and trust in elec-
tronic communication - towards a European frame-
work for digital signatures and encryption;
(7)
(8)
The internal market ensures the free movement of
persons, as a result of which citizens and residents of the
European Union increasingly need to deal with authori-
ties in Member States other than the one in which they
reside; the availability of electronic communication
could be of great service in this respect;
Rapid technological development and the global char-
acter of the Internet necessitate an approach which is
open to various technologies and services capable of
authenticating data electronically;
(3) On 1 December 1997 the Council invited the Commis-
sion to submit as soon as possible a proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
on digital signatures;
(4) Electronic communication and commerce necessitate'
electronic signatures' and related services allowing data
authentication; divergent rules with respect to legal
recognition of electronic signatures and the accreditation
of certification-service providers in the Member States
may create a significant barrier to the use of electronic
communications and electronic commerce; on the other
hand, a clear Community framework regarding the
conditions applying to electronic signatures will
strengthen confidence in, and general acceptance of, the
new technologies; legislation in the Member States
should not hinder the free movement of goods and
services in the intern~l market;
(1) OJ C 325, 23.10.1998, p. 5.
(2) OJ C 40, 15.2.1999, p. 29.
(3) OJ C 93, 6.4.1999, p. 33.
(4) Opinion of the European Parliament of 13 January 1999 (OJ C
104, 14.4.1999, p. 49), Council Common Position of 28 June 1999
(OJ C 243, 27.8.1999, p. 33) and Decision of the European Parlia-
ment of 27 October 1999 (not yet published in the Official
Journal). Council Decision of 30 Novemoer 1999.
(9) Electronic signatures will be used in a large variety of
circumstances and applications, resulting in a wide range
of new services and products related· to or using elec-
tronic signatures; the definition of such products and
services should not be limited to the issuance and
management of certificates, but should also encompass
any other service and product using, or ancillary to,
electronic signatures, such as registration services, time-
stamping services, directory services, computing services
or consultancy services related to electronic signatures;
(10) The internal market enables certification-service-
providers to develop their cross-border activities with a
view to increasing their competitiveness, and thus to
offer consumers and businesses new opportunities to
exchange information and trade electronically in a
secure way, regardless of frontiers; in order to stimulate
the Community-wide provision of certification services
over open networks, certification-service-providers
should be free to provide their services without prior
authorisation; prior authorisation means not only any
(5) OJ L 367, 31.12.1994, p. 1. Regulation as amended by Regulation
(EO No 837/95 (OJ L 90, 21.4.1995, p. 1).
(6) OJ L 367, 31.12.1994, p. 8. Decision as last amended by Decision
99/193/CFSP (OJ L 73, 19.3.1999. p. 1).
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permission whereby the certification-service-provider
concerned has to obtain a decision by national authori-
ties before being allowed to provide its certification
services, but also any other measures having the same
effect;
(11) Voluntary accreditation schemes aiming at an enhanced
level of service-provision may offer certification-service-
providers the appropriate framework for developing
further their services towards the levels of trust, security
and quality demanded by the evolving market; such
schemes should encourage the development of best
practice among certification-service-providers; certi-
fication-service-providers should be left free to adhere to
and benefit from such accreditation schemes;
(12) Certification services can be offered either by a public
entity or a legal or natural person, when it is established
in accordance with the national law; whereas Member
States should not prohibit certification-service-providers
from operating outside voluntary accreditation schemes;
it should be ensured that such accreditation schemes do
not reduce competition for certification services;
(13) Member States may decide how they ensure the supervi-
sion of compliance with the provisions laid down in this
Directive; this Directive does not preclude the establish-
ment of private-sector-based supervision systems; this
Directive does not oblige certification-service-providers
to apply to be supervised under any applicable accredita-
tion scheme;
(14) It is important to strike a balance between consumer
and business needs;
(IS) Annex III covers requirements for secure signature-crea-
tion devices to ensure the functionality of advanced
electronic signatures; it does not cover the entire system
environment in which such devices operate; the func-
tioning of the internal market requires the Commission
and the Member States to act swiftly to enable the
bodies charged with the conformity assessment of secure
signature devices with Annex III to be designated; in
order to meet market needs conformity assessment must
be timely and efficient;
(16) This Directive contributes to the use and legal recogni-
tion of electronic signatures within the Community; a
regulatory framework is not needed for electronic signa-
tures exclusively used within systems, whiG:h are based
. on voluntary agreements under private law between a
specified number of participants; the freedom of parties
to agree among themselves the terms and conditions
under which they accept electronically signed data
should be respected to the extent allowed by national
law; the legal effectiveness of electronic signatures used
in such systems and their admissibility as evidence in
legal proceedings should be recognised;
J-46
(17) This Directive does not seek to hannooise national rules
concerning contract law, particularly the formation and
performance of contracts, or other formalities of a non-
contractual nature concerning signatures; for this reason
the provisions concerning the legal effect of electronic
signatures should be without prejudice to requirements
regarding form laid down in national law with regard to
the conclusion of contracts or the rules determining
where a contract is concluded;
(18) The storage and copying of signature-creation data could
cause a threat to the legal validity of electronic signa-
tures;
(19) Electronic signatures will be used in the public sector
within national and Community administrations and in
communications between such administrations and with
citizens and economic operators, for example in the
public procurement, taxation, social security, health and
justice systems;
(20) Harmonised criteria relating to the legal effects of elec-
tronic signatures win preserve a coherent legal frame-
work across the Community; national law lays down
different requirements for the legal validity of hand-
written signatures; whereas certificates can be used to
confirm the identity of a person signing electronically;
advanced electronic signatures based on qualified certi-
ficates aim at a higher level of security; advanced elec-
tronic signatures which are based on a qualified certifi-
cate and which are created by a secure-signature-creation
device can be regarded as legally equivalent to hand-
written signatures ooly if the requirements for hand-
written signatures are fulfilled;
(21) In order to contribute to the general acceptance of elec-
tronic authentication methods it has to be ensured that
electronic signatures can be used as evidence in legal
proceedings in. all Member States; the legal recognition
of electronic signatures should be based upon objective
criteria and not be linked to authorisation of the certi-
fication-service-provider involved; national law governs
the legal spheres in which electronic documents and
electronic signatures may be used; this Directive is
without prejudice to the power of a national court to
make a ruling regarding confonnity with the require-
ments of this Directive and does not affect national rules
regarding the unfettered judicial consideration of
evidence;
(22) Certification-service-providers providing certification-
services to the public are subject to national rules
regarding liability;
(23) The development of international electronic commerce
requires cross-border arrangements involving third
countries; in order to ensure interoperability at a global
level, agreements on multilateral rules with third coun-
tries on mutual recognition of certification services
could be beneficial;
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(24) In order to increase user confidence in electronic
communication and electronic commerce, certification-
service-providers must observe data protection legisla-
tion and individual privacy;
(25) Provisions on the use of pseudonyms in certificates
should not prevent Member States from requiring identi-
fication of persons pursuant to Community or national
law;
(26) The measures necessary for the implementation of this
Directive are to be adopted in accordance with Council
Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down
the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers
conferred on the Commission (1);
(27) Two years after its implementation the Commission will
carry out a review of this Directive so as, inter alia, to
ensure that the advance of technology or changes in the
legal environment have not created barriers to achieving
the aims stated in this Directive; it should examine the
implications of associated technical areas and submit a
report to the European Parliament and the Council on
this subject;
(28) In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty, the
objective of creating a harmonised legal framework for
the provision of electronic signatures and related
services cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can therefore be better achieved by the
Community; this Directive does not go beyond what is
necessary to achieve that objective,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Article 1
Scope
The purpose of this Directive is to facilitate the use of elec-
tronic signatures and to contribute to their legal recognition. It
establishes a legal framework for electronic signatures and
certain certification-services in order to ensure the proper func-
tioning of the internal market.
It does not cover aspects related to the conclusion and validity
of contracts or other legal obligations where there are require-
ments as regards form prescribed by national or Community
law nor does it affect rules and limits, contained in national or
Community law, governing the use of documents.
Article 2
Definitions
For the purpose of this Directive:
1. 'electronic signature' means data in electronic form which
are attached to or logically associated with other electronic
data and which serve as a method of authentication;
(1) OJ L 184, I 7.7.1 999, p. 2 3.
2. 'advanced electronic signature' means an electronic signa-
ture which meets the follOwing requirements:
(a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
(b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
(c) it is created using means that the signatory can main-
tain under his sole control; and
(d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a
manner that any subsequent change of the data is
detectabIe;
3. 'signatory' means a person who holds a signature-creation
device and acts either on his own behalf or on behalf of
the natural or legal person or entity he represents;
4. 'signature-creation data' means unique data, such as codes
or private cryptographic keys, which are used by the signa-
tory to create an electronic signature;
5. lsignature-creation device' means configured software or
hardware used to implement the signature-creation data;
6. 'secure-signature-creation device' means a signature-crea-
tion device which meets the requirements laid down in
Annex III;
7. 'signature-verification-data' means data, such as codes or
public cryptographic keys, which are used for the purpose
of verifying an electronic signature;
8. lsignature-verification device' means configured software or
hardware used to implement the signature-verification-
data;
9. 'certificate' means an electronic attestation which links
signature-verification data to a person and confirms the
identity of that person;
10. 'qualified certificate' means a certificate which meets the
. requirements laid down in Annex I and is provided by a
certification-service-provider who fulfils the requirements
laid down in Annex II;
11. 'certification-service-provider' means an entity or a legal or
natural person who issues certificates or provides other
services related to electronic signatures;
12. 'electronic-signature product' means hardware or software,
or relevant components thereof, which are intended to be
used by a certification-service-provider for the provision of
electronic-signature services or are intended to be used for
the creation or verification of electronic signatures;
13. 'voluntary accreditation' means any permission, setting out
rights and obligations specific to the provision of certi-
fication services, to be granted upon request by the certi-
fication-service-provider concerned, by the public or
private body charged with the elaboration of, and supervi-
sion of compliance with, such rights and obligationsJ
where the certification-service-provider is not entitled to
exercise the rights stemming from the pennission until it
has received the decision by the body.
J-47
19. 1. 2000 Official Journal of the European Communities L 13/15
Article 3
Market access
1. Member States shall not make the provision of certi-
fication services subject to prior authorisation.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1,
Member States may introduce or maintain voluntary accredita-
tion schemes aiming at enhanced levels of certification-service
provision. All conditions related to such schemes must be
objective, transparent, proportionate and non-discriminatory.
Member States may not limit the number of accredited certi-
fication-service-providers for reasons which fall within the
scope of this Directive.
3.· Each Member State shall ensure the establishment of an
appropriate system that allows for supervision of certification-
service-providers which are established on its territory and
issue qualified certificates to the public.
4. The confonnity of secure signature-creation-devices with
the requirements laid down in Annex III shall be determined by
appropriate public or private bodies designated by Member
States. The Commission shall, pursuant to the procedure laid
down in Article 9, establish criteria for Member States to
determine whether a body should be designated.
A determination of conformity with the requirements laid
down in Annex III made by the bodies referred to in the first
subparagraph shall be recognised by all Member States.
5. The Commission may, in accordance with the procedure
laid down in Article 9, establish and publish reference numbers
of generally recognised standards for electronic-signature prod-
ucts in the Official Joumal of the European Communities. Member
States shall presume that there is compliance with the require-
ments laid down in Annex II, point (~, and Annex III when an
electronic signature product meets those standards.
6. Member States and the Commission sh~ll work together
to promote the development and use of signature-verification
devices in the light of the recommendations for secure signa-
ture-verification laid down in Annex IV and in the interests of
the consumer.
7. Member States may make the use of electronic signatures
in the public sector subject to pOSSible additional requirements.
Such requirements shall be objective, transparent, propor-
tionate and non-discriminatory and shall relate only to the
specific characteristics of the application concerned. Such
requirements may not constitute an obstacle to cross-border
services for citizens.
Article 4
Internal market principles
1. Each Member State shall apply the national provisions
which it adopts pursuant to this Directive to certification-
service-prOViders established on its territory and to the services
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which they prOVide. Member States may not restrict the provi-
sion of certification-services originating in another Member
State in the fields covered by this Directive.
2. Member States shall ensure that electronic-signature
products which comply with this Directive are pennitted to
circulate freely in the internal market
Artide 5
Legal effects of electronic signatures
1. Member States shall ensure that advanced electronic
signatures which are based on a qualified certificate and which
are created by a secure-signature-creation device:
(a) satisfy the legal requirements of a signature in relation to
data in electronic fonn in the same manner as a hand-
written signature satisfies those requirements in relation to
paper-based. data; and
(b) are admissible as evidence in legal proceedings.
2. Member States shall ensure that an electronic signature is
not denied legal effectiveness and admiSSibility as evidence in
legal proceedings solely on the grounds that it is:
- in electronic form, or
- not based upon a qualified certificate, or
- not based upon a qualified certificate issued by an accred-
ited certification-service-provider, or
- not created by a secure signature-creation device.
Article 6
Liability
1. As a minimum, Member States shall ensure that by
issuing a certificate as a qualified certificate to the public or by
guaranteeing such a certificate to the public a certification-
service-provider is liable for damage caused to any entity or
legal or natural person who reasonably relies on that certificate:
(a) as regards the accuracy at the time of issuance of all
information contained in the qualified certificate and as
regards the fact that the certificate contains all the details
prescribed for a qualified certificate;
(b) for assurance that at the time of the issuance of the certifi-
cate, the signatory identified in the qualified certificate held
the signature-creation data corresponding to the signatUre-
verification data given or identified in the certificate;
(c) for assurance that the signature-creation data and the signa-
ture-verification data can be used in a complementary
manner in cases where the certification-service-provider
generates them both;
unless the certification-service-provider proves that he has not
acted negligently.
L 13/16 Official Journal of the European Communities 19.1.2000
2. As a minimum Member States shall ensure that a certi-
fication-service-provider who has issued a certificate as a quali-
fied certificate to the public is liable for damage caused to any
entity or legal or natural person who reasonably relies on the
certificate for failure to register revocation of the certificate
unless the certification-service-provider proves that he has not
acted negligently.
3. Member States shall ensure that a certification-service-
provider may indicate in a qualified certificate limitations on
the use of that certificate. provided that the limitations are
recognisabIe to third parties. The certification-service-provider
shall not be liable for damage arising from use of a qualified
certificate which exceeds the limitations placed on it
4. Member States shall ensure that a certification-service-
provider may indicate in the qualified certificate a limit on the
value of transactions for which the certificate can be used,
provided that the limit is recognisable to third parties.
The certification-service-provider shall not be liable for-damage
resulting from this maximum limit being exceeded.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall be without
prejudice to Council Directive 93/13jEEC of 5 April 1993 on
unfair terms in consumer contracts (1).
Artkle 7
International aspects
1. Member States shall ensure that certificates which are
issued as qualified certificates to the public by a certification-
service-provider established in a third country are recognised as
legally equivalent to certificates issued by a certification-service-
provider established within the Community if:
(a) the certification-service-provider fulfils the requirements
laid down in this Directive and has been accredited under a
voluntary accreditation scheme established in a Member
State; or -
(b) a certification-service-provider established within the
Community which fulfils the requirements laid down in
this Directive guarantees the certificate; or
(c) the certificate or the certification-service-provider is recog-
nised under a bilateral or multilateral agreement between
the Community and third countries or international organ-
isations.
2. In order to facilitate cross-border certification services
with third countries and legal recognition of advanced elec-
tronic signatures originating in third countries, the Commis-
sion shall make proposals, where appropriate, to achieve the
effective implementation of standards and international agree-
ments applicable to certification services. In particular, and
where necessary, it shall submit proposals to the Council for
appropriate mandates for the negotiation of bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements with third countries and international organ-
isations. The Council shall decide by qualified majority.
(1) OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29.
3. Whenever the Commission is informed of any difficulties
encountered by Community undertakings with respect to
market access in third countries, it may, if necessary, submit
proposals to the Council for an appropriate mandate for the
negotiation of comparable rights for Community undertakings
in these third countries. The Council shall decide by qualified
majority.
Measures taken pursuant to this paragraph shall be without
prejudice to the obligations of the Community and of the
Member States under relevant international agreements.
Artide 8
Data protection
1. Member States shall ensure that certification-service-
providers and national bodies responsible for accreditation or
supervision comply with the requirements laid down in
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 14 October 1995 on tile protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data (~'
2. Member States shall ensure that a certification-service-
provider which issues certificates to the public may collect
personal data only directly from the data subject, or after the
explicit consent of the data subject, and only insofar as it is
necessary for the purposes of issuing and maintaining the
certificate. The data may not be collected or processed for any
other purposes without the explicit consent of the data subject
3. Without prejudice to the legal effect given to pseudonyms
under national law, Member States shall not prevent certi-
fication service providers from indicating in the certificate a
pseudonym instead of the signatory's name.
Artide 9
Committee
1. The Commission shall be assisted by an 4Electronic-Signa-
ture Committee', hereinafter referred to as 4the committee'.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Articles 4 and
7 of Decision 1999/468jEC shall apply, having. regard to the
provisions of Article 8 thereof.
The period laid down in Article 4(3) of Decision 1999/468/EC
shall be set at three months.
3. The Committee shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
Article 10
Tasks of the committee
The committee shall clarify the requirements laid down in the
Annexes of this Directive, the criteria referred to in Article 3(4)
and the generally recognised standards for electronic signature
products established and published pursuant to Article 3(5), in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 9(2).
(2) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.
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Article 11
Notification
1. Member States shall notify to the Commission and the
other Member States the following:
(a) information on national voluntary accreditation schemes,
including any additional requirements pursuant to Article
3(7);
(b) the names and addresses of the national bodies responsible
for accreditation and supervision as well as of the bodies
referred to in Article 3(4);
(c) the names and addresses of all accredited national certi-
fication service providers.
2. Any infonnation supplied under paragraph 1 and
changes in respect of that information shall be notified by the
Member States as soon as possible.
Article 12
Article 13
Implementation
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive before 19 July 2001. They shall forthwith inform. the
Commission thereof.
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain
a reference to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such a
reference on the occasion of their official publication. The
methods of making such reference shall be laid down by the
Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the
text of the main provisions of domestic Jaw which they adopt
in the field governed by this Directive.
Article 14
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the day of its publica-
tion in the Official Journal of the European Communities
Done at Brussels, 13 December 1999.
Article 15
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
'.~
Review
1. The Commission shall review the operation of this
Directive and report thereon to the European Parliament and to
the Council by 19 July 2003 at the latest.
2. The review shall inter alia assess whether the scope of
this Directive should be modified, taking account of technolog-
ical, market and legal developments. The report shall in partic-
ular include an assessment, on the basis of experience gained,
of aspects of harmonisation. The report shall be accompanied,
where appropriate, by legislative proposals.
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For the European Parliament
The President
N. FONTAINE
For the Council
The President
S. HASSI
-~:.~ ...-
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ANNEX I
Requirements for qualified certificates
Qualified certificates must contain:
(a) an indication that the certificate is issued as a qualified certificate;
(b) the identification of the certification-service-provider and the State in which it is established;
(c) the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which shall be identified as such;
(d) provision for a specific attribute of the signatory to be included if relevant, depending on the purpose for which the
certificate is intended;
(e) signature-verification data which correspond to signature-creation data under the control of the signatory;
(Q an indication of the beginning and end of the period of validity of the certificate;
(g) the identity code of the certificate;
(h) the advanced electronic signature of the certification-service-provider issuing it;
(i) limitations on the scope of use of the certificate, if applicable; and
0) limits on the value of transactions for which the certificate can be used, if applicable.
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ANNEX II
Requirements for certification-service-providers issuing qualified certificates
Certification-service-providers must
(a) demonstrate the reliability necessary for providing certification services;
(b) ensure the operation of a prompt and secure directory and a secure and immediate revocation service;
(c) ensure that the date and time when a certificate is issued or revoked can be detennined precisely;
(d) verify, by appropriate means in accordance with national law, the identity and, if applicable, any specific attributes of
the person to which a qualified certificate is issued;
(e) employ personnel who possess the expert knowledge, experience, and qualifications necessary for the services
provided, in particular competence at managerial level, expertise in electronic signature techology and familiarity with
proper security procedures; they must also apply administrative and management procedures which are adequate and
correspond to recognised standards:
(ij use trustworthy systems and products which are protected against modification and ensure the technical and
cryptographic. security of the process supported by them;
(g) take measures against forgery of certificates, and, in cases where the certification-service-provider generates signature-
creation data, guarantee confidentiality during the process of generating such data;
(h) maintain sufficient financial resources to operate in conformity with the requirements laid down in the Directive, in
particular to bear the risk of liability for damages, for example, by obtaining appropriate insurance;
(i) record all relevant infonnation concerning a qualified certificate for an appropriate period of time, in particular for the
purpose of providing evidence of certification for the purposes of legal proceedings. Such recording may be done
electronically;
0) not store or copy signature-creation data of the person to whom the certification-service-provider prOvided key
management services;
(k) before entering into a contractual relationship with a person seeking a certificate to support his electronic signature
inform that person by a durable means of communication of the precise terms and conditions regarding the use of
the certificate, including any limitations on its use, the existence of a voluntary accreditation scheme and procedures
for complaints and dispute setdement. Such information, which may be transmitted electronically, must be in writing
and in redily understandable language. Relevant parts of this information must also be made available on request to
third.parties relying on the certificate;
Q} use trustworthy systems to store certificates in a verifiable form so that:
- only authorised persons can make entries and changes,
- information can be checked for authenticity,
- certificates are publicly available for retrieval in only those cases for which the certificate-holder's consent has been
obtained, and
- any technical changes compromising these security requirements are apparent to the operator.
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ANNEX III
Requirements for serore signature-creation devices
1. Secure signature-creation devices must, by appropriate technical and procedural means, ensure at the least that
(a) the signature-creation-data used for signature generation can practically occur only once, and that their secrecy is
reasonably assured;
(b) the signature-creation-data used for signature generation cannot, with reasonable assurance, be derived and the
signature is protected against forgery using currently available technology;
(c) the signature-creation-data used for signature generation can be reliably protected by the legitimate signatory
against the use of others.
2. Secure signature-creation devices must not alter the data to be signed or prevent such data from being presented to the
signatory prior to the signature process.
ANNEX N
Recommendations for serore signature verification
DUring the signature-verification process it should be ensured with reasonable certainty that:
(a) the data used for verifying the signature correspond to the data displayed to the verifier;
(b) the signature is reliably verified and the result of that verification is correcdy displayed;
(c) the verifier can, as necessary, reliably establish the contents of the signed data;
(d) the authenticity and validity of the certificate reqUired at the time of signature verification are reliably verified;
(e) the result of verification and the signatory's identity are correcdy displayed;
{Q the use of a pseudonym is clearly indicated; and
(g) any security-relevant changes can be detected.
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Draft Electronic Signature Law, Gennany
Draft
of a Law on the Framework Conditions
for Electronic Signatures
and to Amend Other Regulations
(in the version decided by the Cabinet on 16 August 2000)
If!£:JtO f.eJ3.; ~ ~~e l
../
Unofficial Translation Ministry of Economics and Technology, September 2000, Germany
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The German Parliament has decided the following legislation:
Article 1
Law on Framework Conditions for Electronic Signatures (Signatures
Law - SigG) 1
Contents
Section One: General Regulations
§ 1 Purpose and Area of Application
§ 2 DefInition ofTenns
§ 3 Competent Authority
Section Two: Certification-Service Providers
§ 4 General Requirements
§ 5 Issue of Qualified Certificates
§ 6 Obligation to Provide Information
§ 7 Contents of Qualified Certificates
§ 8 Invalidating Qualified Certificates
§ 9 Qualified Time Stamps
§ 10 Documentation
§ 11 Liability
§ 12 Cover
§ 13 Cessation of Operations
§ 14 Data Protection
Section Three: Voluntary Accreditation
I The obligation to provide infonnation under Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and the Council
of 22 June 1998 on an infonnation procedure in the field ofnonns and technical requirements (OJ EC No. L
204, p. 37 of 21 July 1998), last amended by Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of
20 July 1998 (OJ EC No. L 217, p. 18 of 5 August 1998) and the obligation to provide infonnation under
2
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..--- § 15 Voluntary Accreditation of Certification-Service Providers
§ 16 Certificates from the Competent Authority
Section Four: Technical Security
§ 17 Products for Electronic Signatures
§ 18 Recognition of Testing and ConfIrmation Offices
Section Five: Supervision
§ 19 Supervision Measures
§ 20 Obligatory Cooperation
Section Six: Final Regulations
§ 21 Fines
§ 22 Costs and Contributions
§ 23 Foreign Electronic Signatures and Products for Electronic Signatures
§ 24 Legal Regulations
§ 25 Transitional Regulations
Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 December 1999 on Community
framework conditions for electronic signatures (OJ Ee 2000 No. L 13, p. 2) have been observed
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The Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002
Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 318
The Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002
© Crown Copyright 2002
The legislation contained on this web site is subject to Crown
Copyright protection. It may be reproduced free of charge
provided that it is reproduced accurately and that the source and
copyright status of the material is made evident to users.
It should be noted that the right to reproduce the text of Statutory
Instruments does not extend to the Royal Anns and the Queen's
Printer imprints.
The text of this Internet version of the Statutory Instrument has
been prepared to reflect the text as it was Made. The authoritative
version is the Queen's Printer copy published by The Stationery
Office Limited as the The Electronic Signatures Regulations
2002, ISBN 0 11 039401 1. Purchase this item. For details ofhow
to obtain an official copy see How to obtain The Stationery Office
Limited titles.
To ensure fast access over slow connections, large documents have
been segmented into "chunks". Where you see a "continue" button
at the bottom of the page of text, this indicates that there is another
chunk of text available.
STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS
2002 No. 318
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
The Electronic Signatures Regulations 2002
Page lof9
Made
Laid before Parliament
Coming into force
13th February 2002
14th February 2002
8th March 2002
The Secretary of State, being designated[U for the purpose of section 2(2) of
the European Communities Act 1972[~ in relation to electronic signatures, in
exercise of the powers conferred on her by the said section 2(2), hereby makes
the following Regulations:
Citation and commencement
1. These Regulations may be cited as the Electronic Signatures Regulations
2002 and shall come into force on 8th March 2002.
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2002/20020318.htm
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Contents
Chapter 1:
Chapter 2:
Law Concerning Electronic Signatures and Certification Services
(Unofficial Translation)
General provisions (Article 1 and Article 2)
Presumption of the authenticity of an electro-magnetic records (Article
3)
Chapter 3: Accreditation, etc. of designated certification services
Section 1: Accreditation of designated certification services (Article 4 through
Article 14)
Section 2: Accreditation of designated certification services provided in foreign
countries (Article 15 and Article 16)
Chapter 4: Designated investigating organization, etc.
Section 1: Designated investigating organization (Article 17 through Article 30)
Section 2: Approved investigating organization (Article 31 and Article 32)
Chapter 5: Miscellaneous provisions (Article 33 through Article 40)
Chapter 6: Penalties (Article 41 through Article 47)
Supplemental provisions
Chapter 1: General provisions
Article 1 Purpose
This law aims to promote the diffusion of information using electronic methods and
information processing through securing the smooth utilization of electronic signatures,
and thereby to contribute to the improvement of the citizen's quality 'of life and the
sound development of the national economy, by establishing such provisions as the
presumption of the authenticity of electro-magnetic records, the provisions for
accreditation with regard to designated certification services and the prescription of
other necessary matters concerning electronic signatures.
Article 2 Definitions
For the purpose of this law, "electronic signature" shall mean a measure taken with
regard to information that can be recorded in an electro-magnetic record (here and
hereinafter, any record which is produced by electronic, magnetic, or any other means
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unrecognizable by natural perceptive function, and is used for data-processing by a
computer) and to which both of the following requirements applies:
1. is a measure to indicate that the information was created by the person who
performed the measure; and
ii. is a measure that can confirm whether or not any alteration of the information has
been performed.
2. For the purpose of this law, "certification service" shall mean a service that, in
compliance with either the request of a person who uses such service (hereinafter
referred to as "user") with regard to the electronic signature that he himself
performs or the request of another person, certifies that an item used to confirm
that the user performed an electronic signature belongs to the user.
3. For the purpose of this law, "designated certification service" shall mean a
certification service that is performed with regard to those electronic signatures that
conform to the standards prescribed by the ordinance of the related ministries as
ones that, according to the method thereof, can only be substantially performed by
that person.
Chapter 2: Presumption of the authenticity of an electro-magnetic record
Article 3
An electro-magnetic record which is made in order to express information (with the
exception of one drawn by a public official in the exercise of his official functions)
shall be presumed to be authentic if an electronic signature (limited to those that, if
based on the proper control of the codes and objects necessary to perform the signature,
only that person can substantially perform) is performed by the principal in relation to
information recorded in the electro-magnetic record.
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Chapter 3: Accreditation, etc. of designated certification services
Section 1: Accreditation of desigpated certification services
Article 4 Accreditati00
A person seeking to perform or has been performing designated certification service
may receive an accreditation from the related ministers.
2. A person seeking to receive an accreditation stipulated in the preceding paragraph
shall, in accordance with the prescriptions of the ordinance of the related ministries,
file with the related ministers an application form that states the following facts as
well as other documents prescribed by the ordinance of the related ministries:
i. the name and address, and if a organization, the name of its representative;
ii. an outline of the facilities used for the service applied for accreditation, and
iii. the method of implementation of the service applied for accreditation.
3. When the related ministers have granted the accreditation stipulated in paragraph 1,
the ministers shall make an announcement of that fact.
Article 5 Disqualification provisions
A person to whom any of the following numbered items applies may not receive the
accreditation stipulatedr in paragraph 1 of the preceding article:
i. a person who has been sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment or greater
(including an equivalent penalty pursuant to the laws and regulations of a foreign
country) or who has been sentenced to a penalty pursuant to this Law and with
respect to whom fewer than two years have passed since the day on which either
the enforcement of said penalty finished or the person came to be no longer
subject thereto;
ii. a person whose accreditation has been revoked pursuant to the provisions of
either Article 14, paragraph 1 or Article 16, paragraph 1, and with respect to
whom fewer than two years have passed since the day of the revocation; or
iii. an organization for whom either of the preceding numbered items applies to any
director performing the service.
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Article 6 Requirements of accreditation
The related ministers shall grant an accreditation only when they find that the
application for accreditation stipulated in Article 4, paragraph 1 conforms to all of the
following requirements:
i. the facilities including (hardware, and software) used for the service applied for
accreditation conform to requirements prescribed by the ordinance of the related
ministries;
ii. the confirmation in the service applied for accreditation of the identity of the
user is performed through a method prescribed by the ordinance of the related
ministries; and
iii. in addition to the facts listed in the preceding numbered items, the service
applied for accreditation is performed through a method that conforms with
requirements prescribed by the ordinance of the related ministries.
2. In conducting the review for the purposes of the accreditation stipulated in Article
4, paragraph 1, the related ministers shall, in accordance with the prescriptions of
the ordinance of the related ministries, perform on-site investigation of the system
involved in the implementation of the service applied for accreditation.
Article 7 Renewal of accreditation
If the accreditation stipulated in Article 4, paragraph 1 is not renewed for each term of
no less than one year prescribed by Cabinet Order, the accreditation shall become null
and void upon the passing of the term.
2. The provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2 and those of the preceding two articles
shall be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the renewal of accreditation provided for in
the preceding paragraph.
Article 8 Succession
If a person who has received the accreditation stipulated in Article 4, paragraph 1
(hereinafter referred to as an "accredited certification service provider") transfers all of
the business that performs the accredited certification service, or if there is a
4
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succession or merger with respect to the accredited certification service provider, the
person who obtained all of such business by transfer, the successor (here and
hereinafter in this article, in a case where there are two or more successors, it: by the
agreement of all such successors, a successor is chosen to succeed to the business, that
person), or the organization that continues in existence after the merger or the
organization established by the merger shall succeed to the standing of such accredited
certification service provider. However, the foregoing shall not apply if any of the
numbered items of Article 5 apply to the person who obtained all of such business by
transfer, the successor, or the organization that continues in existence after the merger
or the organization established by the merger.
Article 9 Accreditation etc ofchan~es
If an accredited certification service provider seeks to change an item stipulated in
Article 4, paragraph 2, numbered item 2 or numbered item 3, it must receive the
accreditation of related ministers. However, the foregoing shall not apply with
respect to slight changes prescribed by order of the related ministries.
2. A person seeking to receive the accreditation of change stipulated in the preceding
paragraph shall, in accordance with the prescriptions of the ordinance of the related
ministries, file with the related ministers an application form that states the facts
concerning the change as well as other documents prescribed by the ordinance of
the related ministries.
3. The provisions of Article 4, paragraph 3 and those of Article 6 shall be applied,
mutatis mutandis, to the accreditation ofchange provided for in paragraph 1.
4. If there is a change in a fact provided for in Article 4, paragraph 2, numbered item
1, an accredited certification service provider shall give notice of that fact to the
related ministers without delay.
Article 10 Discontinuance
'"-...---'"
If an accredited certification service provider seeks to discontinue its accredited service,
it must, in accordance with the prescriptions of the ordinance of the related ministries,
give advance notice of that fact to the related ministers without delay.
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2. When the related ministers have received the notice pursuant to the provision of the
preceding paragraph, they shall make an announcement of that fact.
Artjcle ] 1 Books and records
An accredited certification service provider shall, in accordance with the prescriptions
of the ordinance of the related ministries, create and preserve books and records
relating to its accredited service.
Article 12 Proper use of information relatin~ to the conflIUlation of the identity of
~
An accredited certification service provider shall not use the information it learns
through the confirmation of the identity of users for its accredited service for any
purpose other than those necessary for the provision of the accredited service.
Article 13
An accredited certification service provider may, in accordance with the prescriptions
of the ordinance of the related ministries, place a mark to the effect that its service has
received accreditation on an electronic certificate, etc. (here and in the following
paragraph, this shall mean an electro-magnetic record or other means prescribed by the
ordinance of the related ministries as one used for the sake of the certification service,
created to verify that an item used to confirm that a user performed an electronic
signature belongs to theuser.)
2. Except for the cases stipulated in the preceding paragraph, no person shall place the
mark provided for in the preceding paragraph or any mark not clearly
distinguishable therefrom on any electronic certificate, etc.
Article 14 Reyocation of accreditation
If any of the following numbered items applies to an accredited certification service
provider, the related ministers may revoke such accreditation:
i. if Article 5, numbered item 1 or numbered item 3 becomes applicable;
ii. if the accredited certification service provider fails to conform to any numbered
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item of Article 6, paragraph 1; or
iii. if the accredited certification service provider violates any provision of Article 9,
paragraph 1, Article 11, Article 12, or Article 13, paragraph 2; or
iii. if the accredited certification service provider receives the accreditation
provided for in Article 4, paragraph 1 or the accreditation of change stipulated in
Article 9, paragraph 1 through any improper means.
2. When related ministers have revoked an accreditation pursuant to the provisions of
the preceding paragraph, they shall make an announcement of that fact.
Section 2: Accreditation of designated certification service located in foreign
countries
Article 15 Accreditation of foreign certification service etc
~.
A person seeking to perform the designated certification service by means of an office
located in a foreign country may receive the accreditation from the related ministers.
2. The provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 as well as those of Article
5 through Article 7 shall be applied mutatis mutandis to the accreditation provided
for in the preceding paragraph, and the provisions of Article 8 through Article 13
shall be applied mutatis mutandis to the person who has received the accreditation
provided for in the preceding paragraph (hereinafter referred to as "accredited
foreign certification service provider"). In such a case, the term "no person" in
Article 13, paragraph 2 shall be read as "no accredited foreign certification service
provider".
3. If the related ministers find that persons seeking to receive the accreditation
provided for in paragraph 1, a renewal thereof or the accreditation of change
stipulated in Article 9, paragraph 1 as applied mutatis mutandis in the preceding
paragraph are persons who perform certification service by means of offices in the
foreign country pursuant to provisions concerning certification service based on the
laws and regulations of the foreign country that are similar to the provisions for
accreditation stipulated in Article 4, paragraph 1, and that it is necessary to
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faithfully perform a treaty that Japan has entered into with said foreign country or
another international agreement(including administrative agreement) , they may
require such persons to file documents that state facts prescribed by the ordinance
of the related ministries instead of the investigation pursuant to the provisions of
Article 6, paragraph 2 (including cases where they are applied mutatis mutandis in
Article 7, paragraph 2 and Aeticle 9, paragraph 3, as applied mutatis mutandis in
the preceding paragraph).
4. When, in the case as stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the documents are
received from such persons, the related ministers shall, taking the documents into
account, perform an examination for the purpose of the accreditation provided for
in paragraph 1, a renewal thereof or the accreditation of change provided for
Article 9, paragraph 1 as applied mutatis mutandis in paragraph 2.
Article 16 Reyocatjon of accreditation
If any of the following numbered items applies to an accredited foreign certification
service provider, the related ministers may revoke such accreditation:
1. if Article 5, numbered item 1 or numbered item 3, as applied mutatis mutandis in
the preceding article, paragraph 2, becomes applicable;
ii. if the accredited certification service provider fails to conform to any numbered
item of Article 6, paragraph 1 as applied mutatis mutandis in the preceding article,
paragraph 2;
iii. if the accredited foreign certification service provider violates any provision of
Article 9, paragraph 1 or paragraph 4, Article 11, Article 12, or Article 13,
paragraph 2 as applied mutatis mutandis in the preceding article, paragraph 2;
iv. if the accredited certification service provider receives the accreditation
stipulated in the preceding article, paragraph 1 or the accreditation of change
provided for in Article 9, paragraph 1 as applied mutatis mutandis in the
preceding article, paragraph 2 through any improper means.
v. in a case where the related ministers have sought to compel the report of an
accredited foreign certification service provider pursuant to the provisions of
Article 35, paragraph 1 as applied mutatis mutandis in Article 35, paragraph 3,
and either such report is not fued or a false report is filed; or
vi. in a case where the related ministers have sought to have their staff member
conduct an inspection at the business office, administrative office or other place
8
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of business of an accredited foreign certification service provider pursuant to the
provisions of Article 35, paragraph 1 as applied mutatis mutandis in Article 35,
paragraph 3, and said accredited foreign certification service provider either
refuses, obstructs, or evades such inspection· or refuses to answer or provides
false answers in response to questions posed pursuant to the provisions of the
same paragraph.
2. When they have revoked an accreditation pursuant to the prOVISIons of the
preceding paragraph, the related ministers shall make an announcement of that fact.
Chapter 4: Designated investigating organization, etc.
Section 1: Designated investigating organization
Article 17 Inyestigation by a designated investigating organization
The related ministers may have the person they designate (hereinafter referred to as
"designated investigating organization") conduct the whole or part of the investigation
pursuant to the provisions of Article 6, paragraph 2 (including cases where they are
applied mutatis mutandis in Article 7, paragraph 2 [including cases where it is applied
mutatis mutandis in Article 15, paragraph 2], Article 9, paragraph 3 [including cases
where it is applied mutatis mutandis in Article 15, paragraph 2], and Article 15,
paragraph 2) (hereinafter referred to, with the exception of the following section, as
"investigation").
2. If related ministers have the designated investigating organzation conduct the
whole or part of the investigation pursuant to the provisions of the preceding
paragraph, they shall not conduct the whole or part of said investigation. In this
case, the related ministers shall perform an examination in consideration of the
results of the investigation that the designated investigating organization gives
notice of pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4 for the purpose of the
accreditation provided for in Article 4, paragraph 1 or a renewal thereof, the
accreditation of change provided for Article 9, paragraph 1 (including cases where
it is applied mutatis mutandis in Article 15, paragraph 2) or the accreditation
provided for in Article 15, paragraph 1 or renewal thereof.
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3. When the related ministers have the designated investigating organization conduct
the whole or part of the investigation pursuant to the provisions ofparagraph 1, the
person seeking to receive the accreditation provided for in Article 4, paragraph 1 or
a renewal thereof, the accreditation of change provided for Article 9, paragraph 1
(including cases where it is applied mutatis mutandis in Article 15, paragraph 2) or
the accreditation stipulated in Article 15, paragraph 1 or renewal thereof shall, in
accordance with the prescriptions of the ordinance of the related ministries, file
with the designated investigating organization an application with respect to the
investigation that the designated investigating organization performs
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2 (including cases where
they are applied mutatis mutandis in Article 7, paragraph 2 [including cases where
this is applied mutatis mutandis in Article 15, paragraph 2] and Article 15,
paragraph 2) and Article 9, paragraph 2 (including cases where they are applied
mutatis mutandis in Article 15, paragraph 2).
4. When the designated investigating organization has conducted the investigation
upon the application provided for in the preceding paragraph, it shall, in
accordance with the prescriptions of the ordinance of the related ministries, give
notice of the results of the investigation to the related ministers without delay.
Article 18 Designation
Designation pursuant to the prOViSions of the preceding article, paragraph 1
(hereinafter referred to as "designation") shall, in accordance with the prescriptions of
the ordinance of the related ministries, be made upon the application of the person
seeking to conduct the investigation (with the exception of a person seeking to conduct
it by means of an office located in a foreign country).
Article 19 Disqualification provisions
A person to whom any of the following numbered items applies may not receive
designation:
i. a person who has been sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment or greater or who
has been sentenced to a penalty pursuant to this Law and with respect to whom
fewer than two years have passed since the day on which either the enforcement
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of the penalty fmished or the person came to be no longer subject thereto;
ii. a person whose designation has been revoked pursuant to the provisions of
Article 29, paragraph 1, or whose approval Q.as been revoked pursuant to the
provisions of Article 32, paragraph 1, and with respect to whom fewer than two
years have 'passed since the day ofsaid revocation; or
iii. an organization for whom either of the preceding numbered items applies to any
director performing said service.
Article 20 Standards Qfdesi~atiQn
The related ministers shall grant designation upon the application only when they find
that it conforms to all of the following numbered items:
i. it possesses the financial base and technological ability sufficient to competently
and smoothly implement the investigation service;
ii. if an organization, there is no risk that its board members or the makeup of
constituents prescribed by the ordinance of the related ministries in accordance
with organization type will interfere with the fair implementation of the
investigation;
iii. if it performs a service other than the investigation service, there is no risk that
the investigation will become unfair through the performance of such a service;
and
iv. a proper and smooth implementation of the investigation upon the application
will not be impeded as a result of designation.
Article 21 Announcemeot, etc. ofdesignatioo
When they have made a designation, the related ministers shall announce the name and
address of the designated investigating organization and the location of its office
performing the investigation service.
2. If the designated investigation organization seeks to change its name, address or the
..
location of its office performing the investigation service, it must give notice of
such fact to related ministers two weeks in advance of the day on which it seeks to
make such change.
3. Upon the receipt of the notice stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the related
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ministers shall make an announcement of that fact.
Article 22 Renewalofdesignatioo
If the designation is not renewed for each term of five years or more but less than ten
years prescribed by Cabinet Order, the designation shall become null and void upon
the passing of said term.
2. The provisions of Article 18 through Article 20 shall be applied, mutatis mutandis,
to the renewal ofdesignation provided for in the preceding paragraph.
Article 23 Duty of confidentiality, etc.
The board members (here, in the following paragraph as well as in Article 43 and
Article 45, if the designated investigating organization is not an organization, the
person who received said designation) and staff members of the designated
investigating organization, as well as persons who formerly held such positions, shall
not disclose any secrets that they learned in connection with the investigation service.
2. For the purposes of the application of the Criminal Law (Law No. 45 of 1907) and
other penalties, the directors and staff members of a designated investigating
organization engaging in the investigation service are deemed public officials
pursuant to laws and regulations.
Article 24 Duty of investigation
When the designated investigating organization is requested to conduct an
investigation, it shall conduct the investigation without delay unless there is a valid
reason not to.
Article 25 Inyestigation service regulations
The designated investigating organization shall prescribe rules concerning the
investigation service (hereinafter referred to as "investigation service rules") and
obtain the authorization of the related ministers. The same procedure shall apply to
amendments to the investigation service rules.
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2. Matters to be prescribed in the investigation service rules shall be prescribed by the
ordinance of the related ministries.
3. If the related ministers find that investigation service rules authorized pursuant to
paragraph 1 have become inappropriate for the fair implementation of
investigations, they may order that such investigation service rules be amended.
Article 26 Books and records
The designated investigating organization shall, in accordance with the prescriptions of
the ordinance of the related ministries, prepare and preserve books and record facts
concerning the investigation service as being prescribed by the ordinance of the related
ministries.
Article 27 Order to confoon
If related ministers find that a designated investigating organization is not in
confoonity with Article 20, numbered items 1 through 3, they may order that such
designated investigating organization take measures necessary to conform to these
provisions.
Article 28 Suspension and abrogation of service
Unless it receives the authorization of related ministers, a designated investiga~ing
organization may not suspend or abrogate the whole or part of its investigation service.
2. When he has given the authorization stipulated in the preceding paragraph, the
related ministers shall make an announcement of that fact.
Article 29 Revocation, etc ofdesignation
If the related ministers find that any of the following numbered items apply to a
designated investigating organization, they may revoke such designation, or they may
order that the whole or part of the investigation service be suspended for a prescribed
period:
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i. if there is a violation of any provision of this section;
ii. if Article 19, numbered item 1 or numbered item 3 becomes applicable;
111. if investigation service is performed in violation of the investigation service
regulations authorized pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1;
iv. if there is a violation of any order pursuant to the provisions of Article 25,
paragraph 3 or Article 27; or
v. if designation is received by any improper means.
2. When they have revoked a designation or ordered that the whole or part of the
investigation service be suspended for a prescribed period pursuant to the
provisions of the preceding paragraph, the related ministers shall make an
announcement of that fact.
Article 30 Implementation of the investigation service by related ministers
If the designated investigating organization suspends the whole or part of the
investigation service pursuant to the provisions of Article 28, paragraph 1; if the
designated investigating organization is ordered to suspend the whole or part of the
investigation service pursuant to the provisions of the preceding article, paragraph 1; or
if the designated investigating organization becomes unable to conduct the whole or
part of the investigation service due to a natural disaster or other ground, the related
ministers shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 17, paragraph 2, conduct the
whole or part of the investigation service when they find it necessary.
2. When the related ministers decide to conduct the investigation service pursuant to
the provisions of the preceding paragraph, or decide to no longer conduct the
investigation service that it is conducting pursuant to the provisions of the same
paragraph, they shall make an announcement of that fact in advance.
3. For the cases when the related ministers decide to conduct the investigation service
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1, permit the abrogation of the
investigation service pursuant to the provisions of Article 28, paragraph 1, or
revoke a designation pursuant to the provisions of the preceding article, paragraph
1, the ordinance of the related ministries shall prescribe necessary matters
including taking over of the investigation service.
14
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Article 31
SectioD 2: Approyed investigating organization
Approyal, etc ofapproyed investigating organization
When the related ministers receive an application from a person (limited to one
seeking to conduct its business by means of an office located in a foreign country)
seeking to conduct the whole or part of the investigation pursuant to the provisions of
Article 6, paragraph 2 as applied mutatis mutandis in Article 15, paragraph 2
(including cases where they are applied mutatis mutandis in Article 7, paragraph 2 and
Article 9, paragraph 3 as applied mutatis mutandis ins Article 15, paragraph 2)
(hereinafter in this section referred to as "investigation"), they may approve such
petition in accordance with the prescriptions of the ordinance of the related ministries
2. When the related ministers grant the approval provided for in the preceding
paragraph, a person seeking to receive the accreditation stipulated in Article 15,
paragraph 1, a renewal thereof or the accreditation ofchange provided for Article 9,
paragraph 1 as applied mutatis mutandis in Article 15, paragraph 2 may, in
accordance with the prescriptions of the ordinance of the related ministries, apply
the person who received the approval provided for in the preceding paragraph
(hereinafter referred to as "approved investigating organization") with respect to
the investigations that the approved investigating organization conducts
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2 as applied mutatis
mutandis in Article 15, paragraph 2 (including cases where they are applied mutatis
mutandis in Article 7, paragraph 2 as applied mutatis mutandis in Article 15,
paragraph 2) and those of Article 9, paragraph 2 and Article 17, paragraph 3 as
applied mutatis mutandis in Article 15, paragraph 2. In this case, the related
ministers shall perform a review in consideration of the results of the investigation
that the approved investigating organization gives notice of pursuant to the
provisions of the following paragraph for the purpose of the accreditation provided
for in Article 15, paragraph 1, a renewal thereof or the accreditation of change
provided for Article 9, paragraph 1 as applied mutatis mutandis in Article 15,
paragraph 2).
3. When the approved investigating organization has conducted the investigation
associated with the petition provided for in the preceding paragraph, it shall, in
accordance with the prescriptions of the orders of the related ministries, give notice
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of the results of sa~d investigation to the related ministers without delay.
4. If an approved investigative organ suspends or 'abrogates the whole or part of the
investigation service, it must give notice of that fact to related the ministers without
delay.
5. When they have received the notice provided for in the preceding paragraph,
related ministers shall make an announcement of that fact.
6. The provisions of Article 19 through Article 22 shall be applied mutatis mutandis
to the approval provided for in paragraph 1, and the provisions of Article 24
through Article 27 shall be applied mutatis mutandis to the approved investigating
organization. In this case, the term "order" in Article 25 paragraph 3 and in
Article 27 shall be read as "request".
Article 32 Reyocation of approval
,-.... -.-.
If any of the following numbered items applies to an approved investigation organ,
related ministers may revoke such approval:
i. if there is a violation of a provision of the preceding article, paragraph 3 or 4, or a
provision of Article 21, paragraph 2, Article 24, Article 25, paragraph 1, or
Article 26 as applied mutatis mutandis in the preceding article, paragraph 6;
ii. if Article 19, numbered item 1 or numbered item 3, as applied mutatis mutandis
in the preceding article, paragraph 6, becomes applicable;
iii. if investigation service is performed in violation of the investigation service
regulations authorized pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 1 as applied mutatis
mutandis in the preceding article, paragraph 6;
iv. if there is a failure to comply with any request pursuant to the provisions of
Article 25, paragraph 3 or Article 27 as applied mutatis mutandis in the preceding
article, paragraph 6;
v. if the approval stipulated in the preceding article, paragraph 1 is received by any
improper means;
vi. in a case where the related ministers find that any of the preceding numbered
items applies to the approved investigating organization and requests that the
whole or part of the investigation service be suspended for a prescribed period,
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the approved investigating organization fails to comply with such request;
VIl. in a case where the related ministers have sought to compel the report of an
approved investigating organization pursuant to the provisions of Article 35,
paragraph 2 as applied mutatis mutandis in Article 35, paragraph 3, and either
such report is not filed or a false report is ftIed; or
viii. in a case where the related ministers have sought to have its staff member
conduct an inspection at the administrative office of an approved investigating
organization pursuant to the provisions of Article 35, paragraph 2 as applied
mutatis mutandis in Article 35, paragraph 3, and said approved investigating
organization either refuses, obstructs, or evades such inspection or refuses to
answer or provides false answers in response to questions posed pursuant to the
provisions of the same paragraph.
2. When the related ministers has revoked a approval pursuant to the provisions of the
preceding paragraph, the related ministers shall make an announcement of that fact.
Chapter 5: Miscellaneous provisions
Article 33 Support, etc. for designated certification service
In order to promote the smooth implementation of the accreditation prOViSIons
concerning the designated certification service, the related ministers .shall conduct
surveys and research with respect to the evaluation of the technologies associated with
electronic signatures and certification services and strive to provide necessary
information, advice and other support to persons performing designated certification
service and users.
Article 34 Measures by the national government
Through public education activities and public information activities, the national
government shall strive to deepen the citizens' understanding of electronic signatures
and certification services.
Article 35 Collection of reports and on-site inspections
The related ministers may, to the extent necessary to enforce this Law, compel an
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accredited certification service provider to report on its accredited service or have its
staff official enter the business office, administrative office or other place of business
of an accredited certification service provider, and inspect the status of service,
facilities, books and records and other objects associated with its accredited business as
well as ask questions of the persons concerned.
2. The related ministers may, to the extent necessary to enforce this Law, compel a
designated investigating organization to report on its service or have its staff
official enter the administrative office of a designated investigating organization
and inspect the status of service, books and records and other objects as well as ask
questions of the persons concerned.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall be applied mutatis mutandis to accredited
foreign certification service providers and the provisions of the preceding
paragraph shall be applied mutatis mutandis to approved investigating
organizations.
4. A staff official who conducts an on-site inspection pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 (including cases where they are applied respectively in
the preceding paragraph) shall carry a proof of his/her identity and present it to
persons concerned.
5. The authority to conduct on-site inspections pursuant to the prOVISIOns of
paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 (including cases where they are applied respectively
in paragraph 3) shall not be interpreted as recognized for the purpose of criminal
investigations.
Article 36 ms
Persons listed in the following numbered items shall pay to the national government
fees in the amounts prescribed by Cabinet Order, which will be determined in
consideration of actual costs,.
i. a person seeking to receive an accreditation stipulated in Article 4, paragraph 1 or
renewal thereof;
11. a person seeking to receive an accreditation of change stipulated in Article 9,
paragraph 1 (including cases where it is applied mutatis mutandis in Article 15,
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paragraph 2); and
iii. a person seeking to receive an accreditation stipulated in Article 15, paragraph 1
or renewal thereof.
2. A person seeking to receive an investigation performed by a designated
investigating organization shall, in accordance with the prescription of a Cabinet
Order, pay to the designated investigating organization a fee in the amount that the
organization prescribes with the authorization of the related ministers.
Article 37 Relationship between related ministers and the National Public Safety
Commission
When the National Public Safety Commission fmds it necessary to prevent serious
harm associated with the verification of users from occurring in connection with the
accredited service of an accredited certification service provider or an accredited
foreign certification service provider, the Commission may request the related
ministers to take necessary measures.
Article 38 Request for review
A person who objects with respect to a disposition or omission a designated
investigating organization pursuant to the provisions of this Law may request that the
related ministers conduct a review pursuant to the Administrative Appeal Law (Law
No. 160 of 1962)
Article 39 Interim measures
In the event that a Cabinet Order or ordinance of the related ministries pursuant to the
provisions of this Law is enacted, amended or repealed, necessary interim measures
(including interim measures pertaining to penalties) in the respective forms of Cabinet
Order and ordinance of the related ministries may be prescribed within a scope
determined to be reasonably necessary in accordance with such enactment, amendment
or repeaL
Article 40 The related ministers, etc.
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The tenn "the related minister" as used in this Law refers to the Minister of General
Affairs, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of Economy and Industry; however,
the reference "the related ministers" in Article 33 refers to the Minister of General
Affairs and the Minister ofEconomy and Industry.
2. The term "ordinance of the related ministries" as used in this Law refers to an
ordinance jointly issued by the Minister of GeneraJ Affairs, the Minister of Justice,
and the Minister ofEconomy and Industry.
Chapter 6: Penalties
Article 41
A person who makes a false application before an accredited certification service
provider or accredited foreign certification service provider in connection with its
accredited certification service and thereby causes an untrue certification shall be
punished with penal servitude for not more than three years or a fine of not more than
two million yen.
2. Attempts of the crimes mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be punished.
3. The crimes mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs shall comply with the
precedents of the Criminal Law, Article 2.
Article 42
A person to whom any of the following numbered items applies shall be punished to
no more than one year ofpenal servitude or a fine ofnot more than one million yen:
i. a person who violates a provision of Article 13, paragraph 2;
ii. a person who discloses a secret that he learned in connection with his duties in
violation ofa provision of Article 23, paragraph 1.
Article 43
If an order to suspend service pursuant to the provisions of Article 29, paragraph 1 is
violated, an officer or staff member of a designated investigative organ that commits
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the act of violation shall be punished to no more than one year of penal servitude or a
fine of not more than one million yen.
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Article 44
A person to whom any of the following numbered items applies shall be punished to a
fine of not more than three hundred thousand yen:
i. a person who changes a fact provided for in Article 4, paragraph 2, numbered
item 2 or numbered item 3 in violation of a provision ofArticle 9, paragraph 1;
ii. a person who fails to create or preserve the accounting books and records
pursuant to the provisions of Article 11, or who creates false accounting books
and records; or
iii. a person who fails to file a report pursuant to the provisions of Article 35,
paragraph 1, or files a false such report, or who refuses, obstructs, or evades an
inspection pursuant to the provisions of the same paragraph, or who refuses to
answer or provides false answers in response to questions posed pursuant to the
provisions of the same paragraph.
Article 45
If any of the following numbered items apply, an officer or staff member of a
designated investigating organization that commits the act of violation shall be
punished to a fine of not more than three hundred thousand yen:
1. when the designated investigative organ fails to create accounting book records
pursuant to the provisions of Article 26, creates false records, or fails to preserve
the accounting books;
ii. when the designated investigating organization abrogates all of its investigation
service in violation of a provision of Article 28, paragraph 1; or
iii. when the designated investigative organ fails to file a report pursuant to the
provisions of Article 35, paragraph 2, or files a false such report, or refuses,
obstructs, or evades an inspection pursuant to the provisions of the same
paragraph, or refuses to answer or provides false answers in response to questions
posed pursuant to the provisions of the same paragraph.'
Article 46
If any representative of an organization or any agent, servant or other employee of any
of a organization or person commits, in connection with the service of such
organization or person, an act in violation of Article 42, paragraph 1 or Article 44, then
22
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in addition to the punishment of the actor, the monetary penalties provided for in each
above provision shall be imposed against such organization or person.
Article 47
A person who fails to give notice pursuant to the provisions of Article 9, paragraph 4
or Article 10, paragraph 1, or who gives a false notice shall be punished to a non-penal
fine of no more than one hundred thousand yen.
Supplemental provisions
Article 1 Date of enforcement
This Law shall be enforced from April 1, 2001; provided that the provisions of the
following article shall be enforced from March 1, 2001, and the provisions of
Supplemental Article 4 shall be enforced from the date of enforcement of the Law
Concerning the Arrangement of Related Laws That Accompany the Enforcement of
Laws That Revise Parts of the Commercial Code, etc. (Law No. ---- of2000)
Article 2 Preparatory actions
Prior to the enforcement of this Law, designation pursuant to the provisions of Article
17, paragraph 1 and necessary procedures and other actions in connection therewith
may be performed pursuant to the precedents of Article 18 through Article 20, Article
21, paragraph 1, and Article 25, paragraph 1 and paragraph 2.
Article 3 Examination
When five years have passed since the enforcement of this Law, the government shall
examine the status of enforcement hereof and take necessary measures based on the
results of such examination.
.~
Article 4 Partial revision of the Law Concerning the Arrangement of Related Laws
That Accompany the Enforcement of Laws That Reyise Parts of the
23
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Commercial Code, etc
A part of the Law Concerning the Arrangement of Related Laws That Accompany the
Enforcement of Laws That Revise Parts of the Commercial Code, etc. shall be revised
as follows.
The following article shall be added following Article 150:
Article 150-2 partial revision of the Law Concerning Electronic Signatures and
Certification Services
A part of the Law Concerning Electronic Signatures and Certification Services (Law
No. __ of 2000) shall be revised as follows.
Throughout the text of Article 8, the phrase "or merger" shall be changed to , "merger
or partition (limited to one that would cause succession of the whole of the business
that performs service associated with such accreditation)"; the phrase "or the
organization that continues in existence after the merger" shall be changed to "the
organization that continues in existence after the merger"; and the phrase "or the
organization that succeeds to the whole of such business through partition" shall be
added after the phrase "the organization established by the merger".
24
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DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL
of24 October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in
particular Article 100a thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (2),
Acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b of the Treaty
(3),
(1) Whereas the objectives of the Community, as laid down in the Treaty, as
amended by the Treaty on European Union, include creating an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe, fostering closer relations between the States
belonging to the Community, ensuring economic and social progress by common
action to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, encouraging the constant
improvement of the living conditions of its peoples, preserving and strengthening
peace and liberty and promoting democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights
recognized in the constitution and laws of the Member States and in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
(2) Whereas data-processing systems are designed to serve man; whereas they
must, whatever the nationality or residence of natural persons, respect their
fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, and contribute to
economic and social progress, trade expansion and the well-being of individuals;
(3) Whereas the establishment and functioning of an internal market in which, in
accordance with Article 7a of the Treaty, the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital is ensured require not only that personal data should be able
to flow freely from one Member State to another, but also that the fundamental
rights of individuals should be safeguarded;
(4) Whereas increasingly frequent recourse is being had in the Community to the
processing of personal data in the various spheres of economic and social activity;
whereas the progress made in information technology is making the processing
and exchange of such data considerably easier;
(5) Whereas the economic and social integration resulting from the establishment
and functioning of the internal market within the meaning of Article 7a of the
Treaty will necessarily lead to a substantial increase in cross-border flows of
personal data between all those involved in a private or public capacity in
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personal data between all those involved in a private or public capacity in
economic and social activity in the Member States; whereas the exchange of
personal data between undertakings in different Member States is set to increase;
whereas the national authorities in the various Member States are being called
upon by virtue of Community law to collaborate and exchange personal data so as
to be able to perform their duties or carty out tasks on behalf of an authority in
another Member State within the context of the area without internal frontiers as
constituted by the internal market;
(6) Whereas, furthennore, the increase in scientific and technical cooperation and
the coordinated introduction ofnew telecommunications networks in the
Community necessitate and facilitate cross-border flows of personal data;
(7) Whereas the difference in levels of protection of the rights and freedoms of
individuals, notably the right to privacy, with regard to the processing of personal
data afforded in the Member States may prevent the transmission of such data
from the territory of one Member State to that of another Member State; whereas
this difference may therefore constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of a number of
economic activities at Community level, distort competition and impede
authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities under Community law;
whereas this difference in levels of protection is due to the existence of a wide
variety of national laws, regulations and administrative provisions;
(8) Whereas, in order to remove the obstacles to flows of personal data, the level
of protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals with regard to the
processing of such data must be equivalent in all Member States; whereas this
objective is vital to the internal market but cannot be achieved by the Member
States alone, especially in view of the scale of the divergences which currently
exist between the relevant laws in the Member States and the need to coordinate
the laws of the Member States so as to ensure that the cross-border flow of
personal data is regulated in a consistent manner that is in keeping with the
objective of the internal market as provided for in Article 7a of the Treaty;
whereas Community action to approximate those laws is therefore needed;
(9) Whereas, given the equivalent protection resulting from the approximation of
national laws, the Member States will no longer be able to inhibit the free
movement between them of personal data on grounds relating to protection of the
rights and freedoms of individuals, and in particular the right to privacy; whereas
Member States will be left a margin for manoeuvre, which may, in the context of
implementation of the Directive, also be exercised by the business and social
partners; whereas Member States will therefore be able to specify in their national
law the general conditions governing the lawfulness of data processing; whereas
in doing so the Member States shall strive to improve the protection currently
provided by their legislation; whereas, within the limits of this margin for
manoeuvre and in accordance with Community law, disparities could arise in the
implementation of the Directive, and this could have an effect on the movement
of data within a Member State as well as within the Community;
(10) Whereas the object of the national laws on the processing of personal data is
to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, which is
recognized both in Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in the general principles of
Community law; whereas, for that reason, the approximation of those laws must
not result in any lessening of the protection they afford but must, on the contrary,
seek to ensure a high level ofprotection in the Community;
( 11) Whereas the principles of the protection of the rights and freedoms of
individuals, notably the" right to privacy, which are contained in this Directive,
give substance to and amplify those contained in the Council of Europe
Convention of 28 January 1981 for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data;
(12) Whereas the protection principles must apply to all processing of personal
data by any person whose activities are governed by Community law; whereas
there should be excluded the processing of data carried out by a natural person in
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there should be excluded the processing of data carried out by a natural person in
the exercise of activities which are exclusively personal or domestic, such as
correspondence and the holding of records of addresses;
(13) Whereas the acitivities referred to in Titles V and VI of the Treaty on
European Union regarding public safety, defence, State security or the acitivities
of the State in the area of criminal laws fall outside the scope of Community law,
without prejudice to the obligations incumbent upon Member States under Article
56 (2), Article 57 or Article IOOa of the Treaty establishing the European
Community; whereas the processing ofpersonal data that is necessary to
safeguard the economic well-being of the State does not fall within the scope of
this Directive where such processing relates to State security matters;
(14) Whereas, given the importance of the developments under way, in the
framework of the information society, of the techniques used to capture, transmit,
manipulate, record, store or communicate sound and image data relating to natural
persons, this Directive should be applicable to processing involving such data;
(15) Whereas the processing of such data is covered by this Directive only if it is
automated or if the data processed are contained or are intended to be contained in
a filing system structured according to specific criteria relating to individuals, so
as to pennit easy access to the personal data in question;
(16) Whereas the processing of sound and image data, such as in cases of video
surveillance, does not come within the scope of this Directive if it is carried out
for the purposes of public security, defence, national security or in the course of
State activities relating to the area of criminal law or of other activities which do
not come within the scope of Community law;
(17) Whereas, as far as the processing of sound and image data carried out for
purposes ofjournalism or the purposes of literary or artistic expression is
concerned, in particular in the audiovisual field, the principles of the Directive are
to apply in a restricted manner according to the provisions laid down in Article 9;
(18) Whereas, in order to ensure that individuals are not deprived of the protection
to which they are entitled under this Directive, any processing of personal data in
the Community must be carried out in accordance with the law of one of the
Member States; whereas, in this connection, processing carried out under the
responsibility of a controller who is established in a Member State should be
governed by the law of that State;
(19) Whereas establishment on the territory of a Member State implies the
effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements; whereas the
legal fOIm of such an establishment, whether simply branch or a subsidiary with a
legal personality, is not the detennining factor in this respect; whereas, when a
single controller is established on the territory of several Member States,
particularly by means of subsidiaries, he must ensure, in order to avoid any
circumvention of national rules, that each of the establishments fulfils the
obligations imposed by the national law applicable to its activities;
(20) Whereas the fact that the processing of data is carried out by a person
established in a third country must not stand in the way of the protection of
individuals provided for in this Directive; whereas in these cases, the processing
should be governed by the law of the Member State in which the means used are
located, and there should be guarantees to ensure that the rights and obligations
provided for in this Directive are respected in practice;
(21) Whereas this Directive is without prejudice to the rules of territoriality
applicable in criminal matters;
(22) Whereas Member States shall more precisely define in the laws they enact or
when bringing into force the measures taken under this Directive the general
circumstances in which processing is lawful; whereas in particular Article 5, in
conjunction with Articles 7 and 8, allows Member States, independently of
general rules, to provide for special processing conditions for specific sectors and
for the various categories of data covered by Article 8;
(23) Whereas Member States are empowered to ensure the implementation of the
protection of individuals both by means of a general law on the protection of
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protection of individuals both by means of a general law on the protection of
individuals as regards the processing of personal data and by sectorial laws such
as those relating, for example, to statistical institutes;
(24) Whereas the legislation concerning the protection of lega! persons with
regard to the processing data which concerns them is not affected by this
Directive;
(25) Whereas the principles of protection must be reflected, on the one hand, in
the obligations imposed on persons, public authorities, enterprises, agencies or
other bodies responsible for processing, in particular regarding data quality,
technical security, notification to the supervisory authority, and the circumstances
under which processing can be carried out, and, on the other hand, in the right
conferred on individuals, the data on whom are the subject of processing, to be
infonned that processing is taking place, to consult the data, to request corrections
and even to object to processing in certain circumstances;
(26) Whereas the principles ofprotection must apply to any information
concerning an identified or identifiable person; whereas, to detennine whether a
person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means .likely reasonably
to be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said
person; whereas the principles of protection shall not apply to data rendered
anonymous in such a way that the data subject is no longer identifiable; whereas
codes of conduct within the meaning ofArticle 27 may be a useful instrument for
providing guidance as to the ways in which data may be rendered anonymous and
retained in a fOIm in which identification of the data subject is no longer possible;
(27) Whereas the protection of individuals must apply as much to automatic
processing of data as to manual processing; whereas the scope of this protection
must not in effect depend on the techniques used, othelWise this would create a
serious risk of circumvention; whereas, nonetheless, as regards manual
processing, this Directive covers only filing systems, not unstructured files;
whereas, in particular, the content of a filing system must be structured according
to specific criteria relating to individuals allowing easy access to the personal
data; whereas, in line with the definition in Article 2 (c), the different criteria for
determining the constituents of a structured set of personal data, and the different
criteria governing access to such a set, may be laid down by each Member State;
whereas files or sets of files as well as their cover pages, which are not structured
according to specific criteria, shall under no circumstances fall within the scope of
this Directive;
(28) Whereas any processing of personal data must be lawful and fair to the
individuals concerned; whereas, in particular, the data must be adequate, relevant
and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are processed;
whereas such purposes must be explicit and legitimate and must be detennined at
the time of collection of the data; whereas the purposes of processing further to
collection shall not be incompatible with the purposes as they were originally
specified;
(29) Whereas the further processing of personal data for historical, statistical or
scientific purposes is not generally to be considered incompatible with the
purposes for which the data have previously been collected provided that Member
States furnish suitable safeguards; whereas these safeguards must in particular rule
out the use of the data in support of measures or decisions regarding any
particular individual;
(30) Whereas, in order to be lawful, the processing of personal data must in
addition be carried out with the consent of the data subject or be necessary for the
conclusion or performance of a contract binding on the data subject, or as a legal
requirement, or for the perfonnance of a task carried out in the public interest or
in the exercise of official authority, or in the legitimate interests of a natural or
legal person, provided that the interests or the rights and freedoms of the data
subject are not overriding; whereas, in particular, in order to maintain a balance
between the interests involved while guaranteeing effective competition, Member
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between the interests involved while guaranteeing effective competition, Member
States may detennine the circumstances in which personal data may be used or
disclosed to a third party in the context of the legitimate ordinary business
activities of companies and other bodies; whereas Member States may similarly
specify the conditions under which personal data may be disclosed to a third party
for the purposes of marketing whether carried out commercially or by a charitable
organization or by any other association or foundation, of a political nature for
example, subject to the provisions allowing a data subject to object to the
processing of data regarding him, at no cost and without having to state his
reasons;
(31) Whereas the processing ofpersonal data must equally be regarded as lawful
where it is carried out in order to protect an interest which is essential for the data
subject's life;
(32) Whereas it is for national legislation to determine whether the controller
perfotming a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official
authority should be a public administration or another natural or legal person
governed by public law, or by private law such as a professional association;
(33) Whereas data which are capable by their nature of infringing fundamental
freedoms or privacy should not be processed unless the data subject gives his
explicit consent; whereas, however, derogations from this prohibition must be
explicitly provided for in respect of specific needs, in particular where the
processing of these data is carried out for certain health-related purposes by
persons subject to a legal obligation of professional secrecy or in the course of
legitimate activities by certain associations or foundations the purpose ofwhich is
to pennit the exercise of fundamental freedoms;
(34) Whereas Member States must also be authorized, when justified by grounds
of important public interest, to derogate from the prohibition on processing
sensitive categories of data where important reasons ofpublic interest so justify in
areas such as public health and social protection - especially in order to ensure the
quality and cost-effectiveness of the procedures used for settling claims for
benefits and services in the health insurance system - scientific research and
government statistics; whereas it is incumbent on them, however, to provide
specific and suitable safeguards so as to protect the fundamental rights and the
privacy of individuals;
(35) Whereas, moreover, the processing of personal data by official authorities for
achieving aims, laid down in constitutional law or international public law, of
officially recognized religious associations is carried out on important grounds of
public interest;
(36) Whereas where, in the course of electoral activities, the operation of the
democratic system requires in certain Member States. that political parties compile
data on people's political opinion, the processing of such data may be pennitted
for reasons of important public interest, provided that appropriate safeguards are
established;
(37) Whereas the processing of personal data for purposes ofjournalism or for
purposes of literary of artistic expression, in particular in the audiovisual field,
should qualify for exemption from the requirements of certain provisions of this
Directive in so far as this is necessary to reconcile the fundamental rights of
individuals with freedom of infonnation and notably the right to receive and
impart infonnation, as guaranteed in particular in Article 10 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
whereas Member States should therefore lay down exemptions and derogations
necessary for the purpose of balance between fundamental rights as regards
general measures on the legitimacy of data processing, measures on the transfer of
data to third countries and the power of the supervisory authority; whereas this
should not, however, lead Member States to lay down exemptions from the
measures to ensure security of processing; whereas at least the supervisory
authority responsible for this sector should also be provided with certain ex-post
powers, e.g. to publish a regular report or to refer matters to the judicial
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powers, e.g. to publish a regular report or to refer matters to the judicial
authorities;
(38) Whereas, if the processing of data is to be fair, the data subject must be in a
position to learn of the existence of a processing operation and, where data are
collected from him, must be given accurate and full infonnation, bearing in mind
the circumstances of the collection;
(39) Whereas certain processing operations involve data which the controller has
not collected directly from the data subject; whereas, furthennore, data can be
legitimately disclosed to a third party, even if the disclosure was not anticipated at
the time the data were collected from the data subject; whereas, in all these cases,
the data subject should be infonned when the data are recorded or at the latest
when the data are first disclosed to a third party;
(40) Whereas, however, it is not necessary to impose this obligation of the data
subject already has the infonnation; whereas, moreover, there will be no such
obligation if the recording or disclosure are expressly provided for by law or if the
provision of infonnation to the data subject proves impossible or would involve
disproportionate efforts, which could be the case where processing is for
historical, statistical or scientific purposes; whereas, in this regard, the number of
data subjects, the age of the data, and any compensatory measures adopted may be
, taken into consideration;
(41) Whereas any person must be able to exercise the right of access to data
relating to him which are being processed, in order to verify in particular the
accuracy of the data and the lawfulness of the processing; whereas, for the same
reasons, every data subject must also have the right to know the logic involved in
the automatic processing of data concerning him, at least in the case of the
automated decisions referred to in Article 15 (1); whereas this right must not
adversely affect trade secrets or intellectual property and in particular the
copyright protecting the software; whereas these considerations must not,
however, result in the data subject being refused all infonnation;
(42) Whereas Member States may, in the interest of the data subject or so as to
protect the rights and freedoms of others, restrict rights of access and infotmation;
whereas they may, for example, specify that access to medical data may be
obtained only through a health professional;
(43) Whereas restrictions on the rights of access and infotmation and on certain
obligations of the controller may similarly be imposed by Member States in so far
as they are necessary to safeguard, for example, national security, defence, public
safety, or important economic or financial interests of a Member State or the
Union, as well as criminal investigations and prosecutions and action in respect of
breaches of ethics in the regulated professions; whereas the list of exceptions and
limitations should include the tasks of monitoring, inspection or regulation
necessary in the three last-mentioned areas concerning public security, economic
or financial interests and crime prevention; whereas the listing of tasks in these
three areas does not affect the legitimacy of exceptions or restrictions for reasons
of State security or defence;
(44) Whereas Member States may also be led, by virtue of the provisions of
Community law, to derogate from the provisions of this Directive concerning the
right of access, the obligation to infonn individuals, and the quality of data, in
order to secure certain of the purposes referred to above;
(45) Whereas, in cases where data might lawfully be processed on grounds of
public interest, official authority or the legitimate interests of a natural or legal
person, any data subject should nevertheless be entitled, on legitimate and
compelling grounds relating to his particular situation, to object to the processing
of any data relating to himself; whereas Member States may nevertheless lay
down national provisions to the contrary;
(46) Whereas the protection of the rights and freedoms of data subjects with
regard to the processing of personal data requires that appropriate technical and
organizational measures be taken, both at the time of the design of the processing
system and at the time of the ·processing itself, particularly in order to maintain
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system and at the time of the processing itself, particularly in order to maintain
security and thereby to prevent any unauthorized processing; whereas it is
incumbent on the Member States to ensure that controllers comply with these
measures; whereas these measures must ensure an appropriate level of security,
taking into account the state of the art and the costs of their implementation in
relation to the risks inherent in the processing and the nature of the data to be
protected;
(47) Whereas where a message containing personal data is transmitted by means
of a telecommunications or electronic mail service, the sole purpose of which is
the transmission of such messages, the controller in respect of the personal data
contained in the message will nonnally be considered to be the person from whom
the message originates, rather than the person offering the transmission services;
whereas, nevertheless, those offering such services will normally be considered
controllers in respect of the processing of the additional personal data necessary
for the operation of the service;
(48) Whereas the procedures for notifying the supervisory authority are designed
to ensure disclosure of the purposes and main features of any processing operation
for the purpose of verification that the operation is in accordance with the national
measures taken under this Directive;
(49) Whereas, in order to avoid unsuitable administrative fonnalities, exemptions
from the obligation to notify and simplification of the notification required may
be provided for by Member States in cases where processing is unlikely adversely
to affect the rights and freedoms of data subjects, provided that it is in accordance
with a measure taken by a Member State specifying its limits; whereas exemption
or simplification may similarly be provided for by Member States where a person
appointed by the controller ensures that the processing carried out is not likely
adversely to affect the rights and freedoms of data subjects; whereas such a data
protection official, whether or not an employee of the controller, must be in a
position to exercise his functions in complete independence;
(50) Whereas exemption or simplification could he provided for in cases of
processing operations whose sole purpose is the keeping of a register intended,
according to national law, to provide information to the public and open to
consultation by the public or by any person demonstrating a legitimate interest;
(51) Whereas, nevertheless, simplification or exemption from the obligation to
notify shall not release the controller from any of the other obligations resulting
from this Directive;
(52) Whereas, in this context, ex post facto verification by the competent
authorities must in general be considered a sufficient measure;
(53) Whereas, however, certain processing operation are likely to pose specific
risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects by virtue of their nature, their
scope or their purposes, such as that of excluding individuals from a right, benefit
or a contract, or by virtue of the specific use of new technologies; whereas it is for
Member States, if they so wish, to specify such risks in their legislation;
(54) Whereas with regard to all the processing undertaken in society, the amount
posing such specific risks should be very limited; whereas Member States must
provide that the supervisory authority, or the data protection official in
cooperation with the authority, check such processing prior to it being carried out;
whereas following this prior check, the supervisory authority may, according to its
national law, give an opinion or an authorization regarding the processing;
whereas such checking may equally take place in the course of the preparation
either of a measure of the national parliament or of a measure based on such a
legislative measure, which defmes the nature of the processing and lays down
appropriate safeguards;
(55) Whereas, if the controller fails to respect the rights of data subjects, national
legislation must provide for a judicial remedy; whereas any damage which a
person may suffer as a result of unlawful processing must be compensated for by
the controller, who may be exempted from liability ifhe proves that he is 110t
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responsible for the damage, in particular in cases where he establishes fault on the
part of the data subject or in case of force majeure; whereas sanctions must be
imposed on any person, whether governed by private of public law, who fails to
comply with the national measures taken under this Directive;
(56) Whereas cross-border flows ofpersonal data are necessary to the expansion
of international trade; whereas the protection of individuals guaranteed in the
Community by this Directive does not stand in the way of transfers of personal
data to third countries which ensure an adequate level of protection; whereas the
adequacy of the level ofprotection afforded by a third country must be assessed in
the light of all the circumstances surrounding the transfer operation or set of
transfer operations;
(57) Whereas, on the other hand, the transfer ofpersonal data to a third country
which does not ensure an adequate level of protection must be prohibited;
(58) Whereas provisions should be made for exemptions from this prohibition in
certain circumstances where the data subject has given his consent, where the
transfer is necessary in relation to a contract or a legal claim, where protection of
an important public interest so requires, for example in cases of international
transfers of data between tax or customs administrations or between services
competent for social security matters, or where the transfer is made from a
register established by law and intended for consultation by the public or persons
having a legitimate interest; whereas in this case such a transfer should not
involve the entirety of the data or entire categories of the data contained in the
register and, when the register is intended for consultation by persons having a
legitimate interest, the transfer should be made only at the request of those
persons or if they are to be the recipients;
(59) Whereas particular measures may be taken to compensate for the lack of
protection in a third country in cases where the controller offers appropriate
safeguards; whereas, moreover, provision must be made for procedures for
negotiations between the Community and such third countries;
(60) Whereas, in any event, transfers to third countries may be effected only in
full compliance with the provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to this
Directive, and in particular Article 8 thereof;
(61) Whereas Member States and the Commission, in their respective spheres of
competence, must encourage the trade associations and other representative
organizations concerned to draw up codes of conduct so as to facilitate the
application of this Directive, taking account of the specific characteristics of the
processing carried out in certain sectors, and respecting the national provisions
adopted for its implementation;
(62) Whereas the establishment in Member States of supervisory authorities,
exercising their functions with complete independence, is an essential component
of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data;
(63) Whereas such authorities must have the necessary means to perform their
duties, including powers of investigation and intervention, particularly in cases of
complaints from individuals, and powers to engage in legal proceedings; whereas
such authorities must help to ensure transparency of processing in the Member
States within whose jurisdiction they fall;
(64) Whereas the authorities in the different Member States will need to assist one
another in perfonning their duties so as to ensure that the rules of protection are
properly respected throughout the European Union;
(65) Whereas, at Community level, a Working Party on the Protection of
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data must be set up and be
completely independent in the performance of its functions; whereas, having
regard to its specific nature, it must advise the Commission and, in particular,
contribute to the unifonn application of the national rules adopted pursuant to this
Directive;
(66) Whereas, with regard to the transfer of data to third countries, the application
of this Directive calls for the confennent of powers of implementation on the
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of this Directive calls for the confetment of powers of implementation on the
Commission and the establishment of a procedure as laid down in Council
Decision 87/373/EEC (1);
(67) Whereas an agreement on a modus vivendi between the European
Parliament, the Council and the Commission concerning the implementing
measures for acts adopted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article
189b of the EC Treaty was reached on 20 December 1994;
(68) Whereas the principles set out in this Directive regarding the protection of
the rights and freedoms of individuals, notably their right to privacy, with regard
to the processing of personal data may be supplemented or clarified, in particular
as far as certain sectors are concerned, by specific rules based on those principles;
(69) Whereas Member States should be allowed a period of not more than three
years from the entry into force of the national measures transposing this Directive
in which to apply such new national rules progressively to all processing
operations already under way; whereas, in order to facilitate their cost-effective
implementation, a further period expiring 12 years after the date on which this
Directive is adopted will be allowed to Member States to ensure the conformity of
existing manual filing systems with certain of the Directive's provisions; whereas,
where data contained in such filing systems are manually processed during this
extended transition period, those systems must be brought into confonnity with
these provisions at the time of such processing;
(70) Whereas it is not necessary for the data subject to give his consent again so as
to allow the controller to continue to process, after the national provisions taken
pursuant to this Directive enter into force, any sensitive data necessary for the
performance of a contract concluded on the basis of free and informed consent
before the entry into force of these provisions;
(71) Whereas this Directive does not stand in the way of a Member State's
regulating marketing activities aimed at consumers residing in territory in so far
as such regulation does not concern the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data;
(72) Whereas this Directive allows the principle of public access to official
documents to be taken into account when implementing the principles set out in
this Directive,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Object of the Directive
1. In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the fundamental
rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with
respect to the processing of personal data.
2. Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of personal data
between Member States f9r reasons connected with the protection afforded under
paragraph 1.
Article 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Directive:
(a) 'personal data' shall mean any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity;
(b) 'processing ofpersonal data' ('processing') shall mean any operation or set of
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
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means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination
or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or
destruction;
(c) 'personal data filing system' ('filing system') shall mean any structured set of
personal data which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether
centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis;
(d) 'controller' shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
any other body which alone or jointly with others detennines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of
processing are detennined by national or Community laws or regulations, the
controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by national
or Community law;
(e) 'processor' shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any
other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller;
(f) 'third party' shall mean any natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
any other body other than the data subject, the controller, the processor and the
persons who, under the direct authority of the controller or the processor, are
authorized to process the data;
(g) 'recipient' shall mean a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any
other body to whom data are disclosed, whether a third party or not; however,
authorities which may receive data in the framework of a particular inquiry shall
not be regarded as recipients;
(h) 'the data subject's consent' shall mean any freely given specific and informed
indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to
personal data relating to him being processed.
Article 3
Scope
1. This Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by
automatic means, and to the processing othelWise than by automatic means of
personal data which fonn part of a filing system or are intended to fonn part of a
filing system.
2. This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data:
- in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law,
such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union
and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence, State
security (including the economic well-being of the State when the processing
operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the State in areas
of criminal law,
- by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.
Article 4
National law applicable
1. Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it adopts pursuant to this
Directive to the processing of personal data where:
(a) the processing is carned out in the context of the activities of an establishment
of the controller on the territory of the Member State; when the same controller is
established on the territory of several Member States, he must take the necessary
measures to ensure that each of these establishments complies with the obligations
laid down by the national law applicable;
(b) the controller is not established on the Member State's territory, but in a place
where its national law applies by virtue of international public law;
(c) the controller is not established on Community territory and, for purposes of
processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise,
situated on the tenitory of the said Member State, unless such equipment is used
only for purposes of transit through the tenitory of the Community.
2. In the circumstances referred to in paragraph I (c), the controller must
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2. In the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 (c), the controller must
designate a representative established in the territory of that Member State,
without prejudice to legal actions which could be initiated against the controller
himself.
CHAPTER II GENERAL RULES ON THE LAWFULNESS OF THE
PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA
Article 5
Member States shall, within the limits of the provisions of this Chapter, determine
more precisely the conditions under which the processing of personal data is
lawful.
SECTION I
PRINCIPLES RELATING TO DATA QUALITY
Article 6
1. Member States shall provide that personal data must be:
(a) processed fairly and lawfully;
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data
for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as
incompatible provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards;
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they
are collected and/or further processed;
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be
taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the
purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further processed,
are erased or rectified;
(e) kept in a fonn which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than
is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they
are further processed. Member States shall lay down appropriate safeguards for
personal data stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific use.
2. It shall be for the controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is complied with.
SECTION II
CRITERIA FOR MAKING DATA PROCESSING LEGITIMATE
Article 7
Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for the perfonnance of a contract to which the data
subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to
entering into a contract; or
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the
controller is subject; or
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject; or
(e) processing is necessary for the perfonnance of a task carried out in the public
interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third
party to whom the data are disclosed; or
(t) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by
the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed,
except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights
and freedoms of the data subject which require protection under Article 1 (1).
SECTION III
SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF PROCESSING
Article 8
The processing of special categories of data
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The processing of special categories of data
1. Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where:
(a) the data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing of those data,
except where the laws of the Member State provide that the prohibition referred to
in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject's giving his consent; or
(b) processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and
specific rights of the controller in the field of employment law in so far as it is
authorized by national law providing for adequate safeguards; or
(c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of
another person where the data subje~t is physically or legally incapable of giving
his consent; or
(d) processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with
appropriate guarantees by a foundation, association or any other non-profit-
seeking body with a political, philosophical, religious or trade-union aim and on
condition that the processing relates solely to the members of the body or to
persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes and that
the data are not disclosed to a third party without the consent of the data subjects;
or
(e) the processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by the data
subject or is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.
3. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where processing of the data is required for the
purposes of preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or
treatment or the management of health-care services, and where those data are
processed by a health professional subject under national law or rules established
by national competent bodies to the obligation of professional secrecy or by
another person also subject to an equivalent obligation of secrecy.
4. Subject to the provision of suitable safeguards, Member States may, for reasons
of substantial public interest, lay down exemptions in addition to those laid down
in paragraph 2 either by national law or by decision of the supervisory authority.
5. Processing of data relating to offences, criminal convictions or security
measures may be carried out only under the control of official authority, or if
suitable specific safeguards are provided under national law, subject to
derogations which may be granted by the Member State under national provisions
providing suitable specific safeguards. However, a complete register of criminal
convictions may be kept only under the control of official authority.
Member States may provide that data relating to administrative sanctions or
judgements in civil cases shall also be processed under the control of official
authority.
6. Derogations from paragraph 1 provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be
notified to the Commission.
7. Member States shall detennine the conditions under which a national
identification number or any other identifier of general application may be
processed.
Article 9
Processing of personal data and freedom of expression
Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations from the provisions of
this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter VI for the processing of personal data
carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic.or literary
expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the
rules governing freedom of expression.
SECTION IV
INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN TO THE DATA SUBJECT
Article 10
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Article 10
Infotmation in cases of collection of data from the data subject
Member States shall provide that the controller or his representative must provide
a data subject from whom data relating to himself are collected with at least the
following infonnation, except where he already has it:
(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;
(b) the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended;
(c) any further infonnation such as
- the recipients or categories of recipients of the data,
- whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the
possible consequences of failure to reply,
- the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning
him
in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific
circumstances in which the data are collected, to guarantee fair processing in
respect of the data subject.
Article 11
Infotmation where the data have not been obtained from the data subject
1. Where the data have not been obtained from the data subject, Member States
shall provide that the controller or his representative must at the time of
undertaking the recording of personal data or if a disclosure to a third party is
envisaged, no later than the time when the data are frrst disclosed provide the data
subject with at least the following information, except where he already has it:
(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;
(b) the purposes of the processing;
(c) any further infonnation such as
- the categories of data concerned,
- the recipients or categories of recipients,
- the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning
him
in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific
circumstances in which the data are processed, to guarantee fair processing in
respect of the data subject.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where, in particular for processing for statistical
purposes or for the purposes of historical or scientific research, the provision of
such information proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort or
if recording or disclosure is expressly laid down by law. In these cases Member
States shall provide appropriate safeguards.
SECTION V
THE DATA SUBJECT'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO DATA
Article 12
Right of access
Member States shall guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the
controller:
(a) without constraint at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or
expense:
- confmnation as to whether or not data relating to him are being processed and
infonnation at least as to the purposes of the processing, the categories of data
concerned, and the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the data are
disclosed,
- communication to him in an intelligible form of the data undergoing processing
and of any available infotmation as to their source,
- knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of data concerning
him at least in the case of the automated decisions referred to in Article 15 (1);
(b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of
which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because
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which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because
of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data;
(c) notification to third parties to whom the data have been disclosed of any
rectification, erasure or blocking carried out in compliance with (b), unless this
proves impossible or involves a disproportionate effort.
SECTION VI
EXEMPTIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
Article 13
Exemptions and restrictions
1. Member States may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the
obligations and rights provided for in Articles 6 (1), 10, 11 (1), 12 and 21 when
such a restriction constitutes a necessary measures to safeguard:
(a) national security;
(b) defence;
(c) public security;
(d) the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences,
or of breaches of ethics for regulated professions;
(e) an important economic or financial interest of a Member State or of the
European Union, including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters;
(f) a monitoring, inspection or regulatory function connected, even occasionally,
with the exercise of official authority in cases referred to in (c), (d) and (e);
(g) the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others.
2. Subject to adequate legal safeguards, in particular that the data are not used for
taking measures or decisions regarding any particular individual, Member States
may, where there is clearly no risk of breaching the privacy of the data subject,
restrict by a legislative measure the rights provided for in Article 12 when data are
processed solely for purposes of scientific research or are kept in personal fonn
for a period which does not exceed the period necessary for the sole purpose of
creating statistics.
SECTION VII
THE DATA SUBJECT'S RIGHT TO OBJECT
Article 14
The data subject's right to object
Member States shall grant the data subject the right:
(a) at least in the cases referred to in Article 7 (e) and (t), to object at any time on
compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular situation to the processing
of data relating to him, save where othelWise provided by national legislation.
Where there is a justified objection, the processing instigated by the controller
may no longer involve those data;
(b) to object, on request and free of charge, to the processing of personal data
relating to him which the controller anticipates being processed for the purposes
of direct marketing, or to be informed before personal data are disclosed for the
first time to third parties or used on their behalf for the purposes of direct
marketing, and to be expressly offered the right to object free of charge to such
disclosures or uses.
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that data subjects are
aware of the existence of the right referred to in the frrst subparagraph of (b).
Article 15
Automated individual decisions
1. Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be subject to a
decision which produces legal effectsconceming him or significantly affects him
and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate
certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his perfonnance at work,
creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc.
2. Subject to the other Articles of this Directive, Member States shall provide that
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2. Subject to the other Articles of this Directive, Member States shall provide that
a person may be subjected to a decision of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 if
that decision:
(a) is taken in the course of the entering into or perfonnance of a contract,
provided the request for the entering into or the perfonnance of the contract,
lodged by the data subject, has been satisfied or that there are suitable measures to
safeguard his legitimate interests, such as arrangements allowing him to put his
point of view; or
(b) is authorized by a law which also lays down measures to safeguard the data
subject's legitimate interests.
SECTION VIII .
CONFIDENTIALITY AND SECURITY OF PROCESSING
Article 16
Confidentiality of processing
Any person acting under the authority of the controller or of the processor,
including the processor himself, who has access to personal data must not process
them except on instructions from the controller, unless he is required to do so by
law.
Article 17
SecuritY of processing
1. Member States shall provide that the controller must implement appropriate
technical and organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental
or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or
access, in particular where the processing involves the transmission of data over a
network, and against all other unlawful forms ofprocessing.
Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of their implementation, such
measures shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by
the processing and the nature of the data to be protected.
2. The Member States shall provide that the controller must, where processing is
carried out on his behalf, choose a processor providing sufficient guarantees in
respect of the technical security measures and organizational measures governing
the processing to be carried out, and must ensure compliance with those measures.
3. The carrying out of processing by way of a processor must be governed by a
contract or legal act binding the processor to the controller and stipulating in
particular that:
- the processor shall act only on instructions from the controller,
- the obligations set out in paragraph 1, as defined by the law of the Member State
in which the processor is established, shall also be incumbent on the processor.
4. For the purposes of keeping proof, the parts of the contract or the legal act
relating to data protection and the requirements relating to the measures referred
to in paragraph 1 shall be in writing or in another equivalent fotm.
SECTION IX
NOTIFICATION
Article 18
Obligation to notify the supervisory authority
1. Member States shall provide that the controller or his representative, if any,
must notify the supervisory authority referred to in Article 28 before carrying out
any wholly or partly automatic processing operation or set of such operations
intended to senie a single purpose or several related purposes.
2. Member States may provide for the simplification of or exemption from
notification only in the following cases and under the following conditions:
- where, for categories of processing operations which are unlikely, taking
account of the data to be processed, to affect adversely the rights and freedoms of
data subjects, they specify the purposes of the processing, the data or categories of
data undergoing processing, the category or categories of data subject, the
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data undergoing processing, the category or categories of data subject, the
recipients or categories of recipient to whom the data are to be disclosed and the
length of time the data are to be stored, and/or
- where the controller, in compliance with the national law which governs him,
appoints a personal data protection official, responsible in particular:
- for ensuring in an independent manner the internal application of the national
provisions taken pursuant to this Directive
- for keeping the register of processing operations carried out by the controller,
containing the items of information referred to in Article 21 (2),
thereby ensuring that the rights and freedoms of the data subjects are unlikely to
be adversely affected by the processing operations.
3. Member States may provide that paragraph 1 does not apply to processing
whose sole purpose is the keeping of a register which according to laws or
regulations is intended to provide information to the public and which is open to
consultation either by the public in general or by any person demonstrating a
legitimate interest.
4. Member States may provide for an exemption from the obligation to notify or a
simplification of the notification in the case ofprocessing operations referred to in
Article 8 (2) (d).
5. Member States may stipulate that certain or all non-automatic processing
operations involving personal data shall be notified, or provide for these
processing operations to be subject to simplified notification.
Article 19
Contents of notification
1. Member States shall specify the information to be given in the notification. It
shall include at least:
(a) the name and address of the controller and ofhis representative, if any;
(b) the purpose or purposes of the processing;
(c) a description of the category or categories of data subject and of the data or
categories of data relating to them;
(d) the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the data might be disclosed;
(e) proposed transfers of data to third countries;
(f) a general description allowing a preliminary assessment to be made of the
approp~atenessof the measures taken pursuant to Article 17 to ensure security of
proceSSIng.
2. Member States shall specify the procedures under which any change affecting
the infonnation referred to in paragraph 1 must be notified to the supervisory
authority.
Article 20
Prior checking
1. Member States shall determine the processing operations likely to present
specific risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects and shall check that these
processing operations are examined prior to the start thereof.
2. Such prior checks shall be carried out by the supervisory authority following
receipt of a notification from the controller or by the data protection official, who,
in cases of doubt, must consult the supervisory authority.
3. Member States may also cany out such checks in the context of preparation
either of a measure of the national parliament or of a measure based on such a
legislative measure, which define the nature of the processing and lay down
appropriate safeguards.
Article 21
Publicizing of processing operations
1. Member States shall take measures to ensure that processing operations are
publicized.
2. Member States shall provide that a register of processing operations notified in
J-97
,.-..........
- -0- _. ----
2. Member States shall provide that a register of processing operations notified in
accordance with Article 18 shall be kept by the supervisory authority.
The register shall contain at least the information listed in Article 19 (1) (a) to (e).
The register may be inspected by any person.
3. Member States shall provide, in relation to processing operations not subject to
notification, that controllers or another body appointed by the Member States
make available at least the information referred to in Article 19 (1) (a) to (e) in an
appropriate fonn to any person on request.
Member States may provide that this provision does not apply to processing
whose sole purpose is the keeping of a register which according to laws or
regulations is intended to provide information to the public and which is open to
consultation either by the public in general or by any person who can provide
proof of a legitimate interest.
CHAPTER III JUDICIAL REMEDmS, LIABILITY AND SANCTIONS
Article 22
Remedies
Without prejudice to any administrative remedy for which provision may be
made, inter alia before the supervisory authority referred to in Article 28, prior to
referral to the judicial authority, Member States shall provide for the right of
every person to a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed him by
the national law applicable to the processing in question.
Article 23
Liability
1. Member States shall provide that any person who has suffered damage as a
result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible with the
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive is entitled to receive
compensation from the controller for the damage suffered.
2. The controller may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in part, ifhe
proves that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage.
Article 24
Sanctions
The Member States shall adopt suitable measures to ensure the full
implementation of the provisions of this Directive and shall in particular lay down
the sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement of the provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive.
CHAPTER IV TRANSFER OF PERSONAL DATA TO THIRD COUNTRIES
Article 25
Principles
1. The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal
data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer
may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the national
provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, the third
country in question ensures an adequate level ofprotection.
2. The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be
assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation
or set of data transfer operations; particular consideration shall be given to the
nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation
or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of
law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the
professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that country.
3. The Member States and the Commission shall inform each other ofcases where
they consider that a third country does not ensure an adequate level ofprotection
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they consider that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection
within the meaning of paragraph 2.
4. Where the Commission finds, under the procedure provided for in Article 31
(2), that a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection within the
meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, Member States shall take the measures
necessary to prevent any transfer of data of the same type to the third country in
question.
5. At the appropriate time, the Commission shall enter into negotiations with a
view to remedying the situation resulting from the finding made pursuant to
paragraph 4.
6. The Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure referred to in
Article 31 (2), that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection within
the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, by reason of its domestic law or of the
intemational·commitments it has entered into, particularly upon conclusion of the
negotiations referred to in paragraph 5, for the protection of the private lives and
basic freedoms and rights of individuals.
Member States shall take the measures necessary to comply with the
Commission's decision.
Article 26
Derogations
1. By way of derogation from Article 25 and save where othelWise provided by
domestic law governing particular cases, Member States shall provide that a
transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to a third country which does not
ensure an adequate level of protection within the meaning ofArticle 25 (2) may
take place on condition that: c
(a) the data subject has given his consent unambiguously to the proposed transfer;
or
(b) the transfer is necessary for the perfonnance of a contract between the data
subject and the controller or the implementation of precontractual measures taken
in response to the data subject's request; or
(c) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or perfonnance of a contract
concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third
party; or
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest
grounds, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims; or
(e) the transfer is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject; or
(f) the transfer is made from a register which according to laws or regulations is
intended to provide infotmation to the public and which is open to consultation
either by the public in general or by any person who can demonstrate legitimate
interest, to the extent that the conditions laid down in law for consultation are
fulfilled in the particular case.
2. Without prejudice to paragraph 1, a Member State may authorize a transfer or a
set of transfers of personal data to a third country which does not ensure an
adequate level of protection within the meaning of Article 25 (2), where the
controller adduces adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of the
privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as regards the
exercise of the corresponding rights; such safeguards may in particular result from
appropriate contractual clauses.
3. The Member State shall infolm the Commission and the other Member States
of the authorizations it grants pursuant to paragraph 2.
If a Member State or the Commission objects on justified grounds involving the
protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, the
Commission shall take appropriate measures in accordance with the procedure
laid down in Article 31 (2).
Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with the
Commission's decision. .
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Commission's decision.
4. Where the Commission decides, in accordance with the procedure referred to in
Article 31 (2), that certain standard contractual clauses offer sufficient safeguards
as required by paragraph 2, Member States shall take the necessary measures to
comply with the Commission's decision.
CHAPTER V CODES OF CONDUCT
Article 27
1. The Member States and the Commission shall encourage the drawing up of
codes of conduct intended to contribute to the proper implementation of the
national provisions adopted by the Member States pursuant to this Directive,
taking account of the specific features of the various sectors.
2. Member States shall make provision for trade associations and other bodies
representing other categories of controllers which have drawn up draft national
codes or which have the intention of amending or extending existing national
codes to be able to submit them to the opinion of the national authority.
Member States shall make provision for this authority to ascertain, among other
things, whether the drafts submitted to it are in accordance with the national
provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive. If it sees fit, the authority shall seek
the views of data subjects or their representatives.
3. Draft Community codes, and amendments or extensions to existing Community
codes, may be submitted to the Working Party referred to in Article 29. This
Working Party shall determine, among other things, whether the drafts submitted
to it are in accordance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to this
Directive. If it sees fit, the authority shall seek the views of data subjects or their
representatives. The Commission may ensure appropriate publicity for the codes
which have been approved by the Working Party.
CHAPTER VI SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY AND WORKING PARTY ON
THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE
PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA
Article 28
Supervisory authority
1. Each Member State shall provide that one or more public authorities are
responsible for monitoring the application within its territory of the provisions
adopted by the Member States pursuant to this Directive.
These authoritie~ shall act with complete independence in exercising the functions
entrusted to them.
2. Each Member State shall provide that the supervisory authorities are consulted
when drawing up administrative measures or regulations relating to the protection
of individuals' rights and freedoms with regard to the processing of personal data.
3. Each authority shall in particular be endowed with:
- investigative powers, such as powers of access to data fonning the subject-
matter of processing operations and powers to collect all the information
necessary for the performance of its supervisory duties,
- effective powers of intervention, such as, for example, that of delivering
opinions before processing operations are carried out, in accordance with Article
20, and ensuring appropriate publication of such opinions, of ordering the
blocking, erasure or destruction of data, of imposing a temporary or defmitive ban
on processing, of warning or admonishing the controller, or that of referring the
matter to national parliaments or other political institutions,
- the power to engage in legal proceedings where the national provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive have been violated or to bring these violations to the
attention of the judicial authorities.
Decisions by the supervisory authority which give rise to complaints may be
appealed against through the courts.
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appealed against through the courts.
4. Each supervisory authority shall hear claims lodged by any person, or by an
asso'ciation representing that person, concerning the protection of his rights and
freedoms in regard to the processing of personal data. The person concerned shall
be infonned of the outcome of the claim.
Each supervisory authority shall, in particular, hear claims for checks on the
lawfulness of data processing lodged by any person when the national provisions
adopted pursuant to Article 13 of this Directive apply. The person shall at any rate
be infonned that a check has taken place.
5. Each supervisory authority shall draw up a report on its activities at regular
intervals. The report shall be made public.
6. Each supervisory authority is competent, whatever the national law applicable
to the processing in question, to exercise, on the territory of its own Member
State, the powers conferred on it in accordance with paragraph 3. Each authority
may be requested to exercise its powers by an authority of another Member State.
The supervisory authorities shall cooperate with one another to the extent
necessary for the perfonnance of their duties, in particular by exchanging all
useful infonnation.
7. Member States shall provide that the members and staff of the supervisory
authority, even after their employment has ended, are to be subject to a duty of
professional secrecy with regard to confidential infonnation to which they have
access.
Article 29
Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of
Personal Data
1. A Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing
of Personal Data, hereinafter referred to as 'the Working Party', is hereby set up.
It shall have advisory status and act independently.
2. The Working Party shall be composed of a representative of the supervisory
authority or authorities designated by each Member State and of a representative
of the authority or authorities established for the Community institutions and
bodies, and of a representative of the Commission.
Each member of the Working Party shall be designated by the institution,
authority or authorities which he represents. Where a Member State has
designated more than one supervisory authority, they shall nominate ajoint
representative. The same shall apply to the authorities established for Community
institutions and bodies.
3. The Working Party shall take decisions by a simple majority of the
representatives of the supervisory authorities.
4. The Working Party shall elect its chainnan. The chainnan's tetnl of office shall
be two years. His appointment shall be renewable.
5. The Working Party's secretariat shall be provided by the Commission.
6. The Working Party shall adopt its own rules ofprocedure.
7. The Working Party shall consider items placed on its agenda by its chaitman,
either on his own initiative or at the request of a representative of the supervisory
authorities or at the Commission's request.
Article 30
1. The Working Party shall:
(a) examine any question covering the application of the national measures
adopted under this Directive in order to contribute to the unifotnl application of
such measures;
(b) give the Commission an opinion on the level of protection in the Community
and in third countries;
(c) advise the Commission on any proposed amendment of this Directive, on any
additional or specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms ofnatural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on any other proposed
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persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on any other proposed
Community measures affecting such rights and freedoms;
(d) give an opinion on codes of conduct drawn up at Community level.
2. If the Working Party finds that divergences likely to affect the equivalence of
protection for persons with regard to the processing of personal data in the
Community are arising between the laws or practices of Member States, it shall
infonn the Commission accordingly.
3. The Working Party may, on its own initiative, make recommendations on all
matters relating to the protection of persons with regard to the processing of
personal data in the Community.
4. The Working Party's opinions and recommendations shall be fOlWarded to the
,Commission and to the committee referred to in Article 31.
5. The Commission shall infonn the Working Party of the action it has taken in
response to its opinions and recommendations. It shall do so in a report which
shall also be fOlWarded to the European Parliament and ,the Council. The report
shall be made public.
6. The Working Party shall draw up an annual report on the situation regarding
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data in
the Community and in third countries, which it shall transmit to the Commission,
the European Parliament and the Council. The report shall be made public.
CHAPTER VII COMMUNITY IMPLEMENTING MEASURES
Article 31
The Committee
1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of the
representatives of the Member States and chaired by the representative of the
Commission.
2. The representative of the Commission shall submit to the committee a draft of
the measures to be taken. The committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft
within a time limit which the chairman may lay down according to the urgency of
the matter.
The opinion shall be delivered by the majority laid down in Article 148 (2) of the
Treaty. The votes of the representatives of the Member States within the
committee shall be weighted in the manner set out in that Article. The chaitman
shall not vote.
The Commission shall adopt measUres which shall apply immediately. However,
if these measures are not in accordance with the opinion of the committee, they
shall be communicated by the Commission to the Council forthwith. It that event:
- the Commission shall defer application of the measures which it has decided for
a period of three months from the date of communication,
- the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may take a different decision within
the time limit referred to in the first indent.
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 32
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive at the latest at the end of a
period of three years from the date of its adoption.
When Member States adopt these measures, they shall contain a reference to this
Directive or be accompanied by such reference on the occasion of their official
publication. The methods of making such reference shall be laid down by the
Member States.
2. Member States shall ensure that processing already under way on the date the
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive enter into force, is brought
into conformity with these provisions within three years of this date.
By way of derogation from the preceding subparagraph, Member States may
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By way of derogation from the preceding subparagraph, Member States may
provide that the processing of data already held in manual filing systems on the
date of entry into force of the national provisions adopted in implementation of
this Directive shall be brought into confonnity with Articles 6, 7 and 8 of this
Directive within 12 years of the date on which it is adopted. Member States shall,
however, grant the data subject the right to obtain, at his request and in particular
at the time of exercising his right of access, the rectification, erasure or blocking
of data which are incomplete, inaccurate or stored in a way incompatible with the
legitimate purposes pursued by the controller.
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, Member States may provide, subject
to suitable safeguards, that data kept for the sole purpose of historical research
need not be brought into confonnity with Articles 6, 7 and 8 of this Directive.
4. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the text of the provisions
of domestic law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.
Article 33
The Commission shall report to the Council and the European Parliament at
regular intervals, starting not later than three years after the date referred to in
Article 32 (1), on the implementation of this Directive, attaching to its report, if
necessary, suitable proposals for amendments. The report shall be made public.
The Commission shall examine, in particular, the application of this Directive to
the data processing of sound and image data relating to natural persons and shall
submit any appropriate proposals which prove to be necessary, taking account of
developments in information technology and in the light of the state of progress in
the information society.
Article 34
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Luxembourg, 24 October 1995.
For the European Parliament
The President
K.HAENSCH
For the Council
The President
L. ATIENZA SERNA
(I)OJNoC277,5.11.1990,p.3andOJNoC311,27.11.1992,p.30.
(2) OJ No C 159, 17. 6. 1991, P 38.
(3) Opinion of the European Parliament of 11 March 1992 (OJ No C 94, 13.4.
1992, p. 198), confinned on 2 December 1993 (OJ No C 342, 20. 12. 1993, p.
30); Council common position of20 February 1995 (OJ No C 93,13.4.1995, p.
1) and Decision of the European Parliament of 15 June 1995 (OJ No C 166, 3.7.
1995).
(1) OJ No L 197, 18.7. 1987, p. 33.
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rt~ ~·~J.~~~I~~~~lj~~f~~m~1i~ October 1998 and would prohibit the transfer of personal data to non-European
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._.~.'I means for U.S. organizations to comply with the Directive, the U.S. Department1_.' ~~~~~~~:o~~~;:!~:~1~ :::o~:~=~:: ~~r::~t~~~e:~:~ ~safe
---~-- :::-_-d/iT/:::HH;--::::i>HH::::;-:: important way for U.S. companies to avoid experiencing interruptions in their
:-~l-fVta~)t::i~t~~i:"Yi business dealings with the EU or facing prosecution by European authorities under
European privacy laws. Certifying to the safe harbor will assure that EU
organizations know that your company provides "adequate" privacy protection, as
defined by the Directive.
SAFE HARBOR BENEFITS
The safe harbor provides a number of important benefits to U.S. and EU fums.
Benefits for U.S. organizations participating in the safe harbor will include:
• All 15 Member States of the European Union will be bound by
the European Commission's finding of adequacy
• Companies participating in the safe harbor will be deemed
adequate and data flows to those companies will continue;
• Member State requirements for prior approval of data transfers
either will be waived or approval will be automatically granted;
and
• Claims brought by European citizens against u.S. companies
will be heard in the U.S. subject to limited exceptions.
The safe harbor framework offers a simpler and cheaper means of complying with
the adequacy requirements of the Directive, which should particularly benefit
small and medium enterprises.
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html
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small and medium enterprises.
An EU organization can ensure that it is sending information to a u.s.
organization participating in the safe harbor by viewing the public list of safe
harbor organizations posted on the Department of Commerce's website
(www.export.gov/safeharbor).This list will become operational at the beginning
of November 2000. It will contain the names of all u.s. companies that have self-
certified to the safe harbor framework. This list will be regularly updated, so that
it is clear who is assured of safe harbor benefits.
HOW DOES AN ORGANIZATION JOIN?
The decision by u.s. organizations to enter the safe harbor is entirely voluntary.
Organizations that decide to participate in the safe harbor must comply with the
safe harbor's requirements and publicly declare that they do so. To be assured of
safe harbor benefits, an organization needs to self certify annually to the
Department of Commerce in writing that it agrees to adhere to the safe harbor's
requirements, which includes elements such as notice, choice, access, and
enforcement. It must also state in its published privacy policy statement that it
adheres to the safe harbor. The Department of Commerce will maintain a list of all
organizations that file self certification letters and make both the list and the self
certification letters publicly available.
To qualify for the safe harbor, an organization can (1) join a self-regulatory
privacy program that adheres to the safe harbor's requirements; or (2) develop its
own self regulatory privacy policy that confonns to the safe harbor.
WHAT DO THE SAFE HARBOR PRINCIPLES REQUIRE?
Organizations must comply with the seven safe harbor principles. The principles
require the following:
Notice: Organizations must notify individuals about the purposes for which they
collect and use infotmation about them. They must provide infonnation about how
individuals can contact the organization with any inquiries or complaints, the
types of third parties to which it discloses the information and the choices and
means the organization offers for limiting its use and disclosure.
Choice:. Organizations must give individuals the opportunity to choose (opt out)
whether their personal information will be disclosed to a third party or used for a
purpose incompatible with the purpose for which it was originally collected or
subsequently authorized by the individual. For sensitive infonnation, affirmative
or explicit (opt in) choice must be given if the information is to be disclosed to a
third party or used for a purpose other than its original purpose or the purpose
authorized subsequently by the individual.
Onward Transfer (Transfers to Third Parties): To disclose infonnation to a third
party, organizations must apply the notice and choice principles. Where an
organization wishes to transfer information to a third party that is acting as an
agent(1), it may do so if it makes sure that the third party subscribes to the safe
harbor principles or is subject to the Directive or another adequacy finding. As an
alternative, the organization can enter into a written agreement with such third
party requiring that the third party provide at least the same level of privacy
protection as is required by the relevant principles.
Access: Individuals must have access to personal infonnation about them that an
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html
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Access: InGlvlGualS must nave access to personal Intonnatlon about them that an
organization holds and be able to correct, amend, or delete that infonnation where
it is inaccurate, except where the burden or expense of providing access would be
disproportionate to the risks to the individual's privacy in the case in question, or
where the rights of persons other than the individual would be violated.
Security: Organizations must take reasonable precautions to protect personal
infonnation from loss, misuse and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration and
destruction.
Data integrity: Personal information must be relevant for the purposes for which
it is to be used. An organization should take reasonable steps to ensure that data is
reliable for its intended use, accurate, complete, and current.
Enforcement: In order to ensure compliance with the safe harbor principles, there
must be (a) readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms so
that each individual's complaints and disputes can be investigated and resolved
and damages awarded where the applicable law or private sector initiatives so
provide; (b) procedures for verifying that the commitments companies make to
adhere to the safe harbor principles have been implemented; and (c) obligations to
remedy problems arising out of a failure to comply with the principles. Sanctions
must be sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by the organization.
Organizations that fail to provide annual self certification letters will no longer
appear in the list of participants and safe harbor benefits will no longer be assured.
To provide further guidance, the Department of Commerce has issued a set of
frequently asked questions and answers (FAQs) that clarify and supplement the
safe harbor principles.
HOW AND WHERE WILL THE SAFE HARBOR BE ENFORCED?
In general, enforcement of the safe harbor will take place in the United States in
accordance with U.S. law and will be carried out primarily by the private sector.
Private sector self regulation and enforcement will be backed up as needed by
government enforcement of the federal and state unfair and deceptive statutes. The
effect of these statutes is to give an organization's safe harbor commitments the
force of law vis a vis that organization.
Private Sector Enforcement: As part of their safe harbor obligations,
organizations are required to have in place a dispute resolution system that will
investigate and resolve individual complaints and disputes and procedures for
verifying compliance. They are also required to remedy problems arising out of a
failure to comply with the principles. Sanctions that dispute resolution bodies can
apply must be severe enough to ensure compliance by the organization; they must
include publicity for findings of non-compliance and deletion of data in certain
circumstances. They may also include suspension from membership in a privacy
program (and thus effectively suspension from the safe harbor) and injunctive
orders.
The dispute resolution, verification, and remedy requirements can be satisfied in
different ways. For example, an organization could comply with a private sector
developed privacy seal program that incorporates and satisfies the safe harbor
principles. If the seal program, however, only provides for dispute resolution and
remedies but not verification, then the organization would have to satisfy the
verification requirement in an alternative way.
Organizations can also satisfy the dispute resolution and remedy requirements
http://www.export.gov/safeharborlsh_overview.html
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Organizations can also satisfy the dispute resolution and remedy requirements
through compliance with government supervisory authorities or by committing to
cooperate with data protection authorities located in Europe.
Government Enforcement: Depending on the industry sector, the Federal Trade
Commission, comparable U.S. government agencies, and/or the states may
provide overarching government enforcement of the safe harbor principles. Where
a company relies in whole or in part on self regulation in complying with the safe
harbor principles, its failure to comply with such self regulation must be
actionable under federal or state law prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts or it is
not eligible to join the safe harbor. At present, U.S. organizations that are subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission or the Department of
Transportation with respect to air carriers and ticket agents may participate in the
safe harbor. The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Transportation
with respect to air carriers and ticket agents have both stated in letters to the
European Commission that they will take enforcement action against
organizations that state that they are in compliance with the safe harbor framework
but then fail to live up to their statements.
Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, for example, a company's failure to
abide by commitments to implement the safe harbor principles might be
considered deceptive and actionable by the Federal Trade Commission. This is the
case even where an organization adhering to the safe harbor principles relies
entirely on self-regulation to provide the enforcement required by the safe harbor
enforcement principle. The FTC has the power to rectify such misrepresentations
by seeking administrative orders and civil penalties of up to $12,000 per day for
violations.
Failure to Comply with the Safe Harbor Requirements: If an organization
persistently fails to comply with the safe harbor requirements, it is no longer
entitled to benefit from the safe harbor. Persistent failure to comply arises where
an organization refuses to comply with a final determination by any self
regulatory or government body or where such a body detetmines that an
organization frequently fails to comply with the requirements to the point where
its claim to comply is no longer credible. In these cases, the organization must
promptly notify the Department of Commerce of such facts. Failure to do so may
be actionable under the False Statements Act (18 U.S.C. § 1001).
The Department of Commerce will indicate on the public list it maintains of
organizations self certifying adherence to the safe harbor requirements any
notification it receives of persistent failure to comply and will make clear which
organizations are assured and which organizations are no longer assured of safe
harbor benefits.
An organization applying to participate in a self-regulatory body for the purposes
of re-qualifying for the safe harbor must provide that body with full information
about its prior participation in the safe harbor.
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html
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II
(Acts whose publication is not obligatory)
COMMISSION
COMMISSION DECISION
of 27 December 2001
on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third
countries, under Directive 95/46/EC
(notified under document number C(2001) 4540)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2002/16/EC)
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,
Having regard to Directive 95j46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement
of such data (1), and in particular Article 26(4) thereof,
Whereas:
(1) Pursuant to Directive 95!46/EC Member States are required to provide that a transfer of personal
data to a third country may only take place if the third country in question ensures an adequate level
of data protection and the Member States' laws, which comply with the other provisions of the
Directive, are respected prior to the transfer.
(2) However, Article 26(2) of Directive 95/46!EC pro~ides that Member States may authorise, subject to
certain safeguards, a transfer or a set of transfers of personal data to third countries which do not
ensure an adequate level of protection. Such safeguards may in particular result from appropriate
contractual clauses.
(3) Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC the level of data protection should be assessed in the light of all the
circumstances surrounding the data transfer operation or set of data transfer operations. The
Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data
established under that Directive (~ has issued guidelines to aid with the assessment e).
(1) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.
(2) The web address of the Working Party is:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemaCmarketfen/dataprot/wpdocsfindex.htm.
(J) WP 4 (5020/97): 'First orientations on Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries - Possible Ways Forward in
Assessing Adequacy', a discussion document adopted by the Working Party on 26 June 1997.
WP 7 (5057/97): Working document: 'Judging industry self-regulation: when does it make a meaningful contribution
to the level of data protection in a third country?', adopted by the Working Party on 14 January 1998.
WP 9 (5005/98): Working Document: 4Preliminary views on the use of contractual provisions in the context of
transfers of personal data to third countries', adopted by the Working Party on 22 April 1998.
WP 12: Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the ED data protection direc-
tive, adopted by the Working Party on 24 July 1998, available on the website
'http://europa.eu.intfcommfintemal_marketfenfdataprotfwpdocsfwp12en.htm' hosted by the European Commission.
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(4) The standard contractual clauses relate only to data protection. The data exporter and the data
importer are free to include any other clauses on business related issues which they consider as being
pertinent for the contract as long as they do not contradict the standard contractual clauses.
(5) This Decision should be without prejudice to national authorisations Member States may grant in
accordance with national provisions implementing Article 26(2} of Directive 95/46/EC. This
Decision only has the effect of reqUiring the Member States not to refuse to recognise as providing
adequate safeguards the contractual clauses set out in it and does not therefore have any effect on
other contractual clauses.
(6) The scope of this Decision is limited to establishing that the clauses which it sets out may b.e used by
a data controller established in the Community in order to adduce adequate safeguards within the
meaning of Article 26(2) of Directive 95/46/EC for the transfer of personal data to a processor
established in a third country.
(7) This Decision should implement the obligation prOVided for in Article 17(3) of Directive 95!46!EC
and does not prejudice the content of the contracts or legal acts established pursuant to that
prOVision. However, some of the standard contractual clauses, in particular as regards the data
exporter's obligations, should be included in order to increase clarity as to the provisions which may
be contained in a contract between a controller and a processor.
(8) Supervisory authorities of the Member States play a key role in this contractual mechanism in
ensuring that personal data are adequately protected after the transfer. In exceptional cases where
data exporters refuse or are unable to instruct the data importer properly, with an imminent risk of
grave hann to the data subjects, the standard contractual clauses should allow the supervisory
authorities to audit data importers and, where appropriate, take decisions which are binding on data
importers. The supervisory authorities should have the power to prohibit or suspend a data transfer
or a set of transfers based on the standard contractual clauses in those exceptional cases where it is
established that a transfer on contractual basis is likely to have a substantial adverse effect on the
warranties and obligations providing adequate protection for the data subject
(9) The Commission may also consider in the future whether standard contractual clauses for the
transfer of personal data to' data processors established in third countries not offering an adequate
level of data protection, submitted by business organisations or other interested parties, offer
adequate safeguards in accordance with Article 26(2) of Directive 95/46/EC.
(10) A disclosure of personal data to a data processor established outside the Community is an inter-
national transfer protected under Chapter IV of Directive 95/46/EC. Consequendy, this Decision does
not cover the transfer of personal data by controllers established in the Community to controllers
established outside the Community who fall within the scope of Commission Decision 2001/497/EC
of 15 June 2001 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to third countries,
under Directive 95/46/EC (1).
(11) The standard contractual clauses should provide for the technical and organisational security
measures ensuring a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the
nature of the data to be protected that a data processor established in a third country not providing
adequate protection must apply. Parties should make 'provision in the contract for those technical
and organisational measures which, haVing regard to applicable data protection law, the state of the
art and the cost of their implementation, are necessary in order to protect personal data against
accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure or access or
any other unlawful fonns of processing.
(12) In order to facilitate data flows from the Community, it is desirable that processors providing data
processing services to several data controllers in the Community be allowed to apply the same
technical and organisational security measures irrespective of the Member State from which the data
transfer originates, in particular in those cases where the data importer receives data for further
processing from different establishments of the data exporter in the Community, in which case the
law of the designated Member State of establishment should apply.
(1) OJ L 181, 4.7.2001, p. 19.
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(13) It is appropriate to lay down the minimum information that the parties must specify in the contract
dealing with the transfer. Member States should retain the power to particularise the information the
parties are required to provide. The operation of this Decision should be reviewed in the light of
experience.
(14) The data importer should process the transferred personal data only on behalf of the data exporter
and in accordance with his instructions and the obligations contained in the clauses. In particular the
data importer should not disclose the personal data to a third party unless in accordance with certain
conditions. The data exporter should instruct the data importer throughout the duration of the data
processing Services to process the data in accordance with his instructions, the applicable data
protection laws and the obligations contained in the clauses. The transfer of personal data to
processors established outside the Community does not prejudice the fact that the processing
activities should be governed in any case by the applicable data protection law.
(15) The standard contractual clauses should be enforceable not only by the organisations which are
parties to the contract, but also by the data subjects, in particular where the data subjects suffer
damage as a consequence of a breach of the contract.
(16) The data subject should be entitled to take action and, where appropriate, receive compensation
from the data exporter who is the data controller of the personal data transferred. Exceptionally, the
data subject should also be entitled to take action, and, where appropriate, receive compensation
from the data importer in those cases, arising out of a breach by the data importer of any of his
obligations referred to in the second paragraph of clause 3, where the data exporter has factually
disappeared or has ceased to exist in law or has become insolvent.
(17) In the event of a dispute between a data subject, who invokes the third-party benefiCiary clause and
the data importer, which is not amicably resolved, the data importer should agree to provide the data
subject with the choice between mediation, arbitration or litigation. The extent to which the data
subject will have an effective choice should depend on the availability of reliable and recognised
systems of mediation and arbitration. Mediation by the data protection supervisory authorities of the
Member State in which the data exporter is established should be an option where they provide such
a service.
(18) The contract should be governed by the law of the Member State in which the data exporter is
established enabling a third-party beneficiary to enforce a contract. Data subjects should be allowed
to be represented by associations or other bodies if they so wish and if authorised by national law.
(1 9) The Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of Personal Data
established under Article 29 of Directive 95j46/EC has delivered an opinion on the level of
protection provided under the standard contractual clauses annexed to this Decision, which has been
taken into account in the preparation of this Decision (1).
(20) The measures provided for in this Decision are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee
established under Article 31 of Directive 95/46/EC,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
Article 1
The standard contractual clauses set out in the Annex are considered as offering adequate safeguards with
respect to the protection of the privacy and fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals and as regards
the exercise of the corresponding rights as required by Article 26(2) of Directive 95/46/EC.
(1) Opinion No 7/2001 adopted by the Working Party on 13 September 2001 (DG MARKT....), available on the website
'Europa' hosted by the European Commission.
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Article 2
This Decision concerns only the adequacy of protection provided by the standard contractual clauses set
out in the Annex for the transfer of personal data to processors. It does not affect the application of other
national provisions implementing Directive 95/46/EC that pertain to the processing of personal data within
the Member States.
This Decision shall apply to the transfer of personal data by controllers established in the Community to
recipients established outside the territory of the Community who act only as processors.
Article 3
For the purposes of this Decision:
(a) the definitions in Directive 95/46!EC shall apply;
(b) 'special categories of data' means the data referred to in Article 8 of that Directive;
(c) 'supervisory authority' means the authority referred to in Article 28 of that Directive;
(d) 'data exporter' means the controller who transfers the personal data;
(e) 'data importer' means the processor established in a third country who agrees to receive from the data
exporter personal data intended for processing on the data exporter's behalf after the transfer in
accordance with his instructions and the terms of this Decision and who is not subject to a third
country's system ensuring adequate protection;
(~ 'applicable data protection law' means the legislation protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of
natural persons and, in particular, their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data
applicable to a data controller in the Member State in which the data exporter is established;
(g) 'technical and organisational security measures' means those measures aimed at protecting personal data
against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure or
access, in particular where the processing involves the transmission of data over a network, and against
all other unlawful forms of processing.
Article 4
1. Without prejudice to their powers to take action to ensure compliance with national provisions
adopted pursuant to Chapters II, III, V and VI of Directive 95j46/EC, the competent authorities in the
Member States may exercise their existing powers to prohibit or suspend data flows to third countries in
order to protect individuals with regard to the processing of their personal data in cases where:
(a) it is established that the law to which the data importer is subject imposes upon him requirements to
derogate from the applicable data protection law which go beyond the restrictions necessary in a
democratic society as provided for in Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC where those requirements are
likely to have a substantial adverse effect on the guarantees provided by the applicable data protection
law and the standard contractual clauses; or .
(b) a competent authority has established that the data importer has not respected the contractual clauses
in the Annex; or
(c) there is a substantial likelihood that the standard contractual clauses in the Annex are not being or will
not be complied with and the continuing transfer would create an imminent risk of grave harm to the
data subjects.
2. The prohibition or suspension pursuant to paragraph 1 shall be lifted as soon as the reasons for the
suspension or prohibition no longer exist.
3. When Member States adopt measures pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2, they shall, without delay,
inform the Commission which will forward the information to the other Member States.
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Article 5
The Commission shall evaluate the operation of this Decision on the basis of available information three
years after its notification to the Member States. It shall submit a report on the findings to the Committee
established under Article 31 of Directive 95/46/EC. It shall include any evidence that could affect the
evaluation concerning the adequacy of the standard contractual clauses in the Annex and any evidence that
this Decision is being applied in a discriminatory way.
Article 6
This Decision shall apply from 3 April 2002.
Article 7
This Decision is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 27 December 200 1.
For the Commission
Frederik BOLKESTEIN
Member of the Commission
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ANNEX
Standard Contractual Clauses (processors)
For the purpose.s of Article 26(2) of Directive 95/46!EC for the transfer of personal d~ta to processors established in third
countries \vhkh do not ensure an adequate level of data protection
Name ofthe data exporting organisation: .
address .
tel.: ; fax: ; e-nlail: .
Other information needed to identii}r the organisation
(the data rxporter)
and
Name ofthe data importing organisation: .
address .
tel.: ; fax: . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. : e-J11ail: .
Other information needed to identitJr the organisation:
(the data importer)
HAVE AGREED on the following Contractual Clauses (the Clauses) in order to adduce adequate safeguards with respect to the
protection of pri\T3C}' and fundarnental rights and freedonls of individuals for the transfer by the data exporter to the data
importer of the personal data specified in Appendix I.
Clause 1
Definitions
for the purposes of the Clauses:
(a) 'personal data', 'special categories of data', 'process/processing', 'controller', 'processor'. 'data subjec.t' and 'supervisory
authority' shall have the same me,tning as in Directive 95j46jEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
Oct.ober 1995 on the prot.ection of individuals with regard to the processing ofpersonal dat.a and on the free movement of
such data (the Directive) (1);
(b) 'the data exporter' shall tne~n the controller who transfers the personal data;
(c) 'the data imp0l1er' shall mean the processor who agrees to receive from the data exporter personal data intended for
processing on his behalf after the transfer in acc.ordance with his instructions and the tenus of these Clauses and who is not
subject to a third country's system ensuring to adequate protection;
(d) 'the applicable dat.a protection law' shall mean the legislation protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons and, in particular, their right to privacy With respect. t.o the proces5ing of personal data applicable t.o a data
controller in the Member State in which the data exporter is established:
(e) 'technical and organisational security l11ea~llres' shaH mean those measures aimed at protecting personal data against
accidental or unla\\:ful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure or access. in particular where the
processing involves the transmission of data over a network, ~lnd ~lgainst all other unlawful fonus of processing.
Clause 2
Details of the transfer
The details of the transfer and in particular the special categories of personal data 'where applicable arc specified in Appendix 1
\vhkh forms an integral part of the Clauses.
(1) Partie~ may reproduce definition~ and meal1ing~ contained in Directive 95i46/F.( within this (bu~ if they considered it benet' for the
contract to stand alone.
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Cluu.c.e 3
Third-party beneficiary clause
The data subject can enforce against the data exporter this Clause, Clause 4(b) to (h), Clause 5(a) to (e), and (g), Clause 6{J) and
(2), Clause i, Clause 8(2), and Clauses 9. 10 and 11, as third-party beneficiaries.
The data subject (.an enfor(.e against the data importer this Clause. Clause 5(a) to (e) 'md. (g), Clause 6(1) and (2), Clause 7,
Clause 8(2), and Clauses 9, 10 and 11, in cases where the data exporter has factually disappeared or has ceased to exi~t in law.
The parties do not object to a data subject being represented by an association or other body if the data subject so expressly
\vishes and if pennitted by national law.
cluuse 4
Obligations of the data exporter
The data exporter agrees and warrants:
(a) that the processing. including the transfer itself, of the personal data has been and will continue to be carried out. in
acc.ord.ance with the relevant prOVisions of the applicable data protection law (and, \\!here applicable, has been notified to
the relevant authorities of the ~1ember State where the data exporter is established) and does not violate the relevant
provision~ of that State:
(b) that he has instructed and throughout the duration of the personal data processing sen-ices ·will instruct the data importer
to process the personal data transterred only on the data exporter's behalf and in accordance with the applicable data
protection law and these clauses;
(c) that the d.ata inlporter shall prOVide sufficieut guarantees in respect of the technical and organisational security measures
spccified in AppendiX 2 to this contract~
(d) that aftcr assessrnent of the requirements of the applicablc data protection law, the security measures arc appropriate to
protect personal data against accidental or unla\vful destruction or aCddentalloss, alteration. unauthorised disclosure or
access, in partic.ular where the processing involves the transmission ofdata over a network, and against all other unlawful
forms of processing, and that th e$e measures ensure a level ofsecurity appropriate to the risks presented by the processing
and the nature of the data to be protected haVing regard to the state of the art and the cost of their implementation:
(c) that he will ensure compliance with the security measures;
(f) that, if the t.ransfer involves special categories of data, the data subject has been infonned or will he illfonned before. or as
soon as pOSSible after, the transfer that his data could be translllitted to a third country not prOViding adequate protection;
(g) that he agrees to forward the llotitlc.ation rec.eived fronl the data impo11er pursuant to Clause 5(b) to the data protection
supervisory authority if he decides to continue the transfer or to lift his suspension;
01) to make available to the data subjects upon request a copy of the Clau.~es set out in this Annex, 'with the exception of
AppendLx 2 which shall be replaced by a summary description of the securi1y measures.
Clause 5
Obligations of the data importer (I)
The data importer agrees and walTants:
(a) to process the personal data only on behalfof the data expolter and in compliance with his instru.ctions and the clm.lSes; if
he (.annot prOVide suc.h c.01llplianc.e for whatever reasons, he agrees to illfonn promptly the data expol1er ofhis inability to
comply. in which case the data cxporter is entitled to suspend the transfer of data and/or tennillate the contract:
~)) that he has no reason to believe that t.he legislation applicable t.o hitn prevents hun from fulfilling the inst.ructions received
from the data exporter and his obligations under the contract and that in the event of a change in this legislation which is
likely to have a substantial ad-..erse e.tTect on the warranties and obligations provided by the Clauses, he will promptly
notifY the change to the data exporter as soon as he is aware, in which case the data exporter is entitled to suspend the
transfer of data and/or terminate the contract:
(c) that he has implemented the technical and organisational sel"Urity measures specitled in AppendiX 2before processing the
personal data transterred;
(1) Mandatory requirements of the national legislation applicable to the data importer which do not go beyond what is necessary in 41 democratic
society on tlle ba~is of one of the interest.; listed in Article 13(1) of Directive 95!46jEC. that is, if they COll<jt1tute a neces~ry lueasure to
safeguard national security detence, public 'Security. the prevention. inveo;tigation. detection and prosecution of criminal oHence'S or of
breaches of ethics t<Jr the r~ulated professions, an important economic or financial interest of the State or the prote.ction of the data subject
Of the right.; and freedom~ of othel's. al'e not in c.ontradiction with the standard contractual clauses. Some examples of SUdl mandatory
feqlJirell1ent~ whk~h do not go beyond what is necessary in a democratic ~iety are. inter alia. ulternationally l't<.ogni<jed sanctions,
tax-reporting rcquircmcms or anti-money-laundering reporting requirements.
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(d) that he shall promptly notify the data exporter about:
(i) any legally binding request for disclosure of the personal data by a law enforcetnent authority unless otherwise
prohibited, such as a prohibition under criminal law to preserve the confidentiality ofa law enforcelllent investigation;
(ii) any accidental or unauthorised access: and
(iii) any request received directly from the data subjects \\ithout responding to that requ~t, unless he has been otherwise
authorised to do so;
(e) to deal pron1ptly and properly with all inquiries froln the data exporter relating to his processing of the personal data
subject to the transfer and to abide by the advice of the supervisory authority with regard to the processing of the data
transferred:
(t) at the request of the data exporter to submit his data processing facilities for audit of the processing activities covered by
the clauses which shall be carried out. by the data exporter or an inspection body composed ofindependent memhers and
in possession of the required professional qualifications bound by a duty ofconfidentiality. selected by the data eXpolter,
where applicable, in agreement with the supervisory authority;
(g) to nlake available to the data subject upon request a copy of the Clauses set out in this Annex. with the exceptioll of
Appendix 2 which shall be replaced by a summary description of the security measures in those casc..~ ",itere the data
subject is unable to obtain a copy front the data exporter.
Clau~e 6
Liability
1. The parties agree that H data subject. who has suffered damage as a result ofanyviolation of the provisions referred to in
(1au~e 3 is entitled to receive compensation from the data exporter for the damage suffered.
2. If a data subject is not able to bring the action referred to in paragraph 1 arising out. of a breach by the data importer of
any of his obligations referred to in Clause 3 against the data exporter bt.'C3use the data exporter has disappeared factually or
has ce.ased to exist in law or became insolvent, the data importer agrees that the data subject Inay issue a claim against the data
importer as if he were the data exporter.
3. The parties agree that ifone party is held liable for a violation ofthe clauses committed by the other party, the latter will,
to the extent to which it is liable. indemnify the first. party for any cost, charge, damages, expenses or loss it has incurred.
Indemnifaction is contingent upon:
(a) the data exporter promptly notifying the data importer of a claim; and
(b) the data hllpOlter being given the possibility to cooperate with the data exporter in the defence and settlement of the
daim(l).
Clause 7
Mediation and jurisdiction
1. The data impotter agrees that. if the data subject invokes against him third-party beneficiary rights and/or claims
compensation for damages under the clauses,. the data importer will accept the decision of the data subject:
(a) to refer the dispute to mediation, by an independent: person or, where applicable, by the supervisory authority;
(b) to refer the dispute to the courts in the Member State in which the data exporter is established.
2. The data importer agrees that, hy agreement. with the data subject, the resolution of a specific dispute can be referred to
an arbitration body if the data importer is established in a country which has ratified the Ne,\\T York Convention on
eufore.eluent of arbitration awards.
3. The palties agree that the choice made by the data subject will not prejudice his substantive or procedural rights to seek
remedies in ao:ordance with other provisions of national or inteJ11ational law.
Clause 8
Cooperation with supervisory authorities
1. The data exporter agrees to deposit a copy of t.his contract with the supervisory authority if it so requests or if such
deposit is required under t.he applicable data protection la\"r.
2. The parties agree that the supervisoryauthority has the right to conduct an audit of the data importer witich has the same
scope and is subject to the same conditions as would apply to an audit of the data exporter under the applicable data
protection law.
(') Paragraph 3 is optional.
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Clause 9
Governing law
The Clauses shall be governed by the la"\\' ofthe Member State in which the data exporter is e..c;tablished, namely .
clau.~e 10
Variation of the contract
The parties undcrtake not to \Tat}r or modify the tcnns of the Clauses.
clau.~ II
Obligation after the tennination of personal data processing setvices
1. The parties agree that on the termination of the provision of data processing services. t.he data importer shall, at t.he
choice of the data exporter, return al the personal data transferred and the copies thereof to the data expolter or shall destroy
all the personal data and certify to the data e"'ll0rter that he has done 50, unless legislation imposed upon the data importer
prevent.s him from returning or destro}ing all or part of the personal data transferred. In that case, the data importer warrants
that he will guarantee the confidentiality of the personal data transferred and 'will not activel}~ process the personal data
transfcrrcd anymorc.
2. The data itnportcr warrants that upon rcquest of the data exportcrandior of the 5upervisoT}Tauthority, he will submit his
data processing tacilities for an audit of the measures referred to in paragraph 1.
On behalf of the data exporter:
l'ame (",,'litt.ell out in full): .
Position:
Address:
Other information necessary in order for the contract to be binding (ifany):
Signature .
...........
.........
(~tamp of organisation)
On behalf of the data importer:
Nanle (written ()ut in full): .
Position:
Address:
Other information necessary in order for the contract to be binding (ifany):
Signature '" .
..........
(~Iamp of organisation)
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Appendix 1
to the Standard Contractual Causes
This Appendix fonns part of the Clauses and mu~"t be completed and signed by the parties
(*) The Member States may complete or specify, according t.o their national procedures, any additional necessary infonnation
to be contained in this Appendix)
Data exporter
The data expolter is (please specify briefly your activities relevant to the transfer):
Data importer
The data importer is (please ~'Pecify briefly activities relevant to the transfer):
Data subjects
The personal data transferred concern the following categories of data subjects (please specif}1:
Categories of data
The personal data transferred concern the follOWing categories of data (please specify):
Special categories of data (if appropriate)
The personal dCltCl transferred concern the follOWing special categories of data (please specitly):
Processing operations
The personal data transferred will be subject to the following basic proc.essing activities (please specify):
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DATA EXPORTER
l\arnc: .
Authorised signature
DATA IMPORTER
J-117
0'-..
L 6/62 Official Journal of the European Communities
Appendix 1
to the Standard Contractual Oauses
This Appendix fOnDS part of the Clauses and mu~'t be completed and signed by the parties
Description of the tedmical and organisa1ional security measures implemented by the data importer in accordance with
Clauses 4(d) and S(c) (or document:1egislation attached):
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• Spiders, robots (or bots) and
netcrawlers are all names for
programs that systematically search
pages on the web, building indexes of
information about these pages
most common species
are those that index the web for
search engines.
• These beneficial bugs help us find
things and cause no harm
K-l
• When you typing a query into a
search engine and hit enter, you do
not "search the web," at least in real-
time
• Rather you search a database of web
information, keyed to web addresses
• Other spiders travel the
web looking for specific
types of data
• This of activity is called
data-mining
.t robots.txt
• well-behaved
web crawlers are
supposed to look
at this file to
determine what
not to index.
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• Less beneficial robots crawl the web
collecting email addresses for to sale
to email marketers (spammers)
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• Others search for copyrighted images,
sound and video files, to copy them
for infringing commercial uses
• Napster and second generation peer-
to-peer networks both use bots
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• hacker (hak'er)
• n. 1. Slang. Computer programmer
• 2. An individual who probes and logs
on to remote computers without
permission for the purpose of
learning, entertainment and perhaps
abuse.
• Cf Cracker. A hacker with intent to
harm or profit. Usage: "Good"
hackers call ''bad'' hackers, crackers
• A "exploit" is a successful "hack"
worthy of bragging about
• Examples include hacking into the
CIA website, knocking down a
Microsoft router, etc
control of "root," the highest level of
security in Unix/Linux systems.
BycontroUingroot
the hacker has .
complete controlof
a computer, or in
the case ofservers,
the entire network
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• Script Kiddie n. A beginner hacker,
usually a juvenile, who is only
capable of using simple guides, like
the Jolly Roger Cookbook, or pre-
written programs called scripts or war
scripts.
• See also Lamer
• Pre-written hacking tools. Examples
include:
- Back Orifice -- tool for hacking
Microsoft networks
- Tribe Flood Net, trinOO, Barbed Wire,
etc. -- tool for knocking down web sites
• Sometimes called Warz
• n. The use ofhacker skills in the pursuit
ofpolitical goals.
- Domestic targets are often forces attending
to limit Internet liberty.
- Groups like cDc have provided war scripts
to dissident hacker groups in foreign
nations, esp. China. Reportedly, cDc has
sent 5,000 copies of Back Orifice to
Chinese dissidents.
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Cult of the Dead Cow (cDc) website:
• http://www.cultdeadcow.com/
Hacktivismo website
• http://hacktivismo.com/
• This is the website of cDc foreign
minister Oxblood Ruffin
• All terms related to various cracker
exploits, both sophisticated and
juvenile
• All designed to damage or degrade
Internet service by target
• ... or the Internet itself
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• Hacker uses a program to send rapid
stream of information (arranged in
packets) to a server in the hopes of
shutting is down
• Most current network security can
defeat this attack
• Common script-kiddie exploit
• Hacker uses a program or script to
send stream of misshapen pac~ets to a
server
• The server frantically tries to sort out
the nonconforming packets, but
eventually gets bogged down and
either slows down or crashes
• Otherwise known as a "smurf attack"
or smurfing
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• Scripts are easily found on the web &
make this the amateur hackers AKA
"script kiddies" weapon of choose
- Tribe Flood Net
- trinOO
- Stacheldraht (Barbed Wire)
• The Big Kahuna of DoS attacks
• The target web site is bombarded
by multiple computers with a
steady stream of mis-shaped
~:~e::Phisticated versio~,~~f'f.~~
of the simple denial of ~;:,;~t;~;
service attack tti~
Attack employs zombies
• A daemon is any Internet
program that works in the
background on a computer
attached to the web
- Can be any computer from
a PC to a router to a server
• A zombie is an illegally
installed deamon that is in
the control of the hacker
who installed it
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• The attackers must careful plant
deamon/zombies around the web,
loaded with the DoD service software
• The "general"then sends a message
with the target site to the zombies,
and order it to execute its program
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Tueday 2-8 --
- llam PST Buy.com (on IPO day)
- I230pm PST stamps.com
- 330pm PST e-bay (5.5 hours)
- 4pm PST CnD.com (2 hrs)
- 5pm PST amazon.com (1 hr)
-6pmPSTMSN
Weds 2-9
- 430am PST ZDNet (2hrs)
- 5am PST (E*Trade (1 hr)
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• Worm n. A program that replicates
itself over a computer network, using
up its resources and possibly shutting
it down.
• Type of virus
• Code Red (2001), BugBear (2002)
• Warez (wilrz) n. Illegally traded
software; usually exchanged through
chat rooms and temporarily erected
FTP sites on public PCs (usually in
university labs or libraries).
• Cracks n. Programs designed defeat
copyright protection of software
• Demos are demonstration versions of
programs usually designed to become
inoperative after a period of use (30 days; 50
uses, etc)
• Nagware is slang for shareware; programs
that are usable but the author has for payment
on the honor system
• Both-are common warez, packaged with
cracks to make them full-use versions
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• Spam n. unsolicited commercial email
• Some related issues:
- Spoofs, spoofing
- SpyWare
• Spoof v. To trick a computer or user
into believing something is not wjat it
appears to be.
- IP Spoofing. When a hacker tricks steals
the identitY ofa web router to intercept
traffic
- Email spoofing. Common trick used by
spammers to hide the origin of the
emailer
• Software that secretly tracks your Internet
traffic and or/ the software on your
system, continuously "calling homett,
reporting data to the software company
~~~-
• Usually freewa~ewith a ~= fII!;, 'l1l!...."',
useful functlonTA, ~<:
Often you opt into this
extra "feature" with a
click-thru license.
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• Bonzi products (BonziBUDDY,
Internet BOOST, Voice E-Mail, etc).
• Comet Cursor
• Webopedia
http://www.webopedia.coml
• NetLingo
http://www.netlingo.coml
• The New Hacker's Dictionary
http://www.tuxedo.org/--esr/jargon/
and many other places
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SECTIONL
•Update on Domain Name Disputes and New TLD's
Joseph R. Dreitler
Jones Day Reavis & Pogue
Columbus, OH
I. History of Domain Names and Their Administration
Originally operated by Network Solutions, Inc. (now Verisign)
• U.S. Commerce Department later "opened" for competition creating ICANN
• More than 23 million ".com" and 30 million total names have been registered to
date Country Code Top Level Domains (e.g., .uk, .jp .m) now exist for over 240
jurisdictions, each with its own registry
• More than 170 registrars authorized to register ".com," ".org," ".net" domain
names
• New top level domains (e.g., ".pro," ".biz")
II. Regulation of Trademark Rights in Domain Names
• Registrars issue names on "first come, first served" basis
• Registrars not responsible for infringing use of domain names by registrants
(Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions Inc.)
• Worldwide reach of the Internet means laws ofmany countries may be relevant
III. How Cybersquatters Can Harm IP
• Misdirect traffic to your competitors or unrelated parties goods
• Dilute your brand by associating it with unrelated goods/services
• Associate your brand with unsavory activity (e.g., pornography)
• Illegally criticize your business or practices
IV. Substantive Grounds To Challenge in U.S.
• Trademark Infringement
• Trademark Dilution
• Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Anticybersquatter Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA")
• State law
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A. Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1114)
• Existence of registered trademark
• Use by defendant of "colorable imitation" ofmark
• In a manner that is likely to cause confusion
• Confusion can be as to source, affiliation or endorsement
• Brookfield: "Initial Interest" confusion is enough
• Case law holds domain names can infringe trademarks
• Requires "commercial use" by defendant
• Provides for injunctive relief and damages
B. Trademark Dilution (15 U.S.C. Sec 1125(c))
•
•
•
•
Mark must be both "famous" and "distinctive"
Defendant's use need not cause confusion: "blurring" or "tarnishment" sufficient
Possible need to prove greater similarity than in infringement
Relief usually limited to injunction - Supreme Court to decide this term "harm"
required
c. Lanham Act Section 43(a) (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(a))
•
•
Protects against infringement of unregistered common law marks, trade dress and
false advertising, passing off
Requires likelihood of confusion, endorsement or affiliation
D. Anticybersquatter Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(d))
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Limited to domain names - not metatags
Defendant must register, use or "traffic in" domain names
With bad faith intent to profit from plaintiff's mark
Defendant's domain name must be "dilutive of' famous mark or "confusingly
similar to" valid mark
Remedies include both injunction and damages
"Statutory damages" of up to $100,000 per infringing/dilutive name
Forfeiture of infringing/dilutive domain names
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E. State Law
•
•
•
•
•
Common law infringement
Trespass
False advertising
Unfair competition
Consumer protection statutes
~ ICANN UDRP "Arbitration"
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Not Actually Arbitration (Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc.)
Relatively inexpensive (Dell Computer Corporation v. MTO C.A. and Diabetes
Education Long Life)
Decision usually self executing - but may be "appealed" de novo
Personal jurisdiction not an issue
Law uncertain
Limited relief
May not be helpful if defendant has operating Web site
Does not apply to most CCTLDs
VI. Procedural Options
•
•
•
File suit in U.S. courts
ICANN UDRP Proceeding
Foreign litigation
A. U.S. Litigation
•
•
•
•
•
Relatively expensive
May be hard to serve defendant, enforce judgment
Personal jurisdiction issues complex
Broad relief (injunction, damages and forfeiture of domain names)
Relatively clear and certain legal rights
B. Foreign Litigation
•
•
•
Expensive
Often uncertain result
May be only effective way to stop foreign-based infringers
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VII. Misdirection Web Sites
•
•
•
Use variations on brand names
Sell "keywords" or trademarks to third parties
Often link or "point" to sites that offer competitive goods/services
<e-acme.com>
<acme.org>
<thaiacme.com>*
<acme.gr>*
<chasebanksucks.com>
*foreign language sites
A. "Typo" Squatters
• Misdirect traffic intended for genuine Web site operated by brand owner
<amazom.com>
<del.com>
<midrosoft.com>
<homtail.com>
<wwwlexus.com>
B. Metatag Pirates
•
•
•
"Metatag" is text invisible to Internet user
Used by search engines to identify Web sites listed in search results
Because search technology is automated, unauthorized use of trademarks In
metatags not detected by search engines
c. Unsavory Sites
•
•
•
Frequently pornographic
Operators often unethical and difficult to find - false contact infonnation
Sometimes run by "true believers" in causes
<ballysucks.com>
<xxxacme.com>
<ihateacme.com>
Infinite variety ofother domain names
L-4
D. Finding the Bad Guys
•
•
•
•
•
•
Commercial search tools
Customer complaints
Sales reps and other intra-corporate sources
Web searches
Search engines
<domainsurfer.com>
VIII. Search Methods
•
•
•
•
•
Customer complaints
Sales personnel and other in-house resources
Formal Internet searches
Search engines
<domainsurfer.com>
IX. How to Stop Cybersquatters
•
•
•
Identifying the sources and their prior activities
Reviewing the various substantive legal rights
Choosing the appropriate and available procedures
X. Strategic Goals for Trademark Protection
•
•
•
Terminate serious infringement quickly
Preserve strength and value ofmarks
Use resources efficiently
XI. Recommended Procedures
•
•
•
Establish standard search methodology
Quick clearance ofnon-actionable sites
Prompt action against high priority infringers
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XII. Questionably Actionable Sites
• Fair use (Terri Wells)
• Gripe sites and Non-commercial use (Marianne Bihari Bihari Interiors, Inc., v
Craig Gross And Yolanda Truglio)
• "Fan" sites (Bruce Springsteen -v- JeffBurgar and Bruce Springsteen Club)
• Grey market/downstream distribution of trademarked goods
• Illegal use vs. fair use
• Public relations issues
XIII. Flagrant Misuses: Terminate With Prejudice
• Create fonn letters for recurring infringement/dilution paradigms
• Check lists for infringement, dilution, cybersquatting
• Obtain management guidance for cases that justify fonnallegal action
• Decide which merit civil litigation v. ICANN proceeding
XIV. Relevant Cases
Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 USPQ2d 1479, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11626 (W.D. Wash. 1996) In one of the first reported cases, a court enjoined the
defendant from using "candyland.com" or any similar name as a domain name to identify its
"sexually explicit Internet site" which is "likely to dilute" the value of Hasbro's
CANDYLAND®.
Intermatic v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996); a magistrate recommended that
summary judgment be granted against the use of the domain name INTERMATIC.COM
based on the federal anti-dilution statute. INTERMATIC was a "strong, federally registered
mark which has been exclusively used by Intennatic for over 50 years" .
Cardservice Int'l v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, (E.D. Va.), affd, 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir.
1997). Defendants' use of "cardservice.com" domain name and "Card Service" on Internet
was found likely to cause confusion with plaintiffs registered "Cardservice" mark. Plaintiffs
customers who wish to take advantage of its Internet services are likely to reach defendants'
"Card Service" home page instead, and wrongly assume that they have reached plaintiffs
Internet site.
Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D. N.J. 1998). Plaintiff was successful in
showing that defendant's ')ewsforjesus" Internet site will the dilute value ofplaintiffs "Jews
for Jesus" trademark. Defendant used plaintiff organization's mark to lure individuals to
defendant's site, and then refer, via hyperlink, to another Internet site which also contained
infonnation critical ofplaintiff.
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Planned Parenthood Fed'n ofAmerica v. Bucci, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, 42 USPQ2d
1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) af!'d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 90 (1998).
The court held that by registering Planned Parenthood.com as a domain name and then using
it as a website to promote anti-abortion literature constituted trademark dilution and unfair
competition.
Playboy Enters, Inc. v. Welles, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal 1997), af!'d without op., 162
F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1998). Use of a third party's trademark in metatags does not always
constitute trademark infringement, but see, Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Int'l, Inc., No.
Civ. A. 97-734-A, 1998 WL 724000, at *3, *6-*7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10,1998).
Niton Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998), The
use ofmetatags to divert a competitor's customers may constitutive infringement.
Brookfield Communications, Inc., West Coast Entertainment Corporation, 174 F.3d 1036
(9th Cir. 1999). Defendant's use of plaintiffs "MovieBuff' mark or "moviebuf.com" in
buried code or metatags on its World Wide Web site will result in initial interest confusion.
Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corporation, 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002). Defendant's
use of plaintiffs trademark on its own web site and in metatags to attract customers will
result in initial interest confusion.
Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1090
(C.D. Cal. 1999). Playboy failed to obtain a preliminary injunction on the basis that
defendant Internet service providers cause "initial interest confusion" with plaintiffs
"Playboy" and "Playmate" trademarks by selling "banner advertisements" that respond to
words "playboy" and "playmate" as search terms. Case is currently on appeal to the 9th
Circuit.
Hasbro Inc. v. Clue Computing Inc. 994 F. Supp. 34, (D. Mass. 1997), affd 232 F.3d 1 (1 st
Cir. 2000) Plaintiffs "Clue" mark, for murder mystery board game, is a strong mark.
However, Plaintiff has failed to establish that its "Clue" mark, for murder mystery board
game, is "famous" within meaning of Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. Section
1125(c).
The Network Network v. CBS, Inc., 2000 WL 362016, 54 USPQ2d 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
Registration of TNN.com did not violate CBS' rights in its 1987 federal trademark
registration of TNN. The test for dilution requires that a mark must be famous at the time the
defendant adopts its mark.
Estee Lauder Inc. v. Fragrance Counter, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14825,52 USPQ2d 1786,
No. 99-CV-382 (S.D.N.Y.). Does defendants' purchase of keywords "Clinique," "Estee
Lauder" and "Origins" from the Excite and Webcrawler search engines violate trademark,
dilution or unfair competition law? Case was settled.
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Sporty's Farm v Sportsman's Market, 202 F.3d 489, (2d Cir. 2000). Registration of domain
name "sportys.com" for primary purpose of keeping trademark owner from using that name,
and defendants' creating an unrelated business violates ACPA.
Lucent Technologies Inc. v. lucentsucks.com 95 F. SUppa 2d 528 (E.D. Va. 2000), Plaintiffs
waiting period of eight days between sending notice of intent to proceed in rem and filing of
in rem action did not satisfy jurisdictional requirements for in rem action under Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act.
Barcelona.com Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona 63 USPQ2d 1189 (E.D. Va.
2002), Appeal from decision of UDRP panel is de novo and finding of panel is not binding
on federal district court.
America Online Inc. v. Huang 106 F. SUppa 2d 848, 855-60 (E.D. Va. 2000). Domain name
registration agreements between defendant and domain name registrar are not sufficient
contacts with Virginia for purposes ofpersonal jurisdiction over defendant.
Ford Motor Co. v. Ford Financial Solutions Inc., 103 F. SUppa 2d 1126 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
Defendant's use of mark "Ford Financial Solutions" and domain name
"fordfinancialsolutions.com" infringes plaintiffs "Ford" name and trademarks.
Bancroft & Masters Inc. v. Augusta National, Inc. 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). U.S.
District Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Georgia defendant in action in which
plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment establishing its right to use "masters.com" domain name.
Bird v. Parsons, 62 USPQ2d 1905,2002 FED App. 0177P (6th Cir. 2002) . Affirmed District
Court holding that Washington state operator of domain name registry and domain name
auction site is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio or subject to ACPA for offering to
sell domain names on its web-site.
Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. technodome.com, 106 F. SUppa 2d 860, 865-66 (E.D. Va. 2000).
Plaintiff filing in rem complaint against domain name bears burden of demonstrating due
diligence in trying to establish personal jurisdiction over potential defendant.
Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. SUppa 2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000), ajf'd No. 00-2236 (3rd Cir. 2001).
Plaintiffs "Joe Cartoon" mark is distinctive and famous, and therefore is entitled to
protection under ACPA. Defendant acted with bad faith intent to profit from plaintiffs "Joe
Cartoon" mark in registering domain names that are confusingly similar to plaintiffs
')oecartoon.com".
Electronics Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15719, 56
USPQ2d 1705 (E.D. Pa. 2000). Defendant's "typosquattings" are confusingly similar to
plaintiffs famous "Electronics Boutique" marks, since profitability of defendant's enterprise
depends on Internet users' misspellings which sends them instead to defendant's Web site
where each click on advertisement results in remuneration for defendant.
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OBH Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176,190 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). Defendants'
use of "thebuffalonews.com" domain name constitutes use of trademark "in commerce" and
in connection with distribution or advertising of goods or services within meaning ofLanham
Act.
Porsche Cars North America Inc. v. Spencer, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7060, 55 USPQ2d 1026
(E.D.Cal. 2000). "Porsche" mark for automobiles is "famous" mark entitled to protection
under ACPA.
BigStar Entertainment Inc. v. Next Big Star Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Doctrine of "initial interest confusion" does not apply to claim that consumer searching for
plaintiffs "bigstar.com" may be drawn instead to defendants' "nextbigstar.com" site, since
there is no allegation that defendants have used "bigstar" or "bigstar.com" in metatags to
divert customers.
Broadbridge Media v. Hypered, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Complainant does not
waive right to proceed in federal district court by filing UDRP domain name dispute
complaint.
Weber-Stephen Products Co. v. Armitage Hardware and Building Supply Inc., 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6335, 54 USPQ2d 1766 (N. Ill. 2000). UDRP panel decision is not binding on
federal district court.
Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d 420 (E. D. Va. 2000). Bad
faith intent to profit is necessary element of in rem action under ACPA.
eBay Inc. v. Bidder's Edge Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). Plaintiff on-line
auction site is likely to prevail on merits of its claim that defendant auction aggregator's use
of automated querying programs to access plaintiffs computer systems constituted trespass.
Northern Light Technology, Inc., V. Northern Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Mass.
2000), affd 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001). Individual non-resident defendant in trademark
action is not entitled to immunity from service ofprocess in forum state.
Lucent Technologies Inc. v. Johnson, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16002,56 USPQ2d 1637 (C. D.
Cal. 2000). Claim that registration and use of "lucentsucks.com" domain name is entitled to
First Amendment protection from cybersquatting claim, on ground that
"yourcompanynamesucks" domain names, as group, merit application of First Amendment
"safe harbor" defense, may not be decide on motion to dismiss.
MatteI Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9747, 55 USPQ2d 1620
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), "Barbie" fashion doll and logo are "distinctive" and "famous" for purposes
ofACPA.
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Virtual Works Inc. v. Volkswagen ofAmerica Inc., 238 F.3d 264 (CA 4 2001). Evidence
shows defendant registered "vw.net" domain name with bad faith intent to profit from
protected "VW" trademark, even though defendant used "vw.net"for two years as part of
Internet service provider business.
Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace. com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502,504 (E.D. Va. 2000) The
in rem provision of the ACPA is constitutional.
Fleetboston Financial Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Mass.
2001). Court will not pennit an in rem jurisdiction action to be brought in Massachusetts on
the basis of the plaintiff filing suit and asking the domain name Registrar, located outside of
Massachusetts, to deposit the res in that jurisdiction.
MatteI Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5262, 58 USPQ2d 1798 (S.D.N.Y
2001) There is no basis to bring an in rem action in New York if there was no connection
with the res.
Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d. 648 (N.D. Tex. 2001), the court
held that Congress did not intend to make domain name registries liable under §43(d) for
infringing domain name registrations, absent a showing ofbad faith registration.
Parisi v. Netlearning' Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1050 (E.D. Va. 2001), the court held that the
mandatory administrative proceedings conducted under UDRP are not an "arbitration"
subject to the Federal Arbitration Act.
Nike, Inc. v. Crystal International, WIPO UDRP No. D2002-0352 (July 2002), a single
UDRP panelist from Canada finds that there was no evidence of "bad faith", even though the
owner of nikegolf.net and 4 other variations of Nike - had been previously found liable for
cyberpiracy ofNIKE trademarks in a UDRP action.
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xv. Laws and Regulations Governing Domain Names
A. Unifonn Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP")
(As Approved by ICANN on October 24,1999)
1. Purpose. This Unifonn Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") has been
adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), is
incorporated by reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the tenns and
conditions in connection with a dispute between you and any party other than us (the
registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet domain name registered by you.
Proceedings under Paragraph 4 of this Policy will be conducted according to the Rules for
Unifonn Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules of Procedure"), which are
available at www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-240ct99.htm. and the selected administrative-
dispute-resolution service provider's supplemental rules.
2. Your Representations. By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to
maintain or renew a domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that
(a) the statements that you made in your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate;
(b) to your knowledge, the registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or
otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not registering the domain name
for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name in violation of
any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to detennine whether your
domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights.
3. Cancellations, Transfers, and Changes. We will cancel, transfer or otherwise make
changes to domain name registrations under the following circumstances:
a. subject to the provisions of Paragraph 8, our receipt of written or appropriate
electronic instructions from you or your authorized agent to take such action;
b. our receipt of an order from a court or arbitral tribunal, in each case of competent
jurisdiction, requiring such action; and/or
c. our receipt of a decision of an Administrative Panel requiring such action in any
administrative proceeding to which you were a party and which was conducted under this
Policy or a later version of this Policy adopted by ICANN. (See Paragraph 4(i) and (k)
below.)
We may also cancel, transfer or otherwise make changes to a domain name registration in
accordance with the tenns ofyour Registration Agreement or other legal requirements.
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4. Mandatory Administrative Proceeding.
This Paragraph sets forth the type of disputes for which you are required to submit to a
mandatory administrative proceeding. These proceedings will be conducted before one of the
administrative-dispute-resolution service providers listed at www.icann.org/udrp/approved-
providers.htm (each, a "Provider").
a. Applicable Disputes. You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative
proceeding in the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable
Provider, in compliance with the Rules ofProcedure, that
(i) your domain name is identical or .confusingly similar· to a trademark or service
mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and
(iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
(iv) In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of these
three elements are present.
b. Evidence of Registration and Use in Bad Faith. For the purposes of
Paragraph 4(a)(iii), the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if
found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain
name in bad faith:
(i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the
domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring
the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or
service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in
excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain name;
or .
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the
trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name,
provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the
business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to attract, for
commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating
a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship,
affiliation, or endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on
your web site or location.
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c. How to Demonstrate Your Rights to and Legitimate Interests in the Domain Name in
Responding to a Complaint. When you receive a complaint, you should refer to
Paragraph 5 of the Rules of Procedure in detennining how your response should be
prepared. Any of the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if
found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence presented, shall
demonstrate your rights or legitimate interests to the domain name for purposes of
Paragraph 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable preparations
to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection
with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or
(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been commonly
known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no trademark or service mark
rights; or
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the domain name,
without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the
trademark or service mark at issue.
d. Selection of Provider. The complainant shall select the Provider from among those
approved by ICANN by submitting the complaint to that Provider. The selected Provider
will administer the proceeding, except in cases of consolidation as described in Paragraph
4(f).
e. Initiation of Proceeding and Process and Appointment of Administrative Panel. The
Rules of Procedure state the process for initiating and conducting a proceeding and for
appointing the panel that will decide the dispute (the "Administrative Panel").
f. Consolidation. In the event of multiple disputes between you and a complainant, either
you or the complainant may petition to consolidate the disputes before a single
Administrative Panel. This petition shall be made to the first Administrative Panel
appointed to hear a pending dispute between the parties. This Administrative Panel may
consolidate before it any or all such disputes in its sole discretion, provided that the
disputes being consolidated are governed by this Policy or a later version of this Policy
adopted by ICANN.
g. Fees. All fees charged by a Provider in connection with any dispute before an
Administrative Panel pursuant to this Policy shall be paid by the complainant, except in
cases where you elect to expand the Administrative Panel from one to three panelists as
provided in Paragraph 5(b)(iv) of the Rules of Procedure, in which case all fees will be
split evenly by you and the complainant.
h. Our Involvement in Administrative Proceedings. We do not, and will not, participate
in the administration or conduct of any proceeding before an Administrative Panel. In
addition, we will not be liable as a result of any decisions rendered by the Administrative
Panel.
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i. Remedies. The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any proceeding before
an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain
name or the transfer ofyour domain name registration to the complainant.
j. Notification and Publication. The Provider shall notify us of any decision made by an
Administrative Panel with respect to a domain name you have registered with us. All
decisions under this Policy will be published in full over the Internet, except when an
Administrative Panel determines in an exceptional case to redact portions of its decision.
k. Availability of Court Proceedings. The mandatory administrative proceeding
requirements set forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you or the complainant from
submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution
before such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding
is concluded. If an Administrative Panel decides that your domain name registration
should be canceled or transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the
location of our principal office) after we are informed by the applicable Provider of the
Administrative Panel's decision before implementing that decision. We will then
implement the decision unless we have received from you during that ten (10) business
day period official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, file-stamped by the
clerk of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the complainant in a
jurisdiction to which the complainant has submitted under Paragraph 3(b)(xiii) of the
Rules of Procedure. (In general, that jurisdiction is either the location of our principal
office or of your address as shown in our Whois database. See Paragraphs 1 and 3(b)(xiii)
of the Rules of Procedure for details.) If we receive such documentation within the ten
(10) business day period, we will not implement the Administrative Panel's decision, and
we will take no further action, until we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a
resolution between the parties; (ii) evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been
dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of an order from such court dismissing your
lawsuit or ordering that you do not have the right to continue to use your domain name.
5. All Other Disputes and Litigation. All other disputes between you and any party other
than us regarding your domain name registration that are not brought pursuant to the
mandatory administrative proceeding provisions of Paragraph 4 shall be resolved between
you and such other party through any court, arbitration or other proceeding that may be
available.
6. Our Involvement in Disputes. We will not participate in any way in any dispute between
you and any party other than us regarding the registration and use of your domain name. You
shall not name us as a party or otherwise include us in any such proceeding. In the event that
we are named as a party in any such proceeding, we reserve the right to raise any and all
defenses deemed appropriate, and to take any other action necessary to defend ourselves.
7. Maintaining the Status Quo. We will not cancel, transfer, activate, deactivate, or
otherwise change the status of any domain name registration under this Policy except s
provided in Paragraph 3 above.
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8. Transfers During a Dispute.
a. Transfers of a Domain Name to a New Holder. You may not transfer your domain
name registration to another holder (i) during a pending administrative proceeding
brought pursuant to Paragraph 4 or for a period of fifteen (15) business days (as observed
in the location of our principal place of business) after such proceeding is concluded; or
(ii) during a pending court proceeding or arbitration commenced regarding your domain
name unless .the party to whom the domain name registration is being transferred agrees,
in writing, to be bound by the decision of the court or arbitrator. We reserve the right to
cancel any transfer of a domain name registration to another holder that is made in
violation of this subparagraph.
b. Changing Registrars. You may not transfer your domain name registration to another
registrar during a pending administrative proceeding brought pursuant to Paragraph 4 or
for a period of fifteen (15) business days (as observed in the location of our principal
place of business) after such proceeding is concluded. You may transfer administration of
your domain name registration to another registrar during a pending court action or
arbitration, provided that the domain name you have registered with us shall continue 'to
be subject to the proceedings commenced against you in accordance with the terms of
this Policy. In the event that you transfer a domain name registration to us during the
pendency of a court action or arbitration, such dispute shall remain subject to the domain
name dispute policy of the registrar from which the domain name registration was
transferred.
9. Policy Modifications. We reserve the right to modify this Policy at any time with the
permission of ICANN. We will post our revised Policy at <URL> at least thirty (30) calendar
days before it becomes effective. Unless this Policy has already been invoked by the
submission of a complaint to a Provider, in which event the version of the Policy in effect at
the time it was invoked will apply to you until the dispute is over, all such changes will be
binding upon you with respect to any domain name registration dispute, whether the dispute
arose before, on or after the effective date of our change. In the event that you object to a
change in this Policy, your sole remedy is to cancel your domain name registration with us,
provided that you will not be entitled to a refund of any fees you paid to us. The revised
Policy will apply to you until you cancel your domain name registration.
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B. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1125(d))
TITLE ill--TRADEMARK CYBERPIRACY PREVENTION
TITLE 111--TRADEMARK CYBERPIRACY PREVENTION
SEC. 3001. SHORT TITLE; REFERENCES.
(a) SHORT TITLE- This title may be cited as the 'Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act'.
(b) REFERENCES TO THE TRADEMARK ACT OF 1946- Any reference in this
title to the Trademark Act of 1946 shall be a reference to the Act entitled 'An Act to provide
for the registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the
provisions of certain international conventions, and for other purposes', approved July 5,
1946 (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.).
SEC. 3002. CYBERPIRACY PREVENTION.
(a) IN GENERAL- Section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1125) is!
amended by inserting at the end the fol~owing:
'(d)(l)(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark, including
a personal name which is protected as a mark under this section, if, without regard to the
goods or services of the parties, that person--
'(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark, including a personal name
which is protected as a mark under this section; and
'(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that--
'(I) in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of
the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark;
'(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or dilutive of that
mark; or
'(ill) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of section 706
of title 18, United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36, United States Code.
'(B)(i) In determining whether a person has a bad faith intent described under
subparagraph (A), a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to--
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'(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if
any, in the domain name;
'(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person;
'(ill) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection
with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
'(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in
a site accessible under the domain name;
'(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's
online location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill
represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage
the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of the site;
'(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used, or
having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or services,
or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
'(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact
information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the person's intentional
failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person's prior conduct indicating a
pattern of such conduct;
'(Vill) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain
names which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of others that are
distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of famous marks of
others that are famous at the time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the
goods or services of the parties; and
'(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of subsection (c)(l)
of section 43.
'(ii) Bad faith intent described under subparagraph (A) shall not be found in
any case in which the court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds
to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful.
'(C) In any civil action involving the registration, trafficking, or use of a domain
name under this paragraph, a court may order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain
name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.
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'(D) A person shall be liable for using a domain name under subparagraph (A) only if
that person is the domain name registrant or that registrant's authorized licensee.
'(E) As used in this paragraph, the term 'traffics in' refers to transactions that include,
but are not limited to, sales, purchases, loans, pledges, licenses, exchanges of currency, and
any other transfer for consideration or receipt in exchange for consideration.
'(2)(A) The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in
the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other
domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located if--
'(i) the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) or (c); and
'(ii) the court finds that the owner--
(I) is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over a person who
would have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1); or
(IT) through due diligence was not able to find a person who would
have been a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by--
(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to
proceed under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail
address provided by the registrant to the registrar; and
(bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct
promptly after·filing the action.
(B) The actions under subparagraph (A)(ii) shall constitute service ofprocess.
(C) In an in rem action under this paragraph, a domain name shall be deemed to have
its situs in the judicial district in which--
(i) the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority that
registered r assigned the domain name is located; or
(ii) documents sufficient to estab~ish control and authority regarding the
disposition of the registration and use of the domain name are deposited with the court.
(D)(i) The remedies in an in rem action under this paragraph shall be limited
to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer of the
domain name to the owner of the mark. Upon receipt of written notification of a filed,
stamped copy of a complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a United States district court
under this paragraph, the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain
name authority shall--
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(I) expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to
establish the court's control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use
of the domain name to the court; and
(II) not transfer, suspend, or otherwise modify the domain name during
the pendency of the action, except upon order of the court.
(ii) The domain name registrar or registry or other domain name authority
shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary relief under this paragraph except in the case of
bad faith or reckless disregard, which includes a willful failure to comply with any such court
order.
(3) The civil action established under paragraph (1) and the in rem action established
under paragraph (2), and any remedy available under either such action, shall be in addition
to any other civil action or remedy otherwise applicable.
(4) The in rem jurisdiction established under paragraph (2) shall be in addition to any
other jurisdiction that otherwise exists, whether in rem or in personam. ' .
(b) CYBERPIRACY PROTECTIONS FOR INDNIDUALS-
(1) IN GENERAL-
(A) CNIL LIABILITY- Any person who registers a domain name that
consists of the name of another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar
thereto, without that person's consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by
selling the domain name for financial gain to that person or any third party, shall be liable in
a civil action by such person.
(B) EXCEPTION- A person who in good faith registers a domain name
consisting of the name of another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly
similar thereto, shall not be liable under this paragraph if such name is used in, affiliated
with, or related to a work of authorship protected under title 17, United States Code,
including a work made for hire as defined in section 101 of title 17, United States Code, and
if the person registering the domain name is the copyright owner or licensee of the work, the
person intends to sell the domain name in conjunction with the lawful exploitation of the
work, and such registration is not prohibited by a contract between the registrant and the
named person. The exception under this subparagraph shall apply only to a civil action
brought under paragraph (1) and shall in no manner limit the protections afforded under the
Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.) or other provision ofFederal or State law.
(2) REMEDIES- In any civil action brought under paragraph (1), a court may
award injunctive relief, including the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the
transfer of the domain name to the plaintiff. The court may also, in its discretion, award costs
and attorneys fees to the prevailing party.
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(3) DEFINITION- In this subsection, the term 'domain name' has the
meaning given that term in section 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1127).
(4) EFFECTIVE DATE- This subsection shall apply to domain names
registered on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 3003. DAMAGES AND REMEDIES.
(a) REMEDIES IN CASES OF DOMAIN NAME PIRACY-
(1) INJUNCTIONS- Section 34(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C.
1116(a)) is amended in the first sentence by striking '(a) or (c)' and inserting '(a), (c), or (d)'.
(2) DAMAGES- Section 35(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C.
1117(a)) is amended in the first sentence by inserting, '(c), or (d)' after 'section 43(a)'.
(b) STATUTORY DAMAGES- Section 35 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C.
1117) is amended by adding at the end the following:
'(d) In a case involving a violation of section 43(d)(l), the plaintiff,may elect,
at any time before final judgment is rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual
damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in the amount of not less than $1,000
and not more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.
SEC. 3004. LIMITATION ON LIABILITY.
Section 32(2) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1114) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking 'under section 43(a)'
and inserting 'under section 43(a) or (d)'; and
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E) and inserting after
subparagraph (C) the following:
'(D)(i)(I) A domain name registrar, a domain name registry, or other
domain name registration authority that takes any action described under clause (ii) effecting
a domain name shall not be liable for monetary relief or, except as provided in subclause (II),
for injunctive relief, to any person for such action, regardless of whether the domain name is
finally determined to infringe or dilute the mark.
'(II) A domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain
name registration authority described in subclause (I) may be subject to injunctive relief only
if such registrar, registry, or other registration authority has--
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'(aa) not expeditiously deposited with a court, in which an action has
been filed regarding the disposition of the domain name, documents sufficient for the court to
establish the court's control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use
of the domain name;
'ebb) transferred, suspended, or otherwise modified the domain name
during the pendency of the action, except upon order of the court; or
'(cc) willfully failed to comply with any such court order.
(ii) An action referred to under clause (i)(I) is any action of refusing to
register, removing from registration, transferring, temporarily disabling, or pennanently
canceling a domain name--
'(I) in compliance with a court order under section 43(d); or
'(II) in the implementation of a reasonable policy by such registrar,
registry, or authority prohibiting, the registration of a domain name that is identical to,
confusingly similar to, or dilutive of another's mark.
'(iii) A domain name registrar, a domain name registry, or other domain name
registration authority shall not be liable for damages under this section for the registration or
maintenance of a domain name for another absent a showing ofbad faith intent to profit from
such registration or maintenance of the domain name.
'(iv) If a registrar, registry, or other registration authority takes an action
described under clause (ii) based on a knowing and material misrepresentation by any other
person that a domain name is identical to, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a mark, the
person making the knowing and material misrepresentation shall be liable for any damages,
including costs and attorney's fees, incurred by the domain name registrant as a result of such
action. The court may also grant injunctive relief to the domain name registrant, including the
reactivation of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the domain name
registrant.
'(v) A domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended,
disabled, or transferred under a policy described under clause (ii)(II) may, upon notice to the
mark owner, file a civil action to establish that the registration or use of the domain name by
such registrant is not unlawful under this Act. The court may grant injunctive relief to the
domain name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or transfer of the
domain name to the domain name registrant. ' .
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SEC. 3005. DEFINITIONS.
Section 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1127) is amended by inserting
after the undesignated paragraph defining the term 'counterfeit' the following:
The term 'domain name' means any alphanumeric designation which is registered
with or assigned by any domain name registrar,. domain name registry, or other domain name
registration authority as part of an electronic address on the Internet.
'The term 'Internet' has the meaning given that term in section 230(f)(1) of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(f)(1)).'
SEC. 3006. STUDY ON ABUSIVE DOMAIN NAME REGISTRATIONS INVOLVING
PERSONAL NAMES.
(a) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Patent and Trademark Office and the
Federal Election Commission, shall conduct a study and report to Congress with
recommendations on guidelines and procedures for resolving disputes involving the
registration or use by a person of a domain name that includes the personal name of another
person, in whole or in part, or a name confusingly similar thereto, including consideration of
and recommendations for--
(1) protecting personal names from registration by another person as a second
level domain name for purposes of selling or otherwise transferring such domain name to
such other person or any third party for financial gain;
(2) protecting individuals from bad faith uses of their personal names as
second level domain names by others with malicious intent to harm the reputation of the
individual or the goodwill associated with that individual's name;
(3) protecting consumers from the registration and use of domain names that
include personal names in the second level domain in manners which are intended or are
likely to confuse or deceive the public as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the
domain name registrant, or a site accessible under the domain name, with such other person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods, services, or commercial activities
of the domain name registrant;
(4) protecting the public from registration of domain names that include the
personal names of government officials, official candidates, and potential official candidates
for Federal, State, or local political office in the United States, and the use of such domain
names in a manner that disrupts the electoral process or the public's ability to access accurate
and reliable information regarding such individuals;
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(5) existing remedies, whether under State law or otherwise, and the extent to
which such remedies are sufficient to address the considerations described in paragraphs (1)
through (4); and
(6) the guidelines, procedures, and policies of the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers and the extent to which they address the considerations
described in paragraphs (1) through (4).
(b) GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES- The Secretary of Commerce shall, under
its Memorandum of Understanding with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers, collaborate to develop guidelines and procedures for resolving disputes involving
the registration or use by a person of a domain name that includes the personal name of
another person, in whole or in part, or a name confusingly similar thereto.
SEC. 3007. HISTORIC PRESERVATION.
Section IOI(a)(I)(A) of the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C.
470a(a)(I)(A)) is amended by adding at the end the following: 'Notwithstanding section
43(c) of the Act entitled 'An Act to provide for the registration and protection of trademarks
used in commerce, to carry out the provisions of certain international conventions, and for
other purposes', approved July 5, 1946 (commonly known as the 'Trademark Act of 1946'
(15 U.S.C. II25(c)), buildings and structures on or eligible for inclusion on the National
Register of Historic Places (either individually or as part of a historic district), or designated
as an individual landmark or as a contributing building in a historic district by a unit of State
or local government, may retain the name historically associated with the building or
structure' .
SEC. 3008. SAVINGS CLAUSE.
Nothing in this title shall affect any defense available to a defendant under the
Trademark Act of 1946 (including any defense under section 43(c)(4) of such Act or relating
to fair use) or a person's right of free speech or expression under the first amendment of the
United States Constitution.
SEC. 3009. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
Chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is amended as follows:
(1) Section 1338 of title 28, United States Codes, is amended--
(A) in the section heading by striking 'trade-marks' and inserting
'trademarks' ;
(B) In subsection (a) by striking 'trade-marks' and inserting
'trademarks'; and
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(C) In subsection (b) by striking 'trade-mark' and inserting
'trademark' .
(2) The item relating to section 1338 in the table of sections for chapter 85 of
title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking 'trade-marks' and inserting 'trademarks'.
SEC. 3010. EFFECTIVE DATE.
Sections 3002(a), 3003, 3004, 3005, and 3008 of this title shall apply to all domain
names registered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of thi~ Act, except that
damages under subsection (a) or (d) of section 35 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C.
1117), as amended by section3003 of this title, shall not be available with respect to the
registration, trafficking, or use of a domain name that occurs before the date of the enactment
of this Act.
L-24
WIPO Domain Name Oipsute: Case 02002-0352 http://arbiter.wipojnt/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0352.hbnl
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center
ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION
Nike, Inc. v. Crystal International
Case No. 02002-0352
1. The Parties
1.1 The Complainant is Nike, Inc., an Oregon Corporation with its principal place of business in Beaverton,
Oregon, United States of America.
1.2 The Respondent is Crystal International located at RM609 HyoCunB/D Seo Cho Dong, 1425-10 Seo
Cho Ku, Seoul, Republic of Korea. .
2. The Domain Names and Registrar
2.1 The Domain Names at issue are: <nikepark.com>, <nikepark.net>, <nikemen.com>, <nikegolf.net>,
<nikeshops.com>.
2.2 The Domain Names are registered with Tucows, 96 Mowat Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
3. Procedural History
3.1 A Complaint was submitted by the Complainant to the World Intellectual Property Organization
Arbitration and Mediation Center ("the Center") on April 15, 2002 in hard copy and on April 19, 2002, by
email. The Center sent an Acknowledgement of Receipt of Complaint to the Complainant on
April 16, 2002. The Complainant paid the required fee.
3.2 On April 18, 2002 the Center sent Request for Registrar Verification to the Registrar requesting
verification of registration data. The Registrar confirmed, inter alia, that it is the Registrar of the Domain
Names and that the Domain Names are registered in the Respondent's name.
3.3 The Center verified that the Complaint satisfies the formal requirements of the ICANN Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy"), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (the "Rules"), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy (the "Supplemental Rules").
1 of 10
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3.4 On April 22, 2002, the Center sent a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative
Proceeding to the Respondent together with copies of the Complaint, with a copy to the Complainant. This
notification was sent by the methods required under Paragraph 2(a) of the Rules.
3.5 On May 17. 2002 the Center sent a Notification of Respondent default as no Response was submitted.
3.6 On June 6, 2002 the Center received a completed and signed Statement of Acceptance and
Declaration of Impartiality and Independence from Cecil 0.0. Branson, Q.C. (the "Sole Panelist"). The
Center notified the parties of the appointment of a single-member Panel consisting of the Sole Panelist.
3.7 The Sole Panelist finds that the Panel was properly constituted and appointed in accordance with the
Rules and WIPO Supplemental Rules.
4. Factual Background
4.1 Complainant, Nike Inc. is a leading sports and fitness company, designing, manufacturing and
marketing a broad range of footwear, apparel and equipment. It operates a variety of retail shops
throughout the world, maintains an active presence on the Internet, primarily through its <nike.com>
website where it promotes and sells its goods and services and provides information about its business
activities.
4.2 Complainant asserts that it owns numerous trademark registrations worldwide for its NIKE trademark,
including United States Registrations nos. 978,952, 1,153,938, 1,243,248, 1,277,066 and 1,214,930
covering a broad range of goods and services. The Complainant also says it owns a French trademark
registration for the mark NIKE PARK in connection with apparel, entertainment and retail services (Serial
No. 98 716 571), and that it owns numerous registrations for the mark NIKE GOLF, including United States
Registration No. 1944436 (Classes 18 and 25; bags, footwear and clothing); Mexican Registration Nos.
443269 (Class 18, bags), 435128 (Class 25; footwear, clothing and headwear); Canadian Registration
Nos. 482728 (bags, footwear, clothing, headwear); and United Kingdom Registration No. 2039330
(clothing and footwear). Copies of the trademark registrations mentioned above were exhibited to the
Complaint. While all the U.S. trademarks mentioned are registered to Nike, Inc., this does not appear to be
the case with the Mexican, French, and United Kingdom marks where the trademark owner in each case is
shown as Nike International Ltd., a Bermuda corporation.
5. Parties' Contentions
A. Complainant
5.1 Complainant says that the Respondent appears to have registered the Domain Names at issue on the
following dates: <nikepark.com> July 4, 1999; <nikepark.net> July 4, 1999; <nikemen.com> July 17, 1999:
<nikegolf.net> July 9, 1999; <nikeshops.com> February 16, 2002.
5.2 The Complainant argues the first element of paragraph 4(a) of the Policy, solely on the basis of
confusing similarity. In doing so, it stresses that the Respondent's Domain Names each contain, as their
central and most distinctive element, Complainant's registered and world famous NIKE trademark to
which, in each instance, are added terms, each of which is readily associated with Complainant's products,
services, and/or business, and which sometimes combine to form an additional trademark of Complainant.
5.3 With regard to the rights or legitimate interests of the Respondent, the Complainant asserts that there
is no discernible legitimate interest in the "Nike" designation, and it does not appear that the Respondent
has ever been commonly known by the "Nike". "Nike Park", "Nike Golf', "Nike Men", or "Nike Shops"
designation. Further, the Complainant asserts that Respondent has never used a trademark or service
mark similar thereto by which it may have come to be known and that any such use by Respondent would
likely have constituted legally actionable infringement and dilution of Complainant's world famous
2oflO
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trademark, nor has Respondent made use of the Domain Names in connection with any business or
non-commercial use of the Domain Names. The Complainant concludes that it is far more likely that
Respondent is but one of many "cybersquatters" seeking to profit from Complainant's world famous
trademark.
5.4 That part of the Complainant's submission in the Complaint directed specifically to the element of bad
faith registration and use is set out, verbatim, below.
"1. Respondent registered the domain names in bad faith, since he knew at the time of the fame and
Complainant's ownership of its NIKE trademark [sic}. Respondent could readily foresee that people would
assume the domain names to be connected with Complainant, that the public would seek out this sites
[sic} in the hope of finding Complainant's site, and that Complainant would therefore wish to own and use
it.
2. Moreover, Respondent's use and registration of these domain names has prevented Complainant from
using its own world-famous trademark in these domain names. This conduct constitutes bad faith
registration and use of the domain names under controlling law and precedent.
3. Lastly, Complainant has previously taken action against Respondent to recover domain names
Respondent has appropriated. See Nike, Inc. v. Crystal International, (WIPO Case No. 02001-0102)
(returning domain names nikewomen.com, nikeshop.net, nikeshop..org, nike-shop.com, nike-shop..net, and
inike.net to Complainant.) Respondent has demonstrated a pattern of behavior in incorporating
Complainant's trademarks in its domain names in bad faith."
B. Respondent
5.5 Respondent has failed to respond to Complainant's contentions as found in the Complaint.
c. No Other Submissions
5..6 The Panel has not received any other requests from Complainant or Respondent regarding further
submissions, waivers or extensions of deadlines, and the Panel has not found it necessary to request any
further information from the Parties (taking note of the Respondent's default in responding to the
Complaint).
6. Procedural Order
6.1 The form and content of the Complaint prompted this Panel to issue a Procedural Order, a copy of
which is annexed to this decision. Complainant's Response to the Procedural Order filled in some of the
gaps which had been identified in the Complaint, including the relationship between the named
Complainant and NIKE International Ltd., the discrepancy in the different contact information given for the
Respondent in the Complaint, and the reason for the Complainant not seeking the transfer of the Domain
Names in this case at the same time as those in WIPO Case No. 02001-0102 between the same parties-
the Complainant says that it was not then aware of them.
6.2 Other aspects of the Complainant's Response to the Procedural Order are set out later in this decision.
7. Discussion and Findings
7.1 The Complaint was submitted on the basis of the provisions of the Registration Agreement in effect
between the Respondent and NSI. which incorporates, by reference, the Policy by way of NSl's domain
name dispute policy in effect at the time of the dispute. The Policy requires that domain name registrants
such as Respondent submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding regarding third-party allegations of
30£10
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abuse of domain name registration (Policy, paragraph 4(a».
7.2 The Panel is satisfied that WIPO took all steps reasonably necessary to notify the Respondent of the
filing of the Complaint and initiation of these proceedings, and that the failure of the Respondent to furnish
a reply or participate in any other fashion is not due to any omission by WIPO (see Procedural History,
above).
7.3 Under Rule 5(e) of the Rules, if a Respondent does not submit a Response, in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, the Panel shall decide the dispute based upon the Complaint.
Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules addresses the principles to be used in rendering a decision:
"A Panel shall decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in
accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable."
It has been said that inferences ought not to be drawn from the default of a Respondent in filing a
Response other than those that have been established or can be inferred from the facts presented by the
Complainant and that, as a result of the default, have not been rebutted by any contrary assertions of
evidence. See: Terabeam Corp. v. Colin Goldman, WIPO Case No. 02001-0697. Evidence, not mere
assertions, must be presented even in the case of a Response not being filed. This is in accord with those
Rules material to this issue. Rule 5(e), in requiring that the decision be "based upon the Complaint" in the
absence of a Response, must mean a Complaint which complies with Rule 3(b)(ix) which requires that a
Complaint shall "[d]escribe, in accordance with the Policy, the grounds on which the complaint is made
including, in particular, ... (3) why the domain name(s) should be considered as having been registered
and being used in bad faith". The provision in question goes on to advise the Complainant that the
description should, for the bad faith elements, "discuss any aspects of Paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c) of the
Policy that are applicable." This I take to mean, as the circumstances set out in 4(b) are not exclusive, that
any aspects of the particular circumstances being relied on to prove these elements in the subject case
should be discussed. No such meaningful discussion can take place in a proceeding such as this without
consideration of the admissible evidence led in support of the elements which are being advanced. That
evidence is required ;s clear from the general power given to Panels in para. 1O(d) which mandates us to
"determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence." Complaints are determined
on the basis of the evidence the parties themselves choose to put before the Panelist. It is not an
inquisitorial system and therefore not for the Panel to undertake such a role. See: Randgold Resources
Limited and Randgold &Exploration Co.Ltd. v. Pica Capital Corp., WIPO Case No. 02001-1108; Ascendes
Corporation dba MarketTouch v. Market Touch Limited, WIPO Case No. 02001-1186. I have, therefore,
not conducted a search of the web-sites to which the Domain Names in question resolve. To require
Panels to conduct extensive searches of their own will likely result in a breach of Rule 10(b) which
mandates that "the Panel shall ensure that the Parties are treated with equality and that each Party is
given °a fair opportunity to present its case." Also, the material time for identifying whether anything is
posted on the web-site in question is not after the proceedings have been commenced.
In order to obtain the relief requested under the Policy, Complainant must prove in the Administrative
Proceeding that each of the three elements of paragraph 4(a) are present:
(i) that the Domain Name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; and
7.4 The Panel finds that this element has been proved.
(ii) that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Domain Name; and
7.5 Due to my findings about the third element, the Panel need not address this.
(iii) that the Domain Name has been registered and is being used in bad faith
7.61 will focus on bad faith use in dealing with this element and will assume that bad faith registration has
40fl0
L-28
8/14/2002 10:05 AM
WIPO Domain Name Dipsute: Case 02002-0352 http://arbiter.wipo.int/domainsldecisionslhtml/2002/d2002-0352.html
been proved. Here, there is no evidence that Respondent has attempted to sell the Domain Names for
profit, has engaged in a pattern of conduct depriving others of the ability to obtain Domain Names
corresponding to their trademarks, is a competitor of Complainant seeking to disrupt its business, or is
using the Domain Name to divert Internet users for commercial gain. Nor is there such conduct as
cyberflying, failing to provide correct or any contact information, not responding to communications which
might reasonably be thought to compel a Response, being disingenuous in his or her assertions, o~ failing
to make any preparations to use the Domain Names over an extended period of time. Lack of bona fide
use on its own is insufficient to establish bad faith, where there is no evidence that Respondent has
participated in such conduct as mentioned above. See: Societe des Produits Nestle S.A. v. Pro Fiducia
Treuhand AG, wiPe Case No. 02001-0916.
In the Complainant's submission number 2 as set out in para. 5.4 above it asserts that "Respondent's use
and registration of these domain names has prevented Complainant from using its own world-famous
trademark in these domain names. This conduct constitutes bad faith registration and use of the domain
names under controlling law and precedent." But, what was this use? There must be something beyond
mere registration and it should be a use at the time of the commencement of the UORP proceedings. It is
the opinion of this Panel that mere continuous ownership is not sufficient. There are a number of cases
involving what could be characterized as well-known or famous names where Complainants failed to
recover a confusingly similar Domain Name for one reason or another, including Koninklijke Philips
Electronics N. V. v. Manageware, WIPO Case No. 02001-0796, MatteI Inc. v. Kim Dong Jin, NAF Case No.
114462, Koninklijke Philips Electronics N. V. v. Relson Limited, WIPO Case No. 02001-0003; and PRL
USA Holdings, Inc. v. Polo, wiPe Case No. 02002-0148. Although a distinguished Panelist has said that
whether a trademark is "well known" or "famous" is outside the mandate of UDRP Panels. (See:
Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Frank Gully, WIPO Case No. 02000-0021). The name "Nike" is not fanciful. She was
the ancient Greek goddess of victory.
In paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Procedural Order this Panel touched upon some of the legal concepts seen
as applicable in proving a UDRP case. I now think it helpful to elaborate upon them as they concern the
bad faith element.
An Administrative Panel must not deal with propositions not asserted. (See The Estate of Gary Jennings
and Joyce O. Service v. Submarine and J. Ross, WIPO Case No. 02001-1042.). It is for the Complainant
to plead the issues and to support them with some arguments and evidence. (Jones Apparel Group, Inc. v.
jonesapparelgroup.com, WIPO Case No. 02001-0719; Chambre de Commerce et d'industrie de Rouen v.
Marcel Stenzel, WIPO Case No. 02001-0348; Club Monaco Corporation v. Charles Gindi, WIPO Case No.
02000-0936; Tyco International Services AG and Tyco International (U.S.) Inc. v. Paul Quinn, WIPO Case
No. 02000-1740; and Arturo Salice S.p.A. v. Paullzzo &Company, WIPO Case No. 02000-0537; Simply
stating the reasons will not normally be sufficient to meet the Complainant's burden of proof. (Ferrari S.p.A
v. Pierangelo Ferrari, wiPe Case No. 02001-1004; PomelJato S.p.A. v. Richard Tonelli, WIPO Case No.
02000-0493; Corneliani F. IIi Claudio e Carlalberto Corneliani S.p.A. v. Corantos s.r.i., WIPO Case No.
02000-0759. Assertions that any use of the Domain Name by another party would likely mislead or
deceive the Complainant's customers, without evidence, is not of much use. (Capt'n Snooze Management
Ply. Ltd. v. Domains 4 Sale, WIPO Case No. 02000-0488).
7.7 The use of the conjunctive "and" in para. 4(a)(iii) of the Policy means that both bad faith registration
and bad faith use must be proven by the Complainant. See: World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc.
v. Michael Bosman, WIPO Case No. 099-0001; Dow Jones & Company, Inc. v. The Hephzibah Intro-Net
Project Limited, WIPO Case No. 02000-0704; The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of
Oxford v. D.R. Seagle, WIPO Case No. 02000-0308; Baby Creysi OfAmerica, Inc., et al v. Asesoria en
Computo Integral, et al WIPO Case No. 02000-0237; British Sky Broadcasting Limited v. Domain
Reservations, WIPO Case No. 02000-0507; Global Media Resources SA v. Sexplanets aka SexPlanets
FreeHosting, WIPO Case No. 02001-1391 «sexplanets.com». The complementary provision under the
STOP Policy reads "has been registered or has been used in bad faith". If "and" meant "or" under the
UDRP, why was "or" used for STOP?
7.8 In Telstra Corporation Ltd v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No. 02002-0003 a distinguished
Panelist held that the concept of a domain name "being used in bad faith" is not limited to positive action;
"inaction is within the concept." He continued as follows:
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"... what circumstances of inaction (passive holding) other than those identified in paragraphs 4(b)(i), (ii)
and (iii) can constitute a domain name being used in bad faith? This question cannot be answered in the
abstract; the question can only be answered in respect of the particular facts of a specific case. That is to
say, in considering whether the passive holding of a domain name, following a bad faith registration of it,
satisfies the requirements of paragraph 4(a)(iii), the Administrative Panel must give close attention to all
the circumstances of the Respondent's behaviour. A remedy can be obtained under the Uniform Policy
only if those circumstances show that the Respondent's passive holding amounts to acting in bad faith."
7.9 Evidence which proves bad faith use comes primarily from three sources. Communications between
the parties, particularly statements made by a Respondent, demonstrate bad faith use. Cease and desist
letters relating to the alleged offending use have been effective in drawing out the Respondent. What is
posted on a web-site, often but not always the site to which the Domain Name resolves, performs the
same function, e.g. where the web-site advertises a competing product, displays pornographic material, or
links to such web-sites. On the other hand, if there was a possible fair use or a disclaimer on the web-site,
the result may be otherwise. Another way of proving bad faith use through evidence is to obtain particulars
about the Respondent and its enterprises, past history, reputation and ownership of other Domain Names,
not the subject of the case at hand. There are other evidentiary indicia such as false contact information,
making untruthful statements in a Response, and the like. In this case, although it had two opportunities to
do so, the Complainant failed to produce any such evidence. In this regard it should be noted that my
Procedural Order included the following specific question:
"7. When was the site entered, and what were the contents thereof, including disclaimers if any?"
The Complainant did not address this question.
7.10 The Complainant, in its Complaint in this case, says:
"On August 7,2000, Complainant sent a letter to Respondent placing Respondent on notice of his ongoing
trademark infringement and dilution of Complainant's trademarks, and seeking transfer of Respondent's
domain name. Complainant's letter also offered to reimburse Respondent for his out-of-pocket costs in
registering the domain name. (see Annex F). Respondent never responded."
The Complainant says that it relies on that letter to prove the instant case. In the letter it is asserted that
"your registration and ownership of these domain names constitutes trademark infringement, and violates
the newly enacted United States Cyber Piracy Prevention Act of 1999. NIKE hereby requests that you
transfer this name to NIKE immediately"- For this purpose the sender of the letter encloses transfer
documents for signature. The only name, <nikewoman.com>, covered by that letter, was one of those dealt
with in WIPO Case No. 02001-0102, decided March 19,2001, but that letter was not mentioned in the
decision in that case between these same parties. Under the circumstances, it is difficult for this Panel to
conclude that the Respondent in the instant case should have a finding of bad faith use made against it for
not having responded to a much earlier letter about names dealt with in another case.
7.11 The Complainant asserts that its victory in the earlier case, Nike, Inc. v. Crystal International, WIPO
Case No. 02001-0102 should be used against the same Respondent in this case. It has been held that
previous decisions which decide an element favourable to Complainant in the instant case are not
particularly helpful as they will have undoubtedly turned upon the evidence before the deciding Panel. See:
Harrods Limited v. Virtual World Internet, WIPO Case No. 02002-0396. The earlier decision between the
parties to the instant case does not identify the evidence provided by the Complainant in support of bad
faith use sufficiently to be of help here.
7.12 In its Response to the Procedural Order the Complainant says that it did not attempt to contact
Respondent before initiating the UDRP action and provides no evidence that it attempted to view the
web-sites to which the Domain Names in issue resolve but rather merely asserts that:
"Under the current UDRP Rules, Complainant is under no duty to contact Respondent before filing a
UDRP action. Moreover, Complainant believes that its previous letter and the decision in WIPO
02001-0102 provide Respondent sufficient notice that its registration of domain names incorporating
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Complainant's NIKE trademark violates the U.S. Anti-Cyberpiracy Prevention Act ("ACPA"), and infringes
Complainant's rights under numerous international laws."
"... Complainant notes that the ACPA would apply to Respondent regardless of Respondent's nationality.
The ACPA provides an in rem cause of action against the property of the domain name itself. Thus, the
nationality of the domain name's owner is irrelevant."
Other than noting that the letter, in addition to the in rem aspect of ACPA, threatens "significant financial
penalties", and that the Registrar is Canadian, this Panel takes no issue with the Complainant's belief as
expressed above. However, it is not my remit to apply the ACPA nor "numerous international laws". The
jurisdiction of this ,Panel is to be found wholly within the UDRP with the only remedy being a transfer or
cancellation of the Domain Names in respect of which this matter is submitted. In sum, Complainant
appears not to place any meaningful reliance on active use of the Domain Names in question subsequent
to their registration, nor upon passive use as this Panel understands it to be necessary as laid down in
Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Nuclear Marshmallows WIPO Case No. 02000-0003, and other cases which have
followed it
7.13 Para. 4(a)(iii) requires proof that "your domain name ... is being used in bad faith". Without
appropriate evidence of use, either active or passive, this Panel cannot find this element to have been
proved by the Complainant. Speculation based on assertions does not amount to proof, the onus of which
is on the Complainant.
8. Decision
For the foregoing reasons, the Panel decides that the Complainant fails in its request that the Domain
Names <nikepark.com>,<nikepark.net>,<nikemen.com>J <nikegolf.net>, and <nikeshops.com> be
transferred to the Complainant from the Respondent.
Cecil 0.0. Branson, QC
Sole Panelist
Dated: August 2,2002
Addendum
PROCEDURAL ORDER
pursuant to Rule 12 of the WIPO Supplemental Rules
Nike, Inc. v. Crystal International
Case No. 02002-0352
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1. Upon reviewing the Complaint in this case the Panel's initial view was that it ought to be disallowed as
being deficient in its content. A good number of Panels, including this one, have said that an Administrative
Panel must not deal with propositions not asserted. It is for the Complainant to plead the issues and to
support them with some arguments and evidence. Simply stating reasons will not normally be sufficient to
meet the Complainant's burden of proof. More particularly, it has been held by a Panel that the mere
assertion that any use of the Domain Name by another party would likely mislead or deceive the
Complainant's customers, without evidence, is not of much use. With these general admonitions in mind,
this Panel is concerned about the failure of the Complaint to address a number of material facts which
ought to be within its knowledge.
2. It is noted that the sole Complainant in this case is Nike Inc. However, the Complaint and Annexes
thereto shows that the Mexican, French and United Kingdom trademarks mentioned are owned by Nike
Ipternational Ltd., a Bermuda corporation. The Complaint does not disclose any relationship between Nike
International Ltd. and Nike Inc., either generally or specifically regarding any licensing agreements for
trademarks. Generally, in the Complaint, the Complainant whenever it refers to its name states it as being
simply "Niketl • Nowhere is there any explanation of the place of Nike International Ltd. within the corporate
structure, nor is there any mention of licence agreements concerning the use of any trademarks. Nike
International Inc. is not mentioned at all. If the Mexican, French and United Kingdom marks are considered
material by the Complainant, the aforesaid information should have been provided.
3. The Complainant, in its Complaint says as follows:
On August 7, 2000, Complainant sent a letter to Respondent placing Respondent on notice ofhis ongoing
trademark infringement and dilution of Complainant's trademarks, and seeking transfer of Respondent's
domain name. Complainant's letter also offered to reimburse Respondent for his out-of-pocket costs in
registering the domain name. (see Annex F). Respondent never responded.
Here, it should be noted that the Complaint says:
7. All information known to the Complainant regarding how to contact the Respondent is as follows:
Joowan Lee
erystallnternational
RM609 HyoChunB/D SeoChoDong
1425-10 SeoChoKu
Seoul, 137-070 KR
Tel: 822-555-1554
Despite this, in an earlier paragraph, relying on Network Solutions, Inc.'s Whois database, in addition to
the above contact information it is shown that the Respondent can be contacted through an e-mail address
"maxion@maxion.co.kr". The August 7, 2000, letter directed to Joowan Lee has an altogether different
address in Seoul, Korea. This discrepancy is not explained.
4. The August 7,2000, letter refers to a single Domain Name, <nikewoman.com.>. In the letter a belief is
expressed that "your registration and ownership of these domain names [sic] constitutes trademark
infringement, and violates the newly enacted United States Cyber Piracy Prevention Act of 1999. NIKE
hereby requests that you transfer this name to NIKE immediately:' Is it the Complainant's contention that
the United States Cyber Piracy Prevention Act of 1999 applies to a Korean national? If so, why? The
August 7th letter encloses transfer documents for signature. Do those documents include any of the names
under consideration in the case before this Panel, ,i.e., WIPO Case No. 02002-0352, or does it relate only
to the name <nikewoman.com> despite the reference to "these domain names" above?
5. The name <nikewoman.com> was one of those dealt with in WIPO Case No. 02001-0102, the decision
for which was given on March 19, 2001. Is it Complainant's submission that the Respondent in this case
No. 02002-0352 should have a finding of bad faith use made against it for not having responded to the
August 7,2000, letter about another name, particularly given the length of time intervening, and WIPO
Case No. 02001-0102 in which a decision was rendered on March 19,2001, well before the
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6. In light of the above, there are further material facts which should be within the knowledge of the
Complainant which have not yet been disclosed. These include the following:
1. Why were no proceedings taken against the Respondent in 2001 for the four names registered in July
1999, when as the Complainant states that it "has been careful to prevent conflicting uses from emerging"
in regard to its trademark and similar second-level Domains.. The Registrar of most of the names involved
in the 2001 case was the same and at least one of the names before that earlier Panel was registered on
the same day as <nikemen..com> in this case - July 17,1999.
2. There is no evidence of the attempts "to contact Respondent at all available addresses", other than the
August 7,2000, letter? Were they by telephone, email, in-person or by registered mail?
3. Was the Respondent's contact information correct?
4. What were the contents of such communications? Did they require an answer?
5. Why was nothing done between August 7, 2000, and April 9, 2002, the date of filing of the Complaint in
this case?
6. Have any of the names in question been used? If so, when, and for what purpose?
7. When was the site entered, and what were the contents thereof, including disclaimers if any?
8. What attempts were made to ascertain whether Respondent owns other names than those involved in
this case and WIPO Case No. 02001-0102?
9. If so, how many does it own and what are they?
10. It is not clear from Complainant's submission concerning bad faith whether it is relying on anyone or
more of the four stated circumstances of evidence of registration and use in bad faith set out in paragraph
4b of the UDRP, or whether it is relying on other bases on which this Panel is expected to find bad faith
registration and use.
11. The third, and last, paragraph under the Complainant's submission in regard to Respondent's bad faith
reads as follows:
Lastly, Complainant has previously taken action against Respondent to recover domain names
Respondent has appropriated. See Hike, Inc. v. Crystal International, (WIPO Case No.
D2001-0102)(returning domain names nikewomen.com, nikeshop.net, nikeshop.org, nike-shop.com,
nike-shop.net, and inike.net to Complainant.) Respondent has demonstrated a pattern of behavior in
incorporating Complainant's trademarks in its domain names in bad faith.
Is this argument directed to paragraph 4b(ii) of the UDRP? If so, is the Complainant taking the position
that, despite the requirement in paragraph 4a(iii) of proof that the Domain Name has been registered and
is being used in bad faith, that this language should be read disjunctively? What, for instance, if the
Respondent registered the names in question in bad faith but did nothing more?
1. Is the Complainant relying on WIPO Case No. 02001-0102 as a precedent which this Panel ought to
follow, as the parties were the same and the names bore some similarity to those in issue our case? If so,
what was submitted in the Complaint in the earlier case, as the decision- in that case does not spell out the
bases on which bad faith registration and use was argued.
7. As stated above, the preliminary decision of this Panel was to disallow the claim on the basis of
numerous deficiencies in the pleadings. These Complaints are determined on the basis of the evidence the
parties themselves choose to put before the Panel. It is not an inquisitorial system and therefore not for the
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Panel to undertake such a role. See Rengold Resources Limited and Rengold & Exploration Co. Ltd. v.
Pico Capital Corp., WIPO Case No. 02001-1108 and Ascendes Corporation dba MarketTouch v. Market
Touch Limited, WIPO Case No. 02001-1186. In a similar vein, it must be recognized that Complainants,
having the onus of proof upon them, ought to give considered thought to the drafting of the Complaint,
taking into account that there is no right of reply if a Response is filed and, further, that a Response may
not be filed. In the latter case, the Panel must decide on the basis of the record as presented. Yet, in a
case such as this, not to order transfer of the Domain Names in question, has been thought by some to be
too draconian a penalty for bad pleading. I would dissent from this as a general proposition as a
Respondent is entitled to review the Complaint and make a decision based thereon that it need not file a
Response where the case has not been adequately proved. Previous Panels have dealt with these
situations in a number of ways such as a strong criticism of the way in which the case was presented, but
ordering a transfer of the name in any event, or ruling against the Complainant without prejudice to the
Complainant refiling its Complaint with better pleadings and evidence, or as this Panel is inclined to do,
seek better particulars. To go ahead and order transfer of the names in the face of deficient pleadings and
evidence could tarnish the integrity of the process, and encourage others to do so. Nor do I think that
dismissing the case outright, with or without comment with regard to whether a refiled Complaint can be
made would be appropriate. This could delay unnecessarily a final resolution of the matter with the extra
expense of starting afresh without knowing whether the refiled Complaint would be accepted.
8. Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules instruct Panels to "decide a Complaint on the basis of the statements and
documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it
deems applicable". This, in my view, is exemplified by article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law,
sometimes referred to as the "Magna Carta of Arbitration Procedure" which says "The parties shall be
treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case." An equivalent
statement is to be found in virtually all national arbitration laws and the rules of all major international
arbitration institutions including WIPO in article 38(b) of its Arbitration Rules.
9. This Panel therefore orders that the Complainant be given an opportunity to respond both specifically
and generally to the concerns and questions above in writing delivered to the WIPO Center no later than
Tuesday, July 16, 2002. The Respondent will be served with a copy of this document at the same time,
and shall then have until 12 noon GMT on Wednesday, July 24 to file a Response both to the Complaint as
originally filed by the Complainant and to any further supplemental material filed in response to this
Procedural Order. Both filings shall include any exhibits or other documentation necessary to support the
submissions made. The time for the filing of the Panel's decision in this matter will have to be adjusted
accordingly. Exhibits not available in electronic form shall be faxed to the Center, with hard copies to follow
by courier. The Panel will disregard in their entirety any late filed submissions.
10. This Panel will enter into its final consideration of this matter after the time period above has expired
and, barring extenuating circumstances, propose to render a final decision by August 5, 2002.
Cecil 0.0. Branson, QC
Sole Panelist
Dated: July 4, 2002
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ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION
Dell Computer Corporation .v. MTO C.A. and Diabetes Education Long Life
Case No. D2002-0363
1. The Parties
The Complainant is Dell Computer Corporation of One Dell Way, Round Rock, Texas
78682, United States of America.
The Respondents are MTO C.A. of Mariedy #2, P. Fijo, Falcon Estade Falcon,
Venezuela and Diabetes Education Long Life™ - Dell™, a division ofMaster Tee
Occidente C.A. (MTO C.A.) of Edificio Mariedy No.2, Prolongacion (~:alle Progreso,
Esquina Pumarrosa, Punto Fijo, Estado Falcon, Venezuela. '
2. The Domain Name and Registrar
The domain names at issue are:
<bancondell.com>
<dellamerica.com>
<dellaruba.com>
<dellbahamas.com>
<dellbennuda.com>
<dellbraziLcom>
<dellcaribe.com>
<dellcolombia.com>
<dellcuba.com>
<dellearth.com>
<dellengland.com>
<dellfinland.com>
<dellguatemala.com>
<dellindonesia.com>
<dellitaly.com>
<dellmex.com>
<dellna.com>
<dellnicaragua.com>
<delloffers.com>
<dellaboutus.eom>
<dellamericas.com>
<dellaustralia.com>
<dellbelgium.com>
<dellbolivia.com>
<dellca.com>
<dellcentralamerica.com>
<dellcontact.com>
<dellcustomer.com>
<dellecuador.com>
<dellequator.com>
<del1germany.com>
<dellhawaii.com>
<dellinvestors.com>
<delljapan.com>
<dellmexico.com>
<dellnetherlands.com>
<dellnorthamerica.com>
<dellpakistan.com>
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<dellafrica.com>
<dellargentina.com>
<dellaustria.com>
<dellbelize.com>
<dellbrasil.com>
<dellcaribbean.com>
<dellchile.com>
<dellcostarica.com>
<delldenmark.com>
<dellelsalvador.com>
<delleuro.com>
<dellgreece.com>
<dellhongkong.com>
<dellisrael.com>
<dellkuwait.com>
<dellmiddleeast.com>
<dellnewzealand.com>
<dellnorway.com>
<dellpanama.com>
<deIlportugal.com>
<deIIsa.com>
<dellsouthafrica.com>
<dellsweden.com>
<delluae.com>
<delluruguay.com>
<usadell.com>
<delleurope.com>
<dellpuertorico.com>
<dellscotland.com>
<dellsouthamerica.com>
<dellswitzerland.com>
<delluk.com>
<dellvenezuela.com>
<usdell.com>
<dellfrance.com>
<dellrussia.com>
<dellsingapore.com>
<dellspain'lcom>
<delltaiwan.com>
<dellunitedkingdom.co
m>
<dellwww.com>
<dellchina.com>
The Registrar is Tucows.com, Inc., Toronto, Canada.
3. Procedural History
The WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center [the Center] received the Original
Complaint on April 17, 2002 [electronic version] and on April 22, 2002 [hard copy].
On April 23, 2002, the Center transmitted via email notification of Complaint
deficiency. The Center received Amendment (1) to the Complaint on April 23, 2002
[electronic version] and on April 26, 2002 [hard copy]. The Center received
Amendment (2) to the Complaint on May 14, 2002 [electronic version] and on
May 16, 2002 [hard copy]. By Amendment (2) to the Complaint the Complainant
added three further domain names, which were registered by the Respondent after the
date [April 17, 2002] when the Original Complaint was transnlitted to the Center. The
Original Complaint, Amendment (1) to the Complaint and Amendment (2) to the
Complaint are hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Complaint".
The Center verified that the Complaint satisfies the formal requirements of the ICANN
Unifonn Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy [the Policy], the Rules for Unifonn
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy [the Rules], and the WIPO Supplemental
Rules for Unifonn Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy [the Supplemental Rules].
The Complainant made the required payment to the Center.
The fonnal date of the commencement of this administrative proceeding is
April 24, 2002.
On April 22, 2002 the Center transmitted via email to Tucows.com, Inc. a· request for
registrar verification in connection with the eighty domain names at issue in the
Complaint and on the same day Tucows.com, Inc. transmitted by email to the Center
Tucows' verification response confinning that the registrant is Diabetes Education Long
Life - Dell (trademark) and that the contact for administrative, billing and technical
purposes is Dell™ <diabetes@dellwww.com> all of the same address at Estado Falcon,
Venezuela.
On May 23, 2002 the Center transmitted via email toTucows.com. Inc a request for
registrar verification in connection with the additional three domain names at issue in
Amendment (2) to the Complaint and on the same day Tucows.com, Inc transmitted by
email to the Center Tucows' verification response continning that the registrant is
Diabetes Education Long Life - DELL and that the contact for administrative billing
and technical purposes is DELLTM <diabetes@dellwww.com> all of the same address
at Estado Falcon, Venezuela.
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the Rules, the Center transmitted by on April 24, 2002 to Respondent the Notification
of Complaint and Commencement of the Administrative Proceeding. The Center
advised that the Response was due by May 14, 2002. On the same day the Center
transmitted by fax and by mail copies of the foregoing documents to Respondent at the
addresses provided by the Complaint and Tucows.com, Inc.
The Center received the Respondent's Response on May 9, 2002 [electronic version]
and on May 15, 2002 [hard copy]. On May 10, 2002 the Center transmitted
Acknowledgement of Receipt ofResponse to the Respondent and to the Complainant.
Having received on May 15, 2002 Mr. David Perkins' Declaration of Impartiality and
Independence and his Statement of Acceptance, the Center transmitted to the parties a
Notification of Appointment of Administrative Panel and Projected Decision Date, in
which Mr. David Perkins was formally appointed as the Sole Panelist. The Projected
Decision Date was June 11, 2002. The Sole Panelist finds that the Administrative
Panel was properly constituted and appointed in accordance with the Rules and the
Supplemental Rules.
On May 23, 2002 the Panel issued a Procedural Order admitting Amendment (2) to the
Complaint and providing the Respondent with an opportunity to submit a supplemental
Response by May 27, 2002, such Response to be limited to the issues raised in
Amendment (2) to the Complaint. On May 28, 2002 the Respondent duly filed a
Supplemental Response.
Having verified the communication records in the case file, the Administrative Panel
finds that the Center has discharged its responsibility under para. 2(a) of the Rules "to
employ reasonably available means calculated to achieve actual notice to
Respondents". Therefore, the Administrative Panel shall issue its Decision based upon
the Complaint, Amendment (1) to the Complaint, Amendment (2) to the Complaint, the
Response, the Supplemental Response, the Policy, the Rules and the and tIle
Supplemental Rules.
4. Factual background
4.1 The Complai"ant's Business
The Complainant was founded in 1984. It is the world's largest direct seller of
computer systems. In its fiscal year [February 1, 2001 to January 31,2002] it had
revenues of approximately US$31.2 billion.
4.2 The Complainallt's DELL trademark
4.2.1 The Complainant began using the name and mark DELL as a tradename,
trademark and service mark in 1987. The Complainant is the proprietor of
more than 30 US trademark registrations and applications containing the mark
DELL. Copies of the following are annexed to the Complaint:
Country Registration Mark Class(es) Application!
No. Registration Dates
USA 1,498,470 DELL 9 Filed: December 9, 1987
Registered:
August 2, 1986
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Registered:
October 9, 1990
USA 1,860,272 DELL 9 Filed: February 27, 1992
(Stylised) Registered:
October 25, 1994
USA 2,236,785 DELL 40 Filed: March 19, 1998
Registered: April 6, 1999
USA 2,390,851 WWW.DEL 9 Filed: August 26, 1998
L.COM* Registered:
October 3, 2000
*The WWW.DELL.COM mark was first used in commerce in December 1997.
4.2.2 In addition, the Complainant uses a family ofmarks combining DELL with
another component. These include but are not limited to:
Country Registration Mark Class(es) Application!
No. Re2istration Dates
USA 2,030,084 DELL 9 Filed: January II, 1996
DIMENSIO Registered:
N January 14, 1997
USA 2,284,782 DELL 9 Filed: March 5, 1998
PRECISION Registered
October 12, 1999
USA 2,333,902 DELL 42 Filed: August 13, 1997
FINANCIAL Registered:
SERVICES
•
March 21, 2000
4.2.3 The DELL mark and variations of it are also registered by the Complainant in
more than 130 countries around the world.
4.2.4 In the Respondent's country, Venezuela, the Complainant sells products and
owns a number of trademark registrations for DELL for use in relation to
computer products and services. These include:
Registration Number
P-208279
P-208280
P-208281
P-208284
P-175192
P-217855
S-13926
N-41282
Mark
DELL
DELL
DELL
DELL
DELL (stylised)
WWW.DELL.COM
WWW.DELL.COM
WWW.DELL.COM
4.2.5 The Complainant extensively advertises and promotes its trademarks,
products, services and image. During the 2001 fiscal year alone, the
Complainant spent over US$431 million in advertising and promotion. The
Complainant states that as a result of these activities and of its business, the
DELL mark has become an asset of incalculable value to the Corporation.
4.3 The Complainant's Internet Business
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<dellcomputers.com>
<dellfoundation.org>
The Complainant conducts business on the Internet through numerous DELL
domain names. The earliest of these, <dell.com>, was registered on November
22, 1988. By the end of the fiscal year 2000 [February I, 2000 to January I,
2001] online internet sales by the Complainant accounted for almost 50% of
its revenue and averaged US$40 million per day. The domain names used by
the Complainant include:
<dell.com> <e-del1.com>
<delldirect.com> <dellnet.com>
<dell rowser.com> <dellfactory.com>
<dell webpc.com > <dellhost.com>
<dell auction.com> <dell auctions.com>
<dellplus.com> <deI14me.com>
<dellexchange.com> <dellpoweredge.com>
<dell precision.com> <dell attitude.com>
<delldimension.com> <dellselectcare.com>
4.4 Complainant's Patronage ofdiabetes
The Complainant believes that medical education about diseases, including
diabetes, is an important and worthy cause. The Complainant is a supporter of
the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation's annual walk to cure diabetes.
Over 1500 of the Complainant's employees, including the corporation's
founder [Michael Dell] and its President [Kevin Rollins], participated in the
2001 Austin Walk for the cure, raising over US$130K in that one event.
4.5 The Respo"dents
4.5.1 The Respondents are represented by Glen McShand of Naples, Florida. He is
the President and founder ofMaster Tec Corporation - also of Naples, Florida
- which is described in the Response as;
"... a very well known engineering firm that serves the petroleum and mining
industry worldwide."
Master Tec Occidente C.A. [MTO C.A.] of Venezuela is described as a sister
company of Master Tec Corporation. The Response states:
"Master Tec Corporation and Master Tec Occidente C.A. have hundreds of
trademarks well known by the Petroleum, Mining, Aerospace, Government,
Health, Medical and general industry"."
4.5.2 In February 1999 ''DeII™ Diabetes Education Long Life™'' was founded as a
Division ofMTO C.A. The parties involved were America Tec Corporation:
Tec Corporation: Master Tec Corporation [all of the USA]; MTO C.A. [of
Venezuela] and Mr. McShand. The Response explains that in August 1995
Mr. McShand's infant son, Ian (21 months old), was diagnosed with Type I
diabetes. Mr. McShand and his wife started to help other families struck with
that disease through education, support and counselling. It appears that the
concept behind the Respondent organization is to provide assistance
worldwide to diabetes suffers and/or their families.
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The original registrant of the domain name in issue, BANCONDELL.COM,
was AZTEC ofNaples, Florida. The Original Complaint was filed on April
17, 2002. The next day [April 18, 2002] all 80 domain names were transferred
from MTO C.A. to Diabetes Education Long Life - DELL (Trademark), which
is now the effective Respondent in this administrative action. The additional 3
domain names in issue - identified in Amendment (2) to the Complaint - were
registered by the Diabetes Education Long Life - DELL.
5. The Parties' Contentions
5.1 The Complainant's Case
5.1.1 The Complainant's case is that the domain names in issue are identical or
confusingly similar to its DELL and DELL family of trademarks and service
marks, that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interest in respect of
those domain names, and that such domain names were registered and are
being used in bad faith.
5.1.2 The Complainant states that it first became aware of the domain names in issue
through a domain name Watch Report, the first in January 2002 which
identified 62 of the domain names and the second in March 2002 which
identified the remaining 18 domain names. After filing the Original
Complaint [on April 8, 2002], the Complainant became aware of 3 additional
registrations, namely:
<dellfrance.com>; and <dellchina.com> registered April 20, 2001 and
<delleurope.com>
registered May 1, 2002 and these were added in Amendment (2) to the
Complaint.
5.1.3 The Complaint exhibits the following inter partes correspondence with the
Respondents:
February 12, 2002: The Complainant's attorneys addressed a cease and desist
. letter to Mr. McShand in relation to 62 domain names [identified in their
January 2002 domain names Watch Report] and 4 of the 5 US registered
trademarks [referred to in paragraphs 4.2.1 above].
February 19, 2002: The Complaint exhibits an affidavit from
Jennifer Brockmeyer relating to two conversations with Mr. McShand on that
date. Ms Brockmeyer is a project assistant with the Complainant's attorneys
[Jones Day Reavis & Pogue ofColumbus, Ohio]. Her testimony is as follows:
Mr. McShand stated that his active website, <www.dellwww.com>, was
used for diabetes education.
Mr. McShand stated, that although the domain names were not for sale,
the Complainant could make an offer and he would discuss any such
offer with his partners.
Mr. McShand said that if the Complainant persisted with threats or legal
action, he would post on his websites the fact that Dell Computer
Corporation was trying to shut down a children's diabetes website.
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Mr. Dreitler [of the Jones Day Finn] and Mr. McShand when the latter
stated that his intention was to make money from the 62 sites
complained of in the cease and desist letter.
The Complaint also exhibits an affidavit from Mr. Dreitler, which refers
to a follow-up conversation which he had later the same day with
Mr. McShand. His testimony is as follows:
Mr. McShand stated that he would not transfer the 62 domain names in
issue to the Complainant.
Mr. McShand said he was entitled to use DELL as his worldwide
domain name. There was, therefore, no need for him to use a domain
name incorporating the word diabetes.
When asked ifhe was putting so much work into the domain names with
no expectation ofmaking money, Mr. McShand replied:
"Ofcourse I intend to use them to make money"
Mr. McShand volunteered that he now had more than 80 DELL domain
names.
February 20, 2002: email to Jones Day from Mr. McShand in response to the
cease and desist letter of February 12. The salient points of that letter are:
"Dell" is a generic word. It's dictionary definition means "A small, secluded,
wooded valley."
Many hundreds of companies are doing business under names which
include the word "dell". For example, dell purse book, dell crossword
puzzles etc.
The Complainant has no entitlement to claim exclusive ownership of the
word "dell".
The Respondent is not in the business ofnlanufacturing computers.
DELL is an acronym for "Diabetes Education Long Life".
The Respondent's web pages are directed to US citizens suffering from
or concerned with diabetes. As his audience expanded to other
countries, he would register DELL with the TLD for each country.
The domain names were not for sale.
The letter then reads in the final paragraph:
"If your client is interested in my domains, he or his representatives should
approach me in a better way. I am always open to help."
5.1.4 The Respondent's <dellwww.com> website
The front page of this website is exhibited to the Complaint. It is captioned:
"Children with Diabetes Type I
The Dell or wooded valley is fragile like our children. Education is key for
long life."
The web page then gives a'synopsis of Mr. McShand's story ofhis son's illness
[see, paragraph 4.5.2 above] under the caption.
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"Ian's Story"
Then under another caption
"Our DELL Sites"
the web page lists over 60 of the DELL prefixed domain names in issue in the
Complaint.
5.1.5 Of these, the only active domain name is <deILwww.com>.This. the
Complaint says, should be compared to the Complainant's own
<www.dell.com> website registered on November 22,1988 [see, paragraph
4.3 above]. First, addition of the suffix www does not distinguish that domain
name in issue from the Complainant's DELL trademark. Second, it is clearly
intended to trap those wishing to visit the Complainant's website but who
mistakenly type the www after DELL instead ofbefore it. This is
characterized as typo-piracy, the Complaint referring to the following
decisions under the Policy.
NIKE, Inc .v. Alex Nike, WIPO Case No. D2001-1115. In that case the domain
name in issue was <wwwnike.com>. No response was filed. The Panel stated
that it had:
"... no hesitation in accepting the Complainant's submission that the only
distinctive element ofthe Domain Name is the very well known mark NIKE,
the Complainant's trade mark. The addition of the letters "www" as a prefix in
the context of a domain name is wholly non-distinctive.... 'The Domain
Name is undoubtedly confusingly similar to the trademark NIKE. tI
World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc. v. Matthew Bessette, WIPO
Case No. D2000-0256. The domain names in issue were <www.wwf.com>
and <www.stonecold.com>. No Response was filed. Finding for the
Complainant, the Panel stated:
"Respondent's Domain Names each differs from Complainant's domain names
by a single character, a period between th"e common third level domain,
"www", and the second level domain name. The Panel agrees with the
Complainant's assertion that Respondent is a "typo-pirate" who attempts to
mislead Internet users who mistakenly omit the period between "www" and
the second level domain name. Cybersquatters commonly register domain
names such as the ones at issue, in order to take advantage ofand profit from
the unavoidable fact that typographical errors occur."
5.1.6 Further, the Complainant states that none of the domain names in issue relate,
exfacie, to diabetes or education. The Complaint exhibits, for example, an
available domain name which is appropriately descriptive of the Respondent's
asserted aims, namely:
<diabeteseducation.net>.
Where circumstances such as this prevail, it is an indication ofbad faith intent
in registering the confusingly similar trademark. Here, the Complaint cites:
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Cir. 2001).This is a decision of the US Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit.
The domain name in issue was vw.net, which Volkswagen said constituted a
bad faith intent to profit from the famous VW trademark. At the time Virtual
Works Inc registered the domain name in issue, available alternative domain
names more closely describing its business were available, these included:
<vwi.net>: <vwi.org>: ><irtualworks.net>: and <virtualworks.org>.
The Appeal Court upheld the District Court's decision granting summary
judgment to Volkswagen, the Court citing as an indicia ofbad faith intent
under the 1999 Anticybersquattering Consumer Protection Act [ACPA] the
availability of <vwi.net> and .org at the time Virtual Worlds Inc registered
<vw.net>.
5.1.7 February 21, 2002: following receipt ofMr. McShand's email dated
February 20, 2002 [paragraph 5.1.3 above], Mr. Dreitler replied by email
advising him that, although the Complainant had hoped to resolve the dispute
infonnally~ his cybersquatting activities would result in the matter being dealt
with at "... a more fonnal forum".
5.1.8 February 21, 2002: later that day Mr. McShand replied by email reiterating
his position that the Complainant could not:
"... claim exclusive ownership in the entire planet, all services and/or goods
with the generic word dell."
The Complaint states that, adopting Mr. McShand's theory, it would not be
possible to obtain registered trademarks in dictionary words such as "coke";
"deltan ; "sprite"; "ivory" etc. En passant, the Panel would observe that
Mr. McShand did not in his email of February 20, 2002 appear to deny the
Complainant's rights in the DELL trademark for computers and computer
related goods and services but was saying that the Complainant could not
assert rights in that trademark over other non-computer related services, such
as the Respondent's educative website for diabetes sufferers and those
involved with diabetes sufferers. That said, the Complainant points to the fact
that the Policy does not require a Complainant to demonstrate exclusive rights
to a trademark for each and every good and service.
5.1.9. April 12, 2002: Mr. McShand implemented the threat made in his
conversation on February 19,2002 with Ms Brockmeyer [see, paragraph 5.1.3
above] that he would draw the dispute to the attention ofcomputer magazines.
There is exhibited to the Complaint an article entitled "Dispute over Dell
Domains".
April 18, 2002: the Respondent sent an email to the Complainant in, inter alia,
the following tenns:
"Your company Dell Computer Corporation must stop harassing our business.
Your actions are going to oblige us to take further actions. We will
communicate this issue to all news and editors around the globe. It
5.1.10 Identical or Confusingly Similar
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confused with the Complainant's family of DELL trademarks and domain
names. All those domain names contain the DELL trademark combined with
generic tenns or the name of a country where the Complainant carries on
business under or by reference to the DELL name and mark. Of the 54
separate country names - only counting duplicates like <dellmex.com> and
<dellmexico.com> once and not counting non-country specific domain names
like <dellsouthamerica.com> - the Complainant carries on business or directly
sells its products in 49 of those 54 countries.
5.1.11 As to the Respondent's <dellwww.com> domain name, the Complainant's case
is that it is to all intents and purposes identical [see, paragraph 5.1.5 above].
5.1.12 In support of its case that domain names comprising a trademark with a
generic tenn have been held to be confusingly similar with the Complainant's
trademark, the Complainant refers to the following cases under the Policy.
Brown & Bigelow Inc. v. Site Ads. Inc. NAF Case No. FAOO 11000096127,
where the domain name in issue, <hoylecasino.com>, was found to be
confusingly similar to the Complainant's HOYLE trademark. The Panel
referring to The Body Shop International PLC .v. CPIC Net and Syed Hussain,
WIPO Case No. D2000-1214 and Space Imaging, AF0298 cases [separately
summarized below], the latter as authority for the proposition that a
combination of the Complainant's mark with a generic term that has an
obvious relationship to the Complainant's business gives rise to confusing
similarity.
The Body Shop International PLC .v. ePIC Net and ~vedHussain, WIPO Case
No. D2000-1214, where the domain name in issue, <bodyshopdigital.com>
was found to be confusingly similar to the Complainant's well-known THE
BODY SHOP name and mark.
5.1.13 In support of its case that a domain name comprised of the Complainant's
trademark followed by country designations has been held to be confusingly
similar, the Complainant refers to the following cases.
America Online, Inc. v. Asia On-Line This Domain for Sale~ NAF Case No.
FA0004000094636, where the domain names in issue included <ao-
laustralia.com>; <ao-Ichina.com>; <ao-Ieurope.com>; <ao-lhonkong.com> etc
were found to be confusingly similar with the Complainant's well-known AOL
name and trademark.
Bloomberg L.P..v. Sein MD., NAF Case No. FAOIOI000096487, where the
domain names in issue, <bloombergchina.com> and <bloombergjapan.com>
were held to be confusingly similar with the Complaint's BLOOMBERG name
and trademark, the Panel stating:
"The mere addition of a geographic identifier does not render the distinctive
trademark BLOOMBERG diminished, nor does an addition of the words
CHINA and JAPAN controvert the ownership of trademark or service mark
rights in the Complainant."
5.1.14 Rights or Legitimate Interests
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Respondent registered the 83 DELL domain names in issue without any
legitimate right or interest in respect of them. Specifically, there is no
evidence of the Respondent's use, or demonstrable preparations to use 82 of
the 83 domain names in issue. As to the only domain name in issue in use,
namely <dellwww.com>. it purports to be a "strained acronym" for "Diabetes
Education Long Life". There is no rational connection between the DELL
trademark and a site devoted to diabetes education. This is the more so when
other domain names that contain the word "diabetes" are available for
registration [see, paragraph 5.1.6 above]. Further, neither Mr. McShand nor
MTO C.A. are commonly known as DELL. Put shortly, the domain names in
issue are not being used in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or
services. They were registered by the Respondent long afterDELL had
become a famous trademark of the Complainant and with full knowledge of
the Complainant's superior and prior rights in the DELL trademark.
5.1.15 Registered and Used in Bad Faith
Here, the Complainant points, as evidence ofbad faith, to transfer of80 of the
domain names from MTO C.A. to the Respondent shortly after [April 18,
2002] first being contacted by the Complainant's attorneys [the cease and
desist letter dated February 12, 2002] - see, paragraphs 4.5.3 and 5.1.3 above
respectively]. The Complainant asserts that Mr. McShand took this step to
transfer the domain names away from the United State to Venezuela being
"... apparently insecure in his stated beliefs that he had an absolute right to
own the domains ... .,.
5.1.16 The Complainant points as further evidence of bad faith to the April 2002
Press Release by Mr. McShand [see, paragraph 5.1.9 above] in which he;
identifies himself as the owner of the disputed domain names, making no
mention ofMTO C.A.; and
tried to muddy the Complainant's name in connection with this dispute.
5.1.17 As other bad faith evidence, the Complainant states that the address provided
by MTO C.A. was incomplete and the telephone number provided in
Wisconsin is not a working telephone number, which it characterizes as
"willful omissions .... to keep from being located by legitimate trademark
owners."
5.1.18 Finally, the Respondent's attempt to hide behind a worthy cause so as to be
paid by the Complainant for the domain names in issue is nothing less than
extortion, the Respondent clearly banking on the Complainant not wanting to
risk adverse publicity.
April 18, 2002: the Respondent sent an email to the Complainant in, inter alia,
the following tenns:
"Your company Dell Computer Corporation must stop harassing our business.
Your actions are goi~g to oblige us to take further actions. We will
communicate this issue to all news and editors around the globe."
5.2 The Respondents Case
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5.2.1 Identical or Confusingly Similar
As foreshadowed in Mr. McShand's email dated February 20, 2002 [paragraph
5.1.3 above], the crux of the Respondents' case is as follows:
The word "Dell" is a generic word meaning "a small, secluded, wooded
valley". As such it is available for anyone to use provided that such use
does not conflict with prior use by a business for the same goods and
services.
There are many other registered trademarks in the United State and in
other countries also for the word DELL and for marks including the
word DELL which do not belong to the Complainant.
Because the Complainant and the Respondents are engaged in very
different activities, use by the Respondents of the domain names in issue
for its diabetes education project cannot give rise to any
misrepresentation or confusion in relation to the Complainant's goods or
activities.
5.2.2 The Response then lists the following US and EC Community registered
trademarks and trademark applications for DELL and for marks in which
DELL is a component, none of which belong to the Complainant. [Where the
Class(es) and registration dates are not shown in the table, it is because such
infonnation is not provided in the Response.]
Country Registration Mark and Proprietor Registration
No. Class(es) Date
United 681,510 DELL ... Random House July 7, 1959
States Inc
United 532.275 DELL Dell Publishing October 24, 1947
States CROSSWOR Company Inc
D PUZZLES
16
United 676,728 DELL Dell Publishing April 7, 1959
States CROSSWOR Company Inc
DANNUAL
31
United 779,077 DELL PURSE Dell Publishing October 27, 1964
States BOOK ... Company Inc
United 792,637 THE Fanner in the July 13, 1965
States FARMER IN Dell [ofNeenah,
THE DELL Wisconsin]
...
United App. No. FARM IN Farm in the Dell ...
States 76376273 THE DELL International Inc
43 [of Mountain]
United 1,111,026 MrDELL 29 Mr Dell Foods January 9, 19??
States Inc
United 1,224,455 SUNNY Southland January 18, 1982
States DELL 32· Corporation
United 2,357,754 DELL LAND Jacob Joseph ...
States ... Dell
United App. No. DELL LAND Jacob Joseph ...
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- - -
-
No. Class(es) Date
States 78107555 41 Dell [of Seguin
Texas]
United App.No. SUSAN Susan Dell Inc ...
States 76283960 DELL 25 [of Austin,
Texas]
United App. No. SUSAN Susan Dell Inc ...
States 76284277 DELL 25
United 1,762,728 VAN DELL Park Lane April 6, 1993
States 14 Associates Inc
United 1,818,586 ALP AND Roth Kase USA January 25, 1994
States DELL 42 Ltd
United 1,773,774 ALP and Roth Kase USA May 25, 1993
States DELL 29 Ltd
United 1,827,104 DELL's Dell's Secret March 23, 1994
States SECRET Garden Inc [of
GARDEN 1 Albany,
Georgia]
United 1,862,895 DELL Dellco Inc [of November 15,
States RHEA's Illinois] 1994
CHICKEN
BASKET 42
United 2,482,604 DELL- Dell-Comm Inc August 28, 2001
States COMM . 9 [ 0 f Minnesota]
United App. No. DELLCOMM Dell- ...
States 75186301 37 &42 Comm Inc
United 2,089,203 BLUE DELL Northwest August 19, 1997
States 29 Packing Co [of
Vancouver]
United 2,288,289 ROCCA ... ...
States DELL'ULIVE
TO ...
United 2,158,291 SIGILLO ... ...
States DELL'ARTE
...
United 2,206,921 MOUNTAIN Mountain Craft ...
States DELL ... Inc
United 2,457,353 THE DELL Dell Enterprises ...
States ... Inc [of
Nebraska]
United 2,461,824 DUNDEE Dell Enterprises ...
States DELL ... Inc
United App. No. FARMER IN Hasbro Inc ...
States 76234415 THE DELL
28
United App. No. THE DELL The Skill ...
States 76240735 GROUP 35 Bureau Inc [of
Boston]
United 1,932,995 GUERNSEY Guernsey Dell November 7,
States DELL 11 Inc [of Chicago] 1995
United 2,017,988 DELLWOOD Dellwood November 19,
States ... Financial 1996
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- - -
No. ' Class(es) Date
Services
Company [of
Minneapolis]
United 2,079,798 THE O'DELL O'Dell July 15, 1997
States GROUP ....
United App.No. DELL'ARTE Arthur Newman ...
States 76374207 CHOCOLAT
ECAFE ...
United 2,474,604 DELLS City of ...
States RNER Wisconsin Dells
DISTRICT ...
United 2,503,474 DELLS City of ...
States RIVER Wisconsin Dells
DISTRICT ...
United 1,929,736 DELLS BOAT Dels Boat Co ...
States TRIP ... Inc
EC 166,058 DELL 16 Random House April 1, 1996
Community Inc
EC 1,411,801 DELL 16 Random House September 19,
Community Inc 1997
Ee 1,475,929 DELLd. 30 Kerry Group pIc ...
Community
EC 1,390,157 DELL'OLMO Ratti S.p.A. ...
Community 24
EC 1,552,477 'DELLS 29 Largo Food August 4, 1995
Community Exports Ltd
EC 2,045,500 DELL uao Dellugo Ltd September 20,
Community 29&30 1994
Ee 1,163,781 DELLORTO Dell'Orto S.p.A. ...
Community 12
EC 1,163,780 DELLORTO Dell'Orto S.p.A ...
Community 7
5.2.3 The Response also lists companies which have the name / mark DELL or
include it as a component in their business names.
Corporation I Business Activities Date of First Use
Dell Corporation [of Speciality contracting firm 1972
Rockville, MD]
O'Dell Engineering Inc [of Land Development Projects 1983
Modesto, CA]
Dell Services Inc [of Service Centre for home pre 1977
Michigan] electronics and computers
Dell Quay Sailing Club Sailing Club ...
5.2.4 The Response. lists domain names that use or incorporate the mark DELL.
Domain Name Registrant Business [where stated)
<dellcorp.com> Dell Corporation [of Speciality Contracting
Rockville, MD] firm
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<dellspace.com> Rackspace Ltd [of San
Antonio, Texas]
<delltech.com> Dell Tech Laboratories
Ltd [of Ontario, Canada]
<deillab.com> Michael Richardson [of
Chesapeake, VA]
<dellsex.com> Unused Domain [ofNew
Orleans]
<dellfamilty.com> Nick Dell [of Los
Angeles]
<mzdells.com> Mr. Dell Foods Inc Processed potatoes
<dellphannacy.com> Dell Pharmacy [of
Ontario, Canada]
<odellengineering.com> O'Dell Engineering Inc Land development
projects
<highlanddell.com> Dell Schaefer P.A. [of Attorneys
Hollywood, FL]
<dellscentral.com> Wisconsin Dells Central
<dellman.com> Larry Mile [of Wisconsin]
<deIIservice.com> Dell Service Inc Service center for home
electronics and
computers
<deIIsbank.com> Bank of Wisconsin Dells
<dellstar.com> Dell Star Technologies Video and surveillance
Inc [of Tulsa] systems
<wisconsindells.com> Family Fun in the
Wisconsin Dells
<dellboy.com> Jason Conway [of
Middlesex, United
Kingdom]
<dellsleatherworks.com> Dells Leather Works
<dellink.com> Mun Young Gu [of Seoul,
Korea]
<riodel1.com> City of Rio Dell,
California
<thendell.com> Dells on Anderson Island
Vacation Rental
<seversondells.org> Severson Dells Non profit Nature
Reserve &
Environmental Education
& Research Facility
<dellscoupons.com> Wisconsin Dells
<dellalpe.com> Dell Alpe Italian Foods
<dellschamber.com> Wisconsin Dells Chamber
ofCommerce
<jeuniferodell.org> Jennifer O'Dell Actress
<design-dell.com> Dell Point Technologies Manufacturers ofgas and
Inc fire wood pellet stoves
<delliran.com> Delliran Company [of
Tehran]
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-<dellmedia.com> DigitaLive.com [of Los
Angeles]
<dellonline.com> Andrew Dell [of
Westminster, CAl
<wisdells.com> Wisconsin Dell Visitors &
Convention Bureau
<dellarteoperaensemble.org Dell'Arte Opera Ensemble
>
<wdell.com> Walton Dell's Website
<dellbrothers.com> Dell Brothers Fonnal Clothing
<westfallodell.com> Westfall O'Dell Motors
<dellgames.com> Talkshop Ltd [of Dublin,
Ireland]
<delldigital.com> Superfly Inc [of Stockton,
CAl
<dellphoto.com> Dell Photography
Incorporation [ofAtlanta,
GA]
<dellsonline.com> Wisconsin Dells Hotel
<delltrack.com> Eric Simpson (of Walnut
Creek, CAl
<dells-inn.com> Rodeway Inn
<dellus.com> Laurent Dellus [of Illinois]
<dellme.com> Mercabe Continental SA
de CV [of Monterrey,
Mexico]
<dellcustomerservice.com> Interwise Inc, doing
business as
Itsyourdomain.com
<dellbank.com> DigitaLive.com [of Los
Angeles]
<dellengineering.com> Dell Engineering P.A. [of
Bayville, NJ]
<dellglonbaLcom> S Hadi [of Los Angeles]
<dellhome.com> Internet Hosting [of
Montreal, Canada]
<dellbusiness.com> Internet Hosting [of
Montreal, Canada]
<dellenglish.com> Dell International English International Infonnation
[of Beijing, PRC] Technology
<dellnetwork.com> Jong-Hyun Lee [of Korea]
<dellwireless.com> Centrade Corp
<dellcom.com> Shin-Webxist Hyun [of
Korea]
<dellcompany.com> Boukhaili Hamdaoui [of
Paris, France]
<delldisk.com> Kyu Lee
<doctordell.com> BulkRegister.com
<deIII.com> Raphael Afilalo [of St.
Laurent, Canada]
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-<eurodeILcom> Meta Domains.com [of
Birmingham, ALl
5.2.5 The Response cites the following uses of the generic word "Dell":
Several companies in the United Kingdom.
Several companies in Switzerland.
12 registered trademarks in Austria.
WIPO's Madrid Express database contains "30 records with the generic word
DELL".
Various businesses and individuals in addition to those listed in paragraphs
5.2.2 to 5.2.4 above, including:
Dell Tech Laboratories Ltd:
Dell Road Gospel Church:
Dell'Osso Fanns:
Various departments of Rio Dell City:
Law Office ofSusan Dell:
Casa Dell Angolo:
<Salon dell area.com>;
<widells.com>;
<dellarte.com>;
<dellwilliams.com>;
>olivedellranch.conl>:
Bruce Dell La",," Finll:
Compagnia DellOlio, United States of America:
Dell & Schaefer [Attorneys];
<dellhouse.co.uk>:
John Odell Emergency Operation Centers; and
Judith Chaffee's Commedia Page [<commedia-dell-arte.com>]
5.2.6 The Response asserts that the above examples comprise only a sample of the
very many uses of the word DELL by individuals, companies and
organizations other than the- Complainant. For example,
there are many more companies and individuals using the word DELL as
their trademark or service mark in other countries;
in the United States alone there are over 100 attorneys with the surname
DELL;
DEL [Spanish] and DELL [Italian] mean "from". So, in Italy there are
very many businesses whose names incorporate DELL. In Spanish,
using the prefix DEL with a word beginning with the letter L will
produce a phonetic "dell"; for example Del Lago [from the lake].
5.2.7 In the light of the forgoing, the Respondent's case is that the Complainant
cannot assert its DELL trademarks - which are registered in relation to
computer goods and services - to prevent use of the word / mark DELL in
respect ofquite disparate activities such as diabetes education or diabetes
supplies. It follows, the Respondent says, that the domain names in issue
cannot be confusingly similar to the Complainant's DELL trademark.
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5.2.8 Rights or Legitimate [,.terests
Here the Respondent's case is as follows. First, before being put on notice of
this dispute [by the cease & desist letter dated February 12, 2002 - see,
paragraph 5.1.3 above] the Respondent had been using the DELL acronym for
its diabetes education etc activities [i.e. February 1999 - see, paragraph 4.5.2
above]. This use was bonafide since it bore no relation to the Complainant's
use of the DELL mark for its wholly disparate business and because, as
demonstrated in paragraphs 5.2.1 to 5.2.7 above, DELL is generally used in
business by very many other individuals and companies and DELL and/or
marks incorporating DELL are registered by proprietors other than the
Complainants for different goods and services.
5.2.9 Even though the Respondent has no registered trademark rights in DELL, it is
known by the domain name <dell.www.com> [see, paragraphs 5.1.3 and 5.1.4
above]. The Response states:
"The Respondent's Business Operations, Communications, Customer Support,
Customer Services, Sales, Purchasing, Accounting etc are done mainly by use
of the Internet. The Respondent's Business rely on the Internet. The
Respondent created the business with the purpose to run it exclusively from
the Internet. It
5.2.10 Registered and Used in bad Faith
The Respondent's case is as follows. The other domain names in issue, which
are not as yet used, were registered so as to secure all the domains needed for
the Respondent's business plan alld strategies. The Respondent describes its
strategy as being to build:
"... several web pages and interconnect them with hyperlinks. Also to point
all the remaining domain's URL to the main URL that is
http://www.dellwww.com. By this way the search engines will direct our
customers to our main page or to any other direction decided by our Strategy
Department."
The Respondent describes its Business Plan as being:
"... to secure all countries, cities and states or words needed for their global
expansion."
The Response explains that it is necessary to have the TLD .com for each
country, so that residents of each country can readily reach the main website.
For example, a person in France searching for the Respondent website need
only type DELLFRANCE and with a .com suffix the search engine will direct
that person to that main website.
5.2.11 This, the Response says, is precisely how the Complainant uses its domain
names. For example, <dellcomputers.com>; <delldirect.com>;
<dellbrowser.com>; <dellfactory.com>; <dellplus.com>; <dellwebpc.com>;
<deI14me.com>; <dellexchange.com>; <dellpoweredge.com>;
<dellprecision.com>; <delldimension.com> and <dellselectcare.com> [see,
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<delI.com>.
5.2.12 Further, the fact that prior to notice of this dispute [in February 2002] the
Respondent's domain names in issue - other than <dellwww.com> - were
neither active nor linked to <dellwww.com> is not an indication ofbad faith
registration and use. The Complainant too has domain names, for example
<delliaptop.com>; <dellnews.com>; <dellhelp.com>; <delldvd.com>;
<delltips.com>; <dellhostings.com>; <delltv.com>; <dellorders.com>;
<dellfinance.com>; and <dellparts.com> which are neither active nor linked to
another of the Complainant's websites.
5.2.13 The Respondent did not register or acquire the domain names in issue
primarily for the purpose ofselling them to the Complainant for consideration
in excess of its costs directly related to those domain names. Mr. McShand
made it clear in his telephone conversations on February 19, 2002 [see,
paragraph 5.1.3 above] that the domain names were not for sale.
Mr. McShand goes on to say in the Response that, in reply to questions from
Ms Brockmeyer / Mr. Dreitler asking if he was willing to sell or accept an
offer for those domains, he stated
"If you want to make us an offer, that is up to you. I already told you that our
business has no intention ofselling its trademarks or domains. Do whatever
you wish. Any communication will be discussed by our directors."
5.2.14 The Response concludes in the following tenns:
"The Respondent registered the domains and is using them in the best faith,
best values and best belief. The Respondent's mission is not only to make a
profit. The Respondent's mission is to give the best service, the best product,
and the best education in diabetes. And as a consequence of all this, there is a
profit left. A profit that will be used to serve even better the Respondent's
customers or anyone in the need."
5.3 Other cases under the Policy involving the Complainant's DELL trademark
5.3.1 These are not cited in the Complaint or the Response. In WIPO Case No.
D2001-0285, Panni Phull of Valencia, Spain had registered <dellonline.net>
and <dellonline.org>. No Response'was filed. From the Decision it seems
clear that the Respondent had engaged in a pattern of conduct of registering
domain names incorporating the famous trade marks of third parties. The
Complaint was upheld [Decision dated April 11, 2001].
5.3.2 In WIPO Case No. D2001-0361 Logo Excellence ofHouston, Texas [the alter
ego ofMr. Bryron Hoffmann] had registered 10 domain names incorporating
the DELL mark. For example, <dellpower.com> and <dellconnect.com>.
That Complaint was also upheld [Decision dated May 7, 2001].
5.3.3 WIPO Case No. D2000-0659 involved 9 domain names incorporating the
DELL mark registered by Got Domain Names for Sale. These included
<dellpalm.com>, .net and .org; <dellwireless.net> etc. As in WIPO Case No.
D2001-0285, the Respondent here had registered numerous other domain
names incorporating the trademarks of various entities, such as CNN, Bell
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August 15,2000].
5.3.4 The most notorious of these cases, WIPO Case No. D2000-1087, was decided
on November 17, 2000. It concerned 122 DELL domain names including
<dellcomputersystem.com>; <dellinsurance.com>; <dell-mobile.com>;
<dellservices.com> etc registered by Alex and Birgitta Ewaldsson ofSweden.
No Response was filed. Again the Respondents were found to have registered
numerous other domain names incorporating the trademarks ofother parties,
including the Swedish Company, TELIA and others including PHILIPS:
SIEMENS: IKEA: BENTLEY and JAGUAR. The Complaint was upheld.
5.3.5 The Panel has cited these cases under the Policy, since all of the domain names
in issue in this administrative proceeding were registered subsequent to the
Decisions in those cases. The registration by AZTEC was on
December 29, 2001, the registrations by MTO CA were variously made on
December 3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 16 and 31, 2001 and on February 20, 2002, and
the registrations by Diabetes Education Long Life - DELL - on April 20 and
May I, 2002. It is to be noted that the Respondent's only active website
<dellwww.com> was registered by MTO CA on December 14,2001, the
Respondent Diabetes Education Long Life - DELL having been fomled in
February 1999.
6. Discussion and Findings
6.1 The Policy paragraph 4(a) provides that the Complainant mllst prove each of
the following:
(i) that the Respondent's domain name is identical or confusingly similar to
a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; and
(ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the
domain name; and
(iii) the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
6.2 Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy identifies circumstances which, in particular, but
without limitation, if found by the Panel to be proved based- on its evaluation
of all the evidence presented, shall demonstrate the Respondent's rights or
legitimate interests for the purpose ofparagraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy.
6.3 Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out circumstances which, if found by the
Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use ofa domain
name in bad faith.
6.4 Identical or Confusingly Similar
6.4.1 The Panel finds the domain name <dellwww.com> to all intents and purposes
identical to the Complainantts DELL trademark.
6.4.2 The remaining 82 domain names fall into two categories. The majority
comprises the prefix DELL with the suffix being the name ofa country (for
example, <dellbraziLcom», the name ofa geographical area [for example,
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[for example, <deIlmex.com> and <dellcaribe.com>]. These total 74 domain
names. To them should be added 2 further domain names where the country
abbreviation precedes the DELL mark, namely <usadell.com> and
<usdelI.com>. They are what will be tenned DELL country / geographical
domain names in issue and total 76 domain names in all.
6.4.3 There are then 6 domain names where the DELL mark is used with a generic
word or words. These are <dellaboutus.com>; <dellcontact.com>;
<dellcustomer.com>; <delloffers.com>; <dellinvestors.com> and
<bancondeILcom>. They will be tenned the DELL generic domain names.
6.4.4 As to the 76 DELL country / geographical domain names in issue, the Panel
considers that the America Online, Inc. v. Asia On-Line This Domain for Sale,
NAF Case No. FA0004000094636 and the Bloomberg L.P. .v. Sein MD., NAF
Case No. FAOIOI000096487cases [see, paragraph 5.1.13 above] were
correctly decided.
6.4.5 As to the 6 DELL generic domain names in issue, the Panel also regards them
as confusingly similar to the DELL trademark and family of trademarks. The
Panel refers in this respect not only to the cases under the Policy cited by the
Complainant [see, paragraph 5.1.12 above] but also to the Decisions under the
Policy involving the Complainant's DELL trademarks [see, paragraph 5.3
above].
6.5 Rights or Legitimate Interests
6.5.1 The nub of the Respondent's case, boiled down to its essentials, is that the
Complainant's DELL trademark and family of trademarks are relevant only to
its computer goods and services. It is abundantly clear that there are DELL
registered trademarks for other goods and services, that many individuals and
companies do business under the DELL name or a name incorporating DELL,
so why in relation to a diabetes education website should the Respondent not
be free to use the acronym DELL [Diabetes Education Long Life] for its
DELL country / geographic domain names? The rationale for registering those
domain names is explained in paragraph 5.2.10 above.
6.5.2. The Policy is, however, concerned with whether on the facts of a particular
dispute the Respondent can demonstrate rights to or legitimate interests in the
domain name in issue. In this case, the DELL trademark is well known
internationally in the context of the Complainant and its products. Searches of
national trademark databases, such as the TESS US Patent and Trademark
Office database referred to in the Response, will reveal the extent of the
Complainantts registered rights in the DELL trademark and family of
trademarks. In addition, cases decided under the Policy - such as the earlier
DELL cases noted in paragraph 5.3 above - are readily accessible from the
Centerts website and were so accessible in December 2001 when the earliest of
the domain names in issue were registered. There is, therefore, no question of
the Respondent being taken by surprise in relation to the existence of the
Complainant and its DELL trademarks and the way in which those trademarks
have been used in earlier cases under the Policy.
6.5.3 The Respondent Diabetes Education Long Life - DELL was fonned in
February 1999 [see, paragraph 4.5.2 above]. Its business is ttdone mainly by
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<dellwww.com> [see, paragraph 5.1.5 above] and that domain name was not
registered until December 14, 2001 [see, paragraph 5.3.5 above]. So the actual
use made of that domain name in issue pre dates by less than 2 months the
Complainant's cease and desist letter of February 12, 2002 [see, paragraphs
5.1.2 and 5.1.3 above]. As to the Respondent's preparations to use that domain
name and the other 82 domain names in issue the Response is silent, except to
explain its strategy to direct them to the main website at <dellwww.com> [see,
paragraph 5.2.10 above].
6.5.4 The question is whether such use or intended use can be said to be in
connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. In that connection,
there is - as the Complaint says - no rational connection between the DELL
trademark and a site devoted to diabetes education. The natural domain name
for such a site would be to include the word "diabetes", not a strained
acronym. The Panel is persuaded by the Complainant's case in this respect and
by the Decision of the US Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit under the
ACPA [see, paragraph 5.1.6 above].
6.5.5 Further, the Respondent's description of its existing business and future
business is not, in the Panel's view, convincing. The Response refers to the
Respondent's "Business Operations, Communications, Customer Support,
Customer Services, Sales, Purchasing, Account etc" but no examples of any of
these activities are given [see, paragraph 5.2.9 above]. If the Respondent is, as
the Response claims, using the domain names in issue
"... in the best faith, best values and best belief'
it is strange that no concrete examples ofsuch use are provided.
6.5.6 In short, the Panel concludes that - on the evidence before it - the Respondent
has not demonstrated circumstances within paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy. As
to paragraph 4(c)(ii), there is no evidence either that the Respondent business
has been commonly known by any of the domain names in issue. Of the 83
domain names., only one has been used in relation to an active website and
then only since mid December 2001 at the earliest [see, paragraph 6.5.3
above].
6.5.7 The Panel does not read the Response as advancing a case under paragraph
4(c)(iii) of the Policy but, in any event, the evidence does not - in the Panel's
view - support such a case.
6.5.8 As to the 6 DELL generic domain names [see, paragraph 6.4.3 above] none
have, in the Panel's view, the remotest connection with the stated aims of
Mr. McShand, with the possible exception of<dellabout.us>. The others are
suited to a commercial enterprise - for example, <dellinvestors.com> - not a
website dedicated to the education and help of diabetes sufferers and their
carers. As to <dellaboutus.com>, in the context of the domain names as a
whole and in the light of the Respondent's strategy [see, paragraph 5.2 10
above] the Panel concludes that the Respondent cannot demonstrate rights or
legitimate interests in that domain name or in the other 82 domain names in
issue. The Complaint, therefore, succeeds in satisfying paragraph 4(a)(ii) of
the Policy.
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6.6.1 Having been put on notice of the Complainant's rights [the cease and desist
letter of February 12, 2002 - paragraph 5.1.3 above], the Respondent continued
to register more DELL country / geographical names subsequently. On
February 20, 2002 some 13 such domain names [including, for example,
<dellportugal.com> etc] were registered, followed by 2 in April 2002 and I in
May 2002 [see, paragraph 5.1.2 above].
6.6.2 Did the Respondent register the domain names in issue [between December
2001 and May 2002] primarily for the purpose of selling them to the
Complainant for valuable consideration in excess of the costs directly related
to those names? The Respondent denies that he did and that the domain names
are for sale. However, the Respondent is prepared to consider an offer from
the Complainant to purchase those domain names [see, paragraph 5.2.13],
which is hardly consistent with the philanthropic aims of the Respondent to
educate and support diabetes sufferers. Further, the Respondent could not
have been unaware of the Complainant and its well known DELL trademark.
Trademark searches would quickly have given the Respondent an idea of the
extent of the Complainant's DELL and DELL family trademark registrations.
A WHOIS search would, similarly, have revealed the extent of the
Complainant's DELL domain name registrations. Further, in the context of
the Respondent's warranties and representations in its Registration Agreements
with the Registrar, it would have been prudent to check the Center's website
and that of the National Arbitration Federation [NAF] for any existing cases
under the Policy relating to the Complainant's DELL trademark. Finally, there
is the Respondent's conduct after being put on notice of the Complainant's case
in February 2002 [see, paragraph 6.6.1 above].
6.6.3 Although there is no evidence of any pattern of conduct by the Respondent of
registering as domain names trademarks ofeither parties~ in the Panel's view
the weight of evidence points to conduct falling within paragraph 4(b)(i) of the
Policy. But, even if that is incorrect~ the Panel is not bound by the
circumstances set out in paragraph 4(b) of the Policy [see, paragraph 6.3
above] and is entitled to look at all the circumstances presented in the
Complaint and the Response. While the aims of Mr. McShand and his wife to
assist diabetes sufferers and their carers are acknowledged, the acronym DELL
is just too strained to be believable and it is just not credible that using the
corporate and brand name of the world's largest direct seller ofcomputer
systems is appropriate to bring such sufferers to a diabetes help site.
6.6.4 In all the circumstances, the Panel finds that the Complainant has made out its
case under paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy.
7. Decision
For all the foregoing reasons, the Panel decides that the 83 domain names in issue
[listed in paragraph 2 above] are identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant~s
DELL trademark and family of trademarks, that the Respondent has no rights or
legitimate interests in respect of those domain names and that they have been registered
and are being used by the Respondent in bad faith. Accordingly, the Panel directs that
registration of the 83 domain names in issue be transferred to the Complainant.
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David Perkins
Sole Panelist
Dated: July 5, 2002
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